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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR QE 
CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY COLLEGE NURSING FACULTIES 
IN RESPONSE TO BUDGET CUTBACKS. 1982-198?
This study explored the political behavior of community college nursing faculties 
during a unique period of California history, 1982-87, when the community colleges 
were struggling to adapt to the economic and political consequences of Proposition 13.
Using a two-phase qualitative design, it examined the effects of budget cutbacks 
on the nursing programs at 38 community colleges statewide, including twelve targeted 
for faculty layoffs, and identified the political behavior of their nursing faculties in 
response. It then focused on six districts, varying in size, structure, and location, for a 
series of in-depth case studies. In four districts, nursing programs were targeted for 
closure or downsizing; in two, they were not. Surveys, telephone interviews, and 
document review were the primary research tools.
The results showed that most faculties accommodated to across-the-board 
cutbacks, but opposed and resisted selective termination, generally regarded as a crisis 
situation. One political benefit of accommodating was that little new behavior was 
required and faculties could remain focused on their primary value, clinical teachings. 
Efforts to alter college budget policy, on the other hand, required a level of governance 
participation to which few faculties were willing to commit, absent a crisis. The faculties 
targeted for layoffs orchestrated anti-termination campaigns to prevent the enactment or 
reduce the scope of the policy proposed.
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To those charged with responsibility for public welfare, political action to 
influence public policy is a subject of considerable theoretical and practical importance. 
Although the development of public policy normally takes a slow, plodding, incremental 
course (Lindblom, 1980), occasionally environmental variables converge to produce a 
public crisis necessitating rapid policy change. Such a crisis occurred in 1982-84, as 
California struggled with economic recession. Actions taken by state officials to deal with 
a substantial shortfall in state revenue resulted in the drastic reduction of funds for 
community colleges. This, in turn, initiated a political battle over community college 
finance and, in some districts, a spiral of institutional fiscal decline. The impact of this 
chain of events was felt in all aspects of the community college system, including the 
many areas of vocational instruction. The focus of this study is the political behavior of 
community college faculty in one vocational area, nursing, in response to statewide events 
and the local consequences of financial turbulence.
Statement of the Problem 
Because of a combination of circumstances created by state economic conditions
I
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and the revision of California tax laws, California faced a genuine fiscal crisis in early 
1982, which in turn led to an unprecedented political situation for the California 
community colleges (Director's Report, 1982, September; Commission Report 1983, 
June). Having depleted a huge budget surplus in the bail-out of public agencies after 
Proposition-13, the California state government under the administration of Governor 
Jerry Brown was forced to take drastic measures in order to avoid a budget deficit. These 
included massive cuts to public programs.
One such reduction was a $30 million cut in the state's allocation to the 
community colleges which came as the result of a political compromise. In order to 
forestall the imposition of student fees on a system traditionally tuition-free, the 
community colleges agreed to eliminate hundreds of avocational and recreational courses 
from their state-funded curriculum (San Diego Union. July 17, 1982). With the passage 
of Proposition 13, the community college system had become the fifth largest item in the 
state budget. State officials, concerned about the escalating expense of the system, 
sought ways to reduce that expense. One avenue was to impose student tuition as way of 
raising revenue. The compromise worked out by the legislature under recommendations 
from the California Post-Secondary Education Commission (CPEC) forestalled tuition-a 
policy unpopular with educators and many legislators (Director's Report, 1982, June- 
July).
Unfortunately, the situation worsened the following year, 1983. The recession 
failed to lift, and the state was forced to carry over a $ 1.5 billion dollar budget deficit 
from the previous fiscal year. In order to balance the budget without a general tax 
increase, the newly elected governor, George Deukmejian, among other actions, reduced 
community college funds budgeted for 1982-83, and then reopened the issue of tuition by 
vetoing $231,968,000, or 10.8%, of community college revenue, from the 1983-84 
California Budget Act (Callan, 1983; Hayward, 1983).
That action led to a prolonged political struggle at the state level, one lasting the
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better part of a year. The central focus of the debate was the governor's proposal to 
generate new revenue by levying a $100 per semester tuition fee policy (Director’s 
Report, March-April, 1983). Considered extremely controversial by its opponents, 
Deukmejian's proposal cut to the philosophic heart of state education policy which for 
years had maximized citizen access to post-secondary education. The proposal initiated a 
very emotional debate over the merits of tuition and resulted in a long and bitter political 
stalemate between the governor, and the Democrats in the state assembly who were 
backed by several professional organizations and other interest groups (Los Angeles 
Times. October 11, 1983).
By early 1984, a turnaround in the state economy made it possible to expand the 
state budget for 1984-85. Based on predictions of $3 billion in extra revenue, 
Deukmejian increased state spending by 10.8%, and raised allocations for education (San 
Diego Union. January 10, 1984). Projected increases for higher education were 
sufficient to restore community college base funds and fund other priorities such as the 
important inflation, equalization, and growth funding provisions of SB 851, unfunded 
since their enactment (Director's Report, July, 1984).
Reflecting the optimism accompanying improved conditions, state officials finally 
reached a political compromise on the issue of tuition. That compromise, formalized in 
AB 470 (Campbell), Chapter 3 (1984), and AB 1XX (Katz), Chapter 1 Second 
Extraordinary Session (1984), called for an immediate restoration of $96 million in base 
funds in return for the enactment of a $50 per semester student fee (Klass, 1984). With 
the restoration of funds, the economic crisis in the community college system abated.
The resolution was not without an aftermath, however. Actions taken to deal with 
the economic turbulence caused by the acute crisis brought additional economic 
difficulties after the compromise was reached. Many schools, for instance, limited 
enrollment as a way of cutting expenditures, which in turn resulted in a reduction of 
average daily attendance (ADA), the units for calculating district revenue allotments
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(Hayward, 1983). Official reports, in fact, documented a systemwide decline in ADA of 
over 100,000 students (Los Angeles Times. January 4, 1984). Tuition opponents argued 
that ADA decline was a predictable effect of the student fees levied under the compromise, 
and predicted that student enrollment would continue to shrink. Indeed, in the context of 
an uncertain future, the actual ADA losses initiated a spiral of fiscal decline in many 
districts. Real and projected budget deficits, in turn, caused a serious economic challenge 
to instructional programs and jobs (Los Angeles Times. September 22, 1984).
Given such conditions, it is understandable that administrators in many districts 
would undertake program evaluations and efficiency and productivity assessments with 
the aim of reducing expenditures. Indeed, verbal reports indicated that expensive allied 
health programs such as registered nursing came under scrutiny for their peculiarly low 
student-faculty ratios, ratios which made them particularly expensive to run (personal 
communication, numerous Southern California Community College nursing program 
directors, October-November, 1983). As colleges and districts set their priorities, some 
nursing programs were targeted for cutbacks not always shared by other instructional 
units. Many were forced to reduce operating expenses, while others made curriculum 
changes or cut faculty and enrollment.
The focus of this study is the response of nursing faculty members to those 
circumstances. Aware of the administrative peculiarities of their programs, nursing 
faculties could easily have anticipated cutbacks and taken action to secure their interests. 
Nurses have a reputation for political apathy, however, a fact confirmed by the 
professional literature in nursing which exhorts nurses to overcome their political inertia 
and take an active role in public policy. Reputations often lag behind reality, however, 
and subgroups may diverge from population norms. Whether or not apathy characterized 
the faculty teaching in community college nursing programs between 1982 and 1987, the 
years of severe community college economic crisis and aftermath, is a key issue that bears 
investigation.
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Objectives of the Study
Archer and Goehner (1982) suggested that political action involves participating in 
the democratic process for goal-oriented, cooperative problem solving by which the 
action-taker stands up for his or her values and attempts to influence those with power to 
vote for desired policy outcomes.
Archer and Goehner’s views mirror the perspective of Wirt and FCirst (1982) on 
politics in educational systems. Wirt and Kirst emphasized that the essence of a political 
act is the struggle of a group to secure authoritative support for its values. Archer and 
Goehner’s views are also faithful to Mazzoni's definition of politics. Mazzoni (1980) 
defined politics as an allocation process under which competing individuals and groups 
seek decision benefits through the exercise of influence.
Activities aimed at influencing public officials, referred to as lobbying, are an 
important form of political behavior. This study examined the lobbying and other political 
behavior of community college nursing faculties in response to funding policy changes 
stemming from resource decline. Its purpose was to aid a better understanding of the 
political behavior of nurses.
The primary objectives of this study were to determine:
1. How and to what extent nursing faculty members on behalf of their own 
interests acted to influence policies proposed in campus and state legislative arenas as a 
response to the community college fiscal decline, 1982-87.
2. What factors influenced the patterns of political behavior exhibited by nursing 
faculty members.
3. The impact of nursing faculty political behavior on policy decisions pertaining 
to nursing programs.
The secondary objectives of this study were to determine:
4. How and to what extent the patterns of political behavior of nursing faculty
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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compared to those of nonnursing faculty in the same community colleges subject to the 
same budget cuts.
5. How and to what extent the patterns of political behavior varied among 
community college nursing faculties.
Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework for this study is derived from three sets of abstract 
ideas. The first set relates to resource change, its impact on organizational decision 
making, and the resultant adaptations that occur through administrative action. The 
second set relates to factors that shape the interpretation of organizational changes by 
constituency groups and the development of social crisis. The third set elucidates factors 
that shape the political responses of constituency groups.
Resource Change. Organization J>ecision Structure and Administrative Strategy
The first part of the framework deals with the responses of institutions to resource 
change. It consists of a model of cutback management developed by Levine, Rubin, and 
Wolohojian (1981) in the early 1970s for the study of municipal fiscal crises. Modified 
for academic organizations, this model was subsequently used by Sibolski (1984) in a 
study of higher education.
As presented in Figure 1, the model suggests that resource change has an impact 
on an institution's organizational decision structure that, in turn, determines the choices of 
administrative strategies appropriate for dealing with resource change. Levine et al. 
emphasized that severe revenue decline often forces the employment of fiscal control 
strategies which then alter institutional climate by fostering a realignment of formal and 
informal authority. By changing power relationships within and outside of an
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organization, such a realignment often acts as a constraint on administrative discretion in 
selecting approaches to retrenchment
Resource Decline Organization Decision 
Structure
Administrative Strategy
Factors in resource decline; 
revenue losses, inflation, 
asset devaluation
Politicization of decision 
making under conditions of 
resource decline; Severity of 
decline stimulates 
constituency group activity
Options for cutback 
management weighed; 
Uncertainty fosters conflict; 
original tactics altered
Figure 1. Model of the impact of resource decline. Adapted from Levine, Rubin, and 
Wolohojian, 1981, pp. 26-32.
Retrenchment and Crisis in Organizations
The second part of the framework amplifies these ideas by looking at resource 
decline from an organizational crisis perspective. In particular, it deals with variables in 
the perception of crisis. Billings, Milbum, and Schaalman (1980) elaborated a model of 
organizational crisis that included the factors displayed in Figure 2.
Discrepancy between Belief that time is Lack of a contingency
expected and available + insufficient to research + plan for dealing with the 
resources result in threat alternative situation
to important values______________________________________________________
Figure 2. Organizational crisis perspective. Adapted from Billings, Milbum, and 
Schaalman, 1980, p. 306.
Threat to important values which results from perceived resource discrepancy is 
the salient and most fundamental aspect of the model (Milbum, 1972; Paige, 1972; 
Robinson, 1972; Simon, 1977).
Billings et al. (1980) emphasized that once a discrepancy is perceived, the
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seriousness of the problem is judged according to the factors identified in Figure 3.
Perceived value of loss Probability the loss will Time pressure imposed 
_______________________ +_________ occur_________ +_____ for the reaction
Figure 3. Factors in degree of crisis. Adapted from Billings, Milbum, and Schaalman, 
1980, pp. 307-308.
Although crisis does not accompany all retrenchment, targeted cuts, for example, 
tenured faculty layoffs and the termination of programs, lead to a particularly volatile 
cutback climate that is associated with crisis (Deutsch, 1983; Kerlin and Dunlap, 1993; 
Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian, 1981; Powers, 1982).
Crisis, perceived or real, often results in conflict among the individuals and 
groups in organizations (Hermann, 1963). Cyert (1978) noted that organizational 
cutbacks create an emphasis on survival that fosters conflict over and above the level 
usually experienced under stable budget circumstances. Hall and Mansfield (1971) 
reported that financial decline in organizations increases personal stress and self-serving 
behavior and reduces concern by individuals and groups for the organization as a whole.
Retrenchment and Political Behavior
The third part of the conceptual framework deals with additional social and 
symbolic factors that shape a constituency group's response to institutional decline. 
Authorities agree that resource allocation in schools and other public institutions is a 
political process, particularly under conditions of scarcity (Cyert and March, 1963; Dahl 
and Lindblom, 1976; Gumport, 1993, May-June; Krantz, 1988; Levine, Rubin, and 
Wolohojian, 1981; March and Simon, 1958; Slaughter, 1993; Wanat, 1978; Wildavsky, 
1984; Wiles, Wiles, and Bondi, 1981; Wirt, 1975; Wirt and Kirst, 1982).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9
Budgeting, often described as a technical function, can therefore also be viewed as 
a process of institutional priority setting, a political process, the outcome of which is 
determined by the power relationships within and outside of an organization. Thus, the 
relative power of an organization's constituency groups is often reflected in the allocations 
made to subunits (Gumport, 1993, May-June; Wanat, 1978; Wildavsky, 1984). This 
view represents the movement away from the rational model toward a political model of 
organizational decision making.
Although budgeting is a constant feature of organizational life, interest in 
organizational politics is not (Cohen and March, 1974). At any given time, participation 
in politics is determined by important factors. Interest may be activated by dramatic 
institutional conditions (Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian, 1981), and particularly by 
issues with important symbolic meaning (Edelman, 1967). Interest is frequently a 
consequence of scarcity since scarcity creates struggles for the allocation of resources 
within an organization (Easton, 1971; Gumport, 1993, May-June).
Interest in politics is also a consequence of factors that shape political behavior. 
Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985) identified two broad categories affecting individual 
behavior, personal factors and environmental factors. These factors converge to shape a 
perception of justice that is the driving force of political behavior.
Personal factors lie within the individual and include the individual motives, 
values, attitudes, and perceptions of others and of the organization and its structures and 
functions that distinguish one individual from another.
Environmental factors are the factors beyond the individual that are shared with 
others. One important environmental factor is the social context in which an individual 
functions on a daily basis. According to Verba (1961), the primary group (small, face-to- 
face group), by fostering group consciousness (shared opinions, attitudes, values), has a 
powerful influence on the individual. The primary group is instrumental in the 
mobilization of political behavior because such groups are the locus of political decision
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making in an organization as well as the transmission points for political communications. 
Thus, they exercise a major influence on the political beliefs and attitudes of group 
members. In school settings, a primary group may be a faculty, a group of students, 
clerical personnel, or a group of trustees or administrators-any small constituency bound 
together by issues or interests.
Summary of Conceptual Framework
It is clear that the ideas of this conceptual framework overlap. To summarize and 
integrate the three major aspects, it can be said that the first part of the framework outlines 
the essential organizational aspects of resource decline, while the second and third 
develop the psychosocial aspects more specifically related to political behavior. Taken as 
a whole, the framework stipulates that institutions (including educational institutions) 
function as political systems. In any context, resource decline creates a need for fiscal 
control; however, control is difficult to achieve within a political system. Control 
strategies such as plans for expenditure cutbacks tend to activate the political 
constituencies they affect The degree to which these constituencies mobilize depends on 
the psychosocial variables-crisis perception and group consciousness as they reflect the 
interaction of individual and environmental factors—all of which influence a collective 
perception of justice. Subsequent efforts by constituency groups to influence those in 
authority or to alter the balance of power on behalf of their own interests, often bring 
them into conflict with institutional officials, and, in turn, the actions of these groups 
make retrenchment plans more difficult or impossible to achieve, thus determining 
politically the outcome of resource decline.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
Scope, Limits, and Limitations
This study explores the factors described above using a combination of survey, 
case study, and document review research methods. First, it looks at the dimensions of 
resource decline experienced by the California community colleges, the impact statewide 
on nursing programs, and the patterns of political behavior employed by nursing 
faculties. Then, using a case study approach, it describes the specific situations in six 
districts selected for size, location, and approach to retrenchment. The examination of 
institutional cases puts a focus on the perceptions of resource decline held by nursing 
faculty members and the perceived effects that resource decline has on individual and 
group values and goals.
The study also looks at the symbolic issues raised by retrenchment, and the ideas 
and causal theories shared by members about their situation, and the effect those had on 
group behavior; it looks at the faculty group in each case, and its structure and history as 
those bore on the behavior of members; it considers the institutional supports for and 
barriers to lobbying activities; and, finally, it looks at the role of group leaders in 
mobilizing, organizing, and directing members' actions. All of these aspects are relevant 
to the research objectives of this study.
A wide-angle perspective such as this demands an eclectic model of political 
behavior. The one employed in this study blends the following political theories:
1. Game Theory asserts that politics is a game, but one that vitally affects 
groups and individuals with serious players, rules, goals, and scores (Brams, 1975; 
Kuhn and Tuckers, 1953; Rapoport, 1966).
2. Exchange Theory explains political behavior as a series of exchanges in 
which a player trades support for influence (Blau, 1964; Harsanyi, 1962).
3. P luralist Theory emphasizes that interest groups are a basic feature of 
organization life and conflict is a key element of interaction (Dahl, 1961).
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4. Political Elitist Theory postulates that power rests in the hands of a few 
who occupy top positions in institutional hierarchies (Wright, 1956) and finally,
5. Conflict Theory contends that the exertion of control in institutional affairs 
is a source of political conflict subgroups' divergent preferences for the allocation of 
scarce resources (Kalisch and Kalisch 1982).
While its scope is broad, this study does have limits. It makes no attempt, for 
example, to assess the political behavior of nursing faculty unrelated to economic crisis in 
the community college system. Aspects such as personal political philosophy, party 
affiliations, voting patterns, electoral campaign activities unrelated to the institution, 
general political preferences, or any political behavior outside of the interests of the 
faculty group or its program as affected by resource decline are beyond the scope of this 
research.
It should be noted that this study is both exploratory and descriptive. It is an 
initial attempt to investigate the complex factors in the political behavior of a subgroup of 
nurses. It employs a qualitative methodology that is well-suited to identifying broad 
relationships, but not to the computation of exact tallies needed for quantifying subjects' 
responses. A particularly important limitation characteristic of qualitative studies is that of 
subjects' variable use of language and the difficulties this sometimes creates in 
interpreting responses; another is the difficulty in controlling the array of factors that 
affect survey and interview responses. (Miles and Huberman, 1984, May) The findings, 
therefore, should help point a direction for further research, but are limited in their 
generalizability and their applicability to particular settings until validated by future 
studies.
Assumptions
This study makes the following assumptions:
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1. A representative democracy by its nature requires an exchange of values and 
influence by its participants.
2. Community colleges as public agencies are political systems with many of the 
features of a representative democracy and a structure and process akin to that of the 
larger political system.
3. Faculty and other groups in a community college comprise political
constituencies and participate formally and informally in the exchange of values and 
influence that is part of setting institutional policy.
4. Community college resources are linked to the interests of college
constituencies.
5. Community college faculty understand their role as participants in a
representative democracy.
6. Nursing educators comprise a faculty subunit which holds interests in common 
with the college organization and the general faculty constituency.
While this study concentrates on the patterns of behavior exhibited by nursing 
faculties in response to resource decline, the researcher makes no assumptions about the 
character of those patterns. This study thus provides a test of theory in educational policy 
making.
Definition of Terms
Political behavior/political action/lobbying. These terms as used in this 
study refer to any behavior of individuals or groups that is aimed at influencing 
authoritative decisions in public institutions.
Economic decline/fiscal dow nturn. These terms refer to deteriorating 
economic conditions, whatever the cause, as they affect public agencies, including 
community colleges.
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Revenue reduction/income decline. These terms refer to reductions in 
revenue from public sources available for the support of public programs such as higher 
education.
Financial cutbacks/expenditure reductions/cost-cutting. These terms 
refer to official reduction in operating budgets necessitated by the loss of institutional 
revenue that sometimes leads to retrenchment of public programs or services.
Educational retrenchment. This term refers to cutbacks in instructional 
programs, services, workforce, or enrollment by an educational institution. 
Retrenchment can be achieved by managing the same programs, student number, or 
services with fewer personnel, supplies or both-or by narrowing the scope of the 
curriculum and services while making accompanying reductions in enrollment and 
personnel.
Suggested retrenchment / proposed retrenchment /  enacted 
retrenchment. Suggested retrenchment is the condition that exists when officials have 
made informal statements about the need to retrench but no official announcement of 
intention to retrench. Proposed retrenchment is the condition that exists after officials 
have made an official announcement of their intention to retrench but have not approved a 
definitive action plan. Enacted retrenchment refers to the state that exists after a 
retrenchment plan is officially approved and implemented.
Significance of the Problem
Given that educational institutions operate as small political systems within the 
community and the larger sphere of state government, an understanding of the actions of 
college constituencies to achieve favorable educational policy decisions is important to 
those who manage educational institutions (Wiles, Wiles, and Bondi, 1981; Wirt and 
Kirst, 1982), particularly in today’s climate of public sector retrenchment. This study
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bears on the factors that promote political behavior in an institutional context.
Further, the nursing professionals who serve as the faculty for community college 
nursing programs comprise a particularly important group. Approximately 55% of the 
labor force in nursing is educated in community college nursing programs (Waters, 
1986). Thus, these teaching professionals are the initial role models and political 
socializes for the majority of nurses educated in the United States. They are, therefore, 
in a position to influence the oudook of most of those who enter the profession.
Nurses generally, however, are noted for their enduring ambivalence toward 
politics and political engagement (Archer and Goehner, 1982; Bagwell, 1980; Berger and 
Hunter, 1984; Cowart, 1977; Hayes and Fritsch, 1988; Hughes and Proulx, 1979; 
McDermott, 1987; Schultz, 1983; Wakefield, 1990). Ambivalence is a characteristic 
which several authorities have described as an outcome of political socialization (Archer 
and Goehner, 1982; Kalisch and Kalisch, 1982). As potential political socializes, the 
political behavior of community college nusing educates is important to undestand— 
especially now as the nation faces the highly political task of health care reform. This 
study contributes to the goal of undestanding nuses' political behavior by examining, in 
this historical instance, whether California community college nusing educates, under 
conditions that significantly challenged nursing programs, were moved to lobby district 
and state officials for policies serving their interests.




This chapter reviews selected literature corresponding to the ideas introduced in 
Chapter I. After an introductory section on the California community colleges, there are 
sections on the Levine et al. (1981) model of cutback management, on retrenchment and 
crisis in organizations, and on retrenchment as it affects political behavior.
The California Community College System
Understanding the effects of resource change on the community college system 
requires a general understanding of how the system developed, and how it is structured 
and financed.
Development of the California Community Colleges
The California community colleges began as an extension of secondary education 
and much about their organization reflects those beginnings. Post-high school courses— 
the courses for grades 13 and 14—were first authorized by the California state legislature 
in 1907, and, in 1910, the Fresno, CA Board of Education established the state's first
16
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two-year college program. In 1921, the state legislature approved the creation of separate 
local community college districts but continued its authorization of junior college 
departments within K-12 districts. The number of campuses increased rapidly in the 
1950s, and in the 1960s, colleges began to cut their ties to secondary systems; separation 
was largely complete in the early 1970s (Weiler, Izu, Nelson, Pratt, Schoenhair, and 
Stem, 1985).
Because of their origins in the secondary system, the community colleges from the 
beginning were unlike the other institutions of public higher education in the state. 
Indeed, the very ideas driving their development set the community colleges apart Those 
ideas included (1) a belief that higher education should be available close to home (hence, 
the construction of local district colleges), and (2) that classes should be open to all high 
school graduates at no cost to students (hence, a no-tuition policy) (Commission for the 
Review of the Master Plan for Higher Education, March, 1986).
Popular with the public, the community colleges expanded rapidly, particularly as 
the baby boom generation arrived in the 1960s. They continued to grow in size and 
number through most of the 1970s by offering educational opportunities to segments of 
the population not previously included in the scheme of higher education. By the focal 
period of this study, in fact, the California community college system had become a huge 
enterprise, encompassing 106 campuses in 70 local districts, and serving more than 1.2 
million students with an annual budget of $1.5 billion (Savage, 1986), out of an overall 
state budget of $21.3 billion (Driscoll, 1984).
The original mission of the community colleges was to prepare students for 
transfer to four-year institutions or for entry level positions in a variety of occupations. 
The system gradually took on a far broader mission, however, as it expanded in the 
1960s. Referred to as the “comprehensive community college,” this new vision expanded 
the scope of college offerings to include not only traditional college courses, but also 
remedial education courses, civic, cultural, and general education courses, community
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services, and basic adult education courses on a wide array of subjects (Director’s Report, 
October- November, 1983).
Eundin£-Qf California-Community Colleges
Because of their origin in secondary education, the community colleges have 
distinct similarities to the public high schools in their funding mechanism. Indeed, during 
the years of this study, community college districts used the average daily attendance 
(ADA) as a workload measure for the computation of local district allocations, the same 
measure used for public high schools. Although that system was subsequently changed, 
ADA being augmented by additional workload measures (AB 1725, Vasconcellos, 1988), 
it contrasted at the time with the funding approaches used for the state universities and the 
University of California. Those approaches were (and are) the line item budget and block 
grant mechanisms. Although the UC and CSU systems also use workload formulas in 
constructing their budgets, unlike the community colleges, they did not then and do not 
now rely on any singular measure of input or output to establish their revenue. More 
importantly, the community colleges, similar to the K-12 districts, received and still 
receive a part of their revenue from local property taxes, although the proportion for most 
districts was decreased from over 50% to under 30% by Proposition 13. The state 
universities and the University of California do not share directly in this latter source of 
funding (League of Women Voters, 1986).
California Community College Governance
Prior to Proposition 13, the governance of community colleges showed striking 
similarities to that of the K-12 districts in that policy control was substantially in the hands 
of locally elected boards of education. That pattern, which evolved from the system of
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property tax financing (League of Women Voters, 1986), gave local community college 
boards the authority to set property tax rates for generating college revenues, as well as to 
adopt local budgets and set local education policy (Weiler et al., 1985).
However, in 1978 the passage of the tax-limitation initiative substantially altered 
that system by limiting the incremental rise in property tax rates, permanently 
withdrawing the prerogative of local trustees to adjust district property taxes as college 
needs required. The chief funding source for local districts thus shifted from property 
taxes to the state general fund.
Not surprisingly, doubtful forecasts about the future of local control followed, 
and, indeed, important changes in state-local power relationships occurred. As Gooder 
(1984) noted, local trustees lost their control over revenue, but retained control over 
expenditures.
Authorities agree that power shifted from local boards to the state government 
with the change in funding (Gooder, 1984; Savage, 1986). The system of strong local 
boards with weak state coordination gave way to a new system that valued accountability 
over access and diversification (Gooder, 1984). Before Proposition 13, state legislators 
showed little interest in local budgets or local spending priorities, but as the state assumed 
greater responsibility for meeting local obligations, state policy makers paid increasing 
attention to the scope of college operations. Moreover, under the new system, power 
accrued to the California Community College Board of Governors and to the state 
chancellor who became responsible for central planning in the system. The community 
colleges thus became an increasingly important aspect of California state government 
(Weiler etal., 1985).
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Resource Change, Organizational Decision Structure, and Administrative Strategy
Resource Change
As a concept, resource change deals with the various factors that diminish revenue 
and lead ultimately to organizational retrenchment. Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian 
(1981) developed a model that emphasizes the commonalties of formal organizations in 
adapting to financial stress. Resource change is the independent variable and determines 
the character of the organizational adaptation.
Theoretical Views on Resource Change
Theories of resource change focus on cycles of revenue expansion and contraction 
and their causes and effects, and assume a direct relationship between economic 
conditions and government spending (Biller, 1980; Bozeman and Slusher, 1979; 
Gumport, 1993, May-June; Levine, 1980; Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian, 1981; Lewis 
and Logalbo, 1980; McTighe, 1979; Whetten, 1980).
At an abstract level, they postulate that economic downturn creates a necessity to 
align government spending with dwindling financial resources, and thus encourages 
competition for appropriations among the various agencies of government as debates on 
government priorities ensue (Bozeman and Slusher, 1979; Lewis and Logalbo, 1980).
Eventually economic downturn, reflected in spending adjustments, results in 
reduced allocations to public programs. According to Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian 
(1981), the impact of resource change on public agencies depends on the degree of 
revenue change, and, more importantly, the level of decline reached. These authorities 
hypothesized that fiscal stress begins at the point of no revenue growth, when institutional 
stress may not yet be evident At this stage, the signs of stress are often masked by an
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agency's use of excess resources or reserves, referred to by Levine and associates as 
“slack”--unutilized revenue accumulated during periods of growth before economic 
downturn occurs. Severe decline, however, unlike mild or even moderate decline, cannot 
be masked. Typically, the slack is gone and this leads to deep cutbacks in services and 
dramatic changes in organizational decision making. By all authoritative descriptions, the 
financial conditions in many, if not most, California community colleges between 1982- 
87 constituted a state of severe decline.
Whetten (1980) offered a theory of resource change as it relates to organizational 
decline in public institutions. He identified four factors as the sources of decline: (1) 
organization atrophy—successful organizations frequently grow overly confident and less 
responsive to new challenges as they mature; (2) environmental entropy—the capacity of 
the environment to support an organization, as Whetten observed, is crucial to its 
survival, but sometimes changes; the options open under a reduced capacity for support, 
according to Whetten, are to “find another ecological niche,” or to “scale down 
operations,” which is a more common approach in public organizations which have more 
difficulty redirecting themselves than private institutions; (3) political vulnerability—the 
base of political support for public institutions is fragile, even for established 
organizations; excessive demands for public resources may, according to Whetten, 
ultimately outstrip the capacity of government to deliver on its promises and this 
frequently results in a change in government; (4) loss of legitimacy-changes in the match 
between an institution's mission and public priorities affect public willingness to support 
an institution; overemphasis by an organization on expanding allocations and lack of 
emphasis on cultivating political acceptance of programs, according to Whetten, erode 
support.
Whetten suggested that under conditions of environmental entropy, organization 
atrophy and loss of legitimacy lead to political vulnerability. Authorities have argued that 
in California the expanded scope of the comprehensive mission rendered the community
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colleges politically vulnerable (Gooder, 1984; Hayward, 1986).
The Changing Environment of Higher Education
Changes in the financial conditions of higher education institutions were first 
noted by Cheit (1971; 1973) in the late 1960s and early 1970s. His studies examined 41 
American colleges and universities and found evidence of financial stress, despite the 
enormous growth of higher education in the same period.
Cheit's work subsequendy led to the development of a large literature on higher 
education financial trends and fiscal forecasting. This literature established that higher 
education was affected by powerful factors fostering a continuous decline of revenue. 
Reduced enrollment from demographic fluctuation (Carnegie Council, 1980; Crossland, 
1980; Hodgkinson, 1983), declining revenues related to enrollment falloff, reductions in 
public and private funding (Kaysen and Sloan Commission, 1980; Mortimer and Tierney, 
1979), and inflation and rising costs (Mortimer and Tierney, 1979) all contributed to 
revenue loss and a need to retrench.
Factors in California Community College Resource Change: The Tax-Limitation Initiative
Although the California community colleges were subject to the conditions 
described above, the literature clearly points to the 1978 tax-limitation measure as the 
unique and most profoundly disruptive factor in their financial situation. Authorities 
agree that resource changes resulting from the passage of Proposition 13 created a 
wrenching fiscal crisis in the system (Jackson, 1981; Kintzer, 1980; Koltai, 1979; 
Lombardi, 1979; McCartan, 1979; McCuen and Hoffland, 1978; McKinley, 1984; 
Meardy, 1979; Permaul, 1985; Pickens, 1981). These changes were not isolated from 
other events before or after the initiative, however. McKinley (1984), for instance,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
described a context of fiscal stress that existed prior to 1978. The taxation equalization 
formula imposed by the Serrano-Priest decision in 1969 initiated the resource decline that 
tax imitation ultimately deepened. After 1978, another change-tax indexing-augmented 
the drop in public revenue that resulted in the state budget crises of 1982-83 and 1983-84, 
setting the stage for the fiscal situation in community colleges between 1982-87.
To understand the situation, a review of the tax-limitation initiative is helpful. 
Proposition 13 cut property taxes to a base o f 1% of 1975-76 appraised property value, 
restricted tax assessment increases to 2% annually, and mandated a two-thirds vote of the 
legislature or the local electorate as necessary to change property taxes. Revenue loss 
from these factors was estimated at $7 billion annually (McCuen and Hoffland, 1978).
City and county programs felt the loss of funds most acutely, since the property 
tax was their prime revenue source. Community colleges, which were funded by 
property taxes, experienced the most direct impact, with only an indirect effect on the 
other segments of the postsecondary system (Hayward, 1986; McCuen and Hoffland, 
1978; Permaul, 1985; Pickens, 1981; Savage, 1986).
At the time of Proposition 13, the community colleges were essentially tuition-free 
and relied on property taxes for over 50% of their operating revenue. After Proposition 
13, they lost an estimated two-thirds of their local revenue (McCuen and Hoffland, 1978; 
Lombardi, 1979). They also lost their ability to raise local revenue through tax increases 
(McCarten, 1979). Not only was the amount of available local revenue reduced, but also 
the authority of districts to adjust tax rates was nearly eliminated.
Despite the partial relief brought by emergency funding legislation, revenue 
reduction took an immediate toll on community college finance. (Koltai, 1978). A bail 
out measure authorized the use of state treasury surpluses to replace revenues. That 
action restored funds to about 87% of their prior level (Kintzer, 1980; McCuen and 
Hoffland, 1978; Pickens, 1981).
Nevertheless, cost cutting became necessary throughout the system. Individual
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districts took various budget-reducing measures (Jackson, 1981). Their strategies 
included spending reserves, reducing program offerings, increasing class size, cutting 
course sections, reducing faculty through attrition, retirement incentives, or layoffs, 
consolidating administradve positions, imposing self- supporting policies for student and 
community services, and reducing purchases of institutional equipment and supplies 
(Jackson, 1981; Koltai, 1979; Lombardi, 1979; McKinley, 1984; Meardy, 1979; 
Permaul, 1985).
Loss of revenue was accompanied by a 10% decline in enrollment systemwide 
(Lombardi, 1979; McCuen and Hoffland, 1978). Given that allocations were based on 
enrollment, it is not surprising that diminished enrollment would contribute to fiscal stress 
in the system. Many observers believed that increased student fees played a part in the 
loss of students (Permaul, 1985). Nevertheless, widespread climate of uncertainty 
resulted in a heavy toll on morale in many districts, and particularly on the campuses that 
sustained the most drastic losses (Bowen and Glenny, 1980).
Factors in California Community College Resource Change: The Politics of Tuition
Environmental entropy and community college politics. The reduced capacity of 
the environment to support the community colleges changed the political climate of higher 
education in California. In particular, revenue reduction forced a reconsideration of 
funding policy for the community college system. The issues centered mainly on 
community college curriculum and tuition policy (Jackson, 1981; Lombardi, 1979; 
Koltai, 1979; McCarten, 1979; Permaul, 1985; Savage, 1986).
Loss of legitimacy and curriculum politics. Under the new conditions of scarcity 
in California following Proposition 13, the financial commitment required of the state by 
the comprehensive mission of the community colleges emerged as a volatile political
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issue. Officials asked: What programs and services should the community colleges 
offer, and what should they charge the students for those offerings? Ultimately, the 
rising costs of the community college system in the context of a precipitous loss of 
revenue caused by state tax law changes hastened a challenge to the comprehensive 
mission which politicized the community college curriculum.
The politics of curriculum officially began with a 1979 classification study 
mandated by Assembly Bill 8 which required the state community college chancellor to 
examine the status of all credit and noncredit courses. Intended to help correct the severe 
state budget crisis, that action reflected “long-held legislative concerns about the proper 
role, mission, function, and funding of the California Community Colleges” 
(Commission Report, 1982, p. 3).
The classification study's findings indicated that 19% of the credit student contact 
hours were generated by courses in physical education, fine and applied arts, and other 
nonacademic, nonvocational courses (Commission Report, 1982). In an official report to 
the state legislature, analysts commented that “some observers perceived this 
concentration as an imbalance in the community college curriculum” (Commission 
Report, 1982, p. 3). Thus, the comprehensive community college mission, viewed by 
public officials as incorporating controversial elements, suffered a substantial loss of 
legitimacy (Pickens, 1981).
The politics of curriculum accelerated in March of 1982, when Assembly 
Concurrent Resolution 81 directed the California Postsecondary Education Commission 
(CPEC) to conduct a study of the impact of student charges on access to the community 
colleges. Recognizing the resolution as a clear step toward tuition, the California 
Postsecondary Education Commission made an effort to protect the no-charge policy for 
academic courses and occupational programs. It recommended that the $30 million 
reduction in state apportionment be reflected in decreased support for noncredit, 
recreational, avocational, and personal development, adult and community education
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courses (Commission Report, 1982). Some analysts referred to this as a “trim-the-fat” 
strategy. The legislature, as a result, passed AB 21, which directed the California 
Community College Board of Governors to discontinue all state support for such courses.
Districts approached “defunding” in various ways. Most dropped courses in 
accord with a highly publicized course list adopted by the state board of governors in 
July, 1982 (Commission Report, 1983). Many districts, however, undertook more 
severe retrenchment than required by the defunding legislation. In 60% of the districts, 
entire degree or certification programs were eliminated (Director's Report, June, 1983). 
In all, more than 5,200 credit courses and 386 noncredit courses were deleted from 
college catalogues (Commission Report, 1983).
Political vulnerability and appropriation politics. The effects of defunding as a 
political strategy were short-lived. Within months, analysts and the politicians who 
supported student fees were again challenging California's tuition-free policy--the symbol 
of equal access to postsecondary education (Jackson, 1981). The prospect of user fees, 
however, was again met by strenuous opposition from community college officials, 
faculty and students (Jackson, 1981; McCartan, 1979; Permaul, 1985; Savage, 1986). 
Ultimately, an intense, rancorous controversy developed between the proponents and 
opponents of tuition (Savage, 1986).
The politics of tuition became even more partisan when in early 1983 the new 
Republican governor of California, George Deukmejian, proposed a tuition fee of $ 100 
per semester. Democratic party leaders, backed by community college officials, wanted 
no part of a tuition policy (Savage, 1986). To surmount the political barriers before him, 
the governor forced the issue by withholding state funds budgeted to the community 
colleges for 1983-84, vetoing $231,968,000 which included $108.5 million in base 
funding (Hayward, 1983). In signing the budget act (which took place on July 22, 1983- 
-well into fiscal year) the governor indicated that he would support legislation to reinstate
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$105,766,000 in base funding provided that it included authorization for a $100 per 
semester student fee (Director’s Report, March-April, 1983; July, 1983). For the next six 
months, the governor and state legislators engaged in a political dance in which proposals 
from each side were toyed with and ultimately rejected by the other (Los Angeles Times. 
August 2, 20, 1983; September 14, 16, 21, 23, 24, 28, 30, 1983; January 5, 11, 14, 18,
1983).
Responsibility for the prolonged impasse seemed to rest primarily with Democrats 
in the state assembly, with the Office of the Chancellor, and with the leaders of the large 
urban districts. According to Patrick Callan, the director of CPEC, and several unnamed 
political insiders interviewed by William Trombley, Los Angeles Times staff writer, those 
officials assumed the coalition of community college interest groups allied with the 
Democrats would prevail. Consequently, they never treated the new governor's proposal 
seriously (Los Angeles Times. October 11, 1983). Dominated by the large, urban 
community college districts-Los Angeles, Oakland, San Diego, and San Francisco-with 
their strong ties to the teachers' unions, the coalition refused to compromise. However, 
the state chancellor, Gerald Hayward, a one-time Democratic legislative aid, also came 
under criticism for assuming the Democrats would ultimately defeat the tuition proposal at 
a time when the community colleges had lost their credibility with the general public (Los 
Angeles Times. October 11, 1983).
Organizational atrophy and the politics of decline. The $232 million lost to the 
governor's 1983 veto represented a 11% decline in community college buying power 
(Hayward, 1983). It deleted $86,700,000 in cost-of-living salary adjustments, 
$27,250,000 for enrollment growth, and $10,690,000 in aid for equalization (Director's 
Report, July, 1983) which put the financially weaker districts in considerable jeopardy 
(Los Angeles Times. July 15, 1983). Discouraging predictions from state-level planners 
warned of the inability of many districts to adjust. A CPEC Director's Report (July,
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1983, p. 1) referred to the funding picture as “worse than the worst case contemplated in 
advance.” CPEC indicated that deferred maintenance necessitated by the reductions would 
result in deteriorating facilities, and obsolete educational equipment which would take a 
toll on program quality (Director's Report, July, 1983). Further, Chancellor Hayward 
indicated that 15,000 course sections would have to be canceled, thus reducing enrollment 
by 163,000 students, and causing corresponding reductions in system revenue (Los 
Angeles Times. July 22, 1983.) CPEC subsequently studied the cumulative impact of 
defunding and the revenue veto, and concluded that the community colleges were scaling 
down operations to an extent that changed “the character and scope of these institutions” 
(Commission Report, 1983, p. 16). Overall, the politics of decline caused a climate of 
crisis and uncertainty in which no coherent debate over the future direction of community 
colleges was possible (Director’s Report, June, July, 1983).
Institutional reassessment and political compromise. By 1984-85, however, the 
picture had substantially changed. A turnaround in the state economy significantly 
increased state revenues, and the 1984 Budget Act showed a projected 18% growth over 
the previous year's expenditures. For the community colleges there was an increase of 
10% in overall funding over the previous year. Funding for the inflation, equalization, 
and growth provisions of SB 851 was finally possible, and there was a 100% increase for 
deferred maintenance needs (Director's Report, July, 1984).
In light of these changes, the stalemate between the governor and the legislature 
came to an end on January 20, 1984. A compromise agreement restored $96 million to 
the community college budget in return for a $50-per-semester tuition fee. It did not 
correct the fiscal problems in the system, however, at least not immediately. For several 
reasons enrollment continued to decline. Instructional retrenchment, student fees, and, 
improved postrecession job availability, perpetuated the vicious cycle set in motion by the 
veto, and resulted in some districts in further funding reduction and retrenchment.
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Thus, the problems—fiscal and political—persisted even after the compromise. 
The $50 tuition fee became a symbol of fundamental change in community college 
governance (Permaul, 1985; Savage, 1986). However, Savage (1986) reported that the 
political disagreements were finally relegated to an independent body, the Commission on 
the Review of the Master Plan for Higher Education. That body sponsored a full-scale 
policy debate over the mission of the community colleges. Ultimately, its actions led to 
omnibus legislation for the reform of the mission, governance and finance of the 
community colleges formalized in AB 1725, 1988 (California Community Colleges, 
October, 1988).
Organizational Decision Structure
The Levine model hypothesizes a complex linkage between changes in 
institutional resources, institutional authority, and community power relationships. 
Organizational decision structure is the intervening variable in the model which connects 
resource change to administrative strategy. Levine et al. defined organizational decision 
structure as the relationship between formal authority and interest group structure, both of 
which help to shape organizational decisions (Levine et al., 1981). Sibolski (1984), who 
adapted the Levine model for higher education, modified that definition to focus on the 
internal decision making patterns or governance system of higher education institutions. 
However, Zoglin (1976), criticized definitions that emphasize internal organization 
mechanisms to the exclusion of the external superstructure affecting policy. He called for 
a broader view-one that encompasses both. Based on Zoglin's ideas, this study will 
expand the concept of organization decision structure to include the influence of outside 
groups and structures that play a role in the community college governance.
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Definition of Governance
Random House Unabridged Dictionary defines governance as the exercise of 
authority or control, and as the method or system of government or management. 
However, governance is assigned various connotations in the education literature where 
the themes of direction, authority, and control are recurring ones (Corson, 1960; Monroe, 
1972; Thornton, 1972), as is the relationship of authority to decision making. Wiles, 
Wiles, and Bondi (1981) focused on decision control as central to school governance. 
Deegan (1985) viewed governance as the social framework in which decision making 
occurs. Alfred and Smydra (1985) stressed that community college governance is a 
process of locating authority for academic decisions.
Another theme in the education literature is scope of participation. Zoglin (1976) 
referred to governance as a process of making decisions about the purpose, procedures, 
and performance of an institution, and emphasized that community college governance is 
the means by which gU interested parties-individuals, groups, agencies, and 
governmental units-participate in making college policy. The Western Interstate 
Commission for Higher Education defined governance as “all aspects of the control and 
direction of community colleges” (WICHE, 1985, p.3). These views share assumptions 
with the Levine et al. model and the public administration approach on which it rests 
(Peterson, 1976). In this study, organization decision structure is taken to mean the 
control exercised by all parties for identifying college policy.
Resource Change and California Community College Governance
Consistent with the Levine etal. (1981) model, resource change caused profound 
changes in California community college governance. The paragraphs below describe 
those changes.
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Resource change and the state role in governance. One of the key questions after 
Proposition 13 was the extent to which decision making authority had shifted from local 
districts to the state. Alfred and Smydra (1985) noted the expanded influence of “state 
systems”—the executive, the legislative, and administrative aspects of state government 
Operationally, state systems include the governor, legislative committees on education and 
finance, the legislative staff, the state budget office, the state higher education planning 
commission (CPEC), the community college governing board, and the state chancellor.
The economic and political events occurring between 1982-87 focused attention 
on the role of the governor and legislature in community college governance. Pressure 
from a longstanding economic recession necessitated state fiscal adaptations at about the 
same time that tax-limitation created a constitutional mandate for an executive and 
legislative review of public priorities. The roles-regulatory and advisory-of the state 
planning commission and the community college governing board also became stronger. 
(Hayward, 1986).
The shift in control occurred as a direct result of changes in community college 
funding (Hayward, 1986; Jackson, 1981; Lombardi, 1979; McCuen and Hoffland, 
1978; McKinley, 1984; Palmer, 1985; Permaul, 1985; Savage, 1986; Tillery and 
Wattenbarger, 1985). With the passage of Proposition 13, the community colleges 
became dependent on state funds to an unprecedented extent Influence over community 
colleges accrued to the executive, legislative, and administrative authorities with power to 
determine the volume and distribution of allocations to the system (Alfred and Smydra,
1985).
Issues of state control extended to the relationship between funding formulas and 
academic programs. Thus, the actions of state administrative bodies reflected a 
substantial coalescence of power (Mingle, 1981).
Resource change and the local role in governance. Theoretically, local authority
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diminishes as central control over financial and curricular decisions accrues (Alfred and 
Smydra, 1985). Although authorities disagree about the extent to which the control of 
funding policy actually shifted in California (Hayward, 1986; Pickens, 1981; Schmidt, 
1986), they agree that gains in control by the state limited the discretion of local bodies 
(Alfred and Smydra, 1985; Weiler et al., 1985; Hayward, 1986; Jackson, 1981; 
McKinley, 1984; Permaul, 1985; Savage, 1986; Tillery and Wattenbarger, 1985).
Authorities questioned how much power the local board retained to effect policy. 
Weiler etal. (1985) conducted a comprehensive study and found a considerable change. 
Neither local trustees nor the state board of governors controlled how much money a 
district received. Tillery and Wattenbarger (1985) noted, however, that local governance 
endured as a value, which created a dichotomy between ideals and reality. In their view, 
that dichotomy fostered a crisis of governance: neither the state nor local bodies held all of 
the elements needed to govern effectively.
Thus, state and local power relationships took on a certain ambiguity. The budget 
approach used by state bodies allowed local districts to maintain much of their traditional 
discretion (Pickens, 1981). However, local boards, showing the conservatism that often 
accompanies fiscal stress, tended to behave as if control had shifted to the state 
(Henderson, 1978; Jackson, 1981). Authorities referred to this situation as 
“organizational dualism” (Alfred, 1985; Cohen and Brawer, 1982), or “bifurcated 
governance” (Hayward, 1986), both of which connote authority split between funding 
and operational control.
Dualism had interesting effects on state-local relationships, one of which was that 
local constituencies began to take their issues directly into the state political arena 
(Hayward, 1986; Tillery and Wattenbarger, 1985). Figure 4 depicts the new 
relationships in California as conceived by Tillery and Wattenbarger (1985). Groups 
interested in influencing policy-associations of trustees, administrators, faculty, and 
community interest groups—directed their issues to state legislators, and thereby gained
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
public attention and created political pressure for local policy outcomes. Lobbying by 
organized interest groups thus became an important factor in local governance. Tillery 
and Wattenbarger (1985) referred to such groups and their activities as the “shadow 
governance network” (p. 14), a phrase describing lines of authority not usually 
represented on official organizational charts.
Coordination
Coordination
Figure 4. Governance of California community colleges: structure and context
Note. From “State Power in a New Era: Threats to Local Authority” by D. Tillery, J.L. 
Wattenbarger, 1985, New Directions for Community Colleges. 49, p. 15. Reprinted by 
permission.
Resource Change and Local Governance Relationships and Roles
According to the Levine model, power and influence relationships change as 
resources erode. Several authorities studied the influence patterns surrounding 
community college policy and found changed relationships under conditions of declining 
revenue.
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Trustee/administrator relationships. Hayward (1986) studied decline and found 
that the dominance of administrators over local policy decreased as resources became 
scarce and local political groups intensified their activities.
Gleazer (1985) observed that the trustees, whose electoral fate rested on 
maintaining a level of community approval, took increased responsibility for defining 
policy and resolving conflicts. Recognizing the potential for litigation that exists when 
conflicts emerge over local compliance with state regulations, trustees began to monitor 
the actions of administrators more closely (Cohen and Brawer, 1982; Gleazer, 1985; 
Hayward, 1986). Tensions between the local board and president were frequently 
resolved by a turnover in the chief executive position (Gleazer, 1985).
Top and middle administration relationships. Several authorities found that fiscal 
crisis substantially changed administrative decision making routines, shifting budget 
decisions centrally and weakening department influence over program planning and 
staffing decisions, particularly as these tended to expand operations (Bozeman and 
Slusher, 1979; Hayward, 1986; Rubin, 1978).
President's role. Hayward (1986) found that local presidents took on expanded 
duties in the area of state accountability; these stressed a new role in developing data 
systems for rational planning. Revenue decline created the need to consider the interests 
of campus constituencies and community groups in decision making, which in turn 
defined the president's role as political strategist (Alfred and Smydra, 1985; Hayward,
1986).
Faculty and student roles. Other authorities observed that as fiscal stress 
increased, faculty interest in governance issues related to planning, budget, and 
retrenchment priorities grew, despite the limits on shared governance typical of
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community colleges (Alfred, 1985; Alfred and Smydra, 1985; Cohen and Brawer, 1982). 
Alfred (1985) linked this new concern to faculty anxiety over cutbacks. With changing 
market conditions, some disciplines became more valuable than others in the competition 
for students. That divided faculty along rank and department lines, and served to 
fragment faculty interests (Alfred and Smydra, 1985). To some extent, the effect was 
offset by collective bargaining associations which rallied to protect faculty contracts in 
situations where job security was threatened. Increasingly, governance items appeared in 
union contracts. Although faculties gained small increments of authority by this means, 
their ability to influence retrenchment by collective negotiations remained limited because 
of the inter-unit competition inherent in retrenchment (Alfred, 1985).
Role of community interest groups. Fiscal stress fostered conditions that 
amplified the role of community interest groups in community college governance (Alfred 
and Smydra, 1985). Pasqua (1979) noted that local groups seeking to preserve their 
special interests expressed their concerns by increasing their engagement with the 
trustees, the administrators, and the media in an effort to influence policy (Pasqua, 1979). 
Moreover, as resources declined, community college officials increasingly solicited 
private funding from business and industry which, in turn, empowered community 
groups as governance advisories (Alfred and Smydra, 1985; Allen and Hughes, 1982; 
Baily, 1986).
Models of Governance
Models of community college governance describe the character of the 
relationships among those who influence policy decisions. Three models are repeatedly 
mentioned: the bureaucratic, the collegial, and the political model (Baldridge, Curtis, 
Ecker, and Riley, 1978; Bensiman, 1984; Deegan, 1985; Gollattscheck, 1985; Palmer, 
1985).
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The bureaucratic model. The bureaucratic model, which rests on a view of 
decision making as rational and devoid of conflict, conceives of organizations as 
hierarchical in structure with authority flowing along formal communication lines from the 
top to the bottom of the hierarchy (Weber, 1969; Merton, 1957). Control is centralized in 
top administrative positions; information for decision making flows upward to decision 
makers, and decisions flow downward to decision implementers (Bensiman, 1984; 
Deegan, 1985; Gollattscheck, 1985). In academic settings, such a model results in a 
minimum of decision sharing (O'Hara, 1990).
The collegial model. The collegial model looks at academic organizations as a 
community of scholars (Millett, 1962). Decisions are a product of exchange in which 
those bearing responsibility for decisions and those affected by them cooperate in a 
process of consensus formation. Conflict is suppressed by the reasoned sharing of 
specialized knowledge. The faculty as professional experts, and the administrators as 
operational experts, are both empowered to control organizational goals and policy 
(Bensiman, 1984; Deegan, 1985; Gollattscheck, 1985).
The political model. The political model looks at organizations as miniature 
political systems comprised of interest groups with diverse needs, values and goals 
(Baldridge, 1971). Diversity makes consensus unrealistic. Therefore, competition for 
control of resources prevails, and organizational conflict results. Decisions are achieved 
through a bargaining process. Pressure is brought to bear on the decision makers by the 
formation of coalitions among interest groups comprised of trustees, administrators, 
faculty, students, clerical workers, citizens (Bensiman, 1984; Deegan, 1985; 
Gollattscheck, 1985). In academic settings both internal and external constituencies exert 
control over policies and enjoy strategic options not defined in the institution’s 
organizational charts.
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An Integrated Model
In a classic meritocracy, the system of authority is relatively weak, and subunits 
enjoy a high degree of functional autonomy (Mintzberg, 1979; Mintzberg, 1983). The 
community college differs from the classical meritocracy, however, in that it is subject to 
administrative dominance, central control, and a high degree of influence from the 
environment (Baldridge, 1982; Baldridge, Curtis, Eckert, and Riley, 1978; Bensiman,
1984).
Baldridge (1982) observed that the presence of academic senates in community 
colleges gives the impression of a meritocratic structure, yet the collegial model fails to 
explain decision making in community colleges. Nor does the bureaucratic model suffice, 
although Bensiman (1984) concluded that it better explains community colleges because it 
highlights their similarities to the secondary system’s pattern of governance.
Mintzberg (1983) recognized the need for a more complex model, especially under 
conditions such as resource scarcity that breed conflict. He recommended a political 
model with bureaucratic and collegial elements--one that recognized the unstable 
configuration of organizational power that occurs when there is conflict
Mintzberg (1979; 1983) therefore blended those elements in the design of an 
integrated model. His integrated model incorporated five internal structural elements: (1) 
the “strategic apex” designating the trustees, president and vice presidents who ensure that 
the organization's mission is served; (2) the “operating core” which refers the faculty and 
unit supervisors who perform the basic work of the organization; (3) the “middle line” 
representing the division deans and associate deans who extend formal authority from the 
strategic apex to the organization's functional units; (4) the “technostructure,” the analysts 
(accountants, planners) who design and run the formal control systems, and (5) “support 
staff,” the clerical, cafeteria, and mailroom employees, and the payroll and public 
relations officers who support the primary function of instruction.
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Mintzberg (1983) referred to these elements as the “internal coalition”~the 
elements of the organization concerned with decision making on a permanent, regular 
basis. A diagram of the internal coalition appears in Figure 5.
Mintzberg contended that under ordinary circumstances coordination is achieved 
by a bureaucratic process with a parallel democratic system for the operating core, when 
such a system is supported by organizational philosophy. According to Mintzberg, to the 
extent a bottom-up influence exists, there will be tension between the strategic apex and 
the operating core, a relationship also noted by Hannan and Freeman, (1988). Mintzberg 
emphasized that a fluid distribution of power is enhanced by collective organization of the 
operating core, which in turn serves to politicize decision making under unstable 
environmental conditions (Mintzberg, 1983).
Mintzberg (1983) also identified the powerful elements in the environment that 
influence institutional decisions. These elements comprise the “external coalition,” the 
alliance that exerts influence from outside of the organization, but which has a less than 
full-time commitment to the decisions of the organization. They include (1) the “public” 
consisting of government at all levels, governmental agencies, and detached groups such 
as special interest groups sufficiently affected by the actions of an institution to attempt to 
influence it; (2) “associates” referring to students and graduates; and (3) “employee 
associations” referring to unions and professional groups. A fourth element, “owners,” 
as conceived by Mintzberg, refers to the voters and tax payers. A diagram of the external 
coalition appears in Figure 6.
According to Mintzberg (1983), conflict typifies the relationship between the 
internal and external coalition. The external coalition, in the face of resistance from the 
internal coalition, tries to control the organization's actions by imposing formal 
constraints (laws, regulations), mounting pressure campaigns (demonstrating, lobbying, 
attracting media attention), invoking direct controls (mandating authorization, limiting 
budgets), and by influencing the election of members of the governing board.










Figure 5. Mintzberg's diagram of the professional bureaucracy
Note. From The Structuring of Organizations (p. 20) by H. Mintzberg, 1979, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. Reprinted by permission.




Figure 6. Mintzberg’s internal and external coalitions
Note. From Power In and Around Organizations (p. 29) by H. Mintzberg, 1983, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. Reprinted by permission.
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Activation of the external coalition, a difficult process, usually corresponds to 
mounting frustration from some fundamental change in the organization, such as a 
marked shift in an institution’s fiscal position or the established order of power. 
Mintzberg (1983) contended that the external coalition, which is characteristically divided, 
derives power from the dependency of the internal coalition on its environment. It is this 
dependency, according to Mintzberg, that makes it necessary for insiders to respond to 
external influence. Mintzberg also emphasized that the flow of power between coalitions 
is extremely complex, and often features alliances that make it difficult to distinguish the 
insiders from the outsiders.
Administrative Strategy
Administrative strategy refers to the approach chosen to reconcile organizational 
output with a change in resources. In the Levine model, administrative strategy is the 
dependent variable and is related to the degree of revenue decline that occurs, and 
corresponding changes in the organization decision structure.
Theoretical Views on Cutback Management
Retrenchment causes organizational stress, authorities agree (Bowen, 1983; 
Dallam and Hoyt, 1983; Deutsch, 1983; Halvorson, Levine, Marks, and Strohm, 1985; 
Kerlin and Dunlap, 1993; Mingle, 1981; Powers, 1982; Rubin, 1978; Volkwein, 1984). 
Administrators, however, are frequently unprepared to deal with scarcity, just as an 
institution's constituencies are often reluctant to accept the need to retrench (Rubin, 1978; 
Volkwein, 1984). Under conditions such as these, the context of management is one of 
enormous and sometimes conflicting pressures to avoid the risks of choice-making that 
accompany almost every course of action.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
Administrative options. Mingle and Norris (1981) distinguished two basic types 
of retrenchment strategies, (1) strategies that stave off organizational change, and (2) 
strategies that adapt the organization to its new circumstances.
Strategies to prevent change, called resistance strategies, are based on the belief or 
hope that retrenchment is temporary. Costs are frozen, reserves are spent, new 
obligations are postponed (Deutsch, 1983). Seeking new students is a common 
resistance strategy in academic institutions (Mingle and Norris, 1981). Attracting new 
sources of revenue is another resistance strategy, as is actions to remove the causes of 
revenue decline.
Adaptation strategies are based on the assumption that decline will persist and 
require institutional change. Adaptation involves cutbacks of two types: (a) across-the- 
board cutbacks, and (b) selective or programmatic cutbacks (Dougherty, 1981). Across- 
the-board measures involve a uniform reduction in the budget for all units and are usually 
aimed at reducing services that are peripheral to the institution's mission. Such measures 
include administrative consolidation, reduction of part-time and clerical personnel, 
reductions in capital purchases, supplies and maintenance, and student services. Across- 
the-board cuts, because they preserve all the units of the institution, are useful when the 
fiscal situation is short-termed. Their use in long-term decline is limited, however, 
because at some point such cuts compromise the effectiveness of the institution (Bowen, 
1983; Dougherty, 1981-B).
Selective cuts, on the other hand, are appropriate for severe economic decline 
(Doughtery, 1981). They include departmental consolidation and size reduction, and the 
elimination of departments or programs which often involves forced layoffs (Mingle and 
Norris, 1981). Such measures allow for an internal reallocation of funds, but require a 
reassessment of priorities and a political evaluation of institutional constituencies (Mingle 
and Norris, 1981).
A third type of adaptation strategy-one not often mentioned in the literature-is the
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manipulation of the environment to increase an organization's competitive advantage 
(Whetten, 1980; Cameron and Zammuto, 1988). This type of adaptation aims to shape 
economic and social policy and to change public opinion by various means, all in support 
of the needs of the organization. Such measures require time, and thus are not helpful in 
the case of an acute crisis.
Evaluation of options. Cutback management involves evaluation to find the right 
mix of strategies. Volkwein (1984) identified two important types of evaluation; (a) the 
rational/analytical and (b) the political/legal.
Rational/analytic evaluations are directed at assessing the likely impact of 
resource decline on the institution. Such evaluations involve forecasts of economic and 
institutional variables. From these, planners construct scenarios of best, worst, and 
probable cases and prepare strategies for each possibility (Bozeman and Slusher, 1979; 
Dougherty, 1981; Powers, 1982).
The difficulty with rational evaluations is that economic variables are difficult to 
predict and forecasts are thus unreliable (Powers, 1982). Rubin (1978) studied 
universities adapting to reduced appropriations and found budgets often in doubt until 
after the fiscal year had begun. Internal allocations had to be adjusted to last minute 
changes in revenue. Costs and enrollment patterns did not always follow the expected 
course, making it necessary to reframe decisions, sometimes over and over again. The 
budget information necessary for assigning unit allotments was difficult to obtain, and 
departments frequently used information distortion as a survival strategy.
Political/legal evaluations are directed at assessing factors related to internal 
and external politics and the legal characteristics of the situation (Volkwein, 1984). The 
objective is to predict the conflict likely to accompany various administrative options.
The difficulty with political evaluations is that it is hard to predict conflict in 
advance without knowing whether the best, worst, or probable case will prevail. This
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leads to differences between official pronouncements on the need for cuts and the size of 
the actual cuts made. Such discrepancies foster skepticism, cynicism and noncompliance 
among constituents, and may take a political toll in that they often turn retrenchment into 
an adversarial process (Cameron, Kim, and Whetten, 1988; Levine, 1980).
The treatment of constituencies. Powers (1982) emphasized that the treatment of 
constituencies is a primary consideration when programs are discontinued. Gumport 
(1993) described the enormous human cost of eliminating academic positions. Because 
the consequences of mismanaging termination are severe, termination is usually avoided 
by managers until no other option is open (Mingle and Norris, 1981).
Major questions confront administrators faced with program termination. 
Dougherty (1981) emphasized that to protect against arbitrary decisions, there is a need 
for meticulous program review and criteria to safeguard faculty and students. Tactics to 
assure fairness, according to Deutsch (1983), do not eliminate conflict, but make it more 
manageable.
Volkwein (1984) stressed the importance of having faculty task forces look at 
priorities and resources. He called for openness by administration, broad participation by 
constituencies, and mechanisms for the consideration of appeals. Powers (1982) stressed 
the need to involve faculty members in establishing cutback criteria and procedures, and 
to publish the results for all groups to review.
Leadership. Leadership is critical to the success of any retrenchment strategy. 
Some authorities analyzed style of leadership as related to retrenchment situations. 
Powers (1982), for example, emphasized that style is important, noting that how one acts 
often determines whether one can act. Others stressed the importance of encouraging all 
of the constituencies to express their opinions. Deutsch (1983), for example, pointed to 
the paternalistic style as particularly unsuitable for organizations being downsized.
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Hayward (1986) also noted the ineffectiveness of the bureaucratic, top-down approach in 
troubled times. Krantz emphasized the importance of responding to the personal concerns 
of staff members threatened by retrenchment
Rost (1991), on the other hand, addressed the nature of leadership, which he 
defined as an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes 
that reflect their mutual purposes. In Rost’s view leaders are those individuals who seek 
to engage others with an interest in the institution to act as joint architects of a change 
required by new institutional conditions. Thus, to Rost, leadership is not a matter of 
style, but part of the process of change.
Resource Decline and Institutional Politics; The Levine Model
Derived from a study of the severe fiscal crisis in New York City in the mid 
1970s, the Levine Model depicts the relationship between resource change (growth and 
decline) and the changes in organization decision structure and administrative strategy that 
derive from it.
Levine et al. (1981) defined three levels of resource decline: (1) no growth, (2) 
moderate decline, (3) and severe decline. According to the model, each has a unique 
effect on formal and informal authority in policy making.
Resource decline and slack. A key concept in the relationship between resource 
decline and authority realignment is the idea of “slack” resources. As stated on page 21, 
slack is the revenue not needed for current operations. Slack increases under conditions 
of revenue growth but diminishes as income declines (Levine et al., 1981).
In a political system, slack is used by those with formal authority to build 
coalitions in order to overcome resistance to change. According to Levine et al. (1981), 
slack is an essential tool of conflict management
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When revenue growth ceases as it does when inflation equals revenue gains, slack 
resources usually diminish but remain sufficient to keep organization service levels 
temporarily constant. No authority realignment occurs (Levine et al. 1981).
In moderate decline, resource growth fails to cover the inflationary rises in costs. 
Slack depletes, and officials as a result may be unable to consolidate power sufficiently to 
make the organizational changes needed. Under these conditions, resources are usually 
rationed, but without the attraction of the rewards made possible by slack, interest group 
activity remains low.
In severe decline--an actual decline with respect to the previous year's revenue 
adjusted for inflation--the slack is gone, and administrators are forced to reconstitute their 
control by reorganizing the institution. These conditions favor vigorous interest group 
activity. Such activity can no longer be mitigated through rewards. At the same time, 
drastic administrative actions foster conflict with constituencies vying to protect their 
interests (Levine et al., 1981). Under these conditions, administrative decisions are made 
as much for political expediency as for fiscal solvency.
Slack as a concept applies to academic systems to the extent that academic officials 
allocate excess funds to (1) increase salaries, lighten faculty workloads, provide faculty 
with opportunities (sabbatical leaves, release time), or (2) meet public needs by paying for 
programs or services (Manns and March, 1978; Rubin, 1978)). In educational 
institutions, as in other institutions, the strength of formal authority is often related to the 
availability of slack resources for achieving institutional or subunit goals. For example, 
the use of slack for a faculty salary increase may quell faculty frustrations and quiet 
activity by that constituency.
Resource decline and administrative strategies. Levine et al. (1981) argued that 
the politics of retrenchment are more or less determined by the severity of decline as are 
the administrative strategies appropriate to the situation.
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The Levine model links the three stages of resource decline to appropriate 
administrative strategies. No growth, according to the model, demands denial and 
delay strategies. These include the use of one-time revenues, contingency fund, 
depletion, asset liquidation, maintenance deferral, and borrowing on future growth. 
Moderate decline demands stretching and resisting strategies. This refers to 
across-the-board tactics such as rationing services or cutting the workforce by attrition 
(Levine et al., 1981). Robbed of reward power, the political position of administrators 
may be weakened in states of moderate decline. But according to the model, without the 
incentive of rewards, interest group activity often remains low.
Severe decline demands cutting and smoothing strategies which include 
personnel layoffs, service termination, and facility closure (Levine et al. (1981). Severe 
decline tends to strengthen the political position of administrators to consolidate their 
authority for making changes in the institution. However, it also generates interest group 
activity and political coalitions which attempt to protect their shared interests.
Retrenchment and Organizational Crisis
Uncertainty, conflict, and stress, the hallmarks of crisis, typify the climate created 
in organizations by severe financial downturn. The term crisis denotes a drastic social 
condition initiated by factors that threaten to overwhelm an organization.
Retrenchment as a Context for Organizational Crisis
A rapid decline in economic resources places all groups in an organization at risk 
for stress. Stress, an aspect of crisis, emanates from a perceived need to protect one’s 
interests.
The social conditions accompanying retrenchment, when they reach a state of
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crisis, complicate the application of adaptive solutions for addressing resource decline. 
Cyert (1978) noted that in retrenching organizations there is an emphasis on survival that 
intensifies conflict between individuals and groups. Hall and Mansfield (1971) described 
the self-serving behavior and diminished concern for the organization as a whole that is 
often characteristic of threatened groups. Hayward (1986), moreover, characterized the 
role of administrators in dealing with severe decline as “mitigating chaos.” Further, 
Rubin (1978) observed that crisis prompts administrators to adopt risky strategies to 
minimize the social effects of dwindling budgets.
A Concept of Organizational Crisis
Crisis Perception
Billings, Milbum, and Schaalman (1980) suggested that a determinant of whether 
an individual is influenced by or attempts to influence others in relation to a situation is the 
extent to which he or she perceives that situation as a crisis.
Hermann (1963), who elaborated one of the best known models of organizational 
crisis perception, described crisis as a situation that (1) threatens high priority values of 
the organization, (2) presents a restricted amount of time in which to respond, and (3) is 
unexpected or unanticipated by the organization (Hermann, 1963, p. 64).
Billings, Milbum, and Schaalman (1980) analyzed Hermann’s model and the 
empirical tests that followed, and concluded that threat and time were indeed important 
factors, but that surprise did not receive empirical support. They modified Hermann's 
model by incorporating two additional factors, (1) sensing a problem, and (2) defining a 
problem as a crisis.
Sensing a problem. The Billings model stipulates that the first step in defining a
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situation as a crisis involves perceiving the event or problem that triggers the crisis. 
Citing the decision making literature, Billings et al. (1980) contended that a problem is 
experienced when a discrepancy or gap is perceived between the existing state and a 
desired state.
Their review of the literature pointed to complexities in the information, rigidities 
in belief, the perceptions of outsiders, and historic standards as important factors in how 
indicators are chosen. They found that the degree of a discrepancy determines whether it 
is noticeable, and the significance of a discrepancy is judged according to the 
consequences that result, which in turn is followed by an adjustment in the threshold for 
identifying subsequent problems.
Defining a problem as a crisis. According to Billings et al. (1980), once a 
discrepancy is sensed, the seriousness of the problem is evaluated by those it affects. The 
perception of crisis is then a function of (1) the perceived value of the possible loss, (2) 
the probability of the loss, and (3) time pressures for responding. Thus, the greater the 
value of the loss, the worse the imminent consequences, the more likely its perceived 
occurrence or insufficient the time to deliberate, the more likely it is that a situation will be 
judged a crisis.
Billings et al. (1980) diverged from Hermann's model in rejecting surprise as a 
factor, but allowed that an absence of contingency plans, more likely if an event is 
unanticipated, increases the probability that the situation will be judged a crisis. The 
Billings model is important because it is more explicitly perceptual than Hermann's. As 
Billings and associates noted, “Crisis is defined by a set of variables as perceived by 
the decision maker” (p. 306). Crisis, under the Billings model resides in the person as 
well as in the situation. Kuklan's (1988) findings also supported such a view.
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Coping with -Organisational Crisis
The effects of crisis on an organization are diverse. Hermann (1963) suggested 
that on the positive side, crisis may lead to tighter organizational integration, innovations 
for meeting problems, or a clarification of values.
On the negative side, crisis may lead to behavior that limits organization viability. 
Hermann (1963) identified poor precrisis organizational integration, the kind that results 
in a tendency toward factionalism and withdrawal behavior by subgroups and individuals, 
as an important factor. He contended that crisis tends to cause a reduction in 
communication channels and a shifting of authority to higher levels in the hierarchical 
structure, both of which increase stress on the subunits and raise the probability of 
conflict between authority and subunits.
Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton (1981) elaborated a “threat-rigidity” thesis to 
explain behavior in organizational crisis. Their thesis relates individual psychology and 
group social patterns to organization-level phenomena. According to the thesis, threat 
conditions cause a restriction in information processing and a constriction of social control 
at all levels, individual, group, and organization.
At the individual level, the evidence for a threat-rigidity thesis, according to Staw 
et al., is in the tendency of threatened individuals to fail to heed warnings, to “freeze-up,” 
or fixate their behavior. Threatened people tend to adhere to previously learned solutions, 
whether or not these are appropriate to the crisis situation.
At the group level, evidence is observed, according to Staw et al., in the effect of 
threat on group cohesiveness which varies as a function of the success of the group's 
efforts to cope. There is also confirmation in the effects on group leadership and social 
control. Members often blame the leader for causing or failing to correct the conditions 
that threaten the group. Threat in turn increases pressure for a uniformity of attitude, 
opinion, and action within the group. Members perceive that such uniformity is
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necessary to achieve a collective goal.
At the organizational level, evidence for the thesis can be found, according to 
Staw et al., in a restriction of the alternatives considered by policy makers who may 
approach problems in a stereotyped way, often with a predominant concern for efficiency. 
It is also observed in the centralization of authority and the formalization and 
standardization of procedures.
Staw et al.(1981) contended that the effects at the individual level shape group 
patterns, and, likewise, that group processes shape organizational processes and policy. 
The interest of members in the welfare of the organization may be central or peripheral. 
Top administrators may defend the interests of the whole organization while middle-level 
administrators frequently express more loyalty to their subunits. The interests of subunit 
members, according to Staw et al. (1981), are often peripheral to the organization and 
heterogeneous in character.
Retrenchment and Political Behavior
Retrenchment and political behavior deals with the relationship between 
institutional cutbacks and additional factors that help to mobilize political behavior.
The literature indicates that resource change brings changes in organization 
decision making and administrative strategies which, in turn, influence the character of the 
responses of institutional constituency groups. Political behavior is an important category 
of constituency response. The factors that activate it are described below.
Theoretical Views on the Activation of Political Behavior
Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985) developed a model of political behavior 
based on the ideas of Easton (1971), Nimmo (1978), and Smith (1968). They looked at
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politics as the authoritative allocation of values for a society, political behavior as the 
activity of people for regulating their conduct under conditions of social conflict, and the 
political process as the activation of issues by authorities, with decisions on involvement 
made by partisans who have an interest in the issues. According to Bamer-Barry and 
Rosenwein, personal and environmental factors act jointly to influence political behavior.
Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985) identified three themes that characterize 
political behavior: (1) its conflictual nature, (2) winning and losing, and (3) the perception 
of justice. They contended that the nature of politics creates a dynamic under which some 
individuals or groups obtain a larger share of the allocations than others. The disparity in 
allocations causes persons to perceive themselves as winners and losers in the process, 
and judge the outcome in normative terms regarding the fairness of treatment and justice 
of the decision.
The Development of Political Interest
It is also important to understand how political interest develops. Cohen and 
March (1974) contended that in academic organizations, it is the symbolic significance of 
issues that determines the number of participants and the intensity of their political 
enthusiasm. Ordinarily, the involvement level is low and people are passive, but 
periodically an issue with symbolic meaning excites arousal.
The symbolic meaning of program closure in educational settings is important It 
represents the termination of a policy, and termination, which suggests endings, has a 
potent symbolic meaning. DeLeon (1978) likened policy termination to other kinds of 
termination: coup d’etat, revolution, surrender, bankruptcy, retirement, divorce, and 
death. All of these are crisis events that connote unpleasantness and failure which people 
naturally want to avoid. Gumport (1993) likened the individual experience of termination 
to the reality of grieving for one's “silenced life.” Thus, it is clear that program
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termination, through the images inherent in its symbolic meaning, has the potential to 
engender strong social resistance to an organization's strategic plans.
The organizational impact of policy termination can be wrenching. Policy 
termination galvanizes anti-termination coalitions (DeLeon, 1978). Moreover, it 
frequently causes participants to question the legitimacy of the exercise of authority 
(Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein, 1985; Behn, 1977; Levine, 1980). Behn (1978) noted 
that the conflict generated by “big-bang” termination (large scale cuts on a compressed 
time schedule) is particularly public and intense, but alternatives to termination frequently 
involve dme (cutbacks as a gradual, decremental process) and money (cutbacks achieved 
by positive incentives) which may or may not be available.
Finally, political arousal changes the decision culture of an institution. 
Schattschneider (1960) conceptualized the change as a transformation from a closed 
system of central control with consensual decision making supporting the status quo, to 
an open system of decentralized decision making, with factious issue oriented debate, 
ideological disagreement, and conflict resolution by majority rule.
Involvement in the Political Process
Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985) classified the factors mobilizing political 
behavior as personal and environmental. They emphasized that these categories interact to 
influence any given individual's response to events.
Personal factors in political behavior. Personal factors are factors in a person’s 
subjective experience that are connected or related to his or her will to act in a political 
way. Personal factors include motives (needs, drives, impulses), emotions (feelings), 
faculties (skills, abilities), and habits. They become related to political behavior by the 
process of political socialization which is the process through which individuals learn
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what it means to be a member of society.
Personal factors also include cognition—a person's mechanisms of knowing about 
the world. “Social cognition” is particularly important It refers to the means by which 
individuals come to know other people, their identity and motives. A related paradigm is 
the “information processing” perspective (Neisser, 1976). It focuses on the inferences 
one individual makes about the nature of other individuals or the situation which then 
become related to his or her own behavior. The attributions thus assigned and categories 
used to describe people and events, the implicit theories an individual generates to explain 
behavior and represent the social world, are relevant to political behavior, according to 
Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985). All of these factors enable persons to interpret and 
make predictions about the environment and the people in it, and thus provide a basis for 
individual decisions about becoming involved in a conflict situation.
Environmental factors in political behavior. Bamer -Barry and Rosenwein (1985) 
distinguished two categories of environmental factors: (a) macroenvironmental factors 
and (b) microenvironmental.
M acroenvironm ental factors are factors not present in the individual’s face- 
to-face interactions but which surround the individual in a larger, more impersonal social 
framework. Specifically, Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985) identified the impact of 
organizational context, social class, history and culture. Of particular interest is the 
organizational context which is, conceptually, the whole of the structure of an 
organization that has an impact on the lives of individuals in it, even though they interact 
with only a part of the organization.
Organizational context has an impact through the communication of role 
expectations. According to Bamer- Barry and Rosenwein (1985), the positions of 
people in political organizations vary greatly in the demands and expectations they place 
on behavior. They stressed that vertical position in a hierarchy of authority is an
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important factor. Generally, the higher a person’s position in an organization, the easier it 
will be for him or her to exercise influence over others. However, they also pointed out 
that high positions may constrain the political options of the people occupying them by the 
contractual responsibilities they impose. Such positions, which require an orientation to 
the organization as a whole, limit as well as expand the options for problem solving.
Organizational crisis as a context for decision making also enhances the motivation 
to behave politically. It is generally true that when people perceive a crisis, they also 
perceive a threat to their values and recognize that unusual action is necessary (Billings et 
al., 1980)
Microenvironmental factors refer to the face-to-face, personal interactions 
between individuals in their immediate, up-close surroundings. Bamer-Barry and 
Rosenwein identified two important features of the microenvironment that relate to the 
decision to become involved in the political process: the normative structure and the 
interpersonal structure.
The normative structure is made up of the rules and ideas people hold about how 
they should behave in specific situations. The interpersonal structure is comprised of the 
size and arrangement of groups.
One of the most effective social structures for transmitting social norms is the so- 
called primary or face-to-face group, comprised generally of no more than 20 people 
(Verba, 1961). Such groups influence member opinions by the affective person-to- 
person ties they support, and the social needs they fulfill for their members. The degree 
of influence of a group exerts depends on its members’ needs for group acceptance and/or 
avoidance of the sanctions that the group places on nonconforming members (Verba, 
1961).
According to Verba (1961), small groups play a decisive role in establishing 
political attitudes and opinions, in training political skills, and in activating and shaping 
political behavior. Of particular importance is the role of the small group in validating
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political behavior as relevant to members' goals and as an effective means to achieve those 
goals.
Small groups also act as a screen for messages from the external environment. 
Through the influence of small group opinion leaders, the interpretation of events by 
group members is modified which in turn may result in “groupthink” or group 
consciousness (shared attitudes, opinions, values). Moreover, small group interactions 
affect not only the content of a member's political attitudes but the intensity of these 
attitudes as well.
Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985) emphasized that the perception of justice, 
also shaped by small groups, is the driving force of political behavior. Within small 
groups, the results of policy decisions are evaluated in terms of the fairness of the process 
and justice of the outcome. The perception of justice, in turn, is linked to decisions on 
actions to rectify perceived injustice.
The Political Behavior of Nurses
In educational settings, as in other settings, the ideals of cutback management are 
not always applied to retrenchment planning. Parker (1984) noted that neglect of rigorous 
guidelines occurs during periods of scarcity just as in periods of abundance. The 
personnel often affected first are those whose voices are least audible; vocal interest 
groups, on the other hand, prompt administrators to acquiesce to their recommendations. 
Much rides, then, on the ability of those who must deal with the consequences of 
retrenchment to activate their own political behavior.
Clearly, nursing programs, which sometimes cost twice the average expenditure 
per ADA, were and are a potential target for selective retrenchment In the context of the 
uncertain funding environment, 1982-87, nursing programs became part of a high-risk 
category, a fact apparent to nursing program administrators from the outset At least two
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state reports, one from the California Postsecondary Education Commission (Director's 
Report, June, 1983), and another from the Chancellor of the California Community 
Colleges (Hayward, 1983), focused on nursing and other allied health programs as 
appropriate units for review and as objects for retrenchment consideration. By inviting 
scrutiny, those reports created an opportunity for local administrators to satisfice 
decisions on program termination, and established a need for political will among those 
reviewed.
The literature on the political behavior of nurses describes nurses as generally 
reluctant to engage in the risk-taking behavior that political activism requires (Archer and 
Goehner, 1982; Kalisch and Kalisch, 1982). Experts identify many factors to explain 
that pattern. They include the following: patterns of female political socialization, 
common personality predispositions among those attracted to nursing, patterns of political 
education in nursing, occupational sex segregation, the demands placed on women by 
contemporary society, the disparity between the education and social class levels of men 
and women, and the depoliticized culture of the nursing workplace (Archer and Goehner, 
1982; Kalisch and Kalish, 1982; Taylor, 1995; Wright, 1989).
Within this literature, a collateral tract exists which is best described as a “how to” 
literature. Apparendy meant to counteract nurses' natural tendencies, this literature 
stresses the importance of political activism by nurses, and describes the concepts and 
processes that support political behavior. In these articles, nurses are credited with 
understanding of the importance of political involvement, but are presumed to be 
politically naive, wary of power, and reluctant to engage in conflict (Beck, 1982; Berger 
and Hunter, 1986; Cowart, 1977; Garant, 1982; Girot, 1990; Hughes and Proulx, 1979; 
Larsen, 1982; Maraldo, 1982; Perry and Jolley, 1991; Winter, 1991).
Empirical studies present a mixed picture. Schultz (1983) studied the political 
values of nurses as measured by the Allport-Vemon-Lindzey Study of Values and found 
scores “skewed toward low.” Although nurses felt “personally powerful,” they also felt
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“politically powerless.” Schultz's data showed that subjects were not political 
participants.
Hanley (1983) studied nurses' political orientation and activities and compared 
their responses with women in two other professional groups—teachers and engineers. 
While controlling for higher education, she found that there were no significant 
differences in political participation among the three professional groups. Her data did 
not confirm the expected lower nurse participation rates related to occupational gender 
segregation.
Small (1989) studied several variables to the political participation of nurses and 
found that although nurses in the study (N = 247) revealed a desire to have influence on 
others (social power motive), they tended to be political spectators and apathetics.
Daffin (1988) studied the political expectations and participation of nurses and 
found that although 91% of her sample (N = 190) reported holding expectations that 
nurses should involve themselves in political roles, only 26% reported doing so. Daffin 
concluded that although nurses have high political expectations, they are active primarily 
as voters.
Three studies dealt with work-related variables that bear on the involvement in 
institutional politics. Coudret (1980) studied community college nursing faculty and 
found that as a result of collective bargaining and the success of bargaining units in 
equalizing faculty workloads, nurses were no longer dissatisfied with workload policies. 
Her conclusions suggested that longer hours--a peculiar function of the structure of 
nursing faculty positions-would not limit political behavior.
Smith (1979) and Hutcherson (1980) studied job satisfaction among nursing 
faculty in community colleges. Smith found management policy to be a job dissatisfier 
and security to be a job satisfier. Hutcherson found that unsuitable salary, benefits, 
facilities and environment bring dissatisfaction. All of these factors are potentially 
amplified as stressors under the deteriorating conditions that frequently accompany fiscal
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crisis in institutions.
Summary on Retrenchment and Political Behavior
This review of the literature builds an understanding of those factors facilitating 
and inhibiting the political behavior of community college constituency groups, and 
particularly the behavior of nursing faculty, in reacting to retrenchment.
In summary, there are strong reasons to expect political behavior from 
constituencies inside and outside the organization when a college undergoes financial 
downturn. Revenue reduction fosters unit competition and survival behavior. Crisis, 
loss, and feelings of aggrievement also promote political behavior. Variables to the local 
impact of resource decline and factors in local governance, however, modify the necessity 
for and intensity of the politics that result. Program termination and faculty layoffs give a 
particularly powerful impetus to political behavior often sufficient to countervail the 
individual apathy and group political inertia in organizations.
Whether or not political behavior results is a function of the interpretations made 
by individuals and social units of the degree of threat and the likelihood of significant 
loss, as well as the fairness of retrenchment policy. It is also a function of the unique 
features of small group interaction and its effect on members’ perceptions of the validity 
and efficacy of their own role as political participants in the organization power structure. 
The question in this study is whether, and under what conditions, a group reputedly and 
self-consciously politically apathetic will rise above its collective image to protect its own 
policy interests when retrenchment threatens those interests.
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CHAPTER HI
METHODOLOGY
This study examined the pattern of political behavior displayed by community 
college nursing faculties in response to proposed or enacted changes in nursing programs 
stemming from financial downturn and fiscal stress in the California community colleges, 
1982-87. This chapter presents the research plan and discusses (1) research approach, 
(2) research design, (3) research samples, (4) data collection, and (5) data analysis.
Research Approach
To accomplish the objectives of this research, a research design was needed with 
the flexibility to accommodate the economic, organizational, and social variables at play. 
The approach taken was a qualitative one incorporating four distinct methodologies: 
surveys, interviews, document and news paper review, and participant observation.
Qualitative research methods share a philosophical foundation appropriate to the 
study of human behavior. They are particularly helpful in a social and organizational 
context that places value on understanding relationships and patterns. A critical challenge 
in this study was to identify the beliefs, values, and perceptions that influenced subjects’ 
political behavior. Qualitative methods are well-suited for that purpose.
Qualitative methodologies have particular benefits for organizational research. 
Authoritative discussions have documented the role of qualitative methods in dealing with
59
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the complexity of social factors typical of organizations. Schwartzman (1993) discussed 
the benefits of ethnography for studying organizations. Hall (1980) emphasized that 
qualitative methods are especially useful for yielding descriptions of the research context 
that are necessary for understanding behavior in educational institutions. Van Maanan 
(1979) depicted the usefulness of qualitative methods to describe unfolding social 
processes, contextual understanding and empathic objectives. Englebert (1981) talked 
about the importance of the holistic perspective of qualitative research which preserves the 
context of the problem under study. Spradley (1979) affirmed the appropriateness of 
qualitative methods for studying systems of meaning. Miles (1979) extolled the face 
validity of qualitative data. Englebert (1981) described qualitative methods as 
collaborative in nature and as incorporating the point of view of both researcher and 
participants for an understanding the phenomenon under study.
Precedent exists for using qualitative methods to study circumstances such as 
those in this study. Hood (1980) used participant observation to study the impact of 
declining financial resources on four state colleges. Askew (1982) applied a constant 
comparative method to assess faculty responses to state university budget retrenchment 
Sibolski (1984) relied on case studies to establish how financially weakened colleges and 
universities turned themselves around. Baltes (1985) used the survey method to uncover 
institutional responses to fiscal stress. Rose (1987) used interviews and document 
analysis to study the impact of budget reduction on academic subunits.
Research Design
Design Overview
The design of this study incorporated a statewide study and a selected site study. 
The statewide study involved two surveys, one directed to the nursing program directors
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of all community college districts offering an associate degree in nursing (see Appendix 
A). The information obtained from that survey was augmented with additional 
information gained through telephone interviews with participating directors. A second 
survey was directed to instructional deans of the colleges from which program directors 
returned surveys (see Appendix B). The purpose of both surveys was to establish 
statewide trends and to advance the task of site selection by screening for college 
conditions, nursing program status, and the acdons of faculties in relation to suggested, 
proposed, or enacted program changes.
In order to establish the fiscal conditions of participating districts, the researcher 
also reviewed summaries of public community college financial information published 
annually by the state of California. The purpose of that review was to illuminate financial 
factors such as revenue loss, expenditure cutbacks, and reserve position.
Based on the survey data, follow-up interviews, and financial review, the 
researcher selected six sites to serve as the case studies for a multiple case-study design. 
Districts were selected for size, location, and more importantly, for their potential to shed 
light on the research objectives. In four of the districts selected, nursing programs and/or 
faculty jobs were pinpointed for elimination. In two, there was no threat of selective 
retrenchment. The researcher conducted interviews with numerous administrators and 
faculty in all six districts, and made participant observations in one particularly large 
district in which an ad hoc faculty political organization formed in response to district 
retrenchment. The researcher also gathered information from newspaper accounts of 
district retrenchment actions.
A multiple case-study design such as the one used in the selected site study 
follows the multi-site qualitative approach suggested by Herriott and Firestone (1983). 
Classical case studies focus on one site or setting only. The multi-site design, in contrast, 
looks at several settings asking the same research questions at each. This allows the 
findings to be compared for commonalties site-to-site, thereby addressing an important
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criticism of the classical case study--that it provides a weak basis for generalizing findings 
(Herriott and Firestone, 1983).
Statewide Study
The statewide surveys were a preliminary step to establish how, generally 
speaking, community colleges and their nursing programs fared during the years of 
revenue decline, 1982-1985. The surveys also provided an efficient way of acquiring the 
information needed for site selection. Kerlinger (1973) affirmed the use of the survey 
method for that purpose.
Follow-up Interviews
Surveys generally do not produce information that penetrates beyond surface 
opinions. Sometimes, moreover, they produce unclear or insufficient information 
(Kerlinger, 1973). To surmount those problems, the researcher conducted follow-up 
telephone interviews with the nursing directors. These interviews focused on the survey 
questions, but aimed to clarify and augment survey answers.
The researcher chose the telephone interview method because telephone interviews 
offer a quick and flexible way of focusing on specific issues, and because they eliminate 
the need for fixed appointments, and make travel expenses unnecessary (Borg and Gall, 
1979).
Document Review
The researcher reviewed the California community college fiscal data from 1973 to 
1988 to highlight district financial conditions. Data were extracted from the Fiscal Data 
Abstracts published annually by the California Community College Board of Governors. 
Those documents contain detailed accounts of revenues and expenditures for each and
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every community college district which are filed in accordance with the requirements of 
state law and the regulations outlined in the California Community Colleges Budget and 
Accounting Manual. (1985, October).
Document analysis is a recognized method of descriptive study. It deals with the 
systematic examination of records or documents as sources of data. Best (1977) stated 
that documentary data, subject to its accuracy, serves a useful purpose in adding 
important information to a field of study.
Site Selection
Based on the survey and follow-up interview data and a faculty's willingness to 
participate, invitations to join the study were extended to the faculties of 10 community 
college nursing programs. All of the invitations were accepted; the data from six proved 
sufficient for the development of case studies.
Factors considered in the selection process were the size and location of 
institution, the impact of resource change on the institution, the impact of retrenchment on 
the institution's nursing program, and the administrators’ general descriptions of nursing 
faculty responses to retrenchment decisions. In the final decision two factors were 
critical--the impact (or lack of impact) of resource decline on a nursing program, and the 
willingness of a faculty to participate in the research study.
Selected Site Study
Respondent Interviews
Following the receipt of invitation acceptances, interview schedules were 
established at each of the participating sites. The researcher conducted all interviews by 
telephone which enabled a substantial number of faculty to be interviewed at each site-see
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Table 1.
Practical limitations made face-to-face interviews with nursing instructors difficult 
to arrange. Typically, faculty members have varied schedules which include off-campus 
laboratories at odd hours of the day and evening. Those often result in a complicated 
pattern of on-campus appearances. Furthermore, classroom and student counseling 
demands often render members reluctant to make commitments that place additional 
pressure on their campus hours. Telephone interviews, which provided for flexibility and 
convenience in interview scheduling, alleviated those problems.
Table I
Case Study interviews
Program3 Nursing Faculty Interview Interviews Others
 Size________ Volunteers0 Completed*1 Interviewed6
1 28 15 10 4
2b 21 8 7 5
10 10 6 6 6
22b 19 14 11 3
28b 12 12 8 4
35 6 4 4 5
38b 14 12 12 4
39 3 3 3 4
 T = 113___________ T = 74___________ T = 6l______  T = 35
Note. The totals do noi include numerous informal interviews with nursing faculty and program directors 
at the meetings of the District 2/22/28/38 coordinating group. Nor do they include those with numerous 
politicians, lobbyists, and district officials who were players in that situation, or the interviews conducted 
with faculties of other districts that were not developed into completed case studies. 
aProgram identification numbers used to preserve respondent confidentiality; numbers assigned 
sequentially in order of survey returns.. 
bcolleges representing a single district. 
cnumber of nursing faculty who volunteered.
^number of nursing faculty interviews completed.
interviews completed with campus administrators and/or general faculty leaders.
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PaQigipaoiObseDffltion
The first faculty interviews, begun in the spring of 1985, were conducted at sites 
where retrenchment had already had an impact Those interviews focused on past events, 
the outcomes of which were known. Another set of interviews, begun in the winter and 
spring of 1986, focused on the events unfolding in two districts, as they occurred. The 
outcome of decisions was unknown at the point interviews were initiated.
In one of those districts, the nursing faculty established an ad hoc coordinating 
group, where, for two semesters, the researcher attended meetings as a participant 
observer. Participant observation is a particularly useful method for obtaining data on 
unfolding social processes (Borg and Gall, 1979). According to research experts, the 
level of participation can be varied. For example, participation can be limited to the level 
necessary to build rapport and develop a better understanding of group functions and 
relationships. That is the level of participation employed in this study, where the 
researcher's role was to interact informally with study participants as they planned a 
variety of political strategies.
Research Samples
Four research samples were assembled for this study. They included: (1) nursing 
program directors in community colleges with registered nursing programs, (2) 
instructional deans in the colleges from which nursing program directors returned 
surveys, (3) nursing faculty members in the nursing programs of the districts serving as 
selected research sites, and (4) nonnursing instructional and administrative personnel 
familiar with retrenchment conditions at the selected research sites. All subjects 
participated voluntarily.
The researcher used various procedures to obtain the samples. Written surveys
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were mailed to sixty nursing program directors at colleges listed in the 1984-85 edition of 
Occupational Programs in California Public Community Colleges (Meyer, 1984). One 
question queried directors as to their faculty’s interest in participating in a case study.
Upon the completion and return of the surveys by nursing program directors, the 
researcher mailed administrator surveys to the occupational instructional deans in the same 
colleges. Their names were obtained from the Meyer (1984) publication.
The sampling procedure used for the selected site studies was somewhat different 
Invitations in the form of a transmittal letter were first sent to faculty groups (see 
Appendix C). Those letters were addressed to the program directors who had indicated 
an interest in participating and whose programs met the selection criteria listed above. 
Upon receiving notification of their acceptance, the researcher sent an interview sign-up 
form (see Appendix D) which, when completed and returned, constituted an agreement to 
participate. At all of the study sites, nursing program directors and faculty interviewees 
were asked to nominate nonnursing faculty and administrators to participate in the study.
Data Collection
Anticipating a low survey response rate, the researcher used a large survey 
mailing to maximize returns. As stated above, 60 program director forms were mailed. 
Two mailings of the director surveys produced a total of 40 responses for a 67% response 
rate. However, two forms, returned with no identifying data, had to be dropped from the 
sample, resulting in a total of 38 usable surveys. Two mailings of the instructional deans 
survey produced a return of 24 out of 38 surveys, for a 63% response rate.
The researcher then placed follow-up telephone calls to each of the nursing 
program directors who returned a usable survey. Those calls were preceded by a letter 
describing the purpose of the call (see Appendix E). The interviews focused on topics 
suggested by the objectives, and by the conceptual framework. The researcher’s
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questions also requested verification, correction, and expansion of survey answers. An 
interview protocol listing general survey topics served to guide the semi-structured 
discussions. A summary of topics appears in Table 2.
Table 2
Interview Topics
Topics Related to Budget Topics Related to Retrenchment
* College financial condition * Structure for establishing priorities
* Mechanism for establishing budget • Participation of nursing director in retrenchment
decision making
* Impact of financial condition on instructional • Perceptions of nursing faculty related to
program retrenchment decisions




• Role of union
• Role of professional associations
The procedure for case-study interviews differed from that of the follow-up 
interviews described above. The researcher first provided a general verbal introduction to 
the study and its goals. Following that introduction, volunteers were assured of the 
study's confidentiality, and the interviews began. The case study interviews focused on 
interviewers’ perceptions of the status of their program and the impact of retrenchment on 
it, college and district retrenchment priorities, and nursing faculty and personal actions 
taken. As the interview data accumulated, themes emerged that were then used by the 
researcher to shape subsequent interviews. Thus, interviews became increasingly 
specific, allowing for a comparison of faculty members' perceptions on particular issues. 
The researcher used an interview topic sheet to keep the interview on course, but 
attempted to maintain a spontaneous flow of information through her use of broad, open- 
ended queries. Faculty interviews generally lasted from 10 to 60 minutes.
Two or more calls were usually necessary to make a contact Approximately 50% 
of the researcher’s calls were placed to home telephone numbers provided by 
respondents. After obtaining the consent of the interviewee, data were tape-recorded, or.
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alternatively, documented in hand-written process notes summarizing important points 
and pertinent verbatim exchanges.
As a participant observer, the researcher attended numerous meetings of an ad hoc 
nursing faculty coordination group which formed at one site selected for a case study. 
During the course of meetings held between February, 1986 and November, 1986, the 
researcher established close communication with the planning committee leaders, spoke 
with scores of faculty members, and directly observed coordinating committee activities. 
Typically, the meetings lasted two hours, and produced many opportunities for 
unscheduled, informal interviews with speakers, organizers and faculty members.
Data Analysis
The first step of data analysis was to organize the survey data. To protect the 
confidentiality of respondents, each program was assigned an identification number for 
data reporting. Programs were numbered in series, according to the order in which their 
directors surveys were received. In cases where two or more programs resided in a 
single district, the identification numbers were consolidated, for example, #3/13, or 
#12/14. The survey data was then summarized, and programs reporting suggested, 
proposed, or enacted program termination, personnel and/or nonpersonnel cutbacks, 
identified and tallied.
Data on the factors pertinent to site selection were condensed by assigning 
arbitrary graded numerical values on each factor for each college. Three graded values 
were used: 1 indicated a low value, 3 an intermediate value, and 5 a high value on a 
factor. The purpose of that exercise was to condense the data for an easy comparison of 
institutions. The researcher considered district size and location, institution size, nursing 
program size, number and size of nursing retrenchment cuts, faculty involvement and 
types of faculty responses as indicated by the program director survey. From this
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information the researcher constructed a number of display matrices—master charts for 
summarizing descriptive data from several research sites (Miles and Huberman, 1984). 
Those appear in Tables 3,4, 5, and 6.
Table 3
Display Matrix; Size
P rogram D istric t College Program
Sample of programs selected
1 3 5 5
10 3 3 3
13 3 5 3
22 5 5 5
35 1 1 1
39 1 1 1
Sample of programs rejected
7 3 3 3
8 3 5 3
12 3 1 3
18 1 3 I
21 3 5 3
33 3 5 3
Note: 5 = large; 3 = medium sized; 1 = small.
Table 4
Display Matrix: Location
Program  Area* U rban6 S u burban6 R ural6














a5 = Southern California; 1 = Northern California 
&5 = large population; 3 = medium; 1 = small.
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Table 5
Display Matrix: Retrenchment in Nursing Programs
Program FT Faculty Enrollment Course Supplies
Sections
Sample of programs selected
1 5 5 5 0
10 3» 3a 3a 5
13 0 0 0 5
22 5 3 3 5
35 0 0 0 0
39 5b 0 0 0
Sample of programs rejected
7 0 0 0 3
8 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 1
18 0 0 0 0
21 0 0 0 3
33 0 1 0 I
Notes. Values assigned on the basis of survey data only. Values refer to enacted retrenchment unless 




Display Matrix: Nursing Faculty Responses
Program # Faculty Involved Actions Taken














Values assigned on basis of program directors’ survey indications of number and intensity of activities. 
5 = high; 3 = medium; 1 = low.
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Following the completion of interviews, the researcher synthesized interview data 
by making research notes in four categories: observation, theoretical, methodological, and 
personal, as suggested by Schatzman and Strauss (1973). Verbal exchanges were 
recorded in the observation notes. From those, entries were made in the other categories; 
for example, notes on interpretations or tasks to accomplish.
The final step in analysis was the assignment of data codes—the abbreviations 
applied to segments of similar data in a body of observations (Miles and Huberman, 
1984). Coding expedited data retrieval and assisted data clustering, an important aspect 
of the analytic process. The researcher compiled a start-list of codes derived from the 
research objectives and conceptual framework presented in Chapter 1. The list appears in 
Table 7.
Much of the data consisted of statements by the respondents about the occurrence 
of some event Those statements were not taken at face value. Indeed the researcher 
applied three criteria of verification. First, no item of data was incorporated into a case 
study that was not supported by two and preferably more respondents, or by a newspaper 
account or official public document (Askew, 1982; Guba, 1981). Exceptions were made 
only when an item would be known only to an individual respondent. Second, the 
credibility of respondents was judged according to the extent personal motives appeared 
to distort their responses. Data found defective by that criterion were evaluated for what 
they might reveal about group process or the role the individual played in the group. 
Finally, the researcher assigned more value to the statements made voluntarily by 
respondents than to those elicited by questions, as recommended by Becker (1985). 
Important statements were checked by presenting them to other respondents for their 
comment. The value placed on a statement was ultimately determined by the amount of 
agreement among respondents. Site summaries were likewise shared with respondents as 
a way of checking their validity. The researcher consulted the most informed, reliable 
respondents at each site and a technique Guba (1981) called “member checks” (p. 86).
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Table 7
Start List of Codes
Pattern of Faculty Actions by Campus
PFA: Actions Taken





















PFA: Retrenchment Decision Process
PFA: Retrenchment Strategy




PFA: Participation in Governance






Pattern of Faculty Actions by Campus 
PFA: Environmental Factors
PFA: Community Support 
PFA: Community Need 
PFA: Symbolic Factors
Pattern Variation among Campuses 
PVC: Campus Budget Conditions 
PVC: Governance 
PVC: Administrative Strategies 
PVC: Impact on Nursing Program 
PVC: General Faculty Actions







PINP Department Communication 
PINP Collegial Relations
The researcher organized the fiscal data with the aid of a computer spread sheet 
program. Again, the data had to be condensed. To expedite year-to-year comparisons, 
the current dollar amounts of reported revenues and expenditures were first converted to 
constant dollars. For that purpose the researcher used the California Consumer Price
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Index (CCPI) supplied by the California Commission on State Finance and computed 
annual inflation factors (see Appendix F). Although experts on fiscal analysis debate 
which index is most appropriate for that purpose—the Higher Education Price Index 
(HEPI), (a national index specific to higher education consumption factors), or the CCPI, 
(an index sensitive to the regional differences that characterize California), the CCPI is the 
one used by the California Postsecondary Education Commission (personal 
communication, Kevin G. Woolfork, Fiscal Analyst, CPEC, September 8, 1993), and 
was therefore employed in this study. From the constant dollar data, the researcher 
constructed trendlines. The procedure employed for that is discussed in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV
THE STATEWIDE STUDY OF NURSING PROGRAMS IN CALIFORNIA
Introduction
This chapter presents the findings of a statewide study of the political behavior of 
nursing faculties in response to funding policy changes and their effects on nursing 
programs stemming from resource decline in the California community college system.
The findings are based on data from the reports of nursing department heads, 
faculty, and college administrators, and from a review of state financial records. All data 
were analyzed in light of the conceptual framework and research objectives, both of 
which are detailed in Chapter I.
To restate, the conceptual framework centers on models of cutback management 
and crisis perception in organizations, and authoritative ideas on the activation of political 
behavior. This framework stipulates that under conditions of resource decline, 
administrative strategy and organization governance change dramatically. Economic 
decline contributes to conditions of competition, crisis, and social conflict in institutions, 
all of which commonly have the effect of activating political behavior. The question 
posed in this study is whether nursing faculty members responded by acting on their own 
policy interests, or whether they followed the reputed pattern of nurses which is to be 
politically apathetic.
74
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The primary research objectives were to determine:
1. How and to what extent nursing faculty members on behalf of their own 
interests acted to influence policies proposed in campus and state legislative arenas as a 
response to community college fiscal decline, 1982-87.
2. What factors influenced the pattern of political behavior exhibited by nursing 
faculty members.
3. What impact nursing faculty response patterns had on policy decisions 
pertaining to nursing programs.
The secondary objectives were to determine:
4. How and to what extent the patterns of political behavior of nursing faculty 
compared to those of nonnursing faculty in the same community colleges subject to the 
same budget cuts.
5. How and to what extent the patterns of political behavior varied among 
community college nursing faculties.
The presentation of the statewide findings is organized in two sections. 
Following a recapitulation of the financial challenge to California community colleges in 
the early 1980s is a discussion of the statewide findings divided into subsections on the 
fiscal position of participating districts, the impact of resource decline on nursing 
programs, the actions taken by nurses in response to resource decline and the factors 
instrumental in shaping those responses.
Recapitulation of the Political Story
After decades of expansion, growth halted for the California community colleges 
in 1978, the year of Proposition 13 and landmark property tax limitation. As a result of 
falling revenues and the subsequent changes in governance this measure brought, a period 
of decline resulted in the community college system that persisted into the mid-1980s and
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beyond. Although national higher education trends undoubtedly contributed to this 
decline, state factors-the economic, social and political factors set in motion by 
Proposition 13—were primarily responsible. In particular, the financing system for the 
community colleges underwent drastic modifications as a direct result of Proposition 13. 
Local revenues were severely diminished and required substantial augmentation from state 
revenue sources. This situation placed new financial responsibilities on the state. As a 
consequence, the state general fund became the most important source o f community 
college revenue, replacing the property tax as the financial base of the system. 
Governance changes accompanied the transfer of funding. The state legislature and state 
governing board of the community colleges emerged with much greater power over the 
system than either of these bodies had previously held. Not surprisingly, those who 
gained fiscal control began to scrutinize the expense of the system and especially aspects 
such as curriculum which were driving up to the overall outlay.
Thus, the comprehensive community college curriculum became a focal point for 
political controversy. Its broad-scoped programs evoked among state policy makers a 
new attitude toward the costs and benefits of an expanded mission (Los Angeles Times. 
May 2, 1982). As a consequence, the mission of the community colleges also came into 
question. A political debate ensued that focused not only on the proper scope of 
curricula, but also on the no-tuition policy—the policy of providing community college 
education at no cost to the student.
Pressure for change mounted slowly until an acute state economic crisis 
intensified preexisting public concerns over state spending. By November, 1982, the 
political climate in California was sufficiently turbulent to support a transition in 
leadership which culminated in the election of George Deukmejian as governor.
Deukmejian's critical postelection challenge was to deal with a $1.5 billion deficit 
carried over from the previous fiscal year. Rather than calling for a general tax increase 
which was sure to be unpopular, the governor reduced funds for all state operations,
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including a substantial share of those funds budgeted to the community colleges (Los 
Angeles Times. July 22, 1983).
In addition to exerting control over the state budget, Deukmejian's objective was 
to achieve a fundamental change in community college finance that would permanently 
reduce the cost of the community colleges to the state. As part of his strategy to do that, 
the governor went on to veto $231,968,000 in monies allocated to the community 
colleges through the 1983-94 budget act, and proposed a community college tuition fee as 
a source of revenue to offset the vetoed funds (Los Angeles Times. July 30, 1983).
This highly controversial proposal embodied the governor's belief that students 
should bear a greater responsibility for the cost of their education. It conflicted 
dramatically, however, with the philosophy of community college officials, faculty, and 
students who had been trying for some time to avoid tuition. Indeed, the California 
Postsecondary Commission (CPEC) only a year earlier had managed to stave off tuition 
by recommending that the legislature “defund” nonpriority courses in the comprehensive 
curriculum (San Diego Union. July 17, 1982).
Not surprisingly, Deukmejian's proposal was immediately unpopular, not only 
with community college interest groups, but also the Democratic politicians in the state 
legislature with whom those groups were aligned (Los Angeles Times. July 30, 1983). 
Perhaps because of the symbolism of tuition, the issue created an emotional and bitterly 
partisan political atmosphere which in turn fostered an unprecedented level of distrust 
between the governor and many state legislators. Each side repeatedly rejected the 
proposals and counter proposals of the other (Los Angeles Times. October 11, 1983). A 
political stalemate ensued that lasted six months. Vetoed funds were ultimately reinstated, 
but not until a compromise was reached under which the governor agreed to allocate 
$96.5 million in return for a $50 per student per semester fee (Los Angeles Times. 
January 27, 1984).
The political struggle within the state government had a devastating local impact
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Its cumulative effect was to force the community colleges to operate for over two years 
under politically volatile and economically unpredictable conditions. Indeed, the financial 
impact of the prolonged play of power was evident until 1987, by which time most, if not 
all, districts finally regained financial stability (Commission Report, 1986; Commission 
Report, 1987).
Before the crisis ended, however, many colleges were forced to make tough 
decisions on internal budget allocations (Commission Report, 1983). State documents 
suggested that administrators scrutinize the costs and benefits of expensive, low 
enrollment vocational programs such as those in the health care fields (Director's Report, 
June, 1983; Hayward, 1983). Thus, it seemed that nursing programs which are well- 
known for their low student-to-teacher ratio would be vulnerable to selective 
administrative cutback strategies. The behavior of nursing faculty in response to this 
situation is the focus of this study.
Findings from the Statewide Study
The statewide findings indicate that in most of the community colleges in the 
sample, the nursing faculty members exhibited some form of political behavior taken on 
behalf of their own interests; however, the pattern and complexity of their behavior 
varied. With few exceptions, those variations related to the impact of decline on job 
security and program status. Threats to job security and program status generally 
involved crisis of varying degrees, and led to more complex and organized patterns of 
political behavior than found in situations where there were no such threats. However, 
they did not always correspond to a finding of institutional financial exigency as might 
have been anticipated on the basis of the conceptual framework. That is to say, nursing 
faculty jobs were jeopardized and programs threatened in districts where the level of 
reserve revenue, or “slack,” failed to drop below the criterion of severe decline set in this 
study, suggesting a complex relationship between district finances and challenges to
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programs and job security.
The following sections report on the organizational characteristics of participating 
institutions, their finances, the impact of resource decline on nursing programs, and the 
political behavior patterns of nursing faculties.
Characteristics of Colleges and Districts in the Statewide Study
Table 8 summarizes the organizational characteristics of institutions participating 
in this study. A total of 38 colleges representing 33 community college districts 
comprised the sample. The administrative organization of these institutions represented 
the four models found in California community colleges as described by Jensen (1984). 
Eighteen single-college districts, eleven multicollege districts, three single­
college/multicampus systems, and one single-college/multicenter district responded.
According to The College Handbook. 1985-86. 23rd Edition, the colleges 
participating in this study were located in three distinctly different environments, 13 in 
densely populated urban areas, 23 in less densely populated suburban areas, and two in 
Iow-population rural areas; 15 districts were located in Northern California, and 23 in 
Southern California.
Institutional size as reflected by student enrollments declined during the period of 
the study, however, single-year figures provide for a comparison. Enrollments varied 
from more than 30,000 students (N = 2) to less than 4,500 students (N = 1). The median 
total enrollment figure was 13,500 students. As a group, participating colleges were 
somewhat larger than the system median (11,000) reflecting the fact that registered 
nursing programs are more frequently found in larger public community colleges (Meyer, 
1982).
Table 8 shows the variation in nursing program enrollments in the sample. In 
1982-83, the totals ranged from 363 students to 31 students, encompassing the largest 
and smallest programs in the community college system at the time (National League for
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Table 8










l SColD sc u 21.8 248
2 MColD sc S 22.6 363
3 MColD NC u 16.0 148
4 MColD sc u 30.5 310
5 MColD sc S 24.8 214
6 MColD NC u 9.8 168
7 MColD sc S 13.3 148
8 SColD sc u 25.2 68
9 SColD sc u 20.1 124
10 MColD NC S 9.5 172
11 SColD sc S 7.5 102
12 MColD NC s 6.8 61
13 MColD NC s 14.6 98
14 MColD NC u 9.9 117
15 MColD NC s 7.4 103
16 MColD SC u 15.3 95
17 SColD SC s 12.9 75
18 SColD SC s 10.0 104
19 MColD NC R 10.6 64
20 SColD SC s 6.0 92
21 MColD NC s 26.6 132
22 MColD SC u 12.7 159
23 SColD SC s 14.2 163
24 SColD SC s 21.5 157
27 MColD SC s 13.5 286
28 MColD SC s 20.0 146
29 MColD NC u 27.2 184
30 SColD SC u 7.3 135
31 SColD NC s 6.5 105
32 MColD SC u 14.8 124
33 SColD SC u 31.1 221
34 SColD NC s 7.5 118
35 SColD SC R 5.1 180
36 SColD NC s 23.9 114
37 SColD NC s 9.0 77
38 MColD SC s 23.0 179
39 SColD SC s 4.2 31
40 SColD SC s 17.5 181
Administrative Organization: SColD = Single-College District MColD = MultiCollege District,
MCamD = Single-College /Multicampus District, MCtrD = Single-College /MultiCenter District. 
^Location: NC = Northern California, SC = Southern California. 
cEnvironment: U = Urban, S = Suburban, R = Rural.
dCollege Enrollment: Expressed in thousands of full and part-time students. Data from 1982-83 
Occupational Programs in California Community Colleges by Leo A. Mayer, 1982. 
eNursing Enrollment: Data from State Approved Schools of Nursing R.N.. 1983. 41st Edition, National 
League for Nursing, 1983.
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Nursing, 1983).
Figure 7 plots program enrollment in relation to college enrollment, and shows a 
substantial variation in the correspondence of those factors. The larger programs, it is 
clear, were generally located in larger institutions, no doubt because of the greater ability 
of larger institutions to provide the financial support that larger programs require. 
Nevertheless, there were exceptions. For example, #10 and 35 were instances of large 
programs located in small institutions. Given those exceptions and the differences in 
institutional structure, environment, and location described above, it is clear that the 
organizations in this study comprised a varied sample, one reflecting the diversity that 
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Figure 7. The relationship between nursing program enrollment and college enrollment.
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Resource Change
Resource change is a central factor in the Levine model of cutback management 
and organization constituency politics. Chapter II described the decline in revenue 
flowing to the California community colleges after the 1978 tax-limitation initiative. A 
key point about that event and the events that followed was that their fiscal impact varied 
from institution to institution.
To establish the variation in the financial circumstances of the districts in this 
study, the researcher summarized the fiscal data for a 15 year period beginning with 
1973-74, the first year of state reporting. The data were taken from the California 
Community College Fiscal Data Abstracts (1973-1988). the annual accounting reports 
published by the California Community College Board of Governors which collate 
financial information by district, the lowest unit of official recording.
To facilitate year-to-year financial comparisons, the researcher converted current 
dollar revenue and expenditures to constant dollars, with 1973-74 serving as the base 
year. Deflators were derived from the California Consumer Price Index (CCPI) (see 
Appendix F). To track real gains and losses, each year’s revenue and expenditure figures 
were indexed. Indexes compare a given district's annual figures to a base year (in this 
case 1973-74) which always has an index value of 1.0 derived by dividing the base year 
dollar figure by itself. The indexes for subsequent years were created by dividing their 
figures by the base-year figure. Indexing is useful because it produces quotients that 
illustrate a district's real revenue and expenditure changes in percentage increments or 
decrements. For example, an index of 1.06 represents a 6% gain over the base year, 
whereas an index of 0.94 represents a 6% drop.
Finally, to summarize the data and display the fluctuations in the sample as a 
whole, the researcher constructed trend line graphs, the procedure for which involved (1) 
ranking the annual sets of district indexes from high to low (see Appendices G, H, I), and
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(2) plotting the indexes of the high and low districts, median district, and interquartile 
districts for each year to construct trendlines revealing the direction of change. High, 
low, median and interquartile indexes served as the benchmarks of year-to-year change in 
the sample, and can be viewed as horizontal “cuts” through the data that reveal the 
dynamic fluctuations in revenues and expenditures systemwide.
In this study, resource change is operationalized as: (1) a change in total revenue, 
(2) a change in the relationship between total revenue and total expenditures, and (3) a 
change in adjusted reserve position—an index of fiscal stability (Dickmeyer, 1980, 1983). 
Measuring the resource change of postsecondary institutions is fraught with problems and 
complexities which have been extensively reported (Dickmeyer, 1980, 1983; Lupton, 
Augenblick, & Heyison, 1976; Millett, 1976; Minter, 1979). The indicators selected for 
this study are supported by current authorities for the purpose of assessing the financial 
health of colleges and universities.
Revenues
Table 9 presents fifteen years of data on district revenues. The current dollar 
revenue figures were drawn from general fund revenue reports. The general fund is the 
account used by districts to track the fiscal transactions related to ordinary operations and 
services (California Community Colleges, October, 1985).
Table 9 shows the revenue changes reported by the 33 districts in the sample, and 
clearly illustrates the district-to-district variations mentioned above. All districts 
experienced a decline in their real dollar revenues after Proposition 13, but reductions 
ranged from 6% to 31% of prior-year revenues, with an average drop of 17.45%. A 
majority of districts again experienced decline after defunding and the revenue veto, 1982- 
1984, but two districts showed no further losses, and three reported growth. The amount 
of change ranged from 8% growth to 23% decline, with a two-year average drop
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Table 9
Total Revenue of Participating Districts. 1973-74 through 1987-88
Revenue in Thousands of Dollars 
7 ^ ------73:74 7E75"75-74'  7£77 mVWl\ 8f-R ll-W mi 84-B15-K
District
1 20,964 22,025 25331 27368 27,960 26037 28,750 33,012 34,648 34.116 34373 36,638 42,024 43545 47,200
20564 19,771 20,973 21,789 20305 17,445 16,618 17,114 16221 15,614 15,189 15,427 17,007 17,070 17,758
1.00 0.94 LOO 1.04 097 0.® 0.79 082 0.77 0.74 072 074 081 081 085
2,22 109538 135521 156,442 16(2324 181*844 171*152 189,650 202,496 189525 191520 191501 193376 206,455 205^28 215296
2# ,J« 100738 122,012 13000 JZ7306 131532 113,133 109624 104575 88*916 87,652 84299 81,421 8Bfl51 83,450 80062
LOO M l. U 9 1.16 120 LQ3 LOO 096 081 080 077 074 076 0.73 074
3,13 30,779 36551 40,656 42,735 46,057 44,637 49,431 55,444 58548 58,453 60299 66506 72506 74324 80518
30,779 33,170 33,796 33,413 33,447 29,679 2853 3,742 Z7.410 26,752 26,646 28,129 29343 29,135 30,293
1.00 1.08 1.10 1.09 1.09 096 0.93 0.93 089 0.87 0.87 0.91 095 0.95 096
4 16575 19568 22510 24597 27,00? 2431 29209 35386 35213 3*212 25890 36555 42001 42551 45525
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9534 8315 11355 14532 17320 15,696 15,094 17,077 15873 15397 14,755 15,142 16,429 16.057 16,766
1.00 0.87 1.24 1.52 1.82 1.65 1-58 1.79 1.66 1.61 1.55 L59 1.72 1.68 1.76
6 28320 32202 34,075
Os!1111 51562
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11,478 11387 12344 13,256 14967 12,644 11,787 11576 10,705 10,481 10,420 10505 12,023 12338 13.197
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8 U568 13387 s I 28,135 33805 36516 35379 35266 37368 43,149 452®  42566
11568 12556 13,659 17576 1757X4 16*113 16263 17525 17896 16292: 15584 15492 17(462 17,688 vrm
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9 5,419 7,445 9302 10,730 14,065 12824 19212 22,618 3,(00 3.709 3392 28,038 33329 35,471 40343
5,419 6,683 8,148 8389 10329 8593 11,105 11,725 10,782 10551 11521 11505 13,488 13,905 15,178
1.00 1-23 1.50 155 189 1-59 2.05 116 1.99 200 207 118 249 257 280
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2570 3,154 3311 3,762 4,047 3,454 3,465 3,447 3,473 3389 3 5 3 3984 4,227 4338 4,714
1.00 1.06 1.11 177 1.36 1.16 1.17 1.16 1.17 1.14 1.19 1-34 1.42 1.46 1-59
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Table 9 (con'd)
Total Revenue of Participating Di§trigts^l973-7-4.tb£Q»gli 1987-8&
Revenue in Thousands of Dollars
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2612 3,119 3,942 4/28 5/46 5233 6,073 6236 6/13 6,747 6,798 7215 8,179 9220 9/84
2642 2/00 3277 3,775 4318 3,479 3510 3233 3,1® 3.088 3,004 3,038 3310 3,614 3,7®
1.® 1.® 1.24 1.43 1.63 1.32 1.33 122 121 1.17 1.14 1.15 1.25 1.37 1.42
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Table 9 (con'd)
Total Revenue of Participating Districts. 1973-74 through 1987-88
Revenue in Thousands of Dollars 
— T T T r ir r r m r T s i r T T W ir iT ^ m r m r s j ^ r ^ r m r m r w s r w s T T m
36 1C0U 17 m  W B  19P9S 18376 73,713 75M  27*755 25,403 7SJ&3 2*496 3*856 357ft 4I2W 
TOjMt H 8 ?  T 2#s 1M « 1238  13,150 U S 6 f t* *  U Jfr 1£«$ 1 3 0 tt 14,«3 131#  
m  u 4  \ z t  \7& m  m  t x t  w  m  m  iM  i4 t mj «. \ s * * •  * * 5 / * * . ' • . ' * * * * * * * *  .. .
I f 5,480 6327 7274 8,068 8352 7,862 9584 10,635 11,061 11,684 11,771 13,042 14341 14323 15343
5,480 5859 6.047 6324 6,428 5227 5540 5513 5,188 5347 5202 5,491 5304 5,615 5760
1.00 1.07 1.10 1.15 1.17 095 1.01 1.01 095 096 095 1.00 1.06 1.02 1.09
& 2373 iSQi 5 M 4*5 m 4710 5351 5,472 S938 7445 && 8,421
8375 2,4ft 2530 apft 3090 2527 2723 2704 2552 2,4ft 2,418 2,497 2760 346f
LOO U8 106 124 130 106 i is 114 107 103 LQ2 m m U5 tsa
40 7,668 10,098 12200 14557 18,090 18.113 21,838 24,4« 25,038 23,713 22558 25,175 28,195 28760 31537
7,668 9,011 10,141 11382 13,137 12,043 12,623 12,651 11,722 1038 9568 10,600 11,410 11352 11365
1.00 1.18 132 1.48 1.71 1.57 1.65 1.65 1.53 1.42 1.30 138 1.49 1.48 1.55
Note. 1st line = current dollar revenue (data from California Community College Fiscal Data Abstracts, 
1973-1988); 2nd line = constant dollar revenue; 3rd line = indexes.
of 6.24%. Table 10 summarizes the figures for both periods.
Figure 8 shows the general trends in revenue over the years before and after tax 
limitation. These trends confirm that the era of expansion~as reflected by revenue 
increases-ended with Proposition 13. After the dramatic decline of Proposition 13, 
however, revenue fluctuation leveled off. Table 10 shows that eight districts recovered to 
some degree, as indicated by the fact that their 1978-82 decline was less than their 1978- 
79 decline; two showed no further deterioration, and one, District 9, showed revenue 
increases. Most, however, began declining again in 1981-82, and in some cases 
experienced an even steeper drop. That reflected interim changes in the state funding 
formula made by the state legislature. AB 8, passed in 1979, introduced the concept of 
marginal growth (and decline) as a substitute for full-cost funding, and limited growth 
funding beyond budgeted amounts. AB1369, passed in 1981, established growth caps 
by district (Weiler et al., 1985; Wellman, 1987). Both measures further depressed 
revenues, particularly in some rapidly growing districts.




District 1977-78/ 1977-78/ 1982-83/ 1977-78/ 1977-78/
1978-79 1981-82 1983-84 1983-84 1986-87
1 (14%) (20%) (5%) (25%) (16%)
2/22/28/38 (17%) (39%) (4%) (43%) (47%)
3/13 (13%) (20%) (2%) (22%) (14%)
4 (19%) (19%) (4%) (23%) (17%)
5 (17%) (16%) (11%) (27%) (14%)
6 (9%) (17%) (7%) (24%) (22%)
7 (20%) (37%) (2%) (39%) (23%)
8 (14%) (5%) (13%) (18%) 0
9 (30%) 10% 8% 18% 68%
10 (19%) (36%) (13%) (49%) (46%)
11 (20%) (19%) 2% (17%) 10%
12/14 (16%) (26%) (5%) (31%) (18%)
15 (10%) (31%) (4%) (35%) (36%)
16 (20%) (9%) (10%) (19%) (12%)
17 (19%) (20%) 1% (19%) (6%)
18 (14%) (20%) (4%) (24%) (1%)
19 (10%) (29%) (14%) (43%) (41%)
20 (14%) (20%) 0 (20%) (5%)
21 (20%) (29%) (4%) (33%) (9%)
23 (13%) (15%) (7%) (22%) (5%)
24 (19%) (18%) (3%) (21%) (6%)
27 (17%) (30%) (3%) (33%) (25%)
29 (19%) (5%) (11%) (16%) 1%
30 (6%) (27%) (10%) (37%) (35%)
31 (17%) (14%) (6%) (20%) (14%)
32 (21%) (24%) (11%) (35%) (28%)
33 (15%) (24%) (7%) (31%) (19%)
34 (22%) (34%) (6%) (40%) (19%)
35 (31%) (42%) (7%) (49%) (26%)
36 (21%) (13%) (16%) (29%) 1%
37 (22%) (22%) 0 (22%) (15%)
39 (24%) (23%) (5%) (28%) (5%)
40 (14%) (18%) (23%) (41%) (23%)
X = (17.45%) X = (21.54%) X = (6.24%) X = (27.78%) X = (14.15%)
Note. Revenue changes (in percentages) ate derived by subtracting later indexes from earlier indexes for 
the time periods stipulated. Parentheses indicate negative change.
Driven by these policy changes, decline resumed to end the respite that many 
districts enjoyed between 1979 and 1981. Shortly thereafter, further policy changes, 
defunding and the revenue veto, compounded previous losses and extended the
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Figure 8. Revenue trends of participating districts.
Note. Upper range represents rapidly growing districts.
progression of decline that began with tax limitation. District revenues descended to their 
lowest levels in the history of state reporting, as six-year (1977-78/1983-84) mean losses 
exceeded the four-year (1977-78/1981-82) drop. Over half of the districts reported 
cumulative losses of 27% or more before conditions began to improve (see Table 10). 
Slow decline finally ended with the influx of lottery money in 1985 (Rodda, 1986). That 
improvement is reflected by the upturn in revenue trends (see Figure 8), and the fact that 
ten-year (1977-78/1986-87) cumulative losses were less than the one-year losses of tax 
limitation (see Table 10).
It is important to ask how severe a decline 27% over six years represents. 
Although the literature fails to provide a practical definition of “severe decline” for the
I I I I I I I I I-r- r“T T  t—r  t  • vi i i i i i i i i i
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community colleges, Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian (1981) established a definition for 
public institutions. They defined severe decline as any constant dollar reduction from the 
previous fiscal period. In contrast, Sibolski (1984), who studied four-year colleges by 
analyzing the Higher Education General Information Survey (United States Department of 
Education) data, determined that a 12% drop in inflation-adjusted dollars over a three year 
period is the equivalent of severe decline. By that criterion (the validity of which can be 
challenged for community colleges), 17 districts in this study reached a state of severe 
decline by as early as 1980-81, and 19 reached a state of very severe decline (4% annual 
rate of loss) before revenues improved.
Financial Position
Dickmeyer (1980), a leading authority on the financial stability of postsecondary 
institutions, concluded from years of study that revenue alone is an inadequate indicator 
of financial position. According to Dickmeyer, the fiscal health of a college depends on 
the relationship of the inflow to the outflow of resources, or, in other words, the balance 
between revenues and expenditures. The following discussion assesses the financial 
position of participating districts by examining expenditures in relation to revenue and 
assessing trends in two financial indicators.
The relationship of expenditures to revenues. Table 11 presents 15 years of data 
on community college expenditures. Expenditure figures were drawn from Objects 1000- 
6000, the accounting classifications for general fund expenditures as defined by the 
California Community Colleges Budget and Accounting Manual. (1985). Table 11 
shows the year-to-year changes reported by districts and the variation among districts in 
any given year. Almost very district made cutbacks immediately after Proposition 13. 
The cutbacks varied from 1% and 29% of prior-year expenditures. Many districts also 
cut spending following defunding, but fewer made the double-digit reductions common
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after tax limitation, and a some actually increased spending. Figure 9 displays the 
systemwide spending fluctuations following Proposition 13.
Table 12 summarizes the expenditure changes of individual districts for easy 
comparison. Although one district (#5) made no cuts immediately following Proposition 
13, all other districts retrenched, some with cuts of 10% or less, but many with cuts 
exceeding 15% or more. Retrenchment slowed after 1979, as indicated by the 1978-1982 
cumulative cutbacks which averaged only half a percentage point higher than the cuts 
associated with tax limitation. It accelerated again in 1982, but never to the degree of 
previous reduction trends. Nevertheless, the cumulative reductions were impressive. By 
1984, in fact, 25% of the districts in the sample had cut spending to levels at or below 
their 1973-74 level of spending. Revenues improved in 1985, and spending picked up in 
a majority of districts. Thus, the ten-year cumulative reductions were substantially less 
than immediate post-Proposition 13 cutbacks (see Table 12).
Table 12 also reveals patterns in retrenchment management. As indicated above, 
many districts made large cutbacks at the time of tax limitation. Although some (#1, 3/13, 
20, 37, 39) continued to manage conservatively, others (#29, 34, 36) gradually eased 
their spending constraints as time went on. Some districts (#2/38, 17, 19, 40), 
minimized their initial reductions, and were forced to play catch-up later. While the 
cutbacks made prior to 1982 often failed to balance losses (as indicated by average 
revenue and spending changes for the period), after 1982 a wave of fiscal conservatism 
overtook the system. Twenty-two (22) districts balanced their budgets or cut spending 
more than their revenue losses demanded (see Table 13). A few districts managed decline 
in an extremely conservative fashion. Districts #3/13 and 39, for example, consistently 
over-cut during the ten-year period, 1977-1987.
Revenue-to-expenditure ratios. Financial indicators are helpful for assessing the 
financial position of organizations. One such indicator is the ratio of revenues to
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Table 11
Total Expenditures (objects 1000-6000) of Participating Districts. 1973-74 through
1987-88_____________________________________________________________
Expenditures in Thousands of Dollars 
Years 73-74 74-75 73-7<5 7(5-77 77-78 78-75 79-80 86-51' 81-81 85-83 83-#4 #4-85 85-86 86-87 sV-fcs
District
1 19,455 21,027 23834 24,942 27555 25,187 27,025 30,013 34897 34,498 32816 36,055 39810 43,152 46,017
19,455 18875 19313 19501 20811 16,747 15,621 15559 16338 15,789 14501 15,181 16,111 16916 17513
1.00 097 099 1.00 1.(8 086 080 080 084 081 075 078 0 ® 087 089
y i 84,767 99245 122,658 140*43 154,607 150801 177,666 197821 214357 2Q 4*4r183,175 203*79 190814 195350 210844
28,3a 84,767 89,089 IOI560 110,041 112*78 99,737 VOfffi: 102551 : 100354 99,474 80943 85,717 77*21 78(499 79*99
to o L05 120 t30 L32 tl# 121 : L2I t l 8 UO 095 to t 091 090 M
3 ,i3 27821 35313 41514 44,016 48,658 44274 48,490 54,775 57948 58,7® 59,400 63,727 69880 71,005 78,128
27821 31,699 34509 34,414 35336 29,438 28,029 28396 27,129 26503 26348 26832 28,199 27,834 29594
1.00 1.14 1.24 1.24 1.27 1.06 1.01 1.02 096 097 094 096 1.01 1.00 1.06
1 --------- 15888 16529 20025 22572 25*41 25,112 28077 33,006 34376 35,472 33,793 36476 30732 43,14# 45881 
15888 15097 1^729 1784# 18,330 14697 16*87 17021 16,094 16*34. 14533 1535# l6f l»  14914. 17,186
LOO t(S t i t t t7 t 2t t t l to# t » t0 7 to # ,099 to e m t ie tl4
£ 7,426 9,692 13,033 14512 21844 24,105 25,708 32477 34,473 32275 33574 37,404 40,764 40*37 42040
7,426 8,700 10834 11346 15*36 16,027 14860 16836 16,139 14,771 14836 15,749 16,497 15,773 15816
1.00 1.17 1.46 1.53 215 216 200 226 217 1.99 200 212 222 212 213
6 25067 27,779 3U 15 34807 37995 37536 43266 505?4 46*44 46,199 <7344 -@556 5L745 50414 <6348
25,767 24*36 25865 27814 27,5® 24*57 25809 26*18 21931 2J.144 20*33 308®  20941 19,7«2 17,437
to o m to o tfl6 to ? m m m m 082 o a t m 081 077 068
7 10,192 12,678 15344 16,613 19549 18,699 21312 23,126 23,<82 23392 22964 25527 29,069 30*26 345®
10,192 11381 12,755 12589 14,197 12433 12319 11909 10,7® 10,706 10,148 10517 11,764 11849 12906
1.00 1.12 1.25 1.27 1.39 1.22 1.21 1.18 1.06 1.05 1.00 1.07 1.15 1.16 1.27
a 9 9 9 12360 14321 16*44 19827 21406 2ffiI6 30562 34,106 3L509 34,485 37553 41,655 44844 <8fc4le
9m 11875 11504 13891 14399 1<«3 14829 15*6 15568 15*94 15*» 15897 1^858 J7579 18*15
LOO L13 tl* 131 L44 L41 t4 J t » to o 156 t5 3 t 6B m t7 6 t®
9 6532 10,153 14,145 15,(88 16,664 15345 17502 21,465 22982 21,733 24588 28547 32142 34,650 38*58
8532 9,114 11,758 11,758 12102 10203 10,117 11,128 10,759 9546 10865 12188 13,008 135® 14594
1.00 1.07 1.38 1.38 1.42 1.20 1.19 1.30 1.26 1.17 1.27 1-43 1.52 1.59 1.69
t t  ' ' 154125 28828
I1ii
25J67 29.168 32499 32537 2W 5t 28*05 31269 33*35 34597
15825 25,160 1733# 16,790 20328 18,088 14547 15,121 15*» 14*® 12882 U,792 12654 12550 12941
LOO t6 7 i t s tn L35 120 697 tM 101 m 086 m 084 086 086
11 2,614 3,044 3,727 4566 5*77 5,113 5,773 6,468 7,0® 7,181 8,009 8,762 10,028 10,694 12345
2,644 2,732 3,098 3570 3832 3,400 3337 3353 3321 3886 3539 3,689 4,058 4,192 4,644
1.00 1.(8 1.17 1.35 1.45 1.29 1.26 1.27 1.26 1.24 1.34 1.40 1.8 1.59 1.76
iU T " ■ 30851 33561 32592 38897 36,75! 35871 42892 6396 <3*06 <4319 41817 <7314 53807 57281 61,709
30851 29947 27,092 26934 26,689 23850 24.677 22593'2& 15®  20*83 18,479 20yP0$ 21.694 22356 S * l6
LOO 099 090 086 0(8# 059 082 6 M 06# 06? 061 066 ft.72 074 077
15 11349 14,189 17392 15,175 15,485 14,733 18,003 18*37 20*34 19816 18,080 18801 20528 20,112 22*45
11349 12,737 14,457 11865 11245 9,796 10,406 9817 9379 9,069 7589 7916 8*27 7884 8569
1.00 1.12 1.27 1.05 0.99 086 0.92 087 0.® 080 070 0.70 072 069 0.74
Id1 25M 30*51 37*66 43,670 49884 51*74 56,424 68*1® 74*06 81*98 76#$ #1,194 86*07 908#t 9958#
25875 27,694 30578 34,144 36387 33*5? 32*15 35337 34,741 3734$ m i 34,187 34807 35626 37,467
too to# t2! T& t4t 132 1*7 1.3# L35 L45 152 L» 156 t39 L46
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Table 11 (con'd)
1000-6000) of Participating Districts. 1973-74 through
1 9 8 7 -8 8
Expenditures in Thousands of Dollars
Y ears 73-74 74-75 75-76 76-77 77-78 78-75 75-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88
17 6551 7007 9.467 16660 11.738 11909 13*67 16010 16582 16105 16949 20,118 20,698 22643 23994
6551 7,008 7*69 8535 6521 7952 7,669 6300 6699 7371 7,490 6471 8376 8976 9,027
1.00 1.07 1.20 1.27 1.30 1.20 1.17 1.27 1.33 1-13 1.14 1.29 1.28 1.35 L38
i6 7m a m  i$ & 14751 12*14 12*18 13,336 15666 16742 17*64 17/07 19596 21384 22)824 2*01
7319 *357 9588 6870 7m 7*09 8*21 7938 7&& 751? 8*67 6654 8)069 9568
ICO V0l tl? 43 419 m U» 199 m v x LtH t » ttf tw 128
4,195 5324 6*51 8,023 9,146 9*86 11*49 13,629 13368 12697 12779 13,061 K9W 13,618 15,096
4,195 5,228 5,695 6*73 6642 6174 6502 7,065 6*58 5911 5,647 5508 6(02 5338 5,679
1.00 1.25 1.36 1.50 1.58 1.47 1.55 1.68 1.49 1-39 135 1.31 1.44 1.27 1.35
id 3387 4p& 5052 5,9® 6397 6184 6997 ? /» 6906 8j#» 6918 99®  16635 13324
3387 3.670 4200 <629 <646 4.U2 4045 4960 4*09 394? 3941 < # 4304 4571 5JM3
to o to s 424 437 157 p t '  149. L20 t& 1 U t * 1*3 1*7 t3 5 t «
i r  ■■■■ 21*74 26661 32,495 37,644 42,681 37910 45577 49*60 47,740 48506 50991 59,738 66712 75,796 86948
21*74 23533 27,012 29,432 30996 25*06 26345 25999 22350 22*00 22488 25.153 26998 29,712 32712
1.00 1.12 1.27 1.38 1.46 1.18 1.24 1.22 1.05 1.04 1.06 1.18 1.27 1.40 1.54
a 7,050 9067 1 1 # ! 125281 125J7 14986 13*96 15035 19/00 1*634 1*019 19511 21*90 22*82: 25,774
7,650 6139 9.106 9 M 9105 7969 7)406 7,791 *904 8524 7m 8*31 8959 saw? 9.697
ICO 106 420 426 419 LOf too to? L16 L II to t t0 6 t.16 t l 8 127
24 13379 16295 16984 20557 22993 21,425 24,067 27,058 30,757 31374 31,671 33376 37,400 40989 44371
13379 14,627 15,781 15916 16625 14*45 13912 14,027 14399 14359 13995 14,053 15,136 16029 16693
1.00 1.09 1.18 1.19 1.24 1.06 1.04 1.05 1.08 1.07 1.05 1.05 1.13 1.20 1.25
I T - " 14300 19,542 22,456 mfgA 28966 20Q53 30310 35,(08 37360 37,006 36099 40,9)7 42371 46.44) 4$fi)6
14300 17342 16667 00061 20963 18)552 17,0* 18*61 175B4 l6 » 6  16305 172» 17,147 16205 16667
100 m 429 .438 44? 139 122 135 t2 t 117 t l? 119 tw 1*6 t  a
29 24653 26755 32,794 36317 39,725 35,640 43,058 52929 55.709 67570 61,702 66752 72452 79334 81,060
24,853 25*12 27*60 28595 28*19 23,697 24989 27,439 26081 31,106 27*66 26918 29321 31,099 30504
1.00 1.04 1.10 1.14 1.16 095 1.00 1.10 1.05 1.25 1.10 1.16 1.18 1.25 1.23
to 5*15 5082 7*06 :799f 7jf47 7354 10*59 11*56 11*48 9942 6& 8 9,428 10,160 11332 12,196
5m 5 0 « 5090 6248 5,408 4990 59«: ?m 5500 4504 3913 3570 4*1* <442 <508
700 UH 415 420 104 694 til t» ?06 096 0 8 : 676 079 095 088
i l 3,744 4511 5,648 6995 7,448 7*47 6109 9,405 1*125 10,178 10361 11380 11971 U545 12573
3,744 4,019 4,695 5,469 5,409 4918 4,687 4976 4,740 4,658 4578 4,792 4904 4,682 4,730
1.00 1.06 1.25 1.46 1.44 1.29 1.25 1.30 1.27 1.24 1.22 1.28 1.28 1.25 1.26
21397 36,160 36056 36,815 46458 40,(07 44352 49,043 56313 52838 53,796 59,008 63380 67941 70j5l9
2tfW  i s m  273t2 26784 2938) 26654 25£» 2i4a4 26364 24182 23330 24845 21698 26)993 26566
too 115 t a 431 134 132 LT6 t2 0 110 L07 1 8 t1 8 M 2 12)
33 15516 17563 19910 22,054 24,018 22917 25,769 26477 32455 33952 34315 37058 36769 41,492 44,128
15516 15586 16550 17*43 17,464 15,171 14995 14,763 15,194 15,493 15,163 15,603 15,690 16*65 16602
1.00 1.00 1.07 1.11 1.13 098 096 095 098 1.00 096 1.01 1.01 1.05 1.07
to 4(485 5 i0 i 6572 7515 6351 6 3 5  9*G7 ,1C0?7 12)85 12*94 13,457 12,602 14*9? 15927 17971
4(485 4671 5*97 5.719 5952 6529 5332 5,7m 5*38 5955 5947 5327 5,786 6*43 6?23
100 LOf 418 128 154 123 119 1*7 1*8 131 133 119 1*9 139 150
35 2518 2*19 3,406 3,825 4526 4,137 5,027 5,182 6187 6*47 6*83 6997 7,911 8557 9506
2518 2531 2*31 2991 3*87 2,751 2906 2686 2997 2959 2776 2946 3*02 3511 3576
1.00 1.09 1*2 1*9 1.42 1.19 1.25 1.16 1.25 1.8 1*0 1.27 1.38 1.51 1.54
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Table 11 (con'd)
Total Expenditures (objects 1000-6000) of Participating Districts. 1973-74 through
1987-88_____________________________________________________________
Expenditures in Thousands of Dollars 
Years 73-V4 )4-75 73-74 74-77" 77-78 78-74 79-80 86-kt dl-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 S'l-Ss




II n S  V ' 4 tw a t n f lbVS'S"*" ... ' w •* ' W B i. .57,063
to o 12X MO ' AM' 147 5 # m f iM Z , M8 1.42 155 134 m tTB
a 4,523 4,938 6,768 7,737 8,984 3221 9,429 10158 11,861 12,143 11,462 13,407 14,062 14,784 16022
4,523 4,433 5,626 6,049 6̂ 524 5,466 5,450 5266 5553 5557 5,065 5,615 5,691 5,795 6,028
1.00 0.96 1.24 1.34 1.44 131 121 1.16 1.23 1 3 1.12 125 126 128 1.33
w 2 3 # 23*5 m 4,461 i s rt 4352 5399 5387 5A55 m '59S3 s m i m 8469
2 3 # 2527 ipta m 253. 2,«5 2399 tSP 25t5 zm Vf* i m
130 106 122 m- ■up 1# U4 M 3 ' m m 106 m US
io 6356 9,717 12,173 13370 18340 19560 21,618 23,252 26,070 26,066 23,708 24519 27314 27,605 #,408
6356 8,723 10,119 10344 13,101 13,005 125U 12,054 12,305 11930 10,476 10324 U256 10321 11,440
1.00 1.27 1.48 1.58 1.91 1-90 1 * 1.76 1.78 1.74 1.53 1.51 1.64 1.58 1.67
Note. 1st line = current dollar expenditures revenue (data from California Community College Fiscal 
Data Abstracts, 1973-1988); 2nd line = constant dollar expenditures; 3rd line = indexes.
expenditures which is a way of showing the balance between district income and 
spending. Millett (1976) defined this ratio as the dividend of “current” fund revenue over 
“current” fund expenditures. A ratio of 1.0 indicates fiscal balance, over 1.0 indicates a 
revenue surplus, and less than 1.0, an operating deficit. According to Millett, several 
years of deficit ratios may signify financial stress.
Table 14 reports the revenue to expenditure ratios for participating districts. A 
simple count shows that, between 1978 and 1984, 18 districts had two or more years of 
deficit ratios. Only five districts showed such a pattern in the years prior to tax limitation. 
This suggests a substantial increase of financial stress in the community college system.
A count of districts showing deficit ratios in any given year shows 1982-83 as the 
most unstable year for the sample as a whole; 21 districts had operating deficits in 1982- 
83, as compared with 9 in 1978-79, the year after Proposition 13. That suggests an 
accumulation of financial stress in the system.
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Table 12











l (17%)* (19%) (9%)* (28%)* (16%)
2/22/28/38 (14%) (14%)b (23%)* (37%) (42%)
3/13 (21%)* (29%)* (4%)* (33%)* (27%)*
4 (10%) (14%) (8%)* (22%) (14%)
5 l%b 2%b (17%)* (16%)b (3%)
6 (10%)* (22%)* (4%) (26%)* (30%)
7 (17%) (33%) (6%)* (39%) (23%)
8 (3%) 16%b (7%) 9%b 32%
9 (22%) (16%)* 1% (15%) 17%
10 (15%) (34%) (15%)* (49%) (49%)
11 (16%) (19%) 8% (11%) 14%
12/14 (9%) (20%) (7%)* (27%) (14%)
15 (13%)* (16%)b (13%)* (29%) (30%)
16 (9%) (6%) (3%) ( 9%)b (2%)
17 (10%) 3%b (19%)* (16%) 5%
18 (12%) (14%) (4%) (18%) 0
19 (11%)* ( 9%)b (14%) (23%)b (31%) •
20 (16%)* (14%) (7%)a (21%)* (2%)
21 (28%)* (41%)* 1% (40%)* (6%)
23 (15%)* (3%) (12%)* (15%) (1%)
24 (18%) (16%) (3%) (19%) (4%)
27 (16%) (24%) (9%)* (33%) (19%)
29 (21%)* (11%)* 5% ( 6%)b 9%
30 (10%)* l%b (32%)* (31%) (19%)
31 (15%) (17%)* (5%) (22%)* (19%)
32 (12%) (14%) (13%)* (27%) (12%)
33 (15%) (15%) 0 (15%) (8%)
34 (11%) (6%) 5% ( l%)b 5%
35 (23%) (17%)b (5%) (22%)b 9%
36 (11%) 0 (5%) ( 5%)b 22%
37 (23%)* (21%) (11%)* (32%)* (16%)
39 (29%)* (33%)* (7%)* (40%)* (14%)*
40 ( 1 %)b (13%) (25%)* (38%) (33%)*
X = (14.33%) X = (14.79%) X = (8.39%) X = (23.45%) X = (9.72%)
Note. Expenditure changes (in percentages) are derived by subtracting later indexes from earlier indexes for
the time periods stipulated. Parentheses indicate negative change. 
'Expenditure reduction exceeds revenue loss for the period. 
"Revenue loss exceeds expenditure reduction by 10% or more.
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Figure 9. Expenditure trends of participating districts.
Table 13
Comparison of Revenue and Expenditure Changes 1982-84
Revenue Expenditure District Revenue Expenditure
District Change Change Change Change
t (0.05) (0.09) * 20 0.00 (0.07)*
2/38 (0.04) (0.23) * 21 (0.04) 0.01
3/13 (0.02) (0.04) * 23 (0.07) (0.12)*
4 (0.04) (0.08) * 24 (0.03) (0.03)*
5 (0.11) (0.17) * 27 (0.03) (0.09)*
6 (0.07) (0.04) 29 (0 .1 1) (0.05)
7 (0.02) (0.06) * 30 (0.10) (0.32)*
8 (0.13) (0.07) 31 (0.06) (0.05)
9 0.08 0.01 * 32 (0.11) (0.13)*
to (0.13) (0.15) * 33 (0.07) 0.00
11 (0.02) 0.08 34 (0.06) 0.05
12/14 0.05 (0.07) * 35 (0.07) (0.05)
15 (0.04) (0.13) * 36 (0.16) (0.05)
16 (0.10) (0.03) 37 0.00 (0.11)*
17 0.01 (0.09) * 39 (0.05) (0.07)*
18 (0.04) (0.04) * 40 (0.22) (0.25)*
19 (0.14) (0.14) *
Note. Revenue and expenditure changes are derived by subtracting the 1983-84 indexes from 1982-83
indexes (Tables 9 and 10), which yields percentage increments or decrements. Parentheses indicate 
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Adjusted reserve position. The revenue-to-expenditure ratio suffices as a crude 
measure of general fiscal stress in the community college system, but is regarded as a 
weak indicator of fiscal trouble in specific organizations. For that purpose, a more 
powerful and sensitive index is needed. Dickmeyer (1980) recommended the “adjusted 
reserve position” (ARP), which factors an institution's revenue reserves into an appraisal 
of its financial position and outlook for financial health.
Reserves-or “slack” in the terminology of Levine et al. (1981)-are, once again, 
the monies left over from a previous fiscal period that are available for future 
expenditures, or to cover current losses. To survive deficits, institutions commonly rely 
on reserves. According to Dickmeyer (1980), growth in reserves is a sign of financial 
health, while a decline in reserves, especially in public institutions, restricts the options 
for effective use of resources, and may signify a deteriorating financial position.
The adjusted reserve position, which takes account of reserves, was computed by 
dividing the general fund balance by the general fund expenditures (Dickmeyer, 1980). 
The general fund balance is the California community college accounting system 
classification for reporting reserves. It is defined as the difference between the assets and 
liabilities of the general fund, designated in this study as the net-ending balance. 
(Although the general fund balance combines monies from restricted and unrestricted 
accounts, a combined accounting according to Dickmeyer (1980), serves to promote the 
clearest picture of an institution's financial resources.)
The adjusted reserve position depicts the fund balance as a proportion of a year's 
expenditures. For instance, a figure of 0.5 (50%) indicates reserves equivalent to one 
half of an institution’s annual budget, or funds sufficient for six months operation after a 
total cessation of revenue. The value of this indicator is that it expresses revenues and 
expenditures in cumulative relationship to one another, and is therefore sensitive to 
growing prosperity or fiscal trouble (Dickmeyer, 1980).
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Table 14
Ratios of Revenues to Expenditures for Participating Districts. 1973-74 through 1987-88
Revenues and Expenditures in Thousands of Dollars 
"Years 75-74 7^75 7j-Td' 7S-7 T 77-7y  7E 77"73-86 "T O " gi-'S f S g 85 "83-gr83-8f 8335 84-67 87-"5 f
butric t
1 20584 22,025 25231 27,868 27560 26237 28,750 33,012 34,648 34,116 343?3 36,638 42,024 43545 47200
19,455 21,027 23,234 24542 27555 25,187 27,025 30,013 34597 34,498 32516 36,055 39510 43,152 46,017
1.06 1.05 1.09 1.12 1.01 1.04 1.06 1.10 0.99 099 1.05 1.02 1.06 1.01 1.(8
2 4 i 109538 135521 156.442 162524 181X844 170,152 189,650 202,496 19525: W 5!0 191501 193376 206)455 205^28 215496
M ,»  84,767 99545 122558 140,743 154407 150504 177466 197521 214357 20t> tt UB37S 208579 190414 195,150 211X244
L29 157 128 1.16 L17 tl}  t0 7  1.02 <189 094 LOS 095 L06 L05 1-02
T I3  30,779 36951 40,656 42,735 46,057 44437 49,431 55,444 58548 58,453 60299 66506 72506 74324 80518
27521 35313 41514 44,016 48,658 44274 48,490 54,775 57948 58,783 59,400 63,727 69,680 71,005 78128
1.11 1.05 098 097 095 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01 0.99 1.02 1.05 1-04 1.05 1-03
*  16975 19568 22910 24597 27/87 24341 2 9 # ?  35536. m t  35590 36355 W &  « 3 5 t =*5/09
15,088 16929 20325 22572 25,241 25112 ,28X77 33926 34576= 35,472 33,7 »  3^476 39,732 43365 45,681 
116 LH 109 V ff m  W  ,'10? 122 102 L06 LOO t<37 09? tOO
» 9534 9563 14561 18587 23550 23,607 26,112 32942 33905 33,642 33391 35963 40597 40961 44564
7,426 9,692 13,033 14512 21944 24,105 25,708 32,444 34,473 32575 33574 37,404 40,764 40,237 42,040
1.28 0.96 1.09 1-28 1.09 098 1.02 1.02 098 1.04 099 096 1.00 1.02 1.06
f f ........... 28328 32202 34975 3 & » ' 37652 37530 «JO0O 9XS5 •48385 45081 47010 5% «? 54913 54323 51561
25,767 2K779 ?«X 5 54JW7 37995 37,536 «26S 59,5# 4m 46199 47444. 49556 5tJ45 50.414 465®
L.18 tl6 ta t 105 099 a s? a » too LOS <H? to o tB2 tO d to * t t l
1 11,478 13342 14,730 16954 20,609 19,016 20391 22331 22966 22901 23580 25,662 29,708 31475 35,078
10,192 12,678 15344 16,613 19549 18,699 21312 23,126 23,032 23392 22964 25927 29,069 30226 343®
1-13 1.04 0.96 1.02 1.05 1.02 096 0.97 099 098 103 099 1.02 1.04 1.02
ft U 568 13967 16*432 22,480 24934 28,135 3m 36S5T6 3537? i m 37968 43,14? 45373 47568
9973 12560 14321 16344 19327 21106 24,616 30562 34,108 34509 34,485 37993 41655 48,416
U 6 t i l ttS 134 123 U S 1X4 t » to ? 1(0 102 098 104 L0l m
<F 5.419 7,445 9,802 10,730 14,085 12924 19312 22,618 23,®0 23,709 25392 28,038 33329 35,471 40343
8532 10153 14,145 15,038 16,664 15345 17502 21,465 22982 21,733 24588 28947 32,142 34,650 38258
064 0.73 069 071 0.85 084 1.10 1.05 1.00 1.09 1.03 097 1.04 1.02 1.®
16 1SX«? 23,789 25*75 26#6 29955 27,238 26,459 31999 3181* 29,869 27885 29343 31089 32542 34564
15925 28,028 20858 21,475 27991 2790< 25,167 29.168 32,499 32537 29351 28,0® 31269 33 <85 3439*
130 m 122 122 UJ7 to o L05 t0 6 098 092 096 to s U 0 099 LOl
11 2970 3514 3983 4911 5573 5,195 5995 6.650 7,419 7,405 7972 9,462 10,446 11,066 12531
2,644 3,044 3.727 4566 5,277 5,113 5.773 6,468 7,0® 7,181 8,009 8,762 10,028 10,694 12345
1.12 1.15 1.07 1.05 1.06 1.02 1.01 1.® 1.05 1.03 1.00 1.08 1.04 1.® 1.02
i i ,l4  " 29963 32355 32314 34947 39,197 35,406 419® 43339 44,156 43,455 =0,1« 48925 55,709 58902 65,747
30,251 33564 32592 33*237 3$51 35971 42,692 43396 «906 44319 41517 47514 ».6D7 57101 61J07
m 097 039 105 to r 099 m t0 l to o 098 ttf t 101 104 L® t»
15 12399 14,619 16,069 17982 17619 17,409 17207 18,604 18953 19216 18989 19,417 20956 21223 23,113
11349 14,189 17,392 15,175 15,485 14,733 18,003 18537 20,(04 19016 18,080 I8301 20328 20,112 22245
1.09 1.03 0.92 1.18 1.14 1.18 096 098 0.95 0.97 1.05 I.® 1.® 1.06 1.04
id 30361 38^79 40213 53,166 56232 52338 62,470 78,50? 81547 79513 81X024 81,129 89,40? 95544 10*939
25575 30851 37,266 43670 49684 s m 56^24 68365 74/906 8159* 76305 81194 86j307 90381 99588
U 8 M4 129 122 113 102 U ! MS 110 097 104 100 UK 105 US
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Table L4 (con'd)
Ratios of Revenues to Expenditures for Participating Districts. 1973-74 through 1987-88
Revenues and Expenditures in Thousands of Dollars 
Years 75-74 74-75 7̂ 75 l&TI 11-W 78-~W 79-80 '8M1' 81-85 8335 W-R' W-8T8S^S K i r B l f
17-------- 7564 19,641 9812 11,669 12988 11899 13,717 15934 16,691 15.413 17069 19515 22543 22,678 26506
6551 7007 9,467 10,660 11,733 11009 13267 16,010 18582 16,105 16049 20,118 20,698 22,643 23094
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i* 5,204 6,696 7,185 8325 10,796 11,026 11.136 13,456 13554 12,485 12,748 12064 14,440 14,636 15545
4,195 5324 6851 8,023 9,146 9286 11249 13,629 13368 12,697 12,779 13,081 14004 13,618 15,096
1.24 1-15 1.05 1.06 1.18 1.19 099 099 1.01 098 1.00 098 097 1.07 1.®
2Q W 6394 5.440 6056 6890 6515 7274 $430 $766 $676 9238 m 13311$ 122# 13546
i m 4088 5852 5520 $104 6997 7031 $906 $401 $918 9065 lft& 5 1X061 13324
I V 136 108 u s t o r m 104 w e 098 t® 104 009 I® W4 10(2
51 23,842 28213 32482 36,429 43251 40201 43938 51536 52,660 52255 53,653 61581 70,193 75,061 87569
21,274 26,661 32495 37,644 42681 37010 45577 49960 47,740 48508 50091 59,738 66,712 75,796 86048
1.12 1.06 1.00 097 1.01 1.06 096 1.03 1.10 1.08 1.05 1.® 1.05 0.99 1.01
a ia 9550 11869 13^59 13,438- 12989 15335 17,4® 17090 17735 17598 19061 22277 S0o4 2& t2
7450 9567 11851 1288! 12337 11986 13296 15185 19020 18024 18019 1931! 2109Q 22082 25,774
120 110 UJ7 H I U57 1.08 u s lt« 095 095 008- 100 m to t W2
53 14,752 17,021 18878 20,758 23311 21382 25,466 29565 30,418 30520 31,431 33,440 37,799 40034 44,644
13379 16095 18884 20357 22093 21,425 24,067 27,058 30,757 31374 31,671 33376 37,400 40089 44371
1.10 1.04 099 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.06 1.09 099 097 099 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01
If 17494 » 5 # 2&7S 31339 295** $,884 35289 37.133 3<*®6 37033 4408 4*296 515®
140® 19542 22456 25684 28066 2$P» 30010 35038 37560 37036 36099 45017 42371 4*44! 4*616
121 m m m 108 m IC i WO $99 $® t « $98 106 WO 104
55-------- 28552 39536 36,622 37348 41308 37,481 43,076 54281 61,405 59,on 58248 66,039 75,795 78027 81,148
24453 28,755 32794 36317 39,725 35,640 43,058 52929 55,709 67070 61,702 6$752 72,452 79334 81,080
1.15 1.37 1.12 1.(8 1.04 1.05 1.00 1.03 1.10 087 094 096 1.05 $99 1.00
& ( & » ' i M $491 "SPS? 9.40! 110)4 19774 10210 9 0 » 1X750 12315
5,215 5582 %m 7/447 7354 m m 11356 11,748 9m $628 . 9,428 1$160 1X3J2 12,196
L12 1X2 186 106 f 717 128 t l ! 106 092 104 116 1JB to e X® WO
JT 5,183 6,190 6,650 7,052 7506 6046 $731 9567 10,040 9035 9082 11,000 11089 11088 12044
3,744 4511 5,648 6095 7,448 7247 8,109 9,405 10,125 10178 10361 11380 11071 11045 12573
1.38 1.37 1.18 1.01 1.01 094 1.08 1.02 0.99 097 096 097 1.00 1.00 I.®
n — 24562 3t& 4 34,936 fta o e 14S/5& 42244 47397 53054 58394/ 5&07 55.<& 5$869 & 0 » ' 61*823 710®
21497 2$10S 32856 36815 40,458 « t f e r «052 490& 56313 52038 52,796 59008 a m 50010
H 4 L12 106! 112 1 8 L05 106 U 0 103 m tOS WO X® $98 l<8
33 18319 20,716 23.469 26,439 27352 25,795 28995 34,054 33,128 30987 32376 35543 40,497 41044 44321
15,516 17363 19810 22054 24,048 22017 25,769 28,477 32,455 33052 34315 37,058 38,769 41,492 44,128
1.18 1.19 1.18 1.20 1.15 1.13 1.13 1.20 1.02 092 094 0.96 1.04 1.01 1.00
1 3 4419 5556 6892 8880 9m 9304 11029 11029 11008 110® 12036 12.434 14m 16058 15213
4,485 5304 s m 7315 $231 8315 9207 10097 12235 IJ& T 13,457 12052 14097 15087 1707!
m 1-09 W8 t s 120 UZ 128 108 m 092 m $98 ,w t MS $96
55 2,642 3,119 3842 4828 5946 5233 6,073 6236 6013 $747 6,796 7215 $179 9020 9084
2318 2319 3,406 3825 4526 4,137 5,027 5,182 6,187 6247 62® 6997 7911 8057 9506
1.14 l.ll 1.16 1.26 1.31 1.26 1.21 1.20 1.10 1.08 1.08 1.® 1.® 1.® 1.®
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Table 14 (con'd)
Ratios of Revenues to Expenditures for Participating Districts. 1973-74 through 1987-88
Revenues and Expenditures in Thousands of Dollars 
 73-74 74-75 75-74 7&-7T 17-11 7EW '79-50 8M f 81-82 TE-M 84-55 55-8(5 86-8r8738
' TM» i w  ljsfc 3^5
m  u4 o j  , las; v a r  m :„ym , ' ts#'; ;m  ~w , ; in
w  5,480 6527 7,2748,088 8352 7362 9584 10,635 11,061 11,684 11,771 13,08 14^1 14,323 15343
4523 4938 6,768 7,737 8384 8221 9,429 10,158 11,861 12,143 11,462 13,407 14,062 14,784 16,022
1.21 1.32 1-07 1.05 0.99 096 1.02 1.05 093 096 1.03 097 1.02 097 099
^  237527194031 | «  Mt V» 52*6-5^ 5»«=' ĝyg» ,7̂
23» ' %?»' 3 ^  * a ft. # ■ ; 4872 jjm  ‘& k $»& "5#  ' 6$5' 83®
m  ts& w  '-*& 095 -.ioj/ tot' Taa: ' 103
« t 7,668 10,038 12700 14557 18,090 18,113 21338 24,403 25,038 23,713 22558 25,175 28,195 28360 31537
6356 9,717 12,173 13370 18,040 19560 21,648 23252 26,070 26,066 23,708 24519 27314 27,605 30,408
1.12 1.03 1.00 1.05 1.00 0.93 1.01 1.05 0.96 0.91 0l95 1.03 1.01 1.05 1.04
Mote. 1st line = current dollar revenues revenue (data from California Community College Fiscal Data 
Abstracts, 1973-1988); 2nd line = current dollar expenditures; 3rd line = ratios.
Table 15 reports the indicator values for the districts in the sample, while Figure 
10 shows the trends in ARPs over a 15 year period. The consumption of reserves in the 
community college system clearly began long before tax limitation, and continued 
downward through tax limitation and the years of events that followed. The median 
reserve level for the institutions in the sample declined from 25% in 1974, to 7% in 1985, 
after which the trend in median reserves took an upturn. The lowest reserve level, 
reported by a particularly stressed institution (#30) at the peak of the tuition policy crisis, 
was -11%. Only three institutions (#34, 35, 39) maintained reserves of 10% or more 
throughout the ten-year period, 1978-79 to 1987-88.
It is important to ask at what point the erosion of reserves places an institution in 
financial jeopardy. Dickmeyer (1983, p. 39) analyzed the ARP for independent two-year 
institutions, and concluded that negative reserves of -20% or less indicated the “lowest 
survival probability.” Clearly, none of the districts in the sample reached that degree of 
decline. Growing concern for district solvency, however, did prompt the legislature to 
create the California Community College Fiscal Monitoring System
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Figure 10. The trends in adjusted reserve position of participating districts.
(AB2910) in 1986, the original mission of which was to help prevent financial 
emergencies in the community college system. After examining the fiscal data, agency 
analysts adopted the criteria used by the K-12 system: 5% reserves defined as the level 
triggering state scrutiny; 3% (accompanied by a pattern of deficit spending) defined as the 
threshold of risk for fiscal emergency (personal communication, S. Nakamura and V. 
Warner, Fiscal Analysts, CCC Fiscal Monitoring System, November, 1988).
Mindful of the importance of reserves, and cognizant of the standards in place for 
K-12 schools, it can be argued that college administrators and trustees would seek to 
preserve at least the minimum reserve level required by the state of other public 
institutions, despite the lack of an official standard for the community colleges prior to 
1987. Thus, for the purposes of this study, it is reasonable to accept the public institution 
guidelines as a cornerstone for an operational definition of severe decline. The five 
percent (5%) reserve level taken as a pattern (two or more consecutive years at
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Table 15
Adjusted Reserve Positions (ARP) of Participating Districts. 1973-74 through 1987-88
Fund Balance and Expenditures in Thousands of Dollars 
Y ears 73-74 7E75 771 8 78-73' 73-OT 86-&f mi 82-fl- g3-84 844S 8j-83~R-3T i’m
d is tric t
1 4383 2^77 3,627 4379 3268 3,413 3,789 5345 3977 2,730 3532 4,128 6536 6919 8320
19,455 21,027 23,234 24,942 27555 25,187 27,025 30,013 34997 34,496 32916 36,055 39910 43,152 46,017
a s 014 0.16 018 012 014 014 018 o n 0.06 O il a n 016 016 018
l 2 i 2S364 37,887 42,410 38(687 36996 40936 44,780 38009 6(457 3064 8003 -2035 8096 17,794 20551
28(38 84,767 99245 122058 140,743 154(697 15Q.0M 177(665 197(821 214357 204(241 183,175 209579 190914 195,150 210(244
030 0.38 035 027 024 027 025 019 aos 002 004 -001 are 009 a«
3,13 8,064 8569 8342 6877 4545 4364 4534 5,155 4912 3011 4,166 6,653 3,782 4,477 4̂ 71
27021 35313 41514 44,016 48,658 44274 48,490 54,775 57048 58,783 59,400 63,727 69,680 71,035 78,128
0.29 0.24 020 016 009 O10 009 009 008 007 0.07 010 005 006 005
4 6,145 4056 m 0173 4^88 2,761 2033 38« 2996 3936 2000 3962 5979 5542 5U j
v m 16029 20,125 22372 25,241 25012 28)17?’ 20926 3^76 35,472 33,793 36,478 39,732 43,148 456®
041 048 036 027 019 O il 009 012 a re 009 009 a re <115 a s a n
5 2016 1,051 158 3.028 3830 3,138 4,422 5306 5,162 3034 4,404 1,731 1,693 2,611 5,007
7,426 9,692 13,(83 14312 21944 24,105 25,706 32444 34,473 32275 33574 37,404 40,764 40,237 42,040
0.30 Oil 0.01 021 017 013 017 016 015 0.12 0.13 005 0.04 006 012
S t,W6l 2,712 4383 4 # 5 3247 4020 4,332 41 . 3* 80 0 20 -1.456 -1358 2371
25,767 27,77? 35,US 34,807 37995 37336 432(6 50574 46944 4^199 47,144 49556 51.745 50)414 46341
a re 0.10 0.14 012 009 O il aw 006 002 000 a re 000 a re •003 aos
1 2054 2,610 1880 2.441 3,416 2288 2,034 1,193 1259 7(9 1917 1,120 1504 3,029 3.135
10,192 12,678 15344 16,613 19549 18,699 21312 23,126 23,032 23392 22064 25927 29(069 30926 343®
022 021 0.12 015 017 015 a io 005 005 003 006 004 005 010 009
8 m 2535 3(478 4076 334* 4300 2(420 3993 4,181 39U 4097 2086 3,167 2312 1(432
9m 12560 14321 16(744 19827 21006 24,616 30362 34,8* 34009 34,683 370» 41655 44944 48)4K
008 020 024 029 017 020 O10 aw 0.12 a n 0.12 a re o re a re o a
9 6,256 5,429 3294 2,011 1,128 1947 1349 1,143 349 2,(81 2,130 1,377 2,415 2,449 3.735
8332 10,153 14,145 15,038 16,664 15345 17302 21,465 22062 21,733 24588 28047 32,142 34,650 38258
073 053 0 3 013 007 013 009 005 0.02 009 009 0.05 008 0.07 0.10
16 15069 10,111 IS250 15,110 14989 14,195 12252 «06S 9224 7^99 4(66? 2)431 2,795 3,129 3091
15025 28028 20(858 21,475 27991 27204. 25,167 29068 32,499 32537 29(151 28,005 310fc 33,035 34395
1.00 036 039 0.70 054 032 051 028 022 a i6 o re a re 009 a «
T T ---------- 1356 1,004 999 719 569 628 618 568 618 6(0 253 6(6 1,102 1557 1,717
2,644 3,044 3.727 4366 5277 5,113 5,773 6,468 7,093 7,181 8,009 8,762 10,028 10,694 12345
0.51 033 0 3 0.16 o n 0.12 O il 009 009 009 0(8 007 O il 0.15 0.14
12,14 7,268 6061 5(685 6903 9,121 3(826 3062 4,172 3^28 4,123 3519 4,83 3,175 4,721
30251 33361 32392 33297 3 m 42(692 43,196 45986 44019 41017 47514 55,6re 57031 61,70:
0*4 018 017 021 a » a re 009 099 609 007 ff» are o re a re o a
15 7,649 8,077 6,746 4558 3200 4320 26(4 1013 201 7 156 481 666 1,728 2,601
11349 14.189 17392 15,175 15,485 14,733 18,003 18037 20,034 19916 18,080 18901 20328 20,112 22245
0.67 057 039 0.30 0.21 029 015 010 0.01 000 001 0.(0 003 0.09 0.12
IS 3,754 5,103 5308 ?(®5 6,428 5,784 7349 5,191 6388 3258 3,120 3,021 5(668 11(006 15251
3t m 37266 43,670 49994 S iM 56,424 68(165 74206 «596 7s m 81,194 86(007 90881
015 o n 015 0.16 013 O il 013 006 009 0Of are oat are 012 ais
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
Table 15 (con’d)
Adjusted Reserve Positions (ARP) of Participating Districts. 1973-74 through 1987-88
Fund Balance and Expenditures in Thousands of Dollars 
Years 73-74 74-75 "75̂ -75 "75-77 77-75 78-7*1 79-800-81 KI-8Z S2-83 83-H4 W-TT 83-80 85-87'87-8F
r r  —  ■ 2372 2,768 2357 2591 3,687 3301 3,410 3216 1296 1,466 2573 1954 4057 3,764 6327
«51 7,807 9,467 10,660 11.733 11309 13267 16,010 18582 16,105 18949 20,118 20,698 22,643 23994
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Table 15 (con’d)
Adjusted Reserve Positions (ARP) of Participating Districts._1973-74 through. 1987-8&
Fund Balance and Expenditures in Thousands of Dollars 
YmS 71-74'74-77 75-74 7&-7T 77-78 nWimiWSMl 82-83 "53-64 84-85' 85-15 84-87 87-8f
I T "  ■ 4 3 » A m i m J s i M M r z m i
7 m 143*2 15584 i m m r n & m 35m 3 7 ,$
m m m <W0 030 021 029 044 m 009 o n 015 020 m 025
37 1,129 2532 2521 3,069 2,707 2,151 2,486 2329 2,135 1,791 2,127 1,746 1391 1,454 1586
4523 4,938 6,768 7,737 8384 8521 9,429 10,158 11561 12,143 11,462 13.407 14,062 14,784 16022
025 tt51 0.42 040 030 026 026 ■ 029 018 015 0.19 013 014 OlO 009
W U fa i m '$ 5 i,K » ■>52 « 2 738 757 & 630 7S8 . ,5 « ? 895
2330 2515 3,410 3339 4,4fc 3572 4,6*2 m X2S7 5,155 5543 m 6535 7,434 m
447 046 053 028 021 021 016 015 012 012 0 t4 014 OH 012 01;
46 1524 1,735 1528 2361 2,406 2547 3599 4,793 4,028 1308 990 1531 1,646 2550 2335
6356 9,717 12,173 13570 18010 19560 21,648 23552 26,070 26,066 23,706 24519 27514 27,605 30,408
0.22 a  18 a  15 021 013 012 016 0.21 015 007 0(X 006 0.06 009 010
Note. 1st line = current dollar fund balance; 2nd line = current dollar expenditures revenue (data from 
California Community College Fiscal Data Abstracts, 1973-1988); 3rd line = ratio.
that level or Iower)--a more conservative standard than the one eventually adopted by the 
state-is useful as a benchmark of unacceptable risk. In this study it will serve as the 
point at which financial exigency becomes a distinct likelihood. This approach differs 
from the one used by Levine et al. (1981) and Sibolski (1984), both of whom looked at 
revenue losses rather than reserve levels. Unlike revenue losses, reserve levels define 
precisely, from the standpoint of cash on hand and institutional obligations, the point at 
which there is an urgent need to reorder institutional priorities and finances (Gray, 1981).
Table 16 shows that by that definition, two or more years of reserve levels at 5% 
or less, ten districts in the sample reached a state of severe decline between 1982 and 
1986; in contrast, only two institutions reached such a state between 1978 and 1982, far 
fewer, in either case, than a criterion of revenue decline would have predicted.
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Table 16
Districts with Low Adjusted Reserve Positions (ARP)
Post-Proposition 13 Post-Defunding
(1977-78 / 1981-82) (1982-83 /  1986-87)
District Lowest Years at or Lowest Years at or
ARP Below 5% ARP Below 5%
2, 38“ (1%) 4
5 4% 2








Note. Parentheses indicate negative percentages.
aLarge urban districts.
Resource Change: Summary
The revenue, expenditure and financial position data show that the community 
college system as a whole experienced extreme financial stress during the period of this 
study. The data clearly show that tax limitation, the initial economic event, was the single 
most important factor in resource change. All districts sustained sizable losses from 
Proposition 13, most were able to minimize decline by making large expenditure 
reductions and spending down their reserves.
Following Proposition 13 and the bail-out, a brief recovery ensued during which 
many districts stabilized financially or made marginal fiscal gains. That respite ended 
abruptly in 1981 when the state legislature moved to curtail system costs by initiating caps 
on growth funding. Thereafter, defunding in 1982, and the revenue veto in 1983, added 
to the cumulative fiscal stress in the community college system. By that time, however, 
districts had dissipated much of their slack, and thus were pressed to step up 
retrenchment
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It is noteworthy that the revenue losses accompanying defunding and the revenue 
veto--the focal events of this study-never matched the steep decline that followed 
Proposition 13, or even the slower decline associated with growth funding changes. 
However, the data show that fiscal stress increased and peaked systemwide between 1982 
and 1984. Greater numbers of districts reported operational deficits, and many responded 
with a pronounced fiscal conservatism that could be said to typify the period. Thus, it 
seems that the importance of these events was not the magnitude of the losses they 
brought, but rather the heightened uncertainty that accompanied them at a time when 
districts were already financially compromised, with no end of austerity in sight and slack 
revenue largely depleted. Remarkably, between 1982-1987, only ten districts met or 
exceeded the criterion of severe decline employed in this study, which, to reiterate, was 
two or more years of reserve levels at 5% or less.
Ailministraiiy£.Strategies.and.Nursins  Programs
According to authorities, the operational measures available to administrators for 
dealing with decline fall into, and thus will be discussed in, three categories: 
nonpersonnel, personnel, and program strategies (Bowen, 1983; Deutsch, 1983). The 
data on administrative strategies were drawn from the interviews conducted with nursing 
program directors. Due to minor interview inconsistencies, the number of queries on any 
given strategy varies. In each case, however, the total number of queries is specified in 
the response tallies.
Nonpersonnel Strategies
During the period of this study, community college administrators often made 
nonpersonnel spending reductions a part of their overall retrenchment strategy.
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Implemented through collegewide spending freezes, static unit budgets, department line- 
item reductions, or allotment increases insufficient to cover cost inflation, these reductions 
resulted in less money for instructional materials, supplies, and equipment Thus 
nonpersonnel spending reductions were frequently an early strategy in a progression of 
institutional strategies for dealing with dwindling state subsidies.
Instructional supplies and materials (Object 4000). Instructional supplies and 
materials have been defined by the CCC Budget and Accounting Manual for accounting 
purposes as those items quickly consumed, easily broken, damaged, or lost, that cost less 
than $200 per unit (California Community Colleges, October, 1985). In nursing, such 
items encompass the printed instructional materials given to students, laboratory and 
classroom supplies of various sorts, and inexpensive audiovisual teaching aids.
Nursing programs use copious printed materials—syllabi, journal reprints, 
instructor-authored materials-which are costly to reproduce, and tend to run up the 
overall expense of instruction. Hence, reduced funding for printed materials was a 
common cost-containment strategy. Twenty-six of 32 directors (81%) queried reported 
such reductions. Sixteen (50%) directors judged their printed materials cutbacks severe 
enough to require an alternative means of funding to preserve teaching routines.
Laboratory supplies encompassed the medical items needed to outfit a nursing 
skills laboratory—the setting where new students are prepared through simulation practice 
for clinical routines. Those items included sterile gloves, bandages, syringes, needles, 
intravenous solutions and tubing, and procedure kits of various sorts, the cost of which 
escalated rapidly—frequently by double-digit increments—during the period of this study.
Budget reduction for laboratory supplies was another common strategy. Of the 36 
directors queried, 32 (88%) claimed that their supply budgets were cut back or frozen, or 
that their increases were insufficient to cover cost-inflation. Nineteen (52%) judged their 
reduction totals severe enough to require alternative sources of funding for supplies.
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Table 17 presents the findings on instructional materials and supplies.
Instructional equipment (Object 6400). Instructional equipment has been defined 
by the Budget and Accounting Manual as tangible property of a more or less permanent 
nature that has a market value on acquisition in excess of $200 per unit (California 
Community Colleges, October, 1985).
In nursing programs, instructional equipment refers to the medical paraphernalia 
necessary to outfit a nursing skills laboratory. That equipment generally approximated the 
items found in a hospital nursing unit: electronically adjustable beds, stretchers and 
wheelchairs, oxygen tanks, oxygen delivery devices, intravenous solution pumps, 
suction devices of various kinds, mechanical lifts, patient monitoring devices, and 
medical procedure mannequins, all of which are expensive purchases and require a sizable 
capital outlay for their procurement or replacement
Equipment funding reductions constituted an almost universal cutback strategy in 
the sample. Of the 37 directors queried, 34 (91%) reported cutbacks of various degrees; 
14 (38%) stated that their budget line items for equipment purchases were eliminated for 
one or more years, in which time purchases were postponed or funded through a central 
college account, and subject to stringent justification and administrative approval 
procedures.
Whether or not those cutbacks interfered with instructional routines depended on 
the pre-cutback state of a program's equipment Numerous nursing departments tapped 
the federal capitation grants and other resources available to nursing education in the 
1970s, to fully outfit their were affected little by capital spending cutbacks. Others were 
less well equipped at the outset of decline. During the years of tight money, their 
equipment became outdated. A few directors (# 5, 7, 32, 33) reported that funds 
available for equipment repairs (Object 5000) were also severely reduced. That resulted 
in chronic equipment dilapidation, which had a serious impact on teaching routines in
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Instructional Material and Supplies (Object 4000). and Instructional 
Equipment (Object 64001 Funding Reductions
Program Printed Laboratory Laboratory Media
Materials Supplies Equipment Programs
i N N N N
2 Y Y Y Y
3 Y® Y® Y Y
4 Y® Y Y Y
5 Y® Y® Y Y
6 Y® Y Yb Yb
7 N Y yah yb
8 Y Y Y Y
9 N Y® Yb Yb
to _ Y® Y Y
LI Y® N N N
12 Y® N N Y
13 N Y® Yb Yb
L4 Y® N Y Y
15 Y® Y® Yb yb
16 - - - -
17 - Y® Y Y
18 Y® Y Y Y
19 Y® Y® yab Yb
20 Y® Y Y Y
21 Y® Y® yab N
22 Y Y® Y Y
23 Y® yab Yb
24 N Y yb yb
27 Y Y Y Y
28 Y Y yab Yb
29 N Y® Y Y
30 - Y Y Y
31 . Y® Y Y
32 Y® Y® yab Yb
33 Y® Y® yab yb
34 Y Y Y Y
35 Y Y Y N
36 Y Y Y Y
37 - Y yab Yb
38 Y Y® yab Yb
39 Y Y Y Y
40 Y® Y® yab yb
xy=26 xy=32 xy=34 xy=33
Note. Y = yes, funds were reduced. No, funding not reduced. Hyphen = not queried. 
a augmentation required, 
b allocation eliminated.
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some instances. “When our electric beds broke down, we had to tell the students to ‘just 
pretend’ when procedures required they raise or lower them,” lamented Director #7. “We 
had to hold some things together with bailing wire!” recalled Director #33
Audiovisual (AV) media programs, which are typically expensive, were subject to 
the same capital spending reductions as laboratory equipment Thirty-four of 37 directors 
(91%) reported that monies for audiovisual teaching aids were substantially reduced or 
eliminated, resulting, in a few cases, in seriously outdated collections. “Some of our 
films were left over from the 1960s!” complained Director #19. In 1985, an influx of 
state money allocated for instructional equipment alleviated the problems faced by many 
vocational programs, including nursing (Commission Report, December, 1985). Table 
17 also summarizes the findings on laboratory equipment and audiovisual media 
programs.
Personnel Strategies
Personnel outlays often comprise up 85% or more of a total institutional budget 
with as much as 50% going to support faculty salaries. Because fixed costs are a concern 
to retrenching organizations (Vandement, 1989), administrative strategies to reduce them 
were predictably common. Hiring freezes, reductions in support personnel and faculty, 
the substitution of part-time for full-time teachers, workload increases and salary freezes 
were some of the tactics reported in this study that became increasingly common after 
1982.
Support personnel. Of the 32 directors queried, 10 (31%) reported that they had 
no assigned positions for laboratory personnel-the technicians who manage nursing 
skills laboratories--and for financial reasons, were unable to obtain them; eight (25%) 
reported reductions of one or more positions, or the downgrading of positions to part-
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time status; eight (25%) reported no change in their laboratory staffing levels. These 
findings are presented in Table 18.
Of the 29 directors queried, nine (31%) reported a reduction of one or more 
secretarial positions which are needed to assist with the bureaucratic responsibilities 
accompanying state regulation, and the myriad duties related to program admissions. 
Three (#5, 13, 35) reported that their secretarial staffing levels, although unchanged, were 
inadequate to meet department needs; one (#9) reported having no department secretarial 
position. Sixteen directors (55%) reported secretarial staffing levels that were not reduced 
and were adequate to meet unit needs (see Table 18).
Faculty positions. Faculty hiring freezes were a common administrative tactic- 
one that led to department faculty attrition in numerous cases. Of 38 directors queried, 21 
(55%) reported one or more full-time position vacancies. Such vacancies frequently went 
unfilled for several semesters, and were accommodated either by reducing program 
enrollment (15 programs) or by staffing clinical courses with part-time faculty (9 
programs).
Faculty reduction by layoff was a far less common strategy. Fourteen directors 
(37%) reported reduction-in-force (RIF) proceedings in their institutions; ten of these 
involved nursing faculty.
Personnel policy. Reductions in funding for faculty continuing education and 
travel (Object 5000) were common personnel policy retrenchment tactics. Of 24 directors 
queried, 18 (75%) reported reduced or eliminated funding for these purposes. Salary 
freezes or reductions were far less common, but flat salaries and meager raises were 
mentioned by nine directors as a cause of faculty morale problems, as was the loss of 
overtime pay, which 11 directors reported (see Table 18).
Nursing workload was an issue that carried over from previous years into the
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Table 18
Personnel Reductions and Personnel Issues
Support Positions FT Faculty Positions Personnel Issues
Program Lab Asst. Secretary Attrition Layoff
l* 0 i 2 4 Yn
2a 0 - 3e 2e Yb
3 I i 0 0 YU
4 . 3e 0 N
5 0 od 0 0 Ybi
6a ob 0 0 2 YU
7 0 0 0 0 Yi
8 ob 0 0 0 YU
9 0 ob ice 0 Yb
10a ob 1 2e 0 vi
11 ob 0 0 0 Y»
12 I I 0 0 N
13 0 od jce 0 YU
14 ob 0 4e 0 Yb
I5a I 0 2e 0 Yi
16a - - 0 0 -
L7a - - 2ce 0 -
18 - - lc 0 Y1
19 0 0 Ic 0 Yb
20 ob - lc 0 -
21 lc 1 3C 0 Yb
22a 2 2 3e 7ef Yb
23 0 0 2e 0 -
24 ob I lce 0 -
27a lc 0 0 Se8 -
28a 0 - 3e i f Yb
29 l c 0 [Ce 0 -
30 lc 0 3e 0 Y*
31 0 0 0 0 -
32 - - 0 0 N
33 oc 0 2e 0 YU
34a - - 0 0 N
35 ob 1 0 0 yhij
36 0 0 0 0 N
37 1 oc 0 0 N
38a ob 0 2 2f Yh
39a ob 0 0 0 N
40a ob I 0 2 YU
Note. Y = ves. N = no. Hyphen = not queried, dColleeewide RIF. ^No position. cPosition downgraded" 
to PT. ^Staffing inadequate. eEnrollment reduced. ^Replaced with transfers. SFaculty transferred, no layoff 
resulted. ^Workload fairness. ‘Salary. ̂ Compensation equity.
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period of this study. Many faculties held historic grievances in regard to workload that 
persisted even as declining college revenue made workload adjustments increasingly 
unlikely. At issue was the formula used to compute full-time equivalency (FI E), which, 
under the provisions of Section 84520 of the Education Code, varied from district to 
district according to the type, schedule, and length of course. Twelve directors (32%) 
reported that workload equity was a matter of great concern to their faculties. In most 
districts, the FTE for laboratory courses, including nursing, was set at 18 to 21 hours, as 
compared with 15 hours for nonlaboratory courses; in a few (# 9, 35, 40), however, the 
equivalency was set higher at 22 to 24 hours. High FTEs, constituted an issue of 
workload fairness for those groups. Many faculties were also concerned about the state- 
mandated nursing faculty meetings not required of other faculty groups, and not factored 
into institutional FTE calculations.
Program Strategies
Program strategies pertained to administrative actions which have consequences 
for a program's status, organization, or continuation. One strategy with the potential to 
affect program status was the reduction of funding for voluntary accreditation. Voluntary 
accreditation in nursing is a prestigious but expensive standing which departments can 
achieve by meeting the standards and paying the fees of the National League for Nursing 
(NLN). Thirteen programs (34%) retained their voluntary accreditation during the years 
of this study, however, three (#3, 10, 11) reported dropping it as part of an institutional 
economy strategy. Twenty-four directors (63%) claimed that during the period of this 
study their faculties were deterred from seeking NLN accreditation due to lack of funding.
Another common strategy used by administrators was to push productivity 
enhancement-maximizing ADA per unit of program cost. Productivity is and was at the 
time of this study measured in weekly student contact hours (WSCH). A contact hour is
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defined as the number of students under the supervision of a certificated instructor for 1 
hour. One ADA is defined as the equivalent of 525 contact hours (Silverman, 1982). 
Prior to 1988, WSCH was the single most important workload measure used to compute 
ADA. Economic productivity, defined as WSCH per FTE, was used by community 
college administrators to evaluate the comparative contributions of college subunits and 
programs to a district's financial welfare.
With WSCH per FTE levels almost universally in the 150 to 250 range, the 
nursing programs in this study fell far short of institutional targets, commonly set at 500 
or above, and even fell short of the state average, which in 1982 hovered at 420 
(Silverman, 1982). Thus, it was not unusual for administrators to urge increases in ADA 
productivity for nursing and other “low-WSCH” programs. Thirty of 37 directors (81%) 
reported they came under substantial administrative pressure to increase their program’s 
WSCH totals. Two directors (#10, 40) reported they were given new WSCH targets 
significandy above previous guidelines. Six reported no increase in WSCH pressure, 
however, two directors in that group (#3, 13) reported their programs were protected by 
an exclusionary clause in the faculty collective bargaining contract which exempted allied 
health programs from district WSCH requirements. Table 19 summarizes these findings.
Productivity evaluations were part of a growing preoccupation with cost- 
efficiency on many campuses. According to numerous program directors, productivity 
evaluations set the conditions for a heightened WSCH awareness within the general 
faculty. That in turn fostered a widespread perception that low-WSCH programs such as 
nursing were “expensive.” As resources dwindled, concern for cost-efficiency 
sometimes resulted in formal administrative proposals for the complete or partial 
termination of low-WSCH units. Programs such as nursing, which are not code­
mandated, and which qualified for elimination under the reduction in force (RIF) and 
teacher dismissal provisions of Section 13447 of the Education Code, were sometimes 
targeted. Indeed, twelve nursing directors reported administrative proposals to terminate




Program Membership Cutback Productivity Requirements Termination Proposals
1 Na Y Y
2 Na Y Y
3 ybc N N
4 Na Y N
5 Na Y yh
6 N*1 Y Y
7 N4* Y N
8 I*5 N
9 N*1 Y N
10 Y® Yf Yh
11 y C N N
12 tP N
13 Yb N N
14 Y N
15 Na Y N
16 - . N
17 N41 Y N
18 Na N N
19 Y N
20 Y N
21 Nd Y N
22 Nd Y Y
23 Nd Y N
24 Nd N® N
27 Nd Y Y
28 Nd Y Y
29 Nd N N
30 Nd Y N
31 Nd N N
32 Nd Y N
33 Nd Y N
34 Nd N Y
35 Na YS N
36 Nd N« N
37 Na N® N
38 Na Y Y
39 Nd Y Y
40 Na Yf Y
E n = 3 3 . I y = 4 I n = 1 2 . I y = 25 I N = 26, L Y = 12
Note. Y = yes. N = no. Hyphen = not queried. aNLN accredited. °NLN membership dropped. CNLN 
accreditation dropped. ^No voluntary accreditation-funding a factor, eNo increase in productivity pressure. 
*New WSCH “targets” given. ^Enrollment increased without commensurate increases in full-time 
faculty. ^Termination warnings given.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
115
or partially terminate nursing programs. Programs #6 and 40, for example, were 
recommended for a 30% faculty reduction; #1, 27, and 34 for a 50% reduction; and #39, 
along with two of eight programs in District #2/22/28/38, for closure. Further, directors 
#5 and 10 reported that they received informal termination warnings under which they 
anticipated the complete or partial termination of their programs. Table 20 summarizes the 
findings on program terminations.
Administrative Strategies and Resource Decline
The Levine et al. (1981) model postulates a link between institutional resources 
and administrative strategies. Severe decline, according to the model, demands layoffs 
and program terminations. To determine whether in fact such strategies were a response 
to impending financial exigency, it is important to examine that link from the standpoint of 
the data in this study. Three ratios are helpful for that purpose, the adjusted reserve 
position defined earlier, the full-time faculty/student ratio—a measure of program 
efficiency as related to unit productivity (Gordon and Dawson, 1991; Jones 1985), and 
the unit enrollment/college enrollment ratio--a rough index of the cost-burden a unit places 
on an institution. Table 21 reports the indicators for the districts proposing nursing 
terminations. Table 22 gives the same indicators for districts in which nursing programs 
reportedly faced no increases in pressure for unit productivity. The full-time faculty-to- 
student ratios for the entire sample varied from 0.14 to 0.03, with a median and mode of 
0.07. A complete list can be found in Appendix J. The nursing enrollment-to-college 
enrollment ratios varied from 4.3 to 0.3 with a median of 1.0, and appear in Appendix K.
By comparing Tables 21 and 22, it is clear that termination proposals are a 
complex administrative determination involving additional decision factors not revealed by 
this study. The faculty-to-student ratios, for example, did not differentiate programs 
proposed for termination from those not (although Program #1 stood out as being
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Table 20
Summary of Nursing Terminations
District Type of Termination Proposed Recommended Faculty Reduction
1 Partial 17 of 30
2/22/28/38 2 Complete 20 of 110
5 Complete*
6 Partial 2 of 7
10 Complete*
27 Partial 0
34 Partial 7 of 15
39 Complete*
40 Partial 3 of 12
Note.* Programs #5, 10 received informal warnings; no RIF proceeding followed. Program #39 was
included in an optional proposal given the board of trustees; no RIF proceeding followed.
Table 21
The Financial Position. Nursing Program Efficiency, and Cost-Burden of Districts
Proposing Nursing Program Terminations
District Year of Prior Year ARP Nsg FT Faculty/ Nsg Enroll /
Proposal Student Ratio College Enroll
Ratio*






6 1987 (0.03) 0.06 1.5
27 1983 0.05 0.07 2.1
34 1983 0.14 0.10 1.6
39 1982 0.15 0.06 0.7
40 1984 0.07 0.10 0.7
Note. Parentheses indicate negative numbers. * Enrollment ratios are calculated for year of ARP.
Table 22
The Ei-naocial_P.QsitiQQ, -Nursing Program J5fQ£isngy,.aadJQoskBuKigojpf P istrias
Supporting the Organizational Continuity of Nursing Programs
District Lowest ARP-1982-1987 Nsg FT Faculty / 
Student Ratio
Nsg Enroll / College 
Enroll Ratio*
3 0.05 0.10 0.9
8 0.05 0.09 0.3
12 0.06 0.08 0.9
24 0.07 0.07 0.7
36 0.09 0.07 0.5
37 0.10 0.09 0.9
Note. *Enrollment ratios are calculated for year of ARP.
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comparatively inefficient). Nor did financial position differentiate the two groups, 
although the range of ARPs (0.15 to -0.03) in Table 20 was wider than that in Table 21 
(0.10 to 0.05), which suggests that harsh cutback measures may be attractive to 
institutions at the extremes of the economic spectrum—fiscally conservative institutions 
presently well-off but concerned about eventual insolvency, and institutions already 
financially troubled. Overall cost burden, on the other hand, did appear to differentiate the 
groups. The enrollment ratios of the institutions proposing nursing terminations were 
substantially above the sample median of 1.0. Clearly, officials differed in their tolerance 
for economic risk. It is especially noteworthy that six of the ten districts (#7, 15, 16, 19, 
30 and 31) with reserves at or below the criterion of severe decline avoided nursing 
program terminations. On the other hand, five districts (#1, 10, 34, 39, and 40) with 
reserves above or well above the reserve criterion proposed nursing program terminations
Administrative Strategies: Summary
These findings show the toll taken on nursing programs by Community College 
retrenchment, 1982-87. All programs sustained reductions in one or more categories: 
nonpersonnel, personnel, and/or program. No program went untouched by resource 
decline. Indeed, the impact on the daily operations was significant in many instances, and 
a frustration to many nursing faculties. Faculty attrition was widespread in the sample; 
layoffs and nursing program termination proposals occurred in a number of cases— 
frequently enough, it would seem, to foster a climate of job insecurity. However, 
termination did not correspond in all cases to a situation of imminent financial emergency.
To summarize, 81% of the nursing program directors reported reduced funding 
for instructional materials, 88% reported reductions for laboratory supplies, and 91% for 
laboratory equipment and teaching aids. A few programs (3) were forced to drop their 
voluntary accreditation; many others (63%) found accreditation unattainable in part for
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lack of funding. In several settings, faculties were unhappy because of salary stagnation, 
long work hours, or low or no funding for travel and continuing education. Numerous 
programs (25%) experienced laboratory staffing cutbacks, while many others (31%) were 
unable to hire needed laboratory personnel. A number of directors (28%) reported 
reductions in department secretarial positions; 58% reported faculty reduction by attrition; 
16% reported full-time faculty layoff attempts in conjunction with partial or complete 
program termination proposals.
Clearly, the impact of retrenchment was widespread and serious enough to require 
adaptations to deal with the resulting shortages and inconvenience. Absent extra pay, 
work condition improvements or other incentives, these could only have been achieved at 
the expense of faculty energy, good will and morale.
The Political Behavior of Nursing Faculties
According to numerous authorities on institutional resource decline, a constituency 
group's behavior derives from a perceived threat to its values inherent in the measures 
administrators employ to facilitate an economic adaptation (Bowen, 1983; Deutsch, 1983; 
Dougherty, 1981; Gumport, 1993 May-June; Mingle and Norris, 1981; Powers, 1982). 
Further, the severity of decline determines the selection of managerial tactics which in turn 
serve to politicize organizational decision making (Levine et al, 1981). Authorities also 
point to perceived discrimination-inequities in the sorting out of winners and losers— 
during retrenchment as another determinant of constituency responses (Bamer-Barry and 
Rosenwein, 1985). These factors, moreover, are linked to constituency behavior by 
notions of group endangerment and distributive injustice. The greater the threat, the more 
intense the partiality perceived in retrenchment tactics, the more likely a constituency will 
react by waging a political offensive.
Typically, organizations respond to resource decline with a series of
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administratively imposed adaptations. In a hierarchical system, where authority is 
contractually assigned, those adaptations constitute a program of externally generated 
demands. Top administrators initiate a flow of requirements to which groups lower in the 
hierarchy are obligated to respond. In the classical bureaucracy, the expectation is that 
those at the lower level will conform to higher-level directives. Colleges and universities 
differ from the classical bureaucracy, however, in that they function, at least to some 
degree, as political systems in which organization policy decisions are subject to 
constituency influence. As conditions change, a group (faculty, classified personnel, 
students) may act in any number of ways to secure its interests and protect its values.
According to Elmore and McLaughlin (1982), in any political system, 
constituencies have four options for dealing with externally generated demands. Those 
are to comply fully, to adjust incrementally, to co-opt the demand maker, or to deny or 
resist the demand. To this list, one might add the option of simply opposing (while 
otherwise complying with) a demand. Figure 11 displays the definitions of these terms 
which admittedly overlap to a certain degree. The following discussion reports on the 
responses of nursing faculties to conditions of decline as described by program directors, 
faculty members, and college administrators.
Responses of Nursing Faculties
As indicated above, retrenchment was pervasive in the California community 
college system between 1982 and 1987. As a consequence, no nursing program avoided 
cutbacks entirely. Although not uniformly harsh, the cutbacks in most cases were 
substantial enough to necessitate an adaptation. Faculties complied, sought altemauves 
for an incremental adjustment, or resisted policy change in any of a variety of ways. 
Table 23 summarizes the responses of nursing faculties to each type of cutback. Table 24 
tallies those responses, and establishes their relative importance as a pattern of adaptation.
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(1) Full Compliance - A constituency group does what it is required by authority to 
do; denotes a rapid, more or less complete adjustment, the strain of which may be 
reduced by careful management
(2) Incremental Adjustment - The constituency group makes a cautious response in 
the direction of compliance; denotes a response that minimizes the reduction of 
services but involves an alternative plan (negotiated time delays, procurement
of substitute resources).
(3) Denial /  Authoritative Resistance • The constituency group acts to fend 
off external pressures by ignoring them or by instituting countervailing 
pressures Qawsuits, legislative initiatives, coalition building, electoral activity, 
threat-making).
(4) Co-optation - The constituency group reaches out to enfold its adversary by 
influencing the adversary's cultural or political outlook (often through an effort to 
educate) or by engaging in pro forma responses.
(5) Opposition - The constituency group expresses its opposition to an external 
demand by various means (demonstrations, rallies, press conferences).
Figure 11. Political options for dealing with an external demand. Adapted from Elmore and McLaughlin 
(1982), p. 110.
Responses to nonpersonnel strategies. Because nonpersonnel cutbacks posed a 
potential threat to instructional quality, faculties, with few exceptions, took steps to 
minimize the impact of cutbacks in that category. Usually, they responded by conserving 
existing resources, but many also sought to locate new resources for a slower, more 
incremental adjustment to funding reductions. A summary of those measures appears in 
Table 25.
To ease the strain of compliance, faculties-a total of 38 in all—stretched their 
resources, minimized consumption, and set priorities for the use of allocated funds. They 
stockpiled essential items as unit funding allowed—19 faculties engaged in supply 
stockpiling-and conserved accumulated inventories through recycling. Indeed, 32 
faculties practiced recycling. Laboratory supplies, for example, were repackaged and 
reused, sometimes to a point where they could no longer be reassembled. “Some of our 
students never got to open a fresh sterile package,” lamented Director #19.
Another mode of response was fund-shifting-the practice of moving allotted
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Responses to Responses to Responses to Program Strategies
Nonpersonnel Strategies Personnel Strategies 
Program Materials Supplies Media and Attrition Layoffs Membership Productivity Termination
Equipment
1 NA NA NA IA D/R/O/IA NA NA R/O/IA
2 C C/IA IA C/Co D/Co/R/O NA C/D R/O
3 IA C/IA IA C NA C NA NA
4 IA C/IA IA C NA NA C NA
5 IA C/IA IA/Co NA Co* NA C/Co Co/R*
6 IA C/IA Co NA RAD C C IA/R/O
7 NA C/IA Co NA NA C C NA
8 NA C C NA NA C C* NA
9 NA C/IA R C NA C D NA
10 C/IA IA Co D/Co/R* IA C/Co Co/R*
11 IA NA NA NA NA C NA NA
12 IA NA NA C NA C NA NA
13 NA C/IA C IA/Co NA C NA NA
14 IA NA C C NA C D NA
15 IA C C R/O Co NA C NA
16 - - . NA NA - . NA
17 - C/IA IA C/Co Co C C NA
18 IA C/IA IA C NA NA NA NA
19 IA C/IA C C NA C Co NA
20 IA C/IA IA C NA C Co NA
21 IA C/IA C R/O NA c Co NA
22 D C/IA IA IA D/Co/R/O c C/D R/O
23 DVD - IA/Co C NA c Co NA
24 NA C C C NA c D NA
27 C c IA C C c C/R C
28 C C/IA C C D/R/O c C/D R/O
29 NA C C C NA c Co NA
30 - C C C/Co NA C D NA
31 C/IA C NA NA c NA NA
32 IA C/IA C Co NA c C/Co NA
33 IA C/IA Co C/Co NA c Co NA
34 C C/IA IA NA R/O c NA R/O/IA
35 D C/IA C C NA NA C/R/O NA
36 C C/IA IA/O Co NA c NA NA
37 - C/IA IA C NA NA Co NA
38 C C/IA IA C D/Co/R/O NA C/D R/Co/O
39 IA C/IA C NA D/R/O C NA R/Co/O
40 IA C/IA C C O NA C O
Note. Hyphen = Not queried; C = Compliance; IA = Incremental adjustment; D = Denial; R = Resistance; 
Co = Cooptation; O = Opposition; NA = Not applicable; * = termination warning only.
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Table 24
Nursing Faculty Response Tallies
NP NO NA NC_____________________________ » of Responses__________________________________
C % IA % D *  k  % Co % O
Nonpersonnel
Materials 38 32 5 27 6 (22.2) 19 C70.3) 2 (7.4) 0 0 0
Supplies 38 36 4 32 32 (100) 27 (84.4) 0 0 0 0
Equipment 38 37 3 34 IS (44.1) 15 (44.1) 0 I (2.9) 5 (14.7) 0
Personnel
A ttr it io n  38 38 l l  27 21 (71.7) 3 (11.1) 0 2 (7.4) 8 (30.0) 2 (7.4)
Faculty L a y o ff  38 38 26 10 1 (8.3) 1 (8.3) 0 8 (80.0) 6 (60.0) 8 (80.0)
Program
Membership 38 37 10 27 26 (96.3) 1 (3.7) 0 0 0 0
Productivity 38 37 10 27 18 (66.6) 0 8 (29.6) 2 (7.7) 10 (38.5) 0
Termination 38 38 26 12 1 (8.3) 3 (25.0) 0 10 (83.3) 5 (41.7) 7 (58.3)
Note. NP = # of Programs; NQ = # Queried; NA = Not Applicable; NC = # Cut C = Compliance; IA = 
Incremental adjustment; D = Denial; R = Resistance; Co = Cooptation; O = Opposition
funds from lower to higher priority uses. Twenty faculties practiced fund shifting. This 
sometimes meant taking money from capital outlay (object 6400), if funded, and putting it 
into instructional supplies (object 4000). Teaching aids and new equipment were often 
sacrificed to maintain adequate inventories of classroom materials and laboratory supplies. 
State regulations, however, stipulate that intercategory transfers must be approved by 
district trustees. Therefore, many directors favored intracategory transfers—the transfers 
over which they maintained complete discretion-and made such transfers a regular part of 
their unit budget strategy. To assure a budget reserve, for example, Director #5, allotted 
extra money for teaching aids under Supplies and Materials (Object 4000). “If you run 
short in duplicating or lab necessities, you take it from AV!” she acknowledged.
To reduce gaps between unit needs and allotments, faculties also coped by 
locating alternative resources. Thirty-three faculties in all used such an approach. One of
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Table 25
Compliance and Incremental Adjustment to Nonpersonnel Strategies
Compliance Incremental Adjustment
Program Supply Fund Supply Solicit Fee Fund
Stockpiling Shifting Recycling Donations Increases Raising
1
2 ♦ * ♦ 4c 4c
3 ♦ * * 4c 4c
4 * 4c 4c 4c 4c
5 * * 4c 4e 4c 4c
6 * 4c 4c 4c
7 * * 4c 4c 4c
8 4c 4c
9 * 4c 4c 4c
10 * * 4c 4c 4c 4c
11 4c
12 4c
13 * * 4c 4c 4c 4c
14 4c
15 * 4c 4c
16
17 * 4c 4c 4c
18 * * 4c 4c 4c
19 * * 4c 4c 4c
20 4c 4c 4c 4c
21 4c 4c 4c 4c
22 * * 4c 4c 4c
23 * 4c 4c
24 * 4c
27 4c 4c 4c
28 * 4c 4c
29 * 4c
30 * * 4c
31 4c 4c
32 * * 4c 4c
33 * 4c 4c 4c
34 4c 4c
35 * ♦ 4c 4c 4c
36 * 4c 4c
37 * 4c 4c 4c
38 * * 4c 4c 4c
39 4c 4c
40 * 4c 4c 4c
I s s =19 I*s = 20 E s r  = 32 I * 1 = 22
OC
MIt I tr =  20
Note. * = Strategy included the transfer of basic skills teaching to the hospital. A total of 33 faculties 
used compliance; 33 faculties used incremental adjustment
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the more common practices was to solicit donations of supplies and equipment from 
hospitals and medical supply companies. Not a new practice, soliciting supplies became 
increasingly popular as cutbacks deepened after 1982. Some faculties eventually 
extended the practice to include equipment, although those efforts frequently yielded items 
in need of costly repairs. A few faculties (#7, 36) encouraged donations by setting up 
formal solicitation protocols which incorporated third-party appraisals and donation tax- 
receipts. There were also variations on this tactic, such as to prevail upon hospitals to sell 
medical items at discounted prices (#10), or to provide free services (laundering linens-- 
#6). Yet, another variation, a form of inter-organizational cost-shifting was to conduct 
teaching activities in the hospital. Numerous faculties took advantage of the hospital as a 
source of supplies and equipment by simply taking students into the clinical setting for 
their basic skills training. Indeed, many embraced this tactic as an acceptable solution to 
campus shortages. “Nursing has that wonderful laboratory in the hospital!” exclaimed 
Director #2. Director #21 observed, “We coped by taking our students to the hospital 
from day one.” “It’s better for the students,” asserted Director #36. Or as Director #13 
noted, “We’re lucky. It’s not like down at autobody where the students have nowhere 
else to go.”
Another common practice was to pass a portion of the cost of materials and 
supplies on to the student. Nearly two-thirds of the programs in the sample relied on 
student fee increases to ease the impact of budget cuts. After the 1984 tuition 
compromise, however, fee increases replaced by tuition under the conditions of the 
compromise, were eliminated as a budget strategy. As a consequence, a substantial 
number of programs turned to fundraising to help make ends meet. Grantwriting became 
a more common management practice than it previously had been, as did the pursuit of 
“soft-money” arrangements for supporting program operations. Indeed, a majority of 
directors undertook educational grant-writing. “This whole period has been a time of 
increasing attention on my part to getting extramural funds!” said Director #37. Although
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small grants (less than $5000) were common, some directors reported large grants. 
Director #22, for example, obtained a $40,000 foundation grant for program equipment; 
Director #38 secured a $75,000 foundation grant to renovate and equip a skills laboratory; 
Director #20 obtained $80,000 for a similar purpose. Only one group (#10) turned to 
direct fund-raising as a means of paying for unit needs, and no groups initiated planned- 
giving programs, perhaps because most community college foundations were at that point 
in a developmental stage.
Another route for pursuing allotment increases was through the bureaucratic 
budget construction process. However, directors found that as decline continued, that 
avenue became increasingly unproductive. “Every year I ask for more money, and every 
year they [campus executives] give me less,” lamented Director #29. “I've had a roll-over 
budget for the last five years,” commented Director #36. Many complained that their role 
as unit managers provided them too little access to the district executives who controlled 
allotments. “How much influence you have depends entirely on who you report to,” 
observed Director #23.
Nevertheless, some directors did succeed by focusing their efforts on restricted 
college funds-those monies designated by law for specific purposes, which in this case 
referred to the federal subsidies available to nursing programs under the Vocational 
Education Act (VEA). At the local level, those funds were often distributed by middle- 
management committees accessible to influence from below, and many directors made 
efforts through that channel to procure or increase their allotments. The pursuit of such 
funds sometimes required directors to challenge the established protocol. Director #7, for 
example, found it necessary to demand a membership on the decision committee. 
Although some directors (#5, 7, 23) succeeded in their effort, others were unsuccessful. 
Ironically, a few of the unsuccessful directors (#6, 13, 22) reported that the competition 
for VEA funds among subunits worked to the disadvantage of nursing programs, because 
the VEA decision makers in their institutions required that those with access to alternative
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resources defer to those totally dependent on college allotments. “There was a lot of give 
and take, but it was usually nursing that did the giving—they knew that we could go to the 
hospital!” said Director #13.
Aside from the many programs that adapted through modes of compliance and 
incremental adjustment, there were a few which pursued co-optive, resistance, 
oppositional or denial tactics. Director #23 successfully co-opted her superiors by 
preparing an elaborate cost-benefit analysis to justify her request for capital outlay funds. 
“I showed the administration how, with a little investment, they could not only get their 
money back, but pull in additional ADA.” That effort succeeded in part because members 
of the nursing faculty concurrently lobbied members of the college budget committee for 
the funding increase. Director #9 described a resistance tactic. “We [members of the 
nursing faculty] went to our administration as a group with the message that if they didn't 
fund our laboratory, they wouldn't have a faculty!” Director #35 adapted by ignoring 
nursing’s assigned budget limits for supplies and materials: “They [administrators] never 
say anything—I guess they know I never ask for anything I don't need.” Director #23 
described a similar approach: ‘There's an unwritten rule on this campus that says ‘He 
who overspends gets rewarded.’”
Responses to personnel strategies. Personnel reductions, part of the gradual 
progression of administrative tactics for dealing with decline, became increasingly 
common after 1982, as economic deterioration in the community college system 
accelerated. Most nursing programs (see Table 18) faced hiring freezes which down­
graded full-time positions, and resulted in staff attrition. However, a few were able to 
replace lost personnel with funds acquired from the soft-money arrangements they 
negotiated with local hospitals. Although the attrition of personnel put pressure on the 
full-time faculty remaining to absorb extra instructional tasks, faculties mounted little 
resistance or formal opposition to the policies resulting in vacancies. The groups in this
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study, with a few notable exceptions, reluctantly accepted the staff changes resulting from 
personnel attrition. Those that did not accept the changes used a variety of tactics. 
Director #21 resisted when her program lost three full-time faculty in a single year. “The 
district’s part-time policy was destroying our program,” she explained. Director #21 
called a meeting of her program advisory committee, and focused the agenda on the 
drawbacks of using part-time personnel. She invited local health care administrators, 
college executives, and a state assemblyman. The effort was unsuccessful; no staffing 
changes resulted. Members of the Program #15 faculty tried to dissuade their board of 
trustees from applying a policy of attrition to the nursing department The institution was 
facing bankruptcy, however, and the board made no concessions. Director #10 went 
over the chancellor’s head to the board of trustees with a request for a unit secretarial 
replacement. She succeeded, but at a social cost Her fellow unit managers disapproved 
of the tactic.
The responses of nursing faculties to layoff proposals were, on the whole, more 
aggressive, and will be discussed below, along with the program termination plans of 
which they were a part.
Responses to program strategies. Nursing faculties responded to cuts in 
membership funds by complying-that is, by giving up, postponing, or putting off 
indefinitely, the pursuit of voluntary accreditation. Only one faculty, #10, pursued an 
incremental solution, turning to direct fundraising to pay its accreditation fees, and no 
faculties opposed membership funding policies. Faculties clearly differed in their 
outlooks on voluntary accreditation. Some considered certification helpful to students 
seeking transfers to four-year colleges; others looked at it as a professional luxury. “We 
never could decide whether the expense was worth it!” said Director #19.
Compliance and co-optation were the most common faculty responses to demands 
for increased ADA productivity. Table 26 summarizes those responses. Twenty-seven
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faculties pursued some form of compliance tactic. Compliance usually required a measure 
of reorganization to achieve the necessary WSCH increases. Reorganization took one of 
three forms: (1) class section consolidation; (2) curriculum expansion; or (3) clinical 
faculty-student ratio increases. Nineteen faculties consolidated, small, frequently repeated 
classes into large lecture sections. By that means, they were able to increase their faculty 
contact hours, but at a risk to student performance: students in the expanded courses 
received less individual attention. Other groups added courses to the curriculum within 
the limits of the credit caps set by the Board of Registered Nursing, (BRN). A few 
faculties directed their new courses to prenursing students with the intention of taking 
advantage of the WSCH potential of that group. Another tactic was to do a more basic 
program restructuring. A few programs (#5, 8) converted from a career ladder (one-year 
LVN to RN) design to a generic (two-year comprehensive) structure. That not only 
assured WSCH increases, but helped rejuvenate program vitality for those programs 
suffering from a decline in their pool of career-ladder applicants. Another program (#35) 
added a career ladder tract to its comprehensive curriculum to boost its WSCH.
Finally, some faculties adapted by increasing their faculty-to-student clinical 
teaching ratios-the most powerful factor depressing nursing unit WSCH. Clinical ratios, 
which ranged from 1:9 to 1:13 in the sample, were set, subject to the provisions of the 
California Administrative Code, by contract between a program and a hospital at a level 
compatible with program objectives and hospital safety standards. Ten faculties in the 
sample implemented marginal increases (1:9 or 1:10 to 1:11 or 1:12) as a way of 
increasing unit WSCH. Such increases, widely perceived to hinder clinical supervision, 
were controversial. As a consequence, several groups considered but ultimately rejected 
ratio adjustments. Indeed, a few faculties resisted administrators' attempts to increase 
ratios. Director #27 threatened to contact the Board of Registered Nursing (BRN) when 
college administrators insisted on an increase. “Clinical ratios are where I draw the line!” 
she said.
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Table 26
Compliance and Co-optation in Response to Program Strategies
Compliance Co-optation
Program Increased Increased Increased Courses Units Reduced ADA
Class Size Courses Clinical Ratio Split Added Courses Study
1 *
2 * * *
3
4 ♦ * 4c
5 * 4c *a
6 * *
7 * * 4c
8 4c
9 *







17 * 4c *
18 4c
19 * * 4c
20 * 4c
21 * 4c








32 * 4c *





38 * * 4c *a
39 *a
40 * *
I'cs = 19 r c =5 Xicr= l l oII
&
£ ua = 2 xrc = 5 Xas= 14
Note. * = increased faculty-student ratio considered but rejected. Twenty-six faculties pursued compliance
tactics. Twenty-three faculties pursued co-optation tactics. Conducted as response to termination threat.
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Several faculties—23 in all—fashioned co-optive responses to WSCH pressure. 
Their featured pro forma curriculum changes—program alterations which entailed a 
minimum of substantive change. One tactic (employed by ten faculties) was to split 
existing courses. Nursing courses are often large, multiunit entities which incorporate a 
range of subjects such as the medical, surgical, procedural, nutritional, developmental, 
and psychosexual aspects of caring for children, adults, or the elderly. Such courses can 
be and in several cases were subdivided into freestanding subunits which increased the 
total credit value of a program’s course offerings. Credit increases were factored into 
WSCH computations to expand a nursing department’s WSCH. Another pro forma 
approach was to add a unit or two to existing courses without changing the course 
structure or content. Both tactics were essentially “paper” changes, designed, as Director 
#10 and others noted, “to get administration off our backs!” Voluntary course cutting 
was yet another co-optive tactic by which some faculties coped. The faculty of Program 
#17, for example, voluntarily reorganized to eliminate certain non-essential courses. 
Members speculated that the cost savings achieved from course-cutting would divert 
administrators' attention from the overall expense of the nursing department.
The most ambitious co-optive tactic of all, however, was to use ADA data to 
redirect local college debates on the cost of nursing programs. As resources dwindled, 
college executives, according to numerous program directors, increasingly favored an 
accounting perspective that treated all units and programs as independent cost-centers- 
that is, as separate economic entities for balancing costs with ADA. Under that 
perspective, every department was expected to “carry its own weight,” or “break even,” 
which low-WSCH programs such as nursing often had difficulty doing. Several nursing 
faculties countered with the argument that a college is not merely a collection of cost 
centers, but rather an economic unity. They emphasized that nursing, as a primary 
student attraction, made an indispensable economic contribution. To back up their 
argument, 14 faculties conducted ADA studies and/or student interest surveys to
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determine the amount of ADA contributed by nursing and prenursing students to the ADA 
totals of other departments-so called indirect ADA.
Other, less common, responses to WSCH pressures included denying the 
importance of WSCH demands, or ignoring WSCH-related directives. Director #24, for 
example, down-played the significance of complaints made by her supervisors. “They 
[college executives] say that nursing is expensive, but they never do anything about it!” 
Directors in District #  2/22/28/38 failed to devise a plan for program consolidation as 
directed. Embroiled in an internal power struggle, they subsequently lost their chance to 
influence district retrenchment decisions as they pertained to nursing.
Responses to terminations and layoffs. Most nursing faculties subject to 
termination proposals mounted a public campaign to meet their anti-termination 
objectives. These campaigns commonly incorporated resistance and opposition tactics 
such as coalition building, public demonstrations, testimony before the board of trustees, 
legislative and regulatory initiatives to gain government intervention and action taken to 
influence. The features of these campaigns and the termination proposals that prompted 
them are summarized in Table 27; campaign tactics are summarized in Table 28.
In most termination situations, nonspecific indicators pointed to the possibility of 
program termination well before an official announcement was made. Those indicators 
included preparations for change such as district-conducted community need surveys, and 
curriculum forums, program efficiency and vitality reviews; special board meetings 
convened to consider district priorities; persistent layoff and termination rumors focused 
on the demise of low-WSCH programs; and media accounts of impending district budget 
crises and restructuring strategies. Most of the nursing groups slated for termination, 
however, ignored or failed to heed these clues for reasons that will be discussed later. 
After policy proposals were announced, however, nursing faculties organized to resist. 
Only the faculty of Program #27 complied without opposition. Its members were offered
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Table 27
Administrative Proposals and Nursing Campaign Features
District Proposal Features Nursing (Campaign Features
Year Status of RIF Initiated Leadership Type Coalition Type
_________ Proposal___________________ _________________________________
Prog
1 1983 Formal Yes Ad Hoc Mixed
2 1986 Formal Yes Ad Hoc Mixed
5 1983 Informal* No Formal Internal
6 1987 Formal Yes Formal Mixed
10 1984 Informal* No Formal Internal
22 1986 Formal Yes Ad Hoc Mixed
27 1983 Formal No None None
28 1986 Formal Yes Ad Hoc Mixed
34 1983 Formal Yes Formal External
38 1986 Formal Yes Ad Hoc Mixed
39 1982 Formal No Formal External
40 1984 Formal Yes Ad Hoc None
Note.* Warning only - no public proposal followed.
Table 28
Resistance and Opposition to Termination Proposals
















I * * * 4c
2 * 4c * * 4c 4c
5 * 4c
6 * 4c 4c 4c
10 * 4c
22 * * * 4c 4c 4c *
27
28 * * 4c
34 * 4c 4c
38 * * * 4c 4c 4c
39 * 4c
40 4c
P b = 10 Xh = 3 I ri = 4 Ze* = 5 Zb* = 8 1^  = 6 bd it
jobs at another institution.
Faculties facing termination varied in the extent to which they were prepared for 
their new situation. Some groups had the resources to mount an anti-termination 
campaign, for example, the political leadership, faculty cohesion, and access to political 
information necessary to support planning. They (#5, 6, 34, 39) reacted quickly. Other
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groups lacked resources, were slower to organize, and often had difficulty consolidating 
anti-termination campaigns. Faculties #1 and 40, for example, suffered from serious 
internal social divisions that significantly complicated their efforts to deal with 
termination.
One primary requirement was political leadership. Some faculties had formal 
leaders (program directors) with the political experience, skill, and determination needed 
to mount a campaign, others did not. Among those that did, (#5, 6, 10, 34, 39), it was 
the formal leaders who automatically took charge of the faculty’s anti-termination efforts. 
In the other cases, where the formal leaders lacked the necessary experience, skill, or 
determination to openly oppose district plans, ad hoc leaders emerged to assume the 
direction of campaign activities.
Nursing faculties used coalition building, public demonstrations, and board 
testimony as their primary anti-termination tactics. Through coalition building, faculties, 
formed alliances with other internal (students, other faculty) and external (program 
alumni, local health professionals, civic and business leaders, local politicians) groups 
interested in their effort. Coalitions, which varied in configuration, provided faculties 
with the political solidarity needed for a successful anti-termination effort. They also 
provided sources of tactical support Union leaders, for example, often gave political 
advice, while students helped with media campaigns, and alumni activated community 
support networks. Coalitions also facilitated complex political strategies. With the help 
of local union leaders, the nursing faculties in District #2/38, for example, undertook a 
complex strategy they otherwise could not have pursued. Such alliances bolstered the 
authority of faculty efforts. The nursing faculties in District #2/38, for example, sought 
help from local legislators to advance their anti-termination arguments. “They [district 
officials] don't listen to us; that’s why we have to find politicians to back us up!” said a 
District #2/38 campaign leader.
The coalitions initiated by nursing faculties were not always easy to consolidate.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
134
Notably, several faculties (#1, 2/38, 6, 39, 40) found alliances with internal groups 
difficult to arrange. They reported that broad-scoped RIF and restructuring proposals 
spawned a degree of subunit self-survivalism that in turn damped unified faculty action. 
In addition, some groups (#2/38,6,10) had difficulty establishing alliances with external 
groups such as with hospital executive councils, particularly after 1983 when hospitals 
fell on economic hard times, and a surplus of nurses developed in many regions of the 
state.
Shaping public opinion was another important tactic. The outreach efforts of 
nursing faculties took several forms—formal press conferences, newspaper interviews, 
radio and TV talk-show appearances, public rallies, and campus demonstrations. The 
purpose of those efforts was to increase public awareness of the district’s intentions and 
the elements of the termination plan to promote anti-termination sentiment. Notably, 
nursing faculties enjoyed a natural advantage over other faculty groups in gaining media 
attention for their cause. This is perhaps because of their strong vocational identity and 
clear public mission, the power of which was recognized but not shared by other faculty 
groups. “The media could care less about art or history, but you mention nursing and 
they're right there!” said a frustrated history teacher in District #2/38.
Students played an important part in executing public demonstrations. Indeed, 
they often overshadowed faculty members who sometimes feared an administrative 
reprisal, and were frequently reluctant to participate in a public display of opposition to 
district policy. Students had no such constraints, and enthusiastically undertook 
attention-grabbing actions such as parading and picketing. Indeed, some student groups 
showed an intuitive understanding of the power of visual symbols by wearing uniforms 
or carrying lighted candles to create evocative images of nursing's ministering tradition. 
Such efforts created an impression of political organization that district policy makers 
found hard to ignore.
Another important tactic was direct lobbying. This took the form of oral
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testimony to the board of trustees and/or letters directed to district officials. By law, 
district boards were (and are) obliged to conduct their business in public, and to take 
public testimony on the issues before them. Accordingly, several nursing faculties 
carefully planned testimony to present to their boards of trustees. Most groups, however, 
lacked experience in making such presentations, and thus several faculties turned to union 
leaders or other sources of authoritative guidance. Indeed two groups (#1, 5) hired 
outside consultants to provide political advice. With assistance, faculties were usually 
able to identify their priorities and organize the tasks at hand. Such help provided the 
boost of confidence that groups needed to orchestrate a show of strength for nursing’s 
issues.
Shows of political solidarity, in fact, were an important campaign feature. Most 
groups took steps to ensure that a crowd of supporters turned out on behalf of nursing’s 
anti-termination position. They organized telephone trees, published flyers, and passed 
out meeting bulletins to alert to the public of the dates and agendas for important board 
meetings. Such tactics, aided by media coverage, helped to produce unanticipated levels 
of public interest in several districts, and unprecedented crowds at board hearings where 
nursing proposals were discussed.
The oral testimony featured a variety of anti-termination arguments and speakers. 
Those who spoke on behalf of nursing represented various constituencies, and their 
testimony varied according to their specific interest in the anti-termination effort Student 
speakers, for example, emphasized a concern for completing their course of study. Often 
student speakers stressed the personal inconveniences and hardships that they anticipated 
to accompany program termination. Health administrators, on the other hand, accentuated 
the impact of program termination on local health care delivery; politicians and civic 
leaders addressed the need to maintain job training opportunities for those (women, 
minorities) attracted to nursing. Members of nursing faculties offered a variety of 
arguments which reflected their theories on the origins of the termination policies.
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Members’ arguments challenged district policy on the basis of social equity, economic 
assumptions, instructional outcomes, and/or consequences for the institution.
Finally, a faculty’s choice of tactics depended on the termination situation- 
whether a formal RIF action was undertaken, or the district merely threatened a RIF. 
RIFs, which initiated a progression of public hearings and statutory deadlines, pushed the 
action directly into the public arena. Targeted groups had few options other than to mount 
a public campaign. Warnings, on the other hand, were less public and allowed targeted 
groups a wider range of options for responding. Groups subject to warnings thus relied 
less on resistance and opposition, and more on compliance and co-optation tactics than 
groups facing formal RIF actions.
Responses to state policy. The nursing faculties in this study, while cognizant of 
the roots of local austerity in state funding formulas, engaged in only limited efforts to 
influence state policy, mostly in the form of lobbying campaigns undertaken to secure a 
legislative solution to local funding problems. Most often their efforts were organized in 
conjunction with the actions of local college executives, union or academic senate leaders, 
as part of a collegewide campaign. Occasionally, nursing faculties acted on their own to 
lobby state officials. Lobbying, however, was not a universal practice. Table 29 
identifies the faculties that organized or participated in letter lobbies. Although a large 
majority of faculties (74%) lobbied state officials, many groups did not. The reasons for 
nonparticipation varied. Several directors indicated their members simply doubted the 
benefits of lobbying. “You can’t change what they do in Sacramento,” said Director #3.
Aside from the local efforts, state groups (California Teachers' Association, the 
California Federation of Teachers, the Faculty Association of the California Community 
Colleges, and the Academic Senate for the California Community Colleges) also 
orchestrated lobbying campaigns. Very few nursing faculty members, however, had 
representatives in state faculty organizations at the time of this study. Indeed, only two
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Table 29
Nursing Participation in Faculty Letter Lobbies
Faculties Participating1 Faculties Not Participating
#1, #2, #4, #6, #7, #9, #10, #12b, #13, #14, #15", 
#17b, #18, #19, #20, #21b, #22b, #28, #29, #31b, 
#32, #33, #34, #35, #36, #37, #38, #39
#3, #5, #8, #11, #16. #23. #24, #27, #30, #40
Note. * = participation defined as action by one or more faculty members. b = students included in effort.
faculties (#9, 13), had members in such groups.
Affiliations with the California Nurses’ Association (CNA) were also weak. The 
problem centered the CNA's endorsement of the American Nurses' Association policy to 
promote the baccalaureate degree as the entry-level credential for professional nursing 
practice. Indeed, many of the nursing directors interviewed for this study viewed the 
CNA's position as antagonistic to the interests of associate degree nursing education. 
They therefore made little effort to work through the CNA to secure legislative support for 
their issues. “We have found the CNA to be totally unhelpful-their stand is so different 
from ours,” exclaimed Director #12. Even Director #10, a high-ranking CNA officer at 
the time of this study, concurred. “It was a real downer for us [faculty #10] knowing that 
we didn’t have the backing of our own professional organization!” she said. As a 
consequence, few anti-termination campaigns went to the CNA for assistance. “CNA 
played no role at all in our situation,” said Director#!.
Other organizations with the potential to influence policy at the state level were the 
Associate Degree Nursing Directors' Associations of Northern and Southern California. 
Both of these groups focused primarily on assisting members in their administrative roles, 
however. Director #7, president of the Southern California association recalled her 
group’s activities. “We had seminars on how to cope when monies are tight.” Director 
#12, president of the Northern association had a similar recollection: ‘We tried to help
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individual directors deal with their problems.” Neither group worked, for example, to 
establish coalitions with other state organizations, or to pursue legislative initiatives to 
relieve the economic pressure on nursing programs (such as, for example, by altering the 
Education Code on WSCH computation). Neither group employed a professional 
lobbyist at the time of this study. Aside from occasional letter lobbying, they did little 
political problem solving in the state arena. An exception was the direct lobbying 
campaign undertaken by the northern directors in 1985 when it appeared as though the 
CNA would press its entry-to-practice agenda in the legislature.
Patterns in Nursing Faculty Political.Behavior.
The findings of this study reveal two well-defined patterns in the political behavior 
of nursing faculties--accommodation and contention. Accommodation was a pattern of 
cooperative, non confrontational behavior in which nursing faculties endeavored to meet, 
or appear to meet, the demands imposed by institutional cutback policies. Contention, on 
the other hand, was a pattern of opposition in which nursing faculties resisted cutback 
policies.
These patterns were apparent in relation to two district retrenchment situations— 
across-the-board operational (nonpersonnel and personnel) cutbacks, and selective 
program retrenchment. Indeed, accommodating faculties cooperated with college goals as 
long as those goals were promoted by nonselective cutback strategies. They complied 
with or incrementally adjusted to cutbacks, and often employed an assortment of co- 
optive tactics to diffuse the economic pressure on their programs. Accommodation, 
however, was reserved for those cutback situations in which nursing programs were not 
threatened with termination. As Table 24 shows well over 90% of the tactics used by 
nursing faculties in such situations fell into the accommodation category.
In contrast, contending faculties used resistance, opposition, and co-optation
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tactics to redirect policies and fend off targeted threats, suggested or proposed, to their 
jobs and the status of their programs. Again, as Table 24 shows, well over 90% of the 
tactics used by nursing faculties in those situation fell into the contention category.
Factors in Accommodation
Accommodation to Nonpersonnel Policies. Nursing faculties tolerated across-the- 
board nonpersonnel cutbacks for a variety of reasons related to the fact that, in general, 
their members did not perceive a crisis in nonselective tactics. Frequently, members 
perceived some level of austerity as unavoidable in view of the economic changes 
confronting the community colleges. Indeed, most of the nursing directors in this study 
associated institutional retrenchment with funding policy changes at the state level. Thus, 
they recognized that conditions external to the institution created a need for local 
retrenchment, and that helped them and their faculties to rationalize a course of 
accommodation. “We understood that Proposition 13 was in place, and that it would 
have a negative effect,” observed Director #18. Further, the directors associated cutbacks 
with the tuition issue dominating state politics. They therefore tended to dismiss the 
inconveniences imposed as temporary in nature. “We were told the situation would be 
short-lived, and so we were willing to put up with cuts, knowing there would be relief,” 
commented Director #3. Anticipation of relief promoted optimism, and faculty 
cooperation with the efforts of administrators. Typically, nursing faculties were eager to 
contribute to the welfare of the college. As Director #3 observed, “Nurses like to do the 
right thing!”
In fact, nursing faculties accommodated to nonpersonnel funding reductions 
regardless of the degree of austerity the cutbacks caused. As discussed above, some 
colleges remained comparatively better off, while others suffered more severe losses. 
However, the size of institutional losses did not directly correspond to the level of
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austerity experienced by nursing programs. Indeed, unit conditions prior to tax limitation 
constituted an important balancing factor. Thus, programs well-outfitted, even those in 
institutions suffering severe losses, had less difficulty adjusting to budget decreases than 
ones poorly outfitted at the outset of decline. “We had availed ourselves generously of 
federal capitation grants, so our equipment was up-to-date when money tightened,” 
Director #18 recalled. Numerous programs (#1, 2 ,3 ,4 , 12, 14, 17, 21, 22, 27, 29, 34, 
35, and 37) fell into the well-outfitted category. Others (#5, 7, 10, 13, 19, 28, 32, 33, 
38, and 40), however, were less well-endowed and thus more seriously affected by 
institutional losses. “We had cords running everywhere because we couldn't afford to 
put in electric oudets,” noted Director #7. Lack of paraphernalia, did not prevent faculties 
from accommodating, however. “You can't create money where there isn't any!” 
lamented Director #32. In fact, prior austerity helped to mitigate the perception of loss. 
“This program has never had adequate facilities-defunding only postponed things 
further,” noted Director #5.
An important reason faculties were able to accommodate cutbacks was that 
substitutes and alternative resources were readily available. “We found other sources of 
supplies—we're getting a lot more things from hospitals now,” commented Director #18. 
Increases in student fees, discussed above, also helped to insulate faculties from austerity, 
as did grantwriting and careful management practices. Rather than purchasing items, 
faculties rented, leased or borrowed costly equipment, or did without. When forced to do 
without, faculties often rationalized the items not obtained as nonessential adjuncts. “We 
find that our students don't have enough time to use videos”, said a member of Program 
#13. Thus, rather than resisting the policies causing austerity, nursing faculties adjusted 
by lowering their expectations for instructional support, and by modifying their teaching 
routines, often emphasizing clinical demonstrations over campus simulations.
Thus, nursing faculties were able to successfully defend the quality of instruction 
against material austerity. Most groups, however, were unable to completely close the
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gap between their needs and resources. “They just kept whittling away at our budget over 
a number of years,” noted Director #38. Incrementalism, in turn, assuaged faculty 
frustration. Indeed, the insidious transition to scarcity helped to minimize the toll of 
cutbacks on faculty morale. “We got used to cutting back!” said Director #39. Some 
groups seemed to take pride in their ability to adjust. “As nurses, we don't need a lot of 
frills to do the job!” exclaimed Director #3.
Other factors, such as the perceived fairness of administrative decisions, also 
helped assuage faculty frustration. In general, nursing directors perceived nonselective 
cutback decisions as rational and meted out fairly. Many lauded the measures (capital 
request procedures, budget priority lists, and formal priority reviews) used by their 
administrators, measures perceived to assure the equitable treatment of sub-units. 
“Wishlists,” a way for departments to designate capital purchase priorities, for allocation 
on a rotating basis, were a common practice. Such measures fostered a perception of 
fairness and contributed to a sense within faculties that administrators were doing their 
best under difficult circumstances. “We've all had to take cuts—our administrators have 
been trying to preserve instruction,” noted Director #19.
In general, across-the-board nonpersonnel policies bolstered faculty morale. 
Nursing directors took comfort, for example, in the observation that their units were no 
worse off than other departments. “Nobody on this campus got capital outlay,” said 
Director #5. “There was no sense here that anyone got hit any worse than anyone else,” 
Director #37 likewise noted. Fairness was not a universal perception, however. A few 
directors became convinced that administrators gave greater consideration to institutional 
subunits more economically productive than nursing. “They gave the high-WSCH 
departments everything they wanted, but we had to prove ourselves,” Director #20 
observed. “They told us to go to the hospital, and gave the equipment to other 
programs,” Director #21 also recalled. There were, however, instances (#16, 30) in 
which nursing departments received special consideration. Overall the directors were
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satisfied with the way nonpersonnel cutbacks were managed.
Accommodation to Personnel Policies. Personnel cutbacks presented a different 
story. For years, many of the nursing departments in this study benefited from staffing 
decisions favoring units with stable enrollments, as confirmed by 19 of the 24 college 
administrators who returned surveys and anecdotally by numerous nursing directors. 
“Other programs were cut to almost zero, but we’ve been able to fill our full-time 
positions,” said Director #7.”
Benevolent staffing decisions promoted a sense shared by numerous directors that 
nursing enjoyed a distinct advantage in personnel decisions. “We got positions filled 
when nobody else around here could,” exclaimed Director #4. Such perceptions, 
however, made it difficult for faculties to foresee the possibility of layoffs or program 
terminations. Thus, for many directors, the worst-case scenario was one of voluntary 
faculty departures. “The worst thing that could happen to us is that we could lose a 
position or two!” exclaimed Director #7.
With the passage of time, however, many groups did eventually experience 
difficulty filling positions. As districts tightened their hiring policies, in response to 
accumulating fiscal stress, faculty attrition accelerated. Coincidentally, the job market for 
nurses weakened in many regions of the state (Morse, 1987), and, insidiously, women’s 
occupational preferences began to change (Aiken, 1987, 1990). Those trends converged 
in 1982-83 to reduce applications to nursing schools, which in turn contributed to 
enrollment losses, and to policies freezing faculty vacant positions in nursing. (See 
Appendix L for nursing enrollment data by district)
Nevertheless, despite those trends, most nursing directors remained optimistic. 
Indeed, few foresaw the possibility of program termination as a threat to their programs. 
The directors based their judgments on a variety of considerations. Many pointed to the 
evaluation criteria used by local administrators, in particular, the application and attrition
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numbers, graduation and licensure exam pass rates, and job procurement statistics that 
administrators considered. Those were criteria on which nursing programs generally did 
well. Some directors, for example, considered termination unlikely based on the success 
of their students. “Our students graduate, transfer, and go on to get jobs, all the things 
the review committee looks at,” noted, Director #23. Others based their judgments on 
other factors. Some stressed the importance of the nursing program as a student 
attraction. “Nursing attracts students to this campus—the administration would be foolish 
to cut us!” Director #30. Others pointed to the prestige of their programs within the 
spectrum of institutional services. “The administrators on this campus consider our 
graduates one of their elitist products,” Director #2 boasted. Still others emphasized 
nursing’s importance to the community. “The hospitals would never allow the district to 
close nursing” observed Director #40. Several directors also recognized the political 
power derived from community support as an insurance against termination. 
“Administration wouldn't dare mess with us—our community advisory committee has 
some very important people on it!” noted Director #4. In all, 27 directors made 
statements reflecting their presumption that program termination was unlikely. “I've been 
here since 1960. Things wax and wane, but we always survive!” reflected Director #3. 
(See Appendix M for a complete file of statements on retrenchment probability.)
Notably, these perceptions endured even as RIF procedures outlined in Section 
13447 of the Education Code, which allows fiscally stressed districts to reduce 
certificated staff (teachers, counselors, librarians, administrators) in reverse order of 
seniority (Ozsogomonyan, 1979), threatened nursing faculty jobs in a number of districts. 
Several nursing directors reported that, in fact, their districts distributed seniority numbers 
in preparation for a RIF. “There was a lot of attention paid to seniority for a while!” 
noted Director #33. This promoted a level of job insecurity in some faculties. However, 
because of the seniority requirement the accompanying anxiety affected the ranks of the 
junior faculty only. Senior faculty members, whose jobs were protected by the RIF
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statute, generally remained complacent “Most of us have been here 15 years or more— 
we didn’t feel threatened,” said Director #36. Frequently, however, the anticipated RIFs 
never materialized, and the anxiety, where it existed, quickly faded as business-as-usual 
resumed.
In short, few directors or their faculties regarded operational cutbacks as a cause 
for crisis. Indeed, the mitigation of perceived urgency by the factors described above 
reinforced the pattern of accommodation, which, again, stressed cooperative managerial 
approaches over the self-promoting, advantage-seeking tactics that many directors clearly 
saw as inappropriate in the absence of a clear, objective threat to unit survival.
Aside from the factors just mentioned, however, nursing faculties had deeper 
motivations for accommodating. In fact, most groups sought to minimize the impact of 
budget cutbacks in a manner compatible with their work routines, which featured long 
clinical laboratories held at off campus sites. Thus many groups ignored the activities of 
the academic senate, college advisory committees, and faculty collective bargaining unit as 
an alternative mode of response. Indeed, as Table 30 shows, the governance participation 
of many nursing faculties was constricted in scope and intensity. Few faculties, in fact, 
participated frequently or consistently in college governance bodies, or had members in 
leadership positions.
To some extent, the problem was structural and to some extent, attitudinal. 
Participation required attendance at on-campus meetings, the schedules of which often 
conflicted with the off-campus teaching routines of nursing faculties. “Our eight-hour 
labs make it hard to get to advisory meetings,” noted Director #9. The demands of 
clinical teaching-extra travel, assignment preparation, long hours of student supervision— 
in turn—promoted a sense of strain in many groups. “We just go to clinical, and come 
back to class, and work the eighty-hour week necessary to get the job done,” lamented 
Director #36. Further, members tended to regard governance participation as 
nonessential, “extra” activity. “Most of our faculty feel they put in so many hours what
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with labs and going to the hospital that they feel they’ve paid their dues,” noted Director 
#7. (See Appendix N for a complete file of statements on governance participation.) That 
was particularly true for budget governance. Indeed, several groups showed a particular 
disdain for budget governance, and, as Table 30 shows, few had representatives on 
college budget committees. ‘The budget is something that seems very far away from our 
daily routines,” observed Director #21. (See Appendix O for a complete file of statements 
on budget governance.) Feeling taxed by the demands of teaching, few faculties were 
attracted to college governance as a means of dealing with budget reductions. Indeed, the 
interest of nursing faculties in college governance can best be described as perfunctory. 
“We always have someone in the faculty senate, but I don’t think it has ever been taken 
quite seriously,” indicated Director #32. Disinterest, in turn fostered a level of 
detachment from the college-as-organization which was apparent even to outside 
observers. “The people in nursing seem to prefer their own company,” observed a 
division dean, #10. “Our nursing faculty is very good, but they do keep to themselves,” 
the Vice President of Instruction, #35, lamented. Indeed, as Table 30 shows, numerous 
college administrators described their nursing faculties as less active in college governance 
than other faculty groups.
Although the structure of teaching was a cause of nursing faculty detachment, 
other social and attitudinal factors also played a role. Some faculties, for example, failed 
to fully appreciate the link between governance participation and department goals. “I 
don’t think our faculty is aware of how involvement in the college can benefit the 
program-they’re just not sophisticated in that respect,” noted Director #4. Others were 
detached because professional values and the professional identity of members nurtured a 
tendency toward self-segregation. “Our faculty see themselves as nurses first, and 
educators second,” observed Director #37. Many groups regarded clinical teaching as the 
uniquely professional aspect of their jobs and were reluctant to shift their focus to larger 
organizational interests. “This faculty’s primary interest is in the clinical preparation of
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students,” Director #20 exclaimed. Another factor was the identity confusion fostered by 
the dual organizational attachment of nursing programs to hospital and college. A 
classical problem, it was a source of member anxiety in some groups. “We always have 
to deal with two bureaucracies, and we don’t know where we fit,” noted Director #2. 
Such identity strains discouraged the attachment of nursing faculty members to the 
college-as-organization. “Our thrust has been to be more like other units, but we always 
look at ourselves and conclude that we’re different.” a Faculty Member, #1 noted. (See 
Appendix P for a complete file of statements on faculty identity.)
The detachment of members from organizational governance brought with it a 
corresponding isolation from campus life. Indeed, members of numerous groups 
complained that their interactions with other departments were infrequent, and that, 
consequently, their relationships with other faculty members remained distant. “People 
I’ve seen for twenty years, I still don’t feel like I know,” said a Faculty #7. (See 
Appendix P) Sequestered from their nonnursing peers, they thus had a tendency to 
minimize the significance of changes in the funding environment, and as a result, avoided 
the bodies involved in shaping college policy. Absent a strong sense of urgency, they 
instead perpetuated their regular routines, and dealt with austerity from a resource 
management framework. “My faculty told me their frustrations, but they expected m£ to 
implement change.” lamented Director #32.
There were, of course, exceptions. Highly participative decision cultures 
flourished at some colleges (#9, 12, 15, 19, and 23, for example) where policy 
requirements overrode the tendency of nursing faculties to ignore their governance 
opportunities. And, indeed, some groups did eventually come to understand the 
competition for funding that developed on their campuses. “Other groups did better than 
we did because they fought harder,” noted Director #32. A striking finding, however, 
was the number of nursing faculties that dealt with cutbacks, not by joining or competing 
with other faculty groups to effect unit gains, but rather by remaining immersed in a
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subculture reflecting their common identity as nurses.
Factors in Contention
Confronted with termination warnings or proposals, nursing faculties generally 
dropped their accommodation tactics in favor of a pattern of contention, which stressed 
resistance and opposition in place of compliance and incremental adjustment
Termination proposals dealt a sudden, hard blow to the standing of nursing 
departments, and thus generated among their faculties an unusual level of concern about 
the future, and an urgency to act which propelled groups to organize anti-termination 
campaigns. Termination proposals threatened faculty job security and nursing program 
status, but at a more subjective level they also threatened members' sense of the 
importance of their professional mission, their institutional identification, their 
professional identity, self-esteem, and the continuity of valued social relationships.
The threat to job security was a primary factor motivating nursing faculties to 
change their behavior. Targeted RIF proposals made job loss an imminent and real 
possibility. Such proposals bred rampant job insecurity. Job insecurity is anxiety related 
to the possibility of being involuntarily dismissed (Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt, 1988). It 
was clearly a problem experienced by the teachers in this study who received dismissal 
intention notices-commonly referred to as “March 15th” notices-as evidenced by their 
reports. However, it also plagued teachers who received no notice but who nevertheless 
feared they might at some future point “I'll be next to go, if they [district officials] 
decide to cut again,” said a member of Faculty #38. It also affected members likely to be 
reassigned rather than terminated. Indeed, those worried about being transferred also 
experienced a kind of job insecurity. That insecurity, to which advancing age, dated 
clinical skills, or lack of specialty training frequently contributed, took the form of doubt 
in relation to one's ability to adapt to new job expectations. Program directors, for
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example, frequently worried about the possibility of returning to clinical teaching, an 
adjustment that might necessitate retraining.
Another factor was the RIF procedure itself. The ritual of dismissal letters served 
to heighten job insecurity, and intensified the climate of threat. “It was scary. I got a 
registered letter in the mail. It said I had the right to an attorney—I wasn't sure why I 
needed one,” commented a member of Faculty #40. Not all of the teachers who received 
letters experienced the potential for dismissal as a threat, however. There were in every 
group some who were willing to move on, and consequently did not worry about job 
loss. “It didn't bother me—I have a nurse practitioner credential—I always knew I could 
find another job,” observed a member of Faculty #39.
The threat to program continuity embodied in termination proposals was another 
source of member anxiety. Teachers worried about the impact of faculty reduction on the 
quality of their programs. Junior faculty members, who often had more recent degrees, 
were more current in their clinical skills, and frequently had more specialty training than 
senior faculty members, were the ones most threatened by downsizing, and their potential 
loss threatened program quality at some sites (#1, 10, 2/38). Program disruption was a 
major concern, however, in those situations where departments were slated for closure. 
Faculty members became concerned over the fate of their enrolled students as well as 
those seeking enrollment. They feared that students forced to transfer might leave school, 
fail to complete their programs, or give up their goals. Finally, the teachers also worried 
about each other, and the fate awaiting those colleagues laid off. Survivor guilt-remorse 
in relation to the termination of others (Brockner, Davy, and Carter, 1988), was evident 
in the sample. More than any other factor it energized the anti-termination activities of 
teachers with seniority. “These people are my friends. I can't stand by and do nothing,” 
said a member of Faculty #22 who was approaching retirement.
The aura of program termination threatened members' sense of the importance of 
their professional mission, which in turn dealt a blow to their professional pride.
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Termination proposals contradicted members’ view of the degree of importance attached 
by others, namely, administrators and other college officials, to nursing's mission. 
Members not infrequendy interpreted termination proposals as symbolic of the lack of 
value college officials placed on nursing. Frequently, members also viewed termination 
as an affront to their collective achievement “The administration didn't research its 
decision-most of them didn't know that one of the first ADN programs accredited 
nationally,” noted a nursing faculty member in District #2/38. At a practical level, 
members also feared that closures and enrollment reductions would result in nursing 
shortages.
Ironically, despite the organizational detachment that typified many faculties in this 
study, termination proposals also threatened the institutional identification of many faculty 
members, particularly those who taught in older programs (#1, 2, 22, 28, 38). Thus, it 
was not uncommon to find teachers who had graduated from the program in which they 
taught. Not infrequently, those individuals identified strongly with their college, and 
derived a deep personal gratification from their continued association with i t  Termination 
proposals threatened that identification, and heightened the anxiety that some felt There 
were also some teachers who for personal reasons experienced termination proposals as a 
profound threat to their self-esteem. “When you are told over and over again that you are 
not needed-it takes away from your self-esteem,” said a member of Faculty #1 who 
became seriously depressed after receiving a dismissal notice.
Finally, numerous members looked at termination proposals as an affront to their 
status as women and female professionals. An interesting finding was the number of 
interviewees who were clearly aware of nursing's passive image, and who linked their 
circumstances to nursing’s status as a woman's profession. “Being female, being nurses- 
-we're nurturing, caring, giving type of people-you know, we give in. Somebody tells 
us to do something—we say 'okay,'“ said member of Faculty #13, with a note of irony in 
her voice. Indeed, a fairly common belief in some groups was that nursing’s status as a
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female occupation rendered their programs vulnerable to exploitation by administrators. 
“We knew they'd never try cutting those people down in engineering!” said a member of 
Faculty#!.
Thus, termination proposals embodied numerous sources of threat, and those 
sources of threat engendered a sense of urgency that motivated members to engage in anti­
termination activities. “We knew we had to do something.” said a member of Faculty # 1. 
It was that sense of urgency that prompted groups to give up accommodation and engage 
in the tactics of contention, characteristic of anti-termination campaigns.
The change in faculty behavior did not happen over night, however, but usually 
occurred in a progression of stages. Immobilization was the first stage. Groups 
frequently did not anticipate termination. On hearing about a proposal to cut their 
program, members were quite frequently surprised, often to the point of shock. “Out of 
the blue, we got word that half of our department was getting pink slips,” recalled 
Director #1. (See Appendix Q for a file of statements on faculty surprise.) In every 
group, in fact, there were members who ignored the indicators of impending termination, 
or who denied the likelihood that a RIF was imminent. ‘W e knew the college was having 
problems, but we never thought it would lead to anything for our department,” a member 
of Faculty #1 observed. It is notable, however, that the policy development process 
contributed to the difficulty many faculties had in foreseeing termination. College 
committees often comprised mainly of executive administrators who set retrenchment 
plans in most institutions. Often they hoped to avoid a RIF, and post-poned their policy 
decisions, made their final plans without consulting targeted personnel. Thus, in several 
cases, faculties, had no clear, definitive forewarning, and thus found themselves in a state 
of unpreparedness when termination proposals were finally made.
The shock of termination was frequently accompanied by a decline in faculty 
morale. As a member of Faculty #40 observed, “Everybody was scared and frightened.” 
Members frequently experienced a loss of morale regardless of their job status.
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“Bumping,” a statutory right allowing those teachers about to be dismissed to bump (take 
the job of) less senior faculty in other departments, if qualified, kept senior teachers on 
edge in some nursing departments. “I’ve been here 17 years, but I still feel threatened— 
you never know who might show up for your job,” said a member of Faculty #38.
Severe anxiety together with lowered morale prevented several faculties from 
quickly coming together to address their common situation, which made planning and 
organizing difficult for several groups. Often members were unable to quickly come to 
grips with the perceived abrupt change in their circumstances. Although the duration of 
the immobilization period varied, in all cases, sooner or later the shock abated. Indeed, 
the resolution accelerated as members began to exchange ideas on the meaning of their 
situation and those exchanges heralded the onset of the second stage of the transition, 
interpretation.
Interpretation, which overlapped immobilization, preceded the final stage in which 
members organized a planning group. In the stage of interpretation, faculties struggled 
for answers to the question, “Why Nursing?” During this phase, targeted faculties began 
a search for answers. During this stage, faculties also engaged in rethinking the causes of 
retrenchment. Old explanations, such as those related state funding changes or political 
stalemates came into question as members sought new reasons--ones closer to home. 
“We knew the cuts were coming from Sacramento, but we still looked at it as, W ho is it 
here that is doing this?'“ noted a member of Faculty #1.
Finding answers was not an easy process. Faculties typically turned to 
administrators and other college officials who were often unable or unwilling to provide 
information. Sometimes the constraints were legal. A member of Faculty #22 noted, “I 
called the planning coordinator for an explanation, but was told that the attorney for the 
district had counseled people in the district office not to talk to us.” Sometimes they were 
situational. “The president visited our center to talk to us, but he just kept repeating that 
we had better raise our WSCH,” recalled a member of Faculty #10.
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Short on information, groups often resorted to speculating. Typically, their 
speculations focused on the past behavior of district officials. Perceived opportunism, 
gender bias, or hidden agendas on the part of officials gave rise to faculty theories that 
officials were exploiting nursing. Faculties also scrutinized cutback policy and examined 
officials’ public statements in search of clues to explain the policy or bolster their theories 
(See Appendix R for a file of statements on causal theories). Faculty #39, for example, 
noted that their president had previously tried to downsize nursing by painting a false 
picture of program costs. They theorized the president “didn’t value nursing.”
Theories helped faculties endure the uncertainty and ambiguity of their termination 
situation, and also served to heighten and focus member anger (see Appendix Q for a file 
of statements on member anger), which in turn made it possible for them to move ahead 
to the next stage of the transition.
The stages of immobilization and interpretation usually lasted from a few days to a 
number weeks. Faculty #1, for example, took two weeks to resolve its initial shock, as 
did Faculty #40. “I think it was ten days before I could get people rallied—it took a while 
for them to believe that this [downsizing] was going to happen,” said Director #40. In 
both cases the period of adjustment was made more intense by looming deadlines and 
dates for board hearings.
The third stage, organization, involved the planning and implementation of a unit 
defense. Most faculties found their political skills challenged by this process. None had 
had prior experience with labor disputes. “We didn't have a clue what to do! We weren't 
experienced like those nurses down at Kaiser who go on strike every now and then,” said 
a member of Faculty #1. The consolidation of political leadership was a problem for 
some groups. RIF procedures, which are adversarial in nature, put an enormous strain 
on targeted groups. They also placed program directors in an awkward position between 
upper-level administrative supervisors and their unit-level faculty colleagues. Some 
directors embraced the unit cause, while others embraced the institution’s plans. Those
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who hesitated to challenge district policy generally espoused a “wait and see” approach, 
often voicing a desire to minimize conflict “Maybe the district will rescind—they've done 
it before,” said Director #38. Such preferences, however, failed to address the urgency 
that most faculty members attached to termination, and differences fostered distrust in the 
faculty ranks. Frequently, members saw their directors’ hesitation as evidence of their 
complicity with management. “Our director doesn't approve of the faculty coalition— 
she's got her eyes on an administrative position,” said a member of Faculty #38. Nursing 
directors, who hesitated, on the other hand viewed their faculty peers as rash and 
misguided. “It's [faculty opposition] a way for some people to vent their anger” observed 
Director #38. Such clashes in perspective complicated the planning process, and, in some 
cases and prompted faculties to seek ad hoc leaders for their anti-termination effort.
The selection of strategies was an important step in planning. A group's choice of 
strategy was to some extent determined by the termination situation-whether a formal 
RIF proposal or informal RIF warning. Again, proposals and warnings created different 
circumstances. Official proposals, which activated statutory due process procedures, 
established public hearings as the forum for decision-making. In those situations, 
governing boards, acting as quasi-appellate bodies, weighed the merits of a RIF against 
the merits of constituents’ challenges. Thus, targeted faculties had little recourse other 
than to become a party to the conflict. Negotiated compromise, on the other hand, 
became all but impossible in the context of a formal REF proposal. Termination 
warnings, by contrast, outlined contingencies which served to shape the retrenchment 
circumstances. Warnings, which were less final, less formal, and less public in nature, 
were generally, less adversarial in nature. Thus, faculties were able to explore strategies 
other than public anti-termination.
The pressures to organize were substantial. Yet, in some cases (#1, 2/38, 40), 
members disagreed among themselves about the proper strategy to take. These 
disagreements, in turn, polarized factions for and against resistance tactics. Members
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who favored resistance usually prevailed, although the resulting lack of unity weakened 
the their organization.
Finally, a few groups used contention tactics for situations other than program 
termination. Those faculties (#9, 15,21, 35) came to view austerity as a crisis, and thus 
were willing to engage in the local conflict in order to influence local policy changes.
Outcomes of the Political Behavior ofNursing Faculties
The tactics of accommodation were useful to nursing faculties because they 
enabled them to reduce the gap between resources and needs, while preserving their 
regular routines, which protected their primary value, clinical teaching. Such tactics 
conveyed a desire to cooperate with institutional goals, but in some cases, brought 
political rewards as well. As the dean of occupational education from District #36 
indicated, “The nursing faculty has a cooperative spirit. They fared well during 
retrenchment.” The benefits of accommodation diminished in situations where subunit 
allocations grew competitive, however. As District #7’s dean of instruction noted, “Most 
departments with supplies, equipment rental, and capital outlay budgets assert themselves 
and take an active role in the budget process,” adding, “Our nursing faculty just wants to 
be left alone to do its own thing.” Thus, accommodation tactics fit within the overall 
pattern of detachment from campus life maintained by many nursing groups which may 
have reduced their sensitivity to indicators of termination or downsizing, and, arguably, 
their preparedness for change.
On the other hand, the groups targeted for termination generally dropped 
accommodation in favor of a contention strategy once they realized their political situation 
had drastically altered. In most cases, those faculties organized anti-termination 
campaigns, which in every instance supported their policy interest by promoting a policy 
reversal or a reduction of policy scope. Faculties #6, 34, and 2/38, for example, avoided
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layoffs altogether, and #39 eluded program closure, while #1 reduced its layoffs by 75%. 
Only program #40, which mounted almost no resistance, failed to make gains.
The extent to which the anti-termination campaigns influenced those achievements 
was unclear. Press accounts, and many, but not all, administrators linked the nursing 
campaigns to policy reversals. “The people in nursing made a very strong case for their 
contributions to the campus, and that made a difference,” noted a District #10 college 
president. Some, however, credited intervening factors—such as third party intervention, 
or the retrenchment tactics of institutional officials. “You send 100 notices and layoff ten- 
-people feel grateful. I hate to sound cynical, but that's the way it works,” said District 
# l ’s dean of occupational education.
Nursing faculty members, on the other hand, uniformly regarded their campaigns 
as instrumental. “I feel certain that if we had not done what we did, we would have lost 
the program,” exclaimed Director #6. Most members, in fact, believed their efforts were 
the deciding factor in the policy turnaround. “We didn't stop them [district officials] from 
closing the two programs, but I know the pressure we put on them saved a lot of jobs,” 
said a member of Faculty #22, with a tone of conviction. Several interviewees also 
pointed to the intangible benefits accruing from their activities, benefits such as improved 
faculty morale, elevated campus standing, or a new, shared sense of political efficacy 
within their faculty group. “It was an awful time, but the crisis put us on the map. The 
administration finally saw for themselves the kind of community support this program 
attracts,” Director #39 commented.
Summary and Discussion of Findings from the Statewide Study
The question asked in this study was whether or not California community college 
nursing faculties, faced with retrenchment, would take action to influence organizational 
policy. The data from the statewide study showed that most faculties did take action, but
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that the pattern and complexity of their activity varied according to their retrenchment 
situation.
As the financial data showed, resource change was a common condition in the 
California community college system, 1982-1987. Indeed, the fiscal events highlighted 
in this study-defunding and the revenue veto-contributed to severe economic decline in 
many districts, but other events, such as interim state funding formula changes, also 
aggravated the financial circumstances initially imposed by Proposition 13. Thirty-three 
community college districts diverse in size, structure, and location, constituted the 
sample. Of those institutions, 17 reached a state of severe decline as defined by a 
criterion of revenue reduction. The average losses from defunding and the revenue veto, 
at 6.24%, were devastating, coming, as they did, at a time when districts had already 
substantially curtailed their costs and spent down their reserves. Indeed, to address their 
revenue losses, all of the districts in this study cut their spending, some in a highly 
conservative pattern, and many to levels below their pre-Proposition 13 expenditure 
levels.
Administrators commonly sought to preserve instructional programs while 
reducing costs. Thus, they employed general cost-cutting measures such as deferring 
maintenance and reducing noninstructional services. When further cutting became 
necessary, they made across-the-board reductions in materials supplies, and capital 
outlay. Many administrators also imposed hiring freezes, part-time faculty adjustments, 
and classified staff reductions to reduce costs. Some went beyond those measures, 
however, to attempt involuntary reductions-in-force and targeted program terminations.
As a costly component of the occupational curriculum, nursing programs were not 
exempt from administrative efforts to reduce instructional costs. Indeed, none of the 38 
programs in this study escaped the impact of resource decline. All were subject to 
nonpersonnel and/or program spending cuts, many to hiring freeze and personnel attrition 
policies, and some to proposals or warnings of program termination and faculty layoff.
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To reiterate, 78% experienced reductions in funds budgeted for instructional materials, 
88% for supplies, 91% for capital outlay; 29% experienced support staff reductions, and 
58% faculty reduction by attrition, and 31% faculty layoffs and program termination.
Nursing faculties subjected to across-the-board spending reductions, typically 
responded with a pattern of accommodation. Accommodation was a collection of tactics 
largely managerial in nature employed under those conditions in which cutbacks were 
perceived to be evenly applied to all departments and no threat to the survival of nursing 
programs was seen to exist. Factors that made accommodation tactics attractive to 
nursing faculties included members’ (1) shared belief that decline was unavoidable and 
temporary, (2) the easy availability of substitutes and alternative resources to minimize the 
need-resources gap, (3) members’ desire to support institutional retrenchment goals, (4) 
their strong motivation to preserve their functional routines which a pattern of 
accommodation made possible, and (5) the insidious course of decline which served to 
mitigate a perception of crisis. Accommodation benefited faculties by allowing them to 
preserve the status quo, while inviting the approval of embattled administrators.
As the data showed, a relatively small number of districts reached a state of severe 
decline as defined by revenue reserves, a benchmark set in this study at two or more 
consecutive years of reserve levels five percent (5%) or lower. Indeed, ten districts 
reached a level of severe decline as defined by that criterion, only four of which proposed 
to downsize or terminate their nursing programs. Six other districts, all with reserves 
above the criterion also proposed to downsize or close their nursing programs. Thus, 
financial exigency, the condition which justifies restructuring, did not exist in many cases 
where district policy proposals targeted nursing programs. In all, twelve nursing 
programs became the object of threatened or proposed faculty layoffs and program 
termination.
As the data showed, under such conditions, must nursing faculties changed their 
strategy and adopted a pattern of contention to deal with their new circumstances.
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Contention featured resistance and opposition tactics, tactics common to anti-termination 
campaigns. Faculties formed coalitions, lobbied district and government officials, 
presented testimony to boards of trustees, attracted media attention with public 
demonstrations, and participated in initiatives of various kinds, all of which were directed 
toward the goal of influencing a reversal or reduction in scope of the nursing termination 
policy.
Factors that made the change of strategy attractive to nursing faculties included 
members’ (1) assessment that a termination proposal significantly raised the probability of 
important losses, (2) their interpretation that termination posed a crisis for individual and 
group welfare, (3) their evaluation that accommodation tactics were inappropriate to their 
new circumstances, (4) their sense that termination constituted an injustice to themselves 
and their educational mission, a sense heightened by the threat termination posed to their 
professional identity, and (5) the fact that they had no contingency plans.
The change in strategy required new behavior of nursing faculties, particularly 
those detached from governance before the policy announcement. Thus, the transition did 
not happen quickly or easily as groups struggled to surmount barriers to organization. 
With only a few exceptions, however, anti-termination campaigns were central to nursing 
faculty efforts to influence a policy turnaround.
Accommodation and contention as patterns of political behavior were used by 
nursing faculties to address local retrenchment policy, the primary focus of most nursing 
faculties in this study. Many groups, however, participated in activities designed to 
influence funding policies at the state level. These activities took the form of faculty letter 
lobbies. Beyond such tactics, however, nursing groups took few actions to redirect state 
policy, and, notably, did not attempt to alter the statutes driving up the cost of community 
college nursing programs.
The findings discussed above are consistent with the conceptual framework of 
Levine et al. (1981) who suggested a model of organization adaptation in which severe
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resource decline politicized organization decision structure to limit administrative 
discretion in dealing with decline. According to the model, how organizations cutback, 
whether across-the-board or selectively, depends on the relative strength of the groups 
exercising power over organizational policy.
The data from the statewide study support the Levine proposition. To the extent 
that administrators refrained from targeting nursing programs, nursing faculties remained 
cooperative with institutional retrenchment goals. They refrained from entering the 
competitive fray that typified decision making on many campuses. However, when 
officials targeted nursing programs, nursing faculties, even those groups ordinarily 
detached from institutional governance, entered the struggle to control cutback policy 
decisions. Faced with termination, they became parties to the conflict in which 
termination decisions were made, and indeed, in most cases achieved a reduction in scope 
of the plan initially proposed.
Nursing faculty members may have a particular tendency to reserve aggressive 
approaches for the most competitive situations. Indeed, several authorities noted 
conditions unique to nursing which shape the organizational behavior of nursing faculty 
members in characteristic ways. Conway and Glass (1978), Kritek (1985), and Steele 
(1991) all pointed out that nurses are professionally socialized in hospitals which are 
much more bureaucratic then colleges. Thus, nurses may have difficulty actualizing the 
values and norms of educational settings. Steele (1991) further noted the role strain 
caused by competing organization loyalties which prompts many nursing instructors to 
prioritize conflicting demands so as to stress clinical responsibilities. Such strain, as the 
data in this study and one done by Bahrawy (1992), impedes the participation of nursing 
faculty in organizational governance even in times of economic decline. Thus, nursing 
faculties will accommodate decline until their political circumstances force them to do 
otherwise.
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CHAPTER V
RESEARCH FINDINGS FROM THE STUDY OF SELECTED NURSING
PROGRAMS
Introduction
The previous chapter presented an overview of findings from 38 community 
colleges on the political behavior of nursing faculties in response to resource decline and 
organizational retrenchment, and, more specifically, to nursing program cutbacks, 1982- 
87. This chapter presents the findings of six case studies which focus in greater detail on 
the institutions, people, circumstances, and events that surrounded resource decline, as 
well as the perspectives, attitudes, theories, and actions of nursing faculty members as 
they reacted to local administrative strategies and their impact on nursing programs.
Findings of the Selected Site Studies
Nine nursing departments located in six community college districts participated in 
the selected site phase of this study. The characteristics of these units, summarized in 
Table 31, make it clear that they shared in the diversity found in the sample as a whole. 
They varied not only in size, but in location and environment. There were, for example, 
large and small programs situated in large and small institutions which in turn were
161
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Table 31











1 SCoID SC U 21.8 248
2/22/28/38 MColD SC
2 S 22.6 363
22 U 12.7 159
28 u 20.0 146
38 s 23.0 179
10 MColD NC S 9.5 172
13 MColD NC s 14.6 98
35 SCoID SC R 5.1 180
39 SCoID SC s 4.2 31
aAdministrative Organization: SCoID = Single College District, MColD = MultiCollege District,
MCamD = Single College/Multicampus District, MCtrD = Single College/MultiCenter District. 
^Location: NC = Northern California, SC = Southern California. .
Environment: U = Urban, S = Suburban, R = Rural.
College Enrollment: Expressed in thousands of full and parttime students. Data from 1982-83
Occupational Programs in California Community Colleges by Leo A. Mayer, 1982.
Cursing Enrollment: Data from State-Approved Schools of Nursing R.N.. 1983. 41st Edition, National 
League for Nursing, 1983.
located at various Northern and Southern California sites, in urban, suburban, and rural 
environments. Seven units (#1, 2, 10, 22, 28, 38, 39) experienced termination crises, 
while two (#13, 35) did not The latter served as comparison cases.
The termination cases are presented chronologically by year of retrenchment crisis; 
the comparison cases follow in order. At each site, individuals acting in various 
capacities were interviewed: cabinet, division and/or department-level administrators, 
nursing program directors, and nursing faculty members, nonnursing faculty members 
and the leaders of faculty organizations-see Table 1 for the totals. Their identities have 
been withheld and fictitious names are used for people and institutions in accord with the 
researcher's agreement to protect the confidentiality of study participants.
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Nursing Faculty Behavior at Arrovo College. (No. 39)
The situation at Arroyo College illustrates the social and political complications of 
aggressive retrenchment management for a small institution and its nursing programs. 
College officials acted early and affirmatively to protect Arroyo's fiscal balance from the 
burden of a number of expensive programs acquired when funding was abundant and 
certain. As part of their strategy, they proposed to eliminate the nursing department 
Caught in this situation, the nursing faculty assembled a successful anti-termination 
campaign.
Introduction
Faced with a potential shortfall of $120,000 for the 1982-83 budget year, the 
Arroyo Board of Trustees asked President Kenneth Blockman to compile a list of ways to 
trim the budget. Blockman, having already proposed to terminate the intercollegiate 
football program, presented the trustees with a list of 12 instructional programs for 
closure. The list included Arroyo's RN and LVN nursing programs.
Coming on the heels of a reduction-in-force the previous year in which three 
counselors and three tenured teachers were laid off, this action caused another social crisis 
in the college and a renewed uproar in the community. In a well-publicized series of 
meetings, the board of trustees, newly reconstituted after an electoral turnover, debated 
the merits of program cu ts- the so-called “low-risk” option, versus the consequences of 
doing nothing-the “high-risk” option. The local press covered the story in a series of 
front page articles, one of which editorialized under the eye-catching banner headline, 
“Bedpans and Jock Straps” (The Signal. March 7, 1982, p. I). In its final decision, the 
Arroyo Board of Trustees bowed to community opinion by voting to retain the nursing 
department.
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Background
Arroyo College is a small, suburban institution serving a cluster of bedroom 
communities 40 miles north of the populous San Fernando Valley in Southern California. 
Despite its size--the smallest in the sample-Arroyo offered 23 occupational programs in 
1981, including programs in registered (RN) and vocational (LVN) nursing, and 
supported, along with its academic offerings, an impressively large athletic department 
(Meyer 1980). Opened in 1969, Arroyo operated initially out of a local high school 
before moving to its present 158 acre site, at which one of the First permanent structures 
was a state-of-the-art stadium built to accommodate an intercollegiate football program.
Arroyo's early history reflected a time of growth and development for 
instructional programs. One of the first, LVN nursing, was initiated in 1970 at the 
request of the regional hospital council on behalf of the hospitals in the area. Within a 
few years, the LVN program had acquired a reputation for excellence, and become a 
source of nurses, not only for the local communities, but also for the surrounding region. 
A decade later, with college revenues no longer certain, local hospitals contributed the 
resources for the addition of an RN career ladder component to the curriculum. Although 
the department remained small in comparison to others in this study, the addition of the 
RN program brought the number of full-time faculty in nursing to a total of six, or 14% 
of the contract teachers at Arroyo.
Intercollegiate football, the centerpiece of Arroyo athletics, was initiated at about 
the same time as LVN nursing, and gradually evolved into a sophisticated athletic 
operation not unlike those in big universities. In contrast to nursing, which had the full 
support of the community, football invited controversy. Although supported by local 
business, the program raised questions about the district’s priorities. Outspoken residents 
who objected to the fact that many of the players were recruited from outside the district 
opposed using district funds for underwriting the education of nonresidents. When, after
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several years, it became clear that the games had not attracted the expected attendance, 
many people at the college-administrators and faculty-also began to question the 
legitimacy of the football program.
Although football conferred prominence on Arroyo as a institution, it added 
considerably to the overall burden on college finances. Typical of small institutions, 
Arroyo lacked economies of scale, and therefore had high maintenance, operation, and 
general support costs—some of the highest unit-for-unit of any college in the community 
college system (Gooder, 1984). Those expenses, added to the output for plant 
construction and program development, created pressure to overspend even before the era 
of expanding revenues ended. Indeed, for five years prior to tax-limitation, the district 
spent more than it received in total revenue (see Table 14), depleting its reserves from 
47% in 1973-74 to 21% in 1978-79 (see Table 15).
With the passage of Proposition 13, the amount of money derived from local taxes 
dropped 29% (see Table 12), a reduction which state funding increases fell $320,000 
short of making up. To balance the budget, officials launched a host of across-the-board 
economies including reductions in class sections, as well as cuts to the instructional 
services, capital outlay, and plant maintenance budgets. Although those steps helped to 
curb college spending, they failed to stop the erosion of reserves, with the result that 
fiscal stability became the paramount concern of district officials in the wake of 
Proposition 13.
Concerned for the long-term fiscal stability of the college, the Arroyo Board of 
Trustees, well in advance of other boards, embarked on a sequence of actions intended to 
correct the college's deteriorating financial situation. Their most important decisions in 
that regard were to change the executive leadership of the college, and to endorse a 
program of aggressive retrenchment measures. Although their moves proved successful 
from a fiscal standpoint-equilibrium was reestablished—they led ultimately to a serious 
crisis in employee morale, and an uproar in the community that resulted in the electoral
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
166
unseating of some members of the board.
The 1981 crisis. For a number of years, Arroyo was run as a virtual hegemony 
under the direction of its original president, Richard Lockwood, and business manager, 
Leo Matthews, who established and maintained tight control over the board of trustees 
and college policy. By all accounts, these men approached decision making in a high­
handed way, addressing personnel matters with a benevolent paternalism that expressed 
their executive authority as much as it spoke to the needs of college personnel. In that 
atmosphere faculty interest in college governance gradually withered to the extent that in 
1974 faculty leaders allowed the college's fledgling academic senate to die.
Only in 1977, after the state authorized faculty collective bargaining, did the 
faculty’s interest in governance rekindle. A CTA faculty association initiated that year 
moved quickly to assert itself by pressing demands for information, to which the 
administration reacted by “clamping down.” As a member of the math department 
recalled, “The faculty association tried to follow the budget but Matthew had things 
buried, and nobody could figure out how much money we had. The administration 
refused to give us any information, so we got help from the CTA.” This initial tug of war 
then escalated and spilled over to other personnel groups. For the next two years, the 
adversarial tension grew. Finally, Business Manager Matthews' hard-line, take-it-or- 
leave-it posture in contract negotiations alienated both the teachers, association and the 
classified employees union. Better organized than the faculty, the classified employees’ 
adopted an electoral strategy, and supported one of their own members in the 1979 trustee 
elections. With the union’s help, Chester Brady, a former classified union officer, 
succeeded in displacing a pro-administration incumbent on the board of trustees, his 
election a clear sign of growing union strength.
In the spring of 1980, the prospects for Proposition 9 -a  ballot initiative to reduce 
state-income taxes-looked good. Indeed, the possibility that it would pass appeared to
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pose an additional threat to Arroyo’s long-term fiscal stability. Thus, the Arroyo Board 
of Trustees sought to redirect the institution. To expedite a change, the trustees made an 
offer of early retirement to Lockwood. They then set about an executive search which 
was contracted out to a private search firm. Although in no way imprudent, the board’s 
move suggested a state of urgency to many in the college, and raised questions among the 
faculty about the possibility of changes in a major retrenchment
As Lockwood's successor, the board hired Kenneth Bloc km an. A former K-12 
administrator, Blockman had little four-year college and no two-year college 
administrative experience. What he did have was a reputation, acquired in a series of 
positions at financially-troubled institutions, as a bottom-line manager who would not 
hesitate to do whatever it took to balance the budget. Indeed, in his most recent position 
at a large, urban high school, Blockman oversaw, in the wake of Proposition 13, the 
termination of the freshman athletic program (The Signal. February 12, 1982).
Blockman arrived at Arroyo in the summer of 1980. During the summer, a group 
of disgruntled coaches from Blockman's previous district contacted members of the 
Arroyo athletic department with reports of the chaos Blockman had caused in their school. 
Word of these reports spread quickly within the Arroyo faculty. By the time the fall 
semester arrived, many members had concluded that Blockman was a professional 
terminator, and were braced for immediate cutbacks.
Their speculations were not unfounded. Shortly after his arrival, Blockman made 
a series of decisions that appeared to confirm the faculty’s worst expectations, the most 
egregious of which from the faculty’s standpoint was a decision to undertake a 
comprehensive review of Arroyo's instructional programs. Rather than appoint a faculty 
task force Blockman contracted the review to an outside firm, the Carvell Education 
Planning Management group. Under the direction of Vincent Berra, dean of instruction, 
it assumed the task of evaluating the efficiency of Arroyo’s academic programs. Having 
excluded the faculty, however, Blockman added to suspicions that he was preparing for a
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RIF. Despite efforts to reassure the faculty with informal round table talks and a 
president's advisory committee the social tension only intensified. Further, Blockman’s 
personal style, which included displays of temper, put people off. As one member put it, 
“He'd invite you to come in whenever you needed something, but if you went in, he'd 
yell at you!” Not surprisingly, many teachers concluded that Blockman’s gestures were 
gratuitous.
In the spring of 1981, six months after Blockman’s arrival, the college faced its 
first serious fiscal crisis-a projected revenue shortfall of $593,000, or 10% of Arroyo's 
total annual budget (The Signal. October 4, 1981). As members of the faculty had 
predicted, Blockman recommended faculty layoffs and program closures, however, the 
layoffs he requested (in music, psychology, athletics, and counseling) did not conform to 
the findings of the review study. Again, rumors spread. Rejecting the official 
explanation that statutory teacher dismissal procedures mandated the deviations, many 
teachers speculated that Blockman was trying to rid the college of trouble-makers. 
Faculty morale plummeted.
The subsequent REF hearings were relatively uneventful. With Matthews’ help, 
Blockman dominated the public debate. His proposal, which reduced the faculty but did 
not cut the administration, was passed by the trustees. Indeed, Blockman successfully 
argued that, the budget process would be blind without a layoff plan (The Signal. October 
4, 1981). The faculty, many members of which were fearful for their jobs, mounted 
almost no resistance. As one member put it, “I believe in standing up for my beliefs, but 
not if it means I’m going to have to starve.”
Community reaction was also slow to build. Indeed, nothing happened until two 
independent probes of the college budget, published after the vote, aroused public 
interest. One study was conducted by an analyst for The Signal, the local paper, the 
other, by an analyst for the classified employees’ union. The findings of both identified 
significant discrepancies in the budget figures anchoring Blockman's plan. Among other
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errors, the analysts discovered that local revenues had been underestimated by $400,000, 
and expenditures overestimated by $150,000. Further, the union analyst noted that 
Arroyo's reserves, at 13%, were high by comparison to other institutions (The Signal. 
October 4, 1981). Both studies suggested that Blockman's measures could have been 
avoided. Indeed, that point was emphasized by The Signal in a front page article 
headlined, “Arroyo Faculty Cuts May Have Been Unnecessary.” The paper singled out 
Matthews’ questionable accounting, and criticized the administration for its failure to use 
up-to-date figures in its budget proposals. It also criticized the administration for failing 
to accurately portray college resources, and chided the board of trustees for failing to 
challenge the layoff proposal, and encourage public debate on fiscal matters. As the paper 
noted, “Only on a few occasions were items publicly discussed in the three-stage process 
that led to the budget's approval,” (The Signal. October 4, 1981, p. 14).
Within days of that report, The Signal printed another piece on a state 
investigation into Arroyo's 1981 counselor layoffs, which had all but gutted a state- 
mandated minority opportunity program at Arroyo (The Signal. October 7, 1981). 
Together, these articles succeeded in drawing public attention to the college. Published 
just four weeks before the trustee elections of 1981, The Signal’s reports became an 
important factor in the election. As the campaign developed, two challengers who were 
running on a platform of reform and fiscal accountability gained the support of the Arroyo 
Faculty Association in its first foray into Arroyo electoral politics. On November 4th, the 
association’s candidates successfully unseated two of the board's more entrenched 
incumbents in a low turnout election (The Signal. November 6, 1981).
The election altered the profile of the board. The challengers, eager to assert 
themselves in the post-election period, aligned themselves with Trustee Brady. That left 
Blockman without a dependable majority. Only Peter Mason, board president, remained 
securely in Blockman's comer. A fifth seat remained open pending a special election 
scheduled for April, 1982 (The Signal. February 17, 1982).
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The 1982 crisis. In the spring of 1982 as the state implemented the growth caps 
enacted by AB 1369, Arroyo officials braced themselves for another budget shortfall. 
Early revenue projections forecast a deficit of $120,000. Again, Blockman called for 
program cutbacks. This time, however, he made his recommendations under the intense 
scrutiny from the press. Blockman portrayed the situation in the gloomiest of terms. In 
an interview with a reporter for The Signal, he attributed the deficit to inadequate growth 
funding, specifically an 11% enrollment increase funded at a 4.8% rate. Sounding a note 
of alarm, Blockman noted that the very future of the college was up in the air, and 
reflected on his retrenchment philosophy. “With today's system, more students do not 
mean more money. The job of the board of trustees is to narrow the scope and mission of 
the college,” he said (The Signal. February 3, 1982, p. 20).
Bowing to public pressure, Blockman announced an intensified board schedule 
for a full public airing of Arroyo’s retrenchment plans (The Signal. February 3, 1982). 
At the first meeting, Blockman presented the trustee with a high-risk (no immediate 
cutback) and a low-risk (immediate cutback) option, and recommended the low-risk 
alternative, urging the board to act in order to meet the statutory deadline for layoff 
notices.
The reaction from the audience was predictably emotional. Not suprisingly, the 
classified employees lambasted the high-risk option. Delaying a decision on faculty 
layoffs, they argued, would place the brunt of any later cutbacks on classified positions, 
which were exempt from statutory RIF deadlines. ‘W e are a total school,” the classified 
union representative pleaded, “All of us should share equally” (The Signal. February 7, 
1982, p. 12). Wary of further program outs the board nevertheless voted 3:1 to accept 
the high-risk option, and directed Blockman to come up with a list of other options to 
balance the budget.
At its next regular meeting, the board took up the issue of Arroyo’s tarnished 
public relations image. Linda Coolidge, one of the newly elected trustees, made several
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specific proposals that would make it easier for members o f the public to address the 
board. Her ideas were summarily adopted, in a move The Signal described as “a 
welcome effort to open the doors of communication that many people thought had been 
rusted shut permanently” (The Signal. February 10, 1982, p. 1).
Two days later, the board met again, this time to discuss the fate of Arroyo’s 
football program. Hastily called, the meeting brought a crowd of faculty, students, 
residents, and business leaders. Blockman, in a long-anticipated move, announced the 
resignation of the head football coach. He then proposed that football be eliminated for a 
savings of $75,000. Many people rose to speak on behalf of continuing the football 
program, however, there were also several who voiced concern about Arroyo’s priorities. 
One woman, for example, argued strenuously that athletics should not be saved at the 
expense of academics. Her comments drew applause from the audience. After hours of 
heated debate, the board, still reticent to cut programs, refused to vote on Blockman's 
proposal (The Signal. February 12, 1982). The next day, The Signal printed a front page 
editorial which referred to Blockman’s football proposal as a “horrid recommendation.” 
In an adjacent article headlined, “Backlash Familiar to Arroyo President,” it also detailed 
Blockman's history as a program terminator (The Signal. February 12, 1982, p. 1).
Two weeks passed during which rumors began to circulate to the effect that 
Arroyo’s nursing programs would be on Blockman's cut list Within days, these were 
confirmed by a front-page press report, entitled, “Arroyo Nursing May Be Cut” (The 
Signal. February 28, 1982). Blockman was quoted as saying that nursing, which he 
noted consumed almost $150,000 annually and served relatively few students, would 
make an excellent choice for termination (The Signal. February 28, 1982).
Finally, on March 2nd, thirteen days before the statutory deadline for layoff 
notices, Blockman presented his alternatives to the board. His proposal called for closing 
twelve academic programs (including autobody, horticulture, physics, economics, 
journalism, and nursing) for a total savings of $281,000. That amount, he said, was
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needed to offset to the district’s newly revised deficit projection. No vote was taken at the 
meeting, but The Signal, with a choice of academics or athletics, thereafter changed its 
editorial position. Three days later, in a front-page headline, it trumpeted, “Don't Touch 
the Nurses” (The Signal. March 5, 1982, p. 1).
The campus reaction. Members of Arroyo's demoralized general faculty were not 
surprised by Blockman's proposal, although many members were taken aback by its 
scope and structure. They were not, however, surprised by its nature. One member 
likened Blockman’s strategy to Vietnam War tactics. “It was like the administration was 
trying to destroy the college to save the college,” said Don Corbin of the science division. 
Suspicious of Blockman, many of the faculty doubted the economic necessity for 
sweeping closures. Accurately or not, the press reports had confirmed what many 
members suspected all along, that administration had manipulated the accounting system 
to advance its retrenchment priorities. As Tom Larry, a math teacher, said to the 
researcher, “It’s entirely possible that the college was short and had to do something, but 
because of the administration's style of keeping their cards under the table, everybody 
was really suspicious.” He added, “It always comes down to what the board wants to 
do. Until recently our board has been kind of a rubber stamp.”
In that context, two theories about Blockman’s action emerged. In one theory, the 
faculty cast Blockman’s list as part of a strategy to eliminate football. Faced with 
community pressure and an unpredictable board, members argued, Blockman needed a 
strong political lever in his campaign to terminate football. For that he chose nursing, 
another high-profile, expensive program as disingenuous, alternative for elimination. 
According to logic, no responsible administrator would drop an academic program, 
particularly a strong one like nursing, to save an athletic program. “It was obvious that it 
was just a ploy,” Lee Tobin, another math teacher, commented.
A second faculty theory argued that Blockman, in complying with the board's
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request for alternatives, was merely supplying the trustees with the trial balloons they 
needed for testing public preferences. Those who held this theory viewed Blockman's 
action as reflecting sensitivity to the political pressure on the trustees. As Ron Taylor, 
dean of life science, noted, “Blockman knew the pressures the trustees were under. He 
was just trying to help them test the water.”
Whichever theory they held, most members of the faculty looked at Blockman’s 
proposal as forcing inter-unit competition. Indeed, the press coverage put the focus 
almost exclusively on nursing and football. As a consequence, members of those 
departments believed themselves parties to a contest Les Olson, head of the Arroyo 
athletic department lamented, “We didn't have anything against nursing-all we wanted 
was to survive ourselves!” Ellen Finley, nursing director, likewise noted, “I don't like 
being pitted against fellow faculty members.”
Members of the athletic department were particularly devastated. Having lost a 
member to the 1981 RIF, they had anticipated Blockman's move but, because of their 
weakened position in the college, felt powerless to do anything about it. The coaches 
were aware, for example, of the symbolism in the choices before the board. As Olson 
noted, “Everybody knows you need a nurse. Who the hell needs a football player?”
The Political Behavior of the Nursing Faculty
The Arroyo nursing department fared well after Proposition 13. While it shared in 
the across-the-board cutbacks made by college officials, nursing had sources of supplies 
and money not available to other units. Indeed, in 1980, as other units lost part-time 
faculty, nursing expanded its curriculum with on-going grants totaling $55,000 annually 
from local hospitals and other health agencies. The course was not entirely smooth, 
however. Within a year of expanding, nursing became the target of a cost-reduction 
scheme. Indeed, Blockman proposed to close the LVN nursing program on the basis of
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national trends to reduce the use of vocational nurses in acute-care hospitals. A quick 
response by Director Finley, however, foiled the action. Finley quickly documented the 
continuing need for LVN's local long-term care facilities. Blockman subsequently 
dropped his proposal, but shortly thereafter, asked Finley to try to reduce the 
department’s costs by increasing it’s clinical teaching ratio along the lines of the high-ratio 
model used by medical schools. Again, Finley challenged Blockman, this time by 
arguing that such a move would pose a risk to the RN program’s state accreditation.
Despite the implications of these events, Finley never anticipated that Blockman 
would try to close her entire department In fact, she continued to believe that the 
financial interest of local hospitals in the RN program would insulate the department from 
termination. Finley was surprised, therefore, when, in early 1982, rumors began to 
circulate about the closure of her department “I was shocked!” she said. Members of 
her staff were likewise surprised. ‘Tw o of our faculty were on soft-money, so part of the 
funds for the program didn't even come out of the general fund!” said RN member Mary 
Lenox. “I guess we didn't think that something like this could happen!”
Members of the nursing department interpreted Blockman's strategy as one of 
forcing nursing into competition with football. Indeed, they were so convinced of this 
that in interviews for this study no one mentioned the other programs on Blockman's list. 
“They tried to equate us with football-we were the two programs being removed,” Nancy 
Richardson, another RN instructor, told the researcher. Although members of the 
department suspected that Blockman’s real objective was to cut football, they nevertheless 
feared that he might carry out his threat “The president--he didn’t care. He would have 
liked to get rid of us too!” Finley said. Several of them speculated that nursing was 
being targeted because it lacked academic status. “We felt the administration wanted to 
emphasize academic areas and didn't consider nursing an academic area!” said 
Richardson. Finley, however, was convinced that members of Blockman’s all-male 
cabinet assumed nursing would capitulate without a fight. “I think they thought we'd roll
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over and play dead, but I picked up the gauntlet He [Blockman] put us in a very weak 
position-I couldn't take a chance,” she said adding, ‘1 was irate--they were equating us 
with football!”
Strategy and tactics. Indignation spurred Finley into action. With only two 
weeks to plan a defense, she pressed her faculty into action. A civic activist with years of 
experience in community politics, Finley took over the tactical planning. Her strategy 
was to knock holes in Blockman's economic argument and mobilize community support. 
In line with the first objective, she conducted an in-house survey of Arroyo's general 
faculty, the purpose of which was to document nursing and prenursing enrollment in 
general education courses. From that information she estimated the indirect ADA 
accumulated by nursing students—that is, the ADA they generated in other departments. 
“I'm tired of hearing that nursing is expensive,” she said.
Then Finley set out to mobilize an anti-termination coalition. To generate support, 
she turned to the local medical and business establishments. She aimed to put together a 
strong show strength on the part of those with an interest in the department. Her 
objective was to counter the influence of the local football boosters which she suspected 
would be substantial. She notified numerous regional hospital administrators, many of 
whom were community leaders in their own right, about the board’s decision, but also 
broadened her outreach to include a “who's who” list of local civic and business people. 
“I knew from my experience in local politics that it was important to get the people with 
clout involved!” she explained.
Finley understood the importance of the media. She actively sought to draw 
media attention to the nursing issue, and was encouraged to do so by a colleague at 
another community college. Hesitant at first, she approached a local radio station, and 
obtained an invitation to appear on a talk-show. Recognizing that her motive might be 
misinterpreted, Finley deemphasized her role as a college official when she was
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interviewed, and used the opportunity to stress the impact of community college fiscal 
decline on nursing. Her purpose, as she described it, was to educate the community, but 
she clearly felt there was a risk involved, and worried that her action would jeopardize her 
position in the college. “I went on the radio, and I talked to people in the service area, 
yes. But I didn’t go out and make a big brouhaha,” Finley reported to the researcher.
As Finley pursued those avenues, members of her faculty went to the faculty 
association for support. However, officials of the faculty association declined to help. 
They explained that their responsibility was to advocate for the faculty as a whole. The 
nursing members then went to their peers in the general faculty but found them also 
hesitant to help. Even teachers in the life sciences, many of whom taught prenursing and 
nursing students, hesitated to pressure the administration for nursing. Members of the 
nursing department interpreted their reticence as an expression of the survival mentality 
operating in the institution. “People were afraid for their jobs!” Richardson explained. 
However, Steven Smith, president of the faculty association, had another explanation. 
Smith claimed that the general faculty, a small, close-knit group by his description, had an 
aversion to taking sides. That aversion in the context of the pending RIF, he said, 
interfered with the organization of a collective response. “Just like the faculty association 
can't take sides, people in the faculty won't either—they won't get behind one program 
versus another program!” He added that the teachers were also unwilling to lobby a 
board long regarded as insensitive to faculty concerns.
Unsuccessful with their campus peers, members of the nursing faculty, assisted 
by their students, then engaged in word-of-mouth networking, primarily at local hospitals 
and health clinics. They also organized an alumni telephone tree to spread information 
about the board's schedule and agenda. Both efforts helped to generate a flurry of calls 
and letters to the board of trustees prior to the hearing on nursing.
Throughout the two-week period, Finley worked alone, independent of her staff. 
She recognized that clinical teaching schedules limited faculty time. However, it was also
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Finley's habit to work alone. Indeed, members of her faculty described Finley as a “take 
charge” administrator with boundless energy to devote to a cause. They regarded her as a 
good spokesperson for the department, and a politically competent leader. “Ellen is a 
powerful woman—she went out and got the community behind us,” Richardson 
commented.
The decision. A large crowd, unprecedented in Arroyo history and estimated at 
between 250 and 300 people, congregated for the March 6th board meeting. Indeed the 
crowd was so large, that the meeting had to be moved from the board room to the college 
cafeteria. A wide variety of interests was represented among those who assembled. 
Various departments, including football and nursing, and representatives from other 
constituencies, including students and classified staff, were on hand. The most heavily 
represented interest, however, was nursing. Numerous health care administrators were 
there to defend the department, along with scores of nursing students, members of their 
families, a large contingent of program alumni, and a legion of local residents, all of 
whom came to show support for the department (The Signal. March 7, 1982).
The first item on the agenda was football. At issue was whether the college 
should immediately search for a new permanent football coach, or install a temporary 
coach for the next year. However, the discussion was quickly redirected to the larger 
issue of college priorities when a number of people in the audience raised questions about 
the wisdom of maintaining a football program at a time when academic programs were 
being considered for elimination. As the discussion developed, most of the opinions 
expressed were clearly on the side of academics. Indeed, only one person, the athletic 
director, rose to speak on behalf of football. Les Olson argued strenuously that football 
should continue because it attracted students to the college. That drew Trustee Coolidge 
into the discussion. Coolidge presented a litany of reasons for dropping football, and 
then moved to convert it to an extramural program. Her motion, which elicited no
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audience objections, passed with a unanimous vote of the board (The Signal. March 7, 
1982).
Next, the board entertained the nursing issue. The question was whether or not to 
close the department. Finley, the first to speak for nursing, took care to place Arroyo’s 
problems in the larger context of the state funding changes. After summarizing her 
understanding of Arroyo’s fiscal situation, Finley said, “If the state doesn't do something 
to bail out the community colleges, we're all in trouble!” (The Signal. March 7, 1982, p. 
10). Finley then went on to present her survey data. At the conclusion of her remarks, 
she warned that doing away with the nursing department would create “a major health 
care crisis a few years down the road.” At a dramatic point in her argument, she pointed 
to the audience. “In case you have any doubt,” she said, “those are my folks out there!” 
(The Signal. March 7, 1982, p. 10). Her gesture drew enthusiastic applause from the 
audience. Throughout the evening Finley appealed to rationality. “I tried to present the 
facts and not use emotion,” she said.
Following Finley, Leo Winters, the chief administrator of a large local hospital, 
addressed the board. He expressed concern that the local health agencies would lose their 
investment in the RN program. “We fought like hell to get the registered nursing program 
going, and now a year and a half later, it’s on the agenda to be cut,” he noted. Clearly 
upset. Winters asserted that no one from the college had bothered to ask the hospitals for 
additional money. “At the very least,” he exclaimed, “we're willing to sit down and talk.” 
(The Signal. March 7, 1982, p. 10).
Winters was followed by a number of other hospital administrators, some from 
other communities, and a miscellaneous group of local residents and program alumni, all 
of whom argued to keep the nursing program. A few members of the science faculty 
spoke persuasively on behalf of nursing. The discussion was heated. Blockman at 
points defended his proposal in rancorous interchanges with members of the audience. 
After a lengthy debate, however, the board voted 4-0 to retain the nursing department
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Later that night the trustees also decided to keep journalism, physics, and auto body, but 
voted to eliminate programs in fire control, consumer homemaking, and ornamental 
horticulture (The Signal. March 7, 1982).
Only three members of the nursing faculty were present at the meeting. 
Richardson from the RN program supported Finley's effort, but did not speak at the 
meeting. “I guess I'm not political,” she commented, adding, “Ellen has a lot more 
experience.” Lenox, Richardson’s colleague on the RN staff, did not attend the meeting. 
“The nursing program here doesn't mean that much to me,” she said, “I knew I could 
move on.” Lenox, a new teacher, accepted the administration’s rationale for terminating 
programs. “If the money isn't there, what are you going to do?” she said. Further, she 
acknowledged that she was struggling to meet the demands of the job. ‘1 was too busy 
teaching to get involved,” she noted, admitting that her personal loyalty was to the 
nursing profession rather than the college. Lenox observed, that, unlike herself, Finley, 
and Richardson both had a strong personal interest in the future of the department
The aftermath. Late in May, the Arroyo Board of Trustees finally rejected 
Blockman’s structural reorganization approach and took definitive steps to revitalize 
campus moral by opting to change Arroyo’s administrative leadership with a buy-out of 
Blockman’s contract After an intense search, the trustees hired a new president whose 
management philosophy stressed open communication and shared governance. Other 
changes followed. Matthews subsequently left the college, and in the fall of 1983, the 
Arroyo faculty association successfully unseated Trustee Mason, the only long-term 
incumbent remaining on the board.
With those changes, the climate at Arroyo began to improve, but the toll of harsh 
retrenchment lingered for some time. For years, Arroyo had cut spending more than its 
revenue losses demanded. Although its reserves never dropped below 12%, the social 
cost of that achievement was enormous.
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Conditions also changed for the nursing department Within months of the crisis, 
it moved out of Arroyo’s applied arts division and into the life science regarded by many 
faculty members as more academically prestigious. Finley credited the move to influence 
the department gained from it’s policy victory. ‘I t  really put us on the map,” she 
observed. But others disagreed with that assessment Indeed, Ron Taylor, dean of life 
science, claimed that the reorganization was done for convenience. “We shared a 
laboratory—it made practical sense.”
Overall, Finley believed that her faculty’s campaign saved the nursing program. 
However, Steve Smith, faculty association president disputed the significance she 
attached to their effort He believed the crisis was contrived to eliminate football, and that 
nursing was never in jeopardy. “Anyone with eyes could see what happened,” he 
observed, “In times of a budget crunch, people are not going to choose an athletic 
program over an academic program that puts people directly into the workforce.” Finley 
went on to become an administrator of the college, an achievement she also attributed to 
the policy victory.
Discussion
The case of nursing at Arroyo College illustrates how programs conspicuously 
high in cost and low in enrollment come to find themselves at the center of controversy 
during times of economic stress. It also illustrates how institutional history, 
environmental trends, and community politics converge to affect the fate of nursing 
programs.
The cutbacks of 1981 and 1982 had their seeds in the early decision culture at 
Arroyo. With the advent of faculty collective bargaining, the system at Arroyo evolved 
from a benign administrative paternalism into a pernicious adversarialism. That change 
more than any other factor explained the failure of college officials to reach out to the
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faculty at key points in retrenchment planning. As much of the literature in educational 
retrenchment makes clear, failure to reach out is a serious error (Bowen, 1983; Deutsch, 
1983; McTighe, 1979; Powers, 1982).
Intent on holding the faculty at bay, Arroyo officials failed to anticipate the public 
response to harsh retrenchment As an important institution in an isolated area, Arroyo 
College was a source of front page news. The local press thus enjoyed an enormous 
potential to influence public opinion on college policy. When it picked up on the 
hegemony dominating retrenchment, it called attention to Arroyo’s management problems 
and the oversight deficiencies of the board. Public reaction, although slow to develop, 
eventually grew strong enough to alter the way business was done at the college. 
Through the electoral process, a new board majority was assembled, one that invited 
public participation in college decisions. The changes at Arroyo thus illustrated what 
Schattschneider (1960) referred to as conflict socialization--the process by which conflict 
is expanded beyond closed-door privacy into the public domain.
This case illustrates how various college constituencies react to selective 
retrenchment While much of the Arroyo general faculty was paralyzed by job insecurity, 
the nursing faculty orchestrated an anti-termination campaign. A high cost, low 
enrollment programs, nursing was targeted as a possible loser in the administration’s 
cutback proposal. Its director, however, quickly organized a response. Understanding, 
as Behn (1978) pointed ou t that the outcome of termination is decided by a policy's 
attentive constituency, she worked to mobilize a coalition by prevailing on nursing's 
natural allies, the local health service administrators and community leaders committed to 
the welfare of the community. Her hastily assembled coalition easily prevailed over the 
demoralized athletic department faculty. The director’s actions were driven by a deep 
sense of injustice, and a belief that college officials did not value her department. Such 
feelings are not uncommon in persons threatened by retrenchment, and can be viewed as 
part of a judgmental perspective aiding survival under threatening conditions. Hood
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(1980) found that in retrenching organizations, people tend to categorize others into two 
groups, those who oppose and those who support their interests, and judge them 
accordingly. Whatever personal attitudes the director held about the administration, 
however, she clearly recognized the importance of appealing to reason as she made her 
public presentations.
The actions of the nursing faculty, on the other hand, revealed a diversity of 
identity and motivation. Clearly, the sense of crisis felt by the nursing director was not 
shared by all of the department’s members. Rather than group pressure (as proposed by 
Verba, 1961), or a need for conformity (as described by Staw et aL, 1981), their actions 
derived from individual political judgments grounded on self and situational appraisals. 
According to Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985), such appraisals play an important role 
in shaping political behavior.
Finally, the crisis at Arroyo derived from a philosophy that put economic 
considerations above all other values. Seeking to terminate an expensive athletic 
program, the Arroyo administration sought a lever to push its recommendation through a 
resistant board, and thus proposed nursing, a high-cost, low enrollment unit, and a useful 
political target, as an alternative. From a Fiscal standpoint, it was a clever tactic, one that 
revealed the high value placed on economic efficiency. Whichever way the decision 
went, for or against athletics, the college budget would be served. Whether or not the 
CEO actually intended to “pit” nursing against football, however, as so many Arroyo 
faculty members believed, his action clearly elicited the nursing director's ire and 
community values determined the policy outcome.
Nursing Faculty Behavior at Palomino College..(No. 1)
The situation at Palomino College illustrates the disabling effect of social conflict 
on an institution facing severe resource decline. For several years, a recalcitrant college
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administration and equally unbending faculty union engaged in an adversarial war that 
worsened the problems of retrenchment for the entire institution. At a critical point, 
college officials planned drastic cutback strategies with the potential to disproportionately 
reduce the nursing department. Although seriously demoralized, members of the 
department organized to fight back.
Introduction
A year after Arroyo’s crisis, the officials of Palomino College announced a 
reduction-in-force that would pare down the nursing faculty by 50% and close 
Palomino's LVN nursing program. The centerpiece of a restructuring plan recommended 
by Interim President Steven Miller, that drastic step, which proposed to cut numerous 
departments, was taken to avoid an anticipated revenue shortfall for 1983-84 of $3.5 
million. In all, layoff notices were sent to 101 faculty members-25% of the full-time 
teaching staff—17 to teachers in the 30-member nursing unit.
Initially shocked, the nursing faculty responded slowly. After a period of 
immobilization, a group of members organized an anti-termination campaign to influence 
the final decision. Their effort forced the board of trustees to back away from its original 
plan. By June, the initial 17 notices had been reduced to eight. Then, during the summer 
term that followed, a vigorous fundraising campaign pursued by the nursing chairperson 
saved the LVN program and provided enough money to reinstate four teachers. 
However, a drop in student enrollment caused in part by public confusion over the status 
of the department led to their dismissal the following year. Unable to accept this turn of 
events, several nursing faculty members blamed the chairperson, and the group lapsed 
into a state of chronic conflict
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Background
Palomino College is a large, centrally-located, urban institution serving a 
collection of old, residential communities in the greater Los Angeles area. After its 
opening in 1928, it underwent a series of transitions, at one point incorporating a second 
campus. In 1954, however, Palomino consolidated as a single, large college to 
eventually become the Palomino Community College District, governed since 1966 by a 
seven member board of trustees.
Over the course of three decades, Palomino established an array of health 
occupation programs including two in nursing—LVN and RN—which gained regional and 
national reputations for excellence. Indeed, the registered nursing program distinguished 
itself as one of the first to be accredited by the National League for Nursing—a milestone 
in the nursing profession's acceptance of the associate degree curriculum.
Over the years, the nursing department expanded to meet the personnel needs of 
several large local hospitals, and achieved a high degree of prominence in the community 
and college. At the dme of this study, it enrolled well over 200 students, and occupied 
much of Palomino's Paramedical Science Building, an impressive structure financed in 
part by a federal grant for the local expansion of nursing education.
The 1982-83 crisis. Interim President Steven Miller arrived at Palomino in the 
middle of 1982-83 academic year to find an institution in full-blown organizational crisis. 
His predecessor, David Bayer, had just departed, leaving the college in economic and 
social turmoil. The board of trustees looked to Miller for a plan to deal with a looming 
$3.5 million budget deficit.
The crisis that Miller inherited derived from a number of complicated economic 
and social factors having to do with Palomino's struggles to adapt, not only to 
Proposition 13, but also to collective bargaining, both of which converged on the college
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within a period of two years. Indeed, just prior to tax-limitation, a newly-certified CTA- 
affiliated faculty collective bargaining unit emerged as a major force in district policy 
making. That development became a matter of concern to district officials as they looked 
forward to Proposition 13. When, in the spring of 1978, Palomino's CEO retired, 
district trustees looked for a new executive with the skills to maintain fiscal control. They 
hired David Bayer, a man in his mid-30s who had no experience as a college president, 
but who, as chief negotiator for a district besieged by union conflicts, had acquired a 
reputation for being “tough on the union.”
As anticipated, Proposition 13 resulted in a precipitous drop in district revenues- 
14% in Bayer's first year on the job (see Table 9). District officials identified two reasons 
for the decline, (1) a state apportionment formula shorting district revenues (The Star- 
News. July 24, 1983), and (2) a less-than-maximum local property tax rate frozen into 
law by the tax initiative leaving Palomino unusually dependent on state funds (Gooder, 
1984). Revenues eroded steadily; by 1982, they were down 20% from pre-tax-limitation 
levels, and by 1984, 25%.
Bayer’s job was to help the college adapt to decline. From the beginning, 
however, his efforts were hindered by faculty resistance. Indeed, CTA union leaders 
regarded him as a union-buster, and distrusted him from the outset, as did the officers of 
the Palomino academic senate who had backed another candidate for the CEO position.
Bayer’s early actions served to confirm faculty doubts. Shortly after his arrival, 
for example, he reorganized the college hierarchy, adding at great expense to the college a 
new executive layer consisting of four new vice presidencies. In another controversial 
move, he then filled those positions with outsiders. Although Bayer’s reorganization, 
which tightened executive control, had merit from a management perspective, it alienated 
the administrators displaced by the new order, and offended numerous faculty members 
who questioned the cost at a time when the college was deliberating serious spending 
reductions. It also violated Palomino hiring traditions, and thereby reinforced faculty
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fears that Bayer was preparing for a campaign against the union.
Bayer’s new cabinet was not without skill. Among its members were Don 
Jeffries, head of administrative services, Jack Baden, head of personnel services, and 
Mary Ogilvie, head of instruction, later replaced by Vincent Berra from Arroyo College. 
They worked diligently to maintain Palomino's fiscal balance, instituting a program of 
spending reductions and strict budget controls. In 1979, they initiated the Palomino 
College Foundation, a fund-raising organization, to pursue external sources of funding.
At first the new cabinet limited its budget cutbacks to capital outlay, supplies, and 
plant maintenance. (The latter caused the appearance of the college to deteriorate 
noticeably.) For three years, 1979-1981, these tactics allowed the district to sustain a 
healthy reserve level of 14% (see Table 15). Subsequently, however, officials were 
forced to lay off classified employees and institute a faculty hiring freeze. Numerous 
positions went unfilled, resulting in the elimination of a few small academic programs.
Despite the cabinets efforts, budget deficit projections became an annual ritual. 
Each year, in fact, Jeffries invoked a mid-year budget freeze to rein in spending. His 
freezes, however, were usually followed by end-of-year surpluses, and those surpluses 
in turn nurtured faculty suspicions the cabinet was over-reacting to Palomino’s fiscal 
circumstances. Faculty doubts set the scene for conflict. Indeed, the ambiguity 
surrounding district budget projections led faculty union officials to press for salary 
raises. As Ed Otis, local CTA executive director, explained, “We were determined that 
the college would not balance its budget on the backs of the faculty.”
True to his reputation, Bayer met union demands with a get-tough approach that 
invited faculty resistance. When both sides proved unwilling to compromise, a series of 
fierce adversarial battles ensued. The warfare went on for a period of three years, 1979- 
1982, and literally tore the campus apart (The Star-News. February 12, 1984). 
Unfortunately the acrimony of contract disputes spilled over to the campus, erecting tall 
barriers between labor and “management” Each side sought public vindication by
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pointing the finger of responsibility at the other. The faculty accused the cabinet of 
“mismanagement”; the cabinet, in turn, accused the faculty of “fiscal naivetd”.
The intense conflict between the administration and the faculty had serious 
organizational and fiscal consequences. A shadow administration, which formed as 
disgruntled middle administrators began taking their problems directly to members of the 
board, gradually undercut Bayer's influence with the trustees. Finally, with Bayer’s 
influence waning, the trustees wavered on the issue of salaries. In an ill-fated attempt to 
restore harmony, they approved a series of large faculty raises—nine percent for 1981-82, 
and another six percent for 1982-83 (California Community Colleges, 1985, February). 
That action led directly to a fiscal crisis in 1982-83. As Jeffries observed, “They hoped 
the fiscal situation would improve but it didn’t.”
In the spring of 1982, AB 21 threatened the funding of numerous avocational and 
physical education courses in the Palomino curriculum. Alarmed by the state’s action, the 
board of trustees approved a plan to review Palomino’s mission. The trustees cited the 
shift of authority and fiscal control to the state as the reason for the undertaking (Star- 
News. September 12, 1982). The board then held a community forum to review 
Palomino’s occupational education program, and surveyed the community to determine 
the continued need for an array of occupational programs. Several hospitals participated.
By the end of the spring semester, it was clear, however, that the social climate at 
Palomino had failed to improved and that a fiscal crisis was looming. The board at that 
point acted to encourage Bayer’s departure by denying him a new four-year contract and 
customary salary raise. Bayer resigned, but agreed to stay on to see the fall semester 
through.
During the summer, Palomino officials announced an impending deficit of $5 
million, 14% of Palomino’s annual budget The administration made immediate efforts to 
gain a salary concession from the faculty union, ail of which failed. College officials then 
began an anxious search for other ways to cut costs (Star-News. October 26, 1982).
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Various ideas, canceling the summer session and furloughing staff among others, were 
considered, but none promised to balance the budget. Pushed to the brink, college 
officials agreed to reorganize the instructional program.
Vincent Berra was recruited from Arroyo College and installed in 1981 as 
Palomino’s vice president for instruction. An ardent cost-cutter, he took on the task of 
planning the reorganization. Berra lacked the requisite doctorate degree for the position, 
but agreed to pursue one as he worked on Palomino’s retrenchment plan. Under pressure 
from the start, Berra had difficulty gaining the faculty's trust. His approach, which was 
to recruit the Carvell consultancy group to do a program review, drew harsh criticism 
from the Palomino faculty, many of whom objected to the Carvell evaluation criteria 
which members believed failed to consider the factors driving up costs in some 
disciplines. Berra proceeded with the study, however, which eventually found 
engineering, nursing, and a few allied health programs at the bottom of Palomino’s 
efficiency list.
After completing the study, Berra convened a committee comprised primarily of 
Palomino’s top administrators, but included a few faculty members and students. The 
committee’s task was to make reform recommendations. Over the course of the 1982 fall 
semester, it developed a plan to reduce spending without lowering college revenue. 
Members were aware that California RIF statutes required all part-time faculty to be 
dismissed before full-time faculty could be laid off (Ozsomogonyan, 1976). In accord, 
they avoided units with high numbers of part-time personnel, especially those with high- 
enrollments, since cutting those units would reduce revenue. Members looked instead for 
units with large full-time faculties and low enrollments, one of which was nursing. As 
Baden, the vice president of personnel services, explained, “Nursing was a target of 
opportunity that was also a high-cost target”
The committee deliberated under difficult conditions during the fall of 1982. It 
was an election year, and as the political season went on, the cost of education became a
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big issue in the gubernatorial campaign. Indeed, the debate at the state level contributed to 
a climate of uncertainty and tension on the Palomino campus. To preserve calm, college 
officials decided to put off their retrenchment decision pending the outcome of the 
election. That delay, however, only fueled speculation, as the faculty focused itself on 
the nature and extent of the impending cuts. One popular faculty theory was that the 
district would target high-cost, low WSCH programs such as nursing, in its restructuring 
effort.
The cutback proposal. Steven Miller, the interim substitute for Bayer, arrived in 
February, just in time to guide the administration in making its final decisions (The Star- 
News. February 4, 1983). The retired CEO of a neighboring district and a one-time 
superintendent of Palomino's K-12 district, Miller was welcomed as an insider. He 
bonded quickly with the other members of the Palomino administrative cabinet
As Miller began work, revised revenue forecasts projected an impending budget 
deficit of $3.5 million. Miller quickly approved the plan put together by Berra's 
committee, which included a proposal to cut nursing. Further based on the results of the 
community survey, which showed a sagging job market for vocational nurses, Miller 
recommended closing the nursing department’s LVN program and downsizing the 
nursing faculty by 50%. As Baden explained, “Miller had a lot of experience with 
nursing programs. He thought that would be the easiest way to do it.”
Members of the Palomino board were skeptical of the plan at first Several 
trustees, in fact, raised questions about the likely community’s likely reaction to a 
reduction in nursing. They wanted to avoid a public outcry. Obliged to sell the idea, 
Miller supplied the board with information on comparative program costs. Much of it 
supported the conclusion that Palomino nursing, with its large, all full-time faculty, was 
unnecessarily expensive. Jeffries, using a metaphor popular with the cabinet, explained, 
“What we had was a Cadillac program that we could easily reduce to Chevrolet size
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
190
without losing the balance of instructional offerings at Palomino.”
On March 3rd, Miller went before the board to publicly unveil Palomino’s 
retrenchment plan. His proposal called for salary and benefit cuts but also called for the 
closure of nine instructional programs, including LVN nursing, the reassignment of unit 
administrators to teaching positions, and an immediate spending freeze (The Star-News. 
March 4, 1983). Additionally, Millers recommendations specified major faculty layoffs 
for nursing (17), physical education (6), music (6), counseling (6), with smaller 
reductions for art, English, foreign languages, science, communications, engineering, 
allied health, and the library. The trustees unanimously approved the plan (The Star- 
News. March 4, 1983). As Jeffries put it, “They finally swallowed the bitter pill—I'd 
been preaching the sky is falling for three years.”
Campus reaction. The Palomino faculty reacted with predictable outrage. So 
angry were its members that the Palomino Academic Senate took the unprecedented step 
of formally censuring Miller and the executive cabinet (The Star-News. March 4, 1983). 
George Smith, president of the senate, told the press, “There seems to be a philosophy 
that cost-effectiveness is the only criterion by which a program is evaluated” (The Star- 
News. March 18, 1983, p. A-l).
Faculty union leaders also joined the fray. They called the plan “catastrophic to 
the profession” (The Star-News. April 11, 1983, p. A-5). Ed Otis, executive director, 
claimed the layoffs were part of a strategy to intimidate the union, and force the faculty to 
accept a salary cut. He downplayed the role of the deficit “The board will not use its 
resources, and that’s what's causing the problem” (The Star-News. April 11, 1983, p. A- 
5).
The cabinet stood firm. Miller, for example, reacted to the faculty’s outrage with 
a detached dismissal. “The faculty hasn't accepted the reality of where the college is 
financially. It's hard to deal with an illness when people refuse to admit that they're
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sick!” he said. Indirectly confirming Otis' charge, Miller observed, “The only way to 
address the [fiscal] problem is to look at salaries,” (The Star-News. March 18, 1983, p. 
A-backpage).
Communication between the faculty and the administration continued to 
deteriorate. For the remainder of the semester, Miller declined to meet with unit-level 
personnel, and routed all communication through his administrative cabinet. Many 
faculty members interpreted this action as evidence of a short-timer’s attitude and 
concluded that Miller lacked concern for the institution. “Miller didn’t care about 
Palomino,” observed the nursing chairperson. Determined not to acquiesce, the union 
filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of the teachers. Thereafter, meetings of the board 
became the main forum for interchanges between the faculty and the administration. 
Numerous departments, academic and vocational, appealed to the community for help, as 
groups of Palomino students repeatedly staged dramatic anti-termination rallies, (The Star 
News. March 26, 1983).
The Political Behavior of the Nursing Faculty
Social and organizational trends beginning in the mid 1960s and continuing 
through the 1970’s set the scene for a crisis in the nursing department. During those 
years, the department expanded its faculty and its enrollment, to eventually become 
Palomino's largest occupational unit, a unit which, unlike other departments, occupied its 
own building. Indeed, because of its size and unique accommodations, nursing was 
widely perceived to have substantial power in the college. In the mid 1970s, however, 
district demographics began to shift, and language barriers, a consequence of Palomino’s 
growing ethnic diversity, increasingly interfered with student success in nursing's 
professional courses. Declining student preparedness in turn caused rising nursing 
attrition rates which slowly undermined the stability of nursing’s enrollment
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During most of the 1970’s, the leadership of the nursing department remained 
stable. Nursing’s long-time department chairperson managed the department’s problems 
in a decidedly authoritarian style, but allowed the local demand for nurses and the 
department’s community reputation to push her policy of expansion. Characteristically, 
members of the nursing faculty deferred to the chairperson’s decisions. Indeed, isolated 
from campus life by their clinical teaching schedules, they made little effort to participate 
in the management of the department or in college affairs. A leadership change did finally 
occur in the late 1970’s, but it resulted in no change to the department’s administrative 
pattern. In fact, the nursing programs continued to grow. Thus, while the department 
outwardly appeared to gain power, the conditions were set for a decline.
That change began in the early 1980’s. As the college prepared for retrenchment 
in the spring of 1982, the nursing faculty turned its attention to choosing a new 
chairperson. Indeed, the selection process preoccupied its members for most of the 
semester. Three candidates, differing in personality, style, management philosophy, and 
ethnic background emerged to seek the position. Their candidacies, to some extent 
reflecting the diversity of the faculty itself, generated strong partisan divisions and intense 
undercurrents of competition. As the election approached, a power struggle ensued, and 
rivalries solidified which the vote did not resolve. Inadvertently, the college executives 
contributed to the conflict. The results of the final vote conducted by the central 
administration were never conveyed to the faculty. That oversight nurtured suspicion that 
the candidate approved was not the one recommended. Faculty resentments lingered, and 
carried over to the fall semester to profoundly affect the operation of the department.
Kris Munoz, a twenty-year veteran of the department, was chosen as the new 
chairperson. She took over in the summer of 1982, just as fiscal crisis engulfed the 
college. With tensions running high in the administration, Munoz kept a low profile, and 
waited for fall to address the problems of her department. When fall arrived, however, 
she found the faculty tense and divided. Munoz made several attempts to restore group
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cohesion seriously weakened by the election. At one point she hired an outside expert to 
work on team-building and race relations, but her efforts were unsuccessful.
Eager to make a mark, however, Munoz went ahead with her own agenda. 
Munoz wanted to revise the way decisions were made in the department Departing from 
tradition, she imposed a new participatory system of decision-making under which she 
directed unit problems to her staff for solutions. A large part of her faculty, however, 
preferred the more directive style of her predecessors. Some even mistook Munoz’s 
collegiality for laissez-faire management Several of the teachers registered their 
dissatisfaction by bickering and sniping in faculty meetings.
As the nursing unit struggled internally, and Palomino’s fiscal situation failed to 
improve, the Palomino general faculty turned its attention to the developing Fiscal crisis. 
Rumors circulated that low-WSCH programs such as engineering and nursing would be 
eliminated from the curriculum. Members of the nursing department failed to take the 
rumors seriously, however. “We knew the college was having trouble, but we never 
thought it would affect our department,” said Betty Silvers, a senior nursing faculty 
member. Even Munoz, who was aware of nursing RIFs in other institutions, considered 
her department secure.
Immediate reaction. The March 3rd retrenchment proposal took the nursing 
faculty by complete surprise. The immediate response of the faculty was shock, indeed 
severe enough to immobilize purposeful action. For days, members went about their 
daily routines in a dazed disbelief. Indeed, they were so overcome that no special faculty 
meeting was called. A week after the announcement, when they finally met for a regular 
faculty meeting, they were still unable to act, and spent their time speculating on who 
would receive layoff notices. That process, in which members focused intensely on their 
tenure status, gave rise to a new schism in the group—one in which members who had 
little seniority began to distance themselves from those who had considerable seniority.
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Liu Lau, a second-year teacher described the situation. As Lau noted, “There were 
divisions. It was like, ‘Okay, you guys are safe. We’re not!’ The tension was very, 
very high.”
As days went by, the initial paralysis began to subside. Members gradually 
turned their attention to identifying which college officials were responsible for the 
termination plan. Campus rumors pointed to Vincent Berra, but members of the nursing 
faculty also questioned Munoz’s role. Munoz was perceived by some as overly passive 
in her dealings with college executives, a tendency members attributed to her Asian 
heritage. Doubts about Munoz’s style led to speculation that she may have known about 
the plan prior to the announcement, but out of loyalty to the administration remained 
quiet. Members of the nursing faculty also questioned the role of the board of trustees, 
particularly two long-term incumbents who had taken controversial positions on women’s 
issues.
Frustrated, some members confronted Munoz demanding explanations of 
nursing’s layoffs. In particular, they wanted to know why nursing’s cuts were larger 
than those of other units. As Lau recalled, “We wanted to know how did they decide that 
nursing should take the most of it?” Munoz tried to obtain answers, but her efforts were 
frustrated. Miller, Interim President who was referring his calls to Berra, refused to talk 
to her. Berra, although willing to meet, dodged her requests for a full accounting by 
repeating what he was saying to the press-that nursing had the worst ratio of 
expenditures to income of any program on campus, and consumed $1.5 million of 
Palomino’s $38.5 million budget (The Star-News. April 4, 1983). The nursing faculty 
rejected that explanation.
Coincidentally, a member of the nursing faculty heard about the crisis at Arroyo 
College. That led someone to call director Finley for information on Berra’s role in 
Arroyo’s nursings crisis. Finley reported that Berra had departed Arroyo before her 
department’s problems occurred, but that did not deter some of the more outspoken
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members of the Palomino group to attribute responsibility for their situation to him 
anyway.
As the search for explanations went on, many members were overtaken by anger 
and a deep sense of the injustice being done to their department. Some members 
experienced the layoffs as a personal rejection. Others, some of whom were graduates of 
the Palomino nursing program, identified strongly with the department They felt a loss 
of personal and professional identity. In one way or another, almost everyone 
experienced the cutbacks as an insult to the faculty’s achievements. As Lau put it, “We 
were thinking of our jobs, but we were also thinking of the program-it was a forerunner 
in community college nursing education.”
Offended by the disproportion of nursing’s cuts, several members concluded that 
Palomino’s all-male cabinet was responsible for the proposal. They speculated that under 
Berra’s influence, the executive cabinet decided to target nursing for reasons of political 
expedience. Members reasoned that the administration was gambling that women faculty 
members would offer little resistance to being laid off. As Ruth Gray, a fundamentals 
teacher, observed, “We knew the administration would never try this [the heavy lay-offs] 
down in engineering.” Not everyone in the unit, however, accepted that theory. Indeed, 
several members remained skeptical. Lau, for example, said “I’m Chinese—I don’t think 
of things in terms of male and female.” Nevertheless, gender bias became the primary 
operating theory of the group. It kindled a sense of outrage among members that finally 
lifted the group to action.
The planning process. Palomino officials scheduled a hearing on the nursing 
issue for March 24th to coincide with the regular meeting of the Palomino Board of 
Trustees. With two weeks gone, the nursing faculty had little time for planning. Further, 
some members’ had doubts about whether the faculty had the resources to mount an anti­
termination campaign. “We weren’t like those nurses at Kaiser who go on strike every
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now and then,” said Rose Stuart, a first-year teacher, “We’d never been involved in a 
labor dispute.” While these doubts slowed the action, the group went on to begin 
planning. “We knew we had to do something, or we would have no chance at all,” 
Silvers explained.
Member participation varied. Ten members took an active role in group planning 
while the others gave their tacit support. Faculty interviewes reported that several junior 
faculty members felt intimidated by the RIF. Thus, they and the teachers close to 
retirement comprised the inactive group.
Although politically inexperienced, Munoz served as group moderator. An idea 
person, she acted as a strategist. Characteristic of her style, Munoz brought in outsiders 
to help organize the group, for example the team building consultant, and the director of 
the faculty association. Otis, the CTA director, consented to help with strategy, but 
declined to advocate for the department He explained that his responsibility was to the 
faculty as a whole. “He kind of told us we had to fight our own battle,” Silvers 
explained.
The faculty rallied to support the problem solving process. Members decided that 
nursing’s base of support was in the community. They quickly endorsed a strategy for 
mobilizing community support, and drafted a list of health service professionals for 
Munoz to contact All agreed to undertake a word-of-mouth networking effort to activate 
community assistance. Barbara Baines, faculty counselor to the senior students, met with 
student leaders who were planning a public demonstration. Notably, many interviewees 
were reluctant to discuss their personal roles in the campaign with the researcher. 
Several, including Munoz, hesitated to divulge the actions they took-especially in regard 
to student participation—which they believed if misconstrued could put their jobs in 
jeopardy.
The faculty appointed three members—Munoz, Silvers, and Baines—to serve as 
spokespersons to the board. With the help of the outside consultant, the group worked
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together on the arguments for the testimony that would be presented. One idea was to 
direcdy confront the issue of gender bias.
The board meeting. The March 24th board meeting was held in The Forum, a 
large indoor amphitheater suitable for big events. The meeting drew a capacity crowd of 
1500 people noted by the press to be the largest ever to assemble for a Palomino board 
meeting. Nearly a hundred uniformed nursing students paraded outside as people 
arrived. Carrying lighted candles and placards, the students caught the attention of local 
media crews. Indeed, their demonstration was highlighted on the eleven o'clock TV 
news and pictured in the local paper the following day (The Star-News. March 25, 1983).
The entire nursing faculty attended the meeting en masse in a show of department 
solidarity. Dozens of prominent hospital administrators and other health professionals 
were also on hand. As the meeting got underway, officials acknowledged a flood of mail 
supporting the nursing department. Almost immediately the nursing layoffs came under 
heavy attack from members of the audience. Thomas Hughes, a spokesman for the 
regional Hospital Council castigated the administration’s termination plan. “California has 
always been a debtor state where nursing education is concerned... A further reduction in 
the number of RNs prepared in the community colleges will be nothing short of 
disastrous,” he told the trustees (The Star-News. April 4, 1983, p. A-1). A prominent 
local internist followed Hughes. He made an eloquent speech which made numerous 
references to the physician's dependence on nurses to do the job of healing. Finally, a 
nursing service director rose to speak about her institution's reliance on the Palomino 
nursing programs for a continuing supply of nurses. Numerous students and their 
families also made appeals that evening.
As the meeting went on, the department's official spokespersons stood in 
succession to address the board. Silvers and Baines focused on instructional quality. 
Silvers stressed the excellence of the nursing faculty, the students' high pass-rate on the
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state licensuie exam, and the long history and fine reputation of the program. Baines, an 
NLN accreditation visitor, introduced herself as an authority on accreditation. She 
pointed out how the layoffs failed to consider teacher specialty credentials and could 
therefore jeopardize the department’s accreditation status. However, Trustee Adams, in 
response, demanded. “How is it then that the Long Beach program is able to handle more 
students with a much smaller faculty?” Baines pled ignorance in what proved to be a 
tense moment for the nursing faculty.
Munoz followed Baines. Her remarks briefly touched on the issue of economy. 
Munoz pointed out that the department's high licensure exam pass rates made the nursing 
programs cost-efficient. She then went on to the centerpiece of her argument, which was 
the gender bias theory. “We...wonder whether there is more than cost involved here,” she 
said, adding, “The fact is, the largest number of pink slips went to the department with 
the largest number of women faculty” (The Star-News. March 25, 1983, p. A-3Z).
Munoz’s remarks drew immediate anger from the trustees. Trustee Stanton, a 
lawyer, quickly retorted that the board had made its decision “solely on economic 
grounds.” In response to Munoz’s suggestion that sexism might have been a factor, he 
snapped, “That is just not the case!” (The Star-News. March 25, 1983, p. A-3Z).
The meeting then went on to other issues. An item on the agenda was Palomino’s 
$2 million fund-raising effort. At a point in the discussion, Trustee Alexander addressed 
Munoz, and remarked that she might save her department by obtaining extramural funds. 
Taken off-guard, Munoz huffed, “I’m not in the money-raising business!” Her sharp 
dismissal drew gasps from the audience. However, Alexander's comment marked a 
change in the expectations of unit managers at Palomino, which until that moment had not 
included fund-raising. Nevertheless, Munoz's surprise, and the audience reaction to her 
remark, embarrassed some members of the nursing faculty who were not reluctant to hold 
her accountable for new standards of unit management.
The reactions of nursing faculty members to the meeting were mixed. Several
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were buoyed by the show of community support. Munoz's accusation of sexism was 
prominently reported in the next day’s paper, (The Star-News. March 25, 1983), 
however, and worried some that her remarks had been too blunt. Others noted that the 
officials had appeared to shut out the speakers, and concluded that the decision on nursing 
had already been made. Furthermore, complaints from nursing service administrators 
about the student demonstration kindled further anxiety, and caused some members to 
worry that nursing’s open resistance would backfire.
Unknown to the nursing faculty, the trustees were, in fact, impressed by the 
nursing effort. The size of the audience and particularly the stature and community 
standing of the stature of those who spoke, and the apparent organization of the 
department’s effort caught their attention. According to Baden, VP of Personnel 
Services, several of the trustees began to have doubt about the plan to cut nursing, and 
reacted by backing away from it. That caused tension between the board and members of 
the cabinet. As Jeffries explained, “Not many boards will stick with you when the going 
gets rough!” Publicly, however, the trustees maintained support for the plan. “We have 
to have a mix of classes,” Trustee Adams commented in a press interview (The Star- 
News. April 4, 1983, p. A-l).
Unfortunately, tensions in the nursing departihent increased. Several members 
refocused on Munoz, and her weaknesses, and the bickering and sniping resumed. Some 
members went to their peers in other departments for support but those efforts produced 
little more than expressions of sympathy. Although they recognized that a survival 
mentality that had overtaken the campus, they also recognized that nursing's social 
isolation—few members participated in college governance or attended general faculty 
functions—was part of the problem. As Gray noted, “We’re accused of being very ivory 
tower.” Some also believed that professional envy, derived from nursing’s standing as 
the occupant of the newest and largest structure, on campus, contributed to the general 
faculty’s apparent disinterest in helping. “People are jealous of us!” said Munoz.
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During the long weeks before the final decision, the group considered undertaking 
other tactics. The idea of documenting nursing's indirect contributions to college ADA 
came up. According to Silvers, that idea was discarded as too time-consuming. In fact, 
she and others seemed unaware of the political value of such documentation. Silvers 
discounted the importance of indirect ADA. “Other departments use that ADA, so it 
doesn’t really reflect on us.”
The decision. On June 2nd, the board of trustees voted to reduce the total number 
of teacher layoffs from 101 to 28. The trustees cited savings from maintenance cutbacks, 
class size increases, and an unusual number of faculty retirements as the factors that made 
the reduced number feasible (The Star-News. June 3, 1983). However, their 
announcement followed by days a decision by the faculty association to form a political 
action committee to seek candidates for the November trustee election (The Star-News. 
May 20, 1983). Robert Holbrooke, dean of occupational education, disputed whether 
there was a link between the two events, however. Palomino officials, he said, never 
intended for the original plan to be implemented. “You send a hundred notices and lay off 
ten,” he said, adding, “People are grateful-1 hate to sound cynical, but that's the way it 
works.”
The final decision reduced the number of layoffs in nursing from seventeen to 
eight The board, however, voted to go ahead with the termination of the LVN program. 
Asked whether gender bias was a factor in the trustees' decision, Jeffries responded, 
“Nursing had a large all full time faculty, and the hospitals weren’t hiring vocational 
nurses. It was an administratively justifiable decision.”
The impact of the nursing faculty's anti-termination campaign on the final decision 
remained unclear. Members of the administrative cabinet claimed that the effect was 
considerable. Jeffries, for example, described the nursing effort as “impressive” and 
“better organized” than those of other groups. Baden noted that other faculty groups
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failed to generate the enthusiastic community support displayed for nursing. He, in fact, 
characterized the nursing decision as a policy mistake. “It was a reasonable move, 
although politically not a good move,” he said. But he added with a note of irony, 
“There never would have been any layoffs if the union had accepted the salary 
concessions.”
The aftermath. A calm spread over the Palomino campus in the initial weeks after 
the decision. Interim President Miller departed, as the Palomino faculty awaited the 
arrival of a new chief executive for which the college hired John Lacey. As president of a 
large community college in the state of Washington, Lacey had experienced the problems 
involved in the transition to statewide tuition, and thus was well-equipped to manage for 
Palomino's forthcoming challenges.
Lacey's first test came six weeks after the board’s final retrenchment decision 
when, just as the college was beginning to recover, another major crisis—the governor's 
revenue veto—descended on Palomino. The estimated impact of the revenue veto on the 
budget was $1.8 million. Lacey took immediate steps to reassure the community. “We' 11 
come up with a plan that will do the least amount of damage,” he indicated in one of his 
first interviews with the local press (Los Angeles Times. July 31, p. B-l).
Over the next several months, the college dealt with budgetary planning and 
faculty contract negotiations, a process stalled since the previous spring. With the tuition 
issue unresolved, and another budget deficit looming, the negotiations never got off the 
ground. Both the union and the district filed unfair labor practice charges with the state 
labor board (The Star-News. October 20, 1983.) How to reduce the deficit without 
further alienating the faculty was the major dilemma facing Lacey. In the middle of the 
standoff, Lacey took the bold and unprecedented step of taking personal charge of the 
contract negotiations. Under his guidance, a compromise was finally reached in which 
the college, in return for a workload concession, promised not to make a salary or fringe
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benefit reduction. Bob Lucus, president of the faculty association, heralded the 
agreement as symbolic of a new era at Palomino. “We've been at war during the last five 
years. This is a sign of peace,” he said (The Star-News. December 16, 1983, p. A-l).
As the contract negotiations concluded, Lacey unveiled a plan to resolve the 
budget deficit It stressed across-the-board reductions and further cuts to capital outlay, 
travel, and maintenance; but it called for no further staff reductions. Lacey said he would 
use college reserves to preserve faculty jobs, but garnered savings by eliminating two of 
the unpopular cabinet vice presidencies that had become focus of campus discord (The 
Star-News. December 9, 22, 1983). In an article on Lacey's plan, the local press 
heralded the new president as a “clearly competent administrator” (The Star-News. 
February 12, 1984, p. A-l). After reaching a low of 8%, Palomino's reserves stabilized 
on the Lacey plan at 11%.
As Lacey worked on Palomino's administrative problems, the district held its 
1983 trustee elections. The campaign focused on the candidacies of two challengers, both 
of whom were women seeking to unseat long-term male incumbents. One of the 
challengers centered her campaign around the need to bring a “feminine perspective” to 
Palomino policy (The Star-News. February 12, 1984). A corps of nursing faculty 
engaged in a range of campaign activities to advance the challengers' efforts. Both were 
ultimately elected (The Star-News. January 1, 1984).
As district and campus conditions improved, however, the situation in the nursing 
department gradually worsened. During the summer of 1983, the department made some 
short-lived gains as Munoz took an offer of money from a long-term care corporation to 
fund LVN faculty salaries. The offer was contingent on having the LVN program 
reinstated and the department's success in locating matching funds. By August, Munoz 
had a total of $113,000 in grants, and an agreement from district officials to rescind the 
termination of the LVN program. With that, she rehired four faculty members. In an 
article featuring the nursing program director’s picture, the local press attributed the
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turnaround to Munoz's personal efforts (The Star-News. August 26, 1983). Even press 
accolades, however, failed to change the attitudes of some members of the nursing faculty 
who continued to be harshly critical of Munoz. “They needed somewhere to put their 
anger,” explained Silvers.
In the fall of 1983, student applications to the nursing department took a sudden 
and unexplained plunge. An apparent explanation was discovered on the editorial page of 
The Star-News where members found a letter to the editor indicating that the Palomino 
nursing department had closed. The faculty concluded that the public was confused about 
the status of the department Members took immediate steps to correct the situation. 
They wrote their own letter to paper to correct the misinformation and placed a large ad in 
The Star-News for the department The ad was financed with personal contributions and 
donations solicited from faculty in the life sciences.
Despite those actions, student applications continued to dwindle. Munoz 
proposed a recruitment program, but her teachers viewed the enrollment situation as 
temporary. In fact it reflected a decline in the regional job market for nurses (Morse, 
1987), but that was not clear at the time.
By the spring, it was clear that nursing’s 1984 fall enrollment would be 
decreased. Based on projected needs, Lacey decided to dismiss the rehired faculty. 
Members of the department however, resented the decision. Although some recognized 
it as an administrative necessity, others, critical of Munoz, attributed the decision to a lack 
of leadership on Munoz’s part “Some of them would have preferred to have Kris defy 
the administration,” Silvers explained. Coincidentally, Munoz, in a gesture of 
cooperative sharing, invited another faculty group to occupy space in the Paramedical 
Science Building. That reinforced as belief held by many of her critics that she was 
“giving the department away.”
As the events of 1983 began to fade, a bizarre turn of events served to refocus 
members on their original theory of the nursing cutbacks. Vincent Berra, who had been
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demoted in Lacey's reorganization, was about to resume teaching when he suddenly 
resigned his position at Palomino. That action, as it turned out, was taken under duress. 
Members discovered that Berra stood accused of making lewd and threatening phone calls 
to scores of women at the college, two of whom pressed charges to which Berra pled no 
contest in Palomino Municipal Court (The Weekly. September 6, 1984; The Star News. 
September 7, 8, 14, 1984). A few members, including Munoz, recognized the behavior 
as a symptom of enormous stress. “It was professional suicide,” Munoz said, “He just 
cracked.” But others saw the revelation as confirming the nursing losses as an act of 
gender bias by a “bad apple” in the Palomino upper administration.
Unfortunately, the damage to the nursing department was not repaired in the 
period of this study. After several poor job evaluations from her department peers, 
Munoz retired.
Discussion
The situation at Palomino College again illustrates how institutional history and 
events such as the transition to collective bargaining complicate the management of 
decline. It also shows how those complications, in conjunction with subunit internal 
problems, indirectly shape the fate of nursing programs.
For several years, Palomino College struggled with economic uncertainty by 
moving in the direction of ever-increasing fiscal and organizational control. Along the 
way, serious mistakes in management compounded Palomino's problems. Most 
egregious was the high-handed disregard of the top executive for existing college 
structure and traditions. The animosity generated by his reorganization spilled over into 
faculty contract negotiations. That, unfortunately, established a battleground for 
adversarial warfare at a time when union cooperation was essential. McTighe (1979) 
emphasized the importance of management openness and union cooperation in times of
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retrenchment He stressed that administrators should involve unions in strategies for 
coping with decline. Moriarty (1985) further described the negative consequences of a 
competitive model of collective bargaining, particularly during decline, and proposed an 
integrative model emphasizing win-win solutions not unlike the ones finally implemented 
at Palomino.
Institutional crisis clearly shaped events for the Palomino nursing faculty. In the 
fall of 1982, when it appeared that college finances were about to collapse, the executive 
administration began a search for easy ways to cut costs, and found an opportunity in the 
nursing department. Its large full-time faculty provided a natural and administratively 
justifiable target
Faced with large scale retrenchment and termination, the Palomino nursing 
faculty, established a loose coalition with its supporters in the community to promote 
department interests and prevent enactment of the termination proposal. That effort 
although partially successful, was hampered by the faculty’s social dynamics, and the 
management errors of a new department chairman who failed to accurately size up her 
staff before imposing a new management model. Sergiovanni and Staratt (1979) 
described a “fight” profile of group dynamics, not unlike that found in the Palomino 
nursing faculty, for which they recommended an autocratic style of management
Clearly, the prospect of termination exacerbated the department's internal 
problems. Staw et al. (1981) described a behavioral tendency on the part of individuals, 
groups, and organizations to act rigidly in the face of threat Some of the manifestations 
they described were in the Palomino nursing faculty including (1) the tendency of 
members to rely on old assumptions about the college in evaluating the threat of 
termination to the nursing unit; (2) members’ difficulty putting together an effective 
planning process; (3) their failure to grasp the administrative aspects of the situation; (4) 
failure to acknowledge administrative values in the department's public testimony, and (5) 
their scapegoating of the department chairperson and other personnel for the unfortunate
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situation in which they found themselves. Ironically, the department chairperson showed 
herself to be more flexible than members of her staff.
Nursing Faculty Behavior at Pine Hill College f#10)
The situation at Pine Hill College illustrates how a clash in values—in this case the 
educational idealism of the faculty versus the economic realism of administrators— can 
complicate an institution's adaptation to decline, and lead administrators to use harsh 
measures that put high-cost programs in a tenuous position. Although never targeted by 
an official termination proposal, the Pine Hill nursing department did undergo a crisis of 
“suggested” termination in 1983-84.
Introduction
The San Juan Community College District (SJCCD) entered the era of decline 
with a rapidly growing enrollment, and a firm commitment to taking all students. Ample 
reserves made it possible for officials to meet the demands of double-digit headcount 
gains for three years after Proposition 13. That pattern changed when the board of 
trustees elevated Richard Ruff, SJCCD business manager, to lead the district. As 
chancellor, Ruff implemented a phased-in, three-year cutback program to stop the drain 
on district reserves. Among other measures, his plan called for increases in instructional 
productivity. In accord, Pine Hill executives set drastic new productivity criteria for 
college subunits to meet or risk the possibility of termination. At several critical points, 
an internal coalition of faculty and middle managers worked to bolster the position of the 
nursing department— temporarily weakened by a lapse of unit.
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Background
Pine Hill College, one of two institutions in the San Juan Community College 
District (SJCCD), serves a large suburban community in California's central coastal 
region where local industry is heavily oriented toward technology. In response to local 
needs, the district established Pine Hill College in 1975 as a forward-looking institution 
of moderate size. The college is unique for its innovative structural plan grouping 
academic departments into a number of multi-disciplinary centers each of which features a 
vocational core, and for the emphasis it puts on democratic ideals in a system of faculty- 
elected middle managers. The San Juan Community College District of which Pine Hill is 
a part is governed by a five-member board of trustees.
The Pine Hill nursing program, an RN nursing program serving the needs of a 
two-district region, was moved from San Juan City College, Pine Hill's sister college, in 
1975 to become part of the Center for Nursing, Mathematics, and the Physical Sciences at 
Pine Hill. It maintains a strong reputation for educational excellence and community 
service. A large program in a mid-size college, its 10 full-time faculty members 
comprised, at the rime of this study, 10% of Pine Hill's contract faculty.
Transition to decline. An enormous reserve fund ($14 million in a $27 million 
budget—54% ARP) and generous state bail-out softened the initial impact of tax limitation 
on the San Juan district (The Mercury News. August 22, 1984). That enabled Chancellor 
Joseph Deming, a man known for his educational idealism, to continue funding district 
programs on a business-as-usual basis. After Proposition 13 passed, however, changes 
in district politics forced a turnover in the leadership of the district A serious rift, which 
developed between Deming and W.J. Harry, an outspoken member of the board of 
trustees, led to the change. While Deming emphasized instructional quality, Harry, a 
businessman, preferred that district decisions be made on a strict cost-accounting basis.
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As tax-Iimitation approached, Harry became adamant about fiscal accountability. 
Deming's educational perspective prevailed until the trustee elections of 1979 when two 
new trustees were elected to the SJCCD board. Thereafter, it lost ground to the more 
business-oriented outlook of Harry and the new trustees. When, coincidentally, leaders 
of the CTA-affiliated faculty association became disgruntled over the faculty contract and 
withdrew their support from Deming, Harry used his influence to push for a change in 
leadership. Powerless in the face of Harry's coalition, Deming resigned at the board's 
request
To fill Deming's position, the SJCCD board promoted Dr. Richard Ruff, a man 
with strong credentials in educational finance and accounting but no experience as chief 
executive. A tough-minded manager, Ruff had a reputation among the faculty as a “no” 
man for the strict spending policies he imposed. Ruff hired Michael Collins, who was 
also economy oriented, as district business manager, and together they redirected district 
policy.
The timing of these changes was propitious. Not long after Ruff assumed the 
chief executive position, the state enacted AB 1369, which slashed San Juan's growth 
allowance to 2.5%  of its 1980-81 ADA totals (The Mercury News. January 22, 1982). 
The district continued to fund growth, but in 1981-82, as enrollment, driven by an influx 
of Asian immigrants, jumped 18%, the drain on district reserves—$4 million in a single 
year-reached runaway proportions (The Mercury News. January 22, 1982). Facing the 
likelihood of similar deficits in the future, district officials decided to change course, and, 
in 1982 ratified a new limited-enrollment policy. Ruff blamed the state's funding policy 
when he announced to the press that it would be necessary “at some point in the next two 
years” to reduce district attendance (The Mercury News. January, 22, 1982, p. IB).
In the fall of 1982, the SJCCD embarked on a plan of sequenced program 
reductions. Ben Carr, Pine Hill College provost, explained the plan as a matter of fiscal 
necessity. “We had to start doing reductions to live within what the state was giving us,
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but we staged it over a three-year period to ease the impact.” The initial steps centered on 
closing nonessential satellite centers and the SJCCD's underused Milpoco campus, but 
included other economies such as support service cuts, personnel reductions, a salary 
freeze for certain groups. Ruff and Collins exempted the faculty from the salary freeze, 
however, an adroit move that placated the faculty union.
The impact of resource decline at Pine Hill. The initial impact of Proposition 13 at 
Pine Hill was minimal. For the first two years the college made few alterations to its 
instructional program, an achievement attributed by faculty interviewees to the 
management of Dr. David Stoller, Pine Hill president Indeed, Stoller, who was well 
regarded by the faculty, dedicated himself to saving instructional programs. “Our 
president cut everything a little so that when things got better, there would be programs in 
place to rebuild,” explained one interviewee.
Under Stoller's management the nursing department experienced only minor 
inconveniences. According to faculty interviewees, the unit's capital outlay was reduced, 
but little else changed. Eve Landow, the acting program director in 1982-83, described 
the situation. “Proposition 13 didn't impact the college much at first—and certainly not the 
nursing department We had a lot of support from the administration.”
That picture changed in 1982-83 when Stoller came under pressure from the 
district office to improve Pine Hill's instructional productivity. Encouraged by the district 
to terminate low-WSCH units such as nursing, Stoller instead impaneled an in-house task 
force to do a comprehensive study of Pine Hill's programs. Stoller believed in the 
benefits of faculty involvement, and therefore initiated what he referred to as a 
“quadripartite process” in which he brought together representatives from four college 
constituencies—students, administration, faculty and classified. “When you involve 
people,” he explained, “it usually helps to make the effects of cutting back less violent on 
the entire campus.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
210
Stoller appointed Landow, the acting nursing director, and Randy Beckett, a 
counselor serving as administrative coordinator for the nursing center, to represent 
nursing on the task force. These appointments were important. Not only had the 
chancellor singled nursing out for possible reductions, but that year the department had no 
permanent director. Dr. Joan Bullock, its long-time director had become ill and taken a 
leave of absence. That left Landow, the associate director to cope with the problems of 
the department, which included a scheduled accreditation visit Unfortunately, she lacked 
the skills for the job. Landow immersed herself in the accreditation process, and ignored 
what was happening outside of the department As a member of her faculty noted, “Eve 
would have been fine if things hadn't been changing—she wasn't aware of what was 
going on in the college.”
Thus, Landow left the program review to Beckett Beckett, as center coordinator 
was attuned to district developments and eagerly took on the task. He admired Bullock, 
and had a special affinity for the nursing department. “It was Joan who encouraged me to 
run for the coordinator position. When she got sick, I felt responsible for the program,” 
Beckett explained to the researcher.
Beckett involved the nursing faculty in the department’s self-study. Together, 
they devised an approach not unlike the one used at Arroyo College to document the 
indirect ADA that nursing student's contributed to other departments. Members went to 
Pine Hill's general education classrooms to count the nursing students taking nonnursing 
courses. At the same time, they surveyed the students to assess nursing’s strength as a 
student attraction, and gathered affidavits from local hospital executives on local job 
availability and the demand for program graduates. They recognized that the study was 
important. As one faculty member put it, “We knew we looked bad on paper.”
The data, compiled from more than 700 students, showed that nursing was a 
major ADA producer and major attraction to the Pine Hill campus. It also showed that the 
local need for nurses had softened somewhat but remained strong. The data gathering
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effort had a downside, however, and damaged nursing's campus relations. Mary Biggs, 
a nursing member, commented, “There were people in the general faculty who saw the 
survey as a threat. They knew somebody was going to be cut!” Beckett submitted the 
data to the review committee.
The 1982-83 board decision. Early in the spring of 1983, Ruff announced an 
impending $2 million shortfall. The chancellor indicated that balancing the deficit would 
require program cuts at the district’s major campuses, and again singled out nursing, this 
time publicly. “Although it is not clear which fields of study will be hit hardest,” he told 
the press, “nursing and engineering technology are proposed for program reductions” 
(The Mercury News. February 4, 1983, p. A-l). Coincidentally, Bullock succumbed to 
her terminal disease, and died.
Within weeks, the Pine Hill task force met to make its final recommendations. At 
175 WSCH, a figure far below the district’s 420 WSCH average, the committee found 
the nursing department insufficiently productive, but noted its vitality, well document in 
the self-study, and it did not recommend termination. Based the committee's findings, 
Stoller accepted the recommendation and passed it on to Ruff, who put nursing on the 
“cutlist” presented to the board.
At that point, Landow awakened to the threat these developments posed. On 
learning about Ruffs action, she made a last-minute, behind-the-scene effort to prevent a 
cutback, and called Bonna Wainwright, the president of the SJCCD board of trustees and 
a practicing nurse. Landow asked for her support. Wainwright, however, was 
noncommittal.
The board subsequendy approved Ruffs recommendation, and approved a 
massive general reduction plan calling for a huge cut-back in part-time faculty for the 
1983-84 academic year. As part of that plan, the trustees eliminated a number of small 
academic programs, and reduced nursing by two full-time positions. They further
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
212
directed Landow to devise a plan for improving nursing's WSCH. There was little public 
debate. As Beckett pointed out, the decisions had worked their way through the college 
advisory process. “Most things that go before the board have already been decided on. 
That's why it didn't develop into a floor fight,” he explained.
Members of the nursing faculty accepted the decision with equanimity. By that 
time Bullock had died, and one of their peers had decided to retire. “It was a good time to 
cut back,” Biggs said. In fact, compared to other departments, some of which lost 
programs, members considered themselves fortunate. “Geology lost its weather 
program, and the astronomy program was canceled!” Biggs noted.
Beckett, however, had a different point of view. He was concerned that the 
district had taken advantage of nursing's temporary weakness. “It was clearly an attack 
on a particularly excellent program weakened by the absence of a very powerful 
personality!” he commented, in a reference to Bullock.
The search for a new nursing director. Shortly after the board's decision, an 
opportunity to rectify the leadership problem in nursing presented itself when Provost 
Carr asked Beckett to organize a committee to find a new director. For the sake of 
economy, they agreed to an “in-house” search.
Beckett set out to find qualified people to sit on the search committee, and looked 
for individuals whose judgment and opinions carried authority in the college. Beckett 
handpicked four teachers from Pine Hill's science departments, all faculty leaders in their 
own right His choices included Tom Ravin, biology center coordinator, and three other 
teachers known for their professionalism, all of whom not by accident shared Beckett's 
concern for preserving the nursing program.
Beckett was aware of the pitfalls of promoting from within, “I knew very well that 
the wrong director might cause so much dissension in the nursing faculty that the program 
would collapse internally.” His committee reviewed three applications, and recommended
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Carla Conner, a seasoned teacher well-liked by her department peers. Among other 
qualifications, Conner had years of experience as an officer of the California Nurses' 
Association, and, in that capacity as a player in state politics. Beckett admitted that 
Conner's experience was a factor in the committee's deliberations. “Carla had all the 
important points--it was clear she was a fighter,” he noted. Conner's appointment was 
approved by the college administration.
Faculty action on the nursing WSCH plan stalled during the search. “Everyone 
was involved with accreditation,” Landow noted. Landow acknowledged, however, that 
her faculty felt little urgency. “There was no crisis that spring. That didn’t develop until 
the fall term,” she said.
The 1983-84 crisis. At some point during the spring semester, SJCCD officials 
recognized that the revenue decline was going to continue to outpace their efforts to 
economize. Their projections pointed to a $1.5 million shortfall for 1984-85, even with 
the proposed cuts in part-time faculty which numbered 150 teachers, and which promised 
to contribute to larger deficits over the long term (The Mercury News. February 4, 1983). 
In April, however, the situation appeared improved when CPEC altered its position on 
initiating tuition. The district officials decided to push back the April registration to July 
to avoid the need to re-register students.
By late June, however, the governor and legislature were still at odds over tuition, 
which contributed to a delay in the approval of the state budget (Los Angeles Times. June 
24, July 15, 1983). As the July registration concluded, SJCCD administrators noted a 
sharp enrollment d ro p -11%-- which they publicly attributed to the course section cuts, 
and the local confusion over state tuition policy (The Mercury News. October 20, 1983). 
That was followed in late July by the governor’s revenue veto which effectively froze the 
SJCCD’s fall revenue. Although serious, the situation of the SJCCD was far from 
desperate-the district had $7 million in cash reserves and expendable real assets worth
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another $18 million. Nevertheless, the chancellor directed college executives to come up 
with another $3 million in cuts.
The result was a full-blown organizational crisis. Asked to trim $1.7 million from 
his budget, George Margolis, president of San Juan City College said publicly, “A $ 1.7 
million budget cut is not a reduction, it's a plan for disaster'’ (The Mercury News. 
October 20, 1983, p. IB).
After the announcement, Ruff convened upper and middle level managers for a 
series of emergency meetings the agenda for which was to formulate strategies for 
preventing fiscal disaster. Among other measures, the administrators considered program 
terminations and personnel layoffs, but also another option which they referred to as a 
“WSCH contract” system. That option focused on improving instructional productivity.
According to Beckett, the message in the meetings was direct and clear. “The 
district office basically said, 'You've got to cut by this much. Where you cut is up to 
you, but we recommend you eliminate the nursing program."* Ravin confirmed his story. 
“We were told several times and in so many words that areas low in WSCH production 
might be necessary to eliminate.”
Beckett and Ravin agreed to a mutual-help strategy. “A group of us felt it was 
wise to try to protect the nursing program in view of the threats,” Ravin explained. 
Ravin's interest in nursing was to maintain it as a feeder program for biology. As a center 
coordinator, he was acutely aware of the economic interdependence of biology and 
nursing, and he recognized that part-time staff reductions, which had been heavy in the 
sciences, exposed his faculty to the possibility of layoffs.
The campus reaction. When school reopened in the fall, a compromise on tuition 
had yet to be reached, which, added to the previous stresses, took a serious toll on faculty 
morale. An atmosphere of crisis prevailed under which old rumors gained new life. 
Stories circulated about the direction further budget cuts might take. Indeed, faculty
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groups on both campuses feared a scenario in which numbers of instructional programs 
and faculty jobs would be lost. At Pine Hill, the competition for funding continued to 
grow. Unit-level administrators had begun undercutting one another as they positioned 
their departments for the survival battle ahead.
During this period, the academic senates, historically strong, provided the main 
forums for faculty discourse on the situation. Indeed, the senates overshadowed the 
faculty association which played almost no role in the situation. “What could they do?” a 
faculty interviewee asked. Throughout the fall, the debate centered on how to protect 
instructional quality from the upcoming cutbacks. Senate leaders made repeated appeals 
to district officials to include them in district decisions. Ruff responded by inviting the 
senates to select representatives to sit on a newly formed budget reduction committee, 
which he set up to make recommendations for another round of cutbacks.
Pressure for productivity, the 1983-84 academic year was tumultuous. Faculty 
tensions escalated over the course of the fall. The main source of pressure turned out to 
be the WSCH contract system under which department faculties were asked to voluntarily 
increase their WSCH per FTE levels by whatever means they could. College executives 
pushed the plan as voluntary, but they also referred to it as a way to “save” programs, 
which members of the faculty interpreted as a veiled threat. Indeed, many groups came to 
view the program as a form of coercion, and reacted with suspicion. Thus, although the 
plan on its face had practical merit, the social climate was not conducive to its 
implementation, and the tension mounted.
In November, the SJCCD held its district trustee elections. Local interest, 
galvanized by the tuition issue, was high. Five candidates challenged the four incumbents 
up for reelection that year. The main election issues were (1) district priorities, whether 
academic or economic, and (2) the use of SJCCD reserves (The Mercury News. 
November 5, 1983). The latter was especially controversial. Although district reserves
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were down substantially, at 22% they remained high by comparison to other institutions. 
Charlene Bowers, a librarian for the K-12 district, opposed W.J. Harry with a platform 
that stressed the need to preserve educational quality. “I am concerned that educational 
priorities for the student will not remain as the primary goal,” she said in a press interview 
(The Mercury News. November 5, 1983, p. 5B).
Chancellor Ruff used the election press coverage to remind voters of the continued 
need for economy. “The new board must decide on cuts for 1985-85 that could be as 
high as $3.3 million,” he said, “Programs that are expensive to operate, such as nursing, 
drama, electronics, and athletics are likely candidates for future budget cuts” (The 
Mercury News. November 5, 1983, p. 4B). Bowers unseated Harry.
As the end of the fall semester approached, the SJCCD took another step toward 
restoring fiscal balance and prepared to sell its 122 acre Milpoco campus property. “The 
well is now dry,” Ruff told the press (The Mercury News. December 29, 1983, p. 3B). 
As part of an overall plan, he Recommended another $2.4 million spending reduction, 
and proposed to layoff six counselors and four tenured faculty members, and terminate 
several small programs including diesel technology (The Mercury News. January 18, 
1984).
The Political Behavior of the Nursing Faculty
Early in the fall of 1983, Pine Hill executives Stoller and Carr conducted a series 
of center visits in which they met with many faculty groups, including the nursing 
faculty. Their purpose was to emphasize the urgency of increasing subunit WSCH. With 
the nursing faculty, the president and provost were particularly emphatic. Stoller, in a 
dramatic departure from his usual reassuring style, suggested to the teachers that nursing 
might well be a target for termination, if they failed to increase its WSCH.
The group was stunned. Caught completely offguard, the faculty reminded
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Stoller about the unit's achievements, and went on at length about how the program was 
important to the community and benefited the college. Stoller and Carr, however, were 
unmoved. “We can't guarantee what will happen if you aren't able to get your average 
up,” Conner recalled Stoller saying. Stoller announced a new productivity target—300 
WSCH per FTE—the break even point for covering unit salaries, and asked the members 
to cooperate by doing what they could to meet the target
Members of the group were frightened by the sudden change in Stoller. As Biggs 
noted, “We didn't know where he stood~it seemed like he wanted to get rid of the 
program,” Fearing that he did, the faculty made immediate plans to comply. “A lot of 
people left the meeting thinking they better start looking for a new position,” said Biggs.
With their administrative support in question, Conner and Beckett decided to go 
directly to the chancellor, and asked Linda Morrison, the new assistant nursing director, 
to accompany them. As the most junior member of the nursing faculty, Morrison 
recognized that her job was at risk, and was therefore eager to go.
The three conferred with Ruff some days later. During the meeting they made 
arguments for keeping the program based largely on quality. To their chagrin, Ruff 
seemed unpersuaded, and brushed off their arguments. “How can we justify a 1:10 
teaching ratio under these economic circumstances?!” he challenged. They concluded that 
Ruff was looking at the nursing department solely from the standpoint of cost “We had 
this interesting situation, where, instructionally, we had achieved a very successful 
program, but the district office didn’t see things in the same light—it was very 
disillusioning,” Beckett observed. Having gained no assurances, they left convinced that 
they would have to come up with a budgetary justification for the program.
Thereafter, Conner, Morrison, and Beckett worked with several members of the 
science faculty. Their purpose was to bolster nursing's position in the college. Beckett 
acted as a liaison between the science and nursing departments, and put together a loose 
coalidon that used a crisis management model to deal with important developments in the
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college and district The action took place on several levels—within the nursing 
department; within the college administrative hierarchy and advisory bodies; and in the 
public forum of the board of trustees.
A major goal in nursing was to comply with the department's WSCH target 
Conner and Morrison set up a task group comprised of the entire nursing faculty. Its job 
was to look for ways to increase unit WSCH. The group looked for a  plan that would not 
substantially alter the program's structure or department routines. After numerous brain­
storming sessions, they settled on a set of curriculum changes described by members as 
“paper changes,” changes with little actual impact on instruction. It was to remove 
smaller content tracts-nutrition and pharmacology to name two—from larger nursing 
courses and assign them separate course numbers and credit units. The group also 
decided to modify a nursing trends course to appeal to pre-nursing students, which was a 
sizable population the department had not tapped. They allocated credits for student hours 
spent in the media laboratory, made a marginal upward adjustment in the clinical teaching 
ratio, and added a new computers in health care course to the curriculum, all of which 
were calculated to move nursing’s WSCH average closer to the 300 target
The group met frequently to finish their work by the November deadline. Work 
sessions were concentrated and intense, but provided time to talk about issues and events. 
Morrison used the opportunity to update the group on events in the college and district 
Few members were active in campus affairs, and she worried that they would revert to the 
complacency they sometimes displayed. “Half of them didn't understand what was going 
on in the district as far as the competition for funding was concerned.” she explained to 
the researcher.
While the nursing faculty worked on their program, Beckett's coalition labored to 
defend the unit against the competitive infighting going on in the college. Conner, 
Beckett, and Morrison each took on important roles.
Conner's role was to defend nursing during regular administrative meetings. Her
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strategy was to fend off the challenges made by her administrative superiors with counter­
arguments and challenges of her own. Some of her superiors, Carr for example, seemed 
to favor further nursing reductions. Her response was to describe the disorganization that 
would occur if further nursing cutbacks were made. She also emphasized the economic 
links between nursing and other Pine Hill units. “The nursing department is not a 
separate entity. It is an integral part of the college. We all share the same students!” she 
often argued in her meetings with Carr and others.
Conner did not restrict herself to defending the unit, but applied pressure of her 
own in the area of funding. She directly confronted, for example, the issue of VEA 
funds—funds to which nursing was entitled but did not receive. “I became aware of the 
voc ed funds that got swallowed up on this campus,” she recalled, “and I asked Carr and 
Stoller, 'Doesn't nursing come in under VEA?' and they said, 'Oh, well, yes nurs;ng 
does.'"
Her purpose was to stave off further economic pressure from the administration. 
“If push ever came to shove,” she said, “they knew we had a viable program, and they 
knew I  knew they were getting voc ed funds to the tune of $350,000!” Conner enjoyed 
the give and take in such interchanges, but was careful to weave in expressions of 
support. “I always let them know I knew their problems were coming from the state, and 
they were just doing their job,” she said.
Conner’s job was not always easy. Despite her years as a teacher, Conner had to 
establish her authority as an administrator. Although approaching her role assertively, 
she still found it necessary to cultivate her own influence by talking with her supervisors 
about her experiences in state politics. “State politicians are very instrumental in this 
district—people here listen to them. I knew them all, so I let Ruff and the others know I 
was active at the state level-that got their attention!” Conner complained about her 
treatment, however. “I got tired of being treated like a little girl!” she lamented.
Beckett and Ravin did the job of trouble-shooting in center coordinator meetings.
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They defended nursing from the challenges of other departments which grew more 
frequent as the fall semester wore on. Shortly after the initiation of the WSCH contract 
program, the competition for funding took off. The center coordinators began to 
scrutinize each other’s budgets. George West, a humanities coordinator who was known 
to influence Provost Carr, began making regular references to nursing's high-cost and 
economic inefficiency. West was upset With the reduction of part-time faculty, his 
center had sustained a heavy loss of class sections. He wanted the college to terminate 
nursing and redirect the savings to his center. Beckett and Ravin met his challenge, 
however, by using nursing’s WSCH data to counter the West's offense. Over and over, 
they emphasized the economic links between nursing and other departments, citing the 
ADA figures derived from nursing's self study. As Ravin noted, “In all sorts of ways we 
assaulted the idea that closing nursing would solve the college's financial problems!”
Morrison centered her action in the academic senate and district budget reduction 
committee. She used the senate as a forum to educate the Pine Hill general faculty on the 
cost of nursing education, and the reasons nursing was expensive. She talked, for 
example, about the low clinical-teaching ratio, and to help her case, invited the officers of 
the senate to visit a clinical laboratory. Morrison promoted nursing’s WSCH plan in the 
senate forum, making an articulate case using WSCH survey data for nursing’s value as a 
college attraction and source of revenue to other departments.
Morrison made another important contribution, however, as a member of the 
budget reduction committee established by Chancellor Ruff. Her appointment to the 
committee was expedited by Beckett and Ravin. They recognized the value of having a 
direct voice in district policy-making and worked behind the scenes to see that Morrison 
got a seat on the committee. Beckett and Ravin wanted to prevent the seat from going to 
anyone who might have a competing agenda.
Morrison's appointment proved to be an important tactical measure. Chaired by 
Collins, the district budget manager, the purpose of the committee was to establish the
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advisory recommendations on which the fate of district programs, in particular the high- 
WSCH programs might well rest The committee reviewed academic offerings, including 
nursing, at Pine Hill and its sister campus, and evaluated the WSCH productivity 
proposals submitted by their faculties.
Morrison used the opportunity to advance nursing’s WSCH plan through the 
committee. As she sat through early meetings, she gained insights on the importance of 
protocol, and the value of framing proposals in the proper format and terminology. She 
learned that plans poorly conceived, or presented in the wrong format, often were 
disregarded. Those insights helped her to tailor her own effort to administrative 
expectations. Before nursing's hearing, Morrison realized that the task of finalizing 
nursing’s plan would be hers. Concerned, she arranged to see Collins, and from him 
learned how to assign credit units to the various elements of the proposal. Together, they 
put the plan in form in order to demonstrate that it met the 300 WSCH per FTE target. 
The benefits were considerable. Not only was the proposal ready for presentation, but 
Morrison had gained Collins’ support for the plan. The committee recommended the 
nursing WSCA proposal for approval.
The local hospitals did not factor into the coalition's strategy. By the fall of 1983, 
the acute-care facilities in the local area were encountering financial difficulties of then- 
own, as evidenced in the fact that Conner's efforts, to obtain grant money from them 
failed. Conner also sought support for the community college issue from the CNA but 
was likewise unsuccessful. An officer of the CNA, she knew its entry-to-practice policy 
conflicted with the interests of community college nursing programs. “Its depressing to 
know that your own professional organization doesn't care,” she said. She used her 
CNA-related legislative activities, however, to draw attention to the problems of the 
community colleges and associate degree nursing education.
The final decision. The policy climax came at the regular meeting of the SJCCD
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board of trustees held December 6, 1983. At the request of the Pine Hill Academic 
Senate, the board of trustees agreed to devote its agenda to the issue of program cuts at 
Pine Hill College.
The meeting was an important event. The coalition prepared for it by holding 
advance conferences with members of the SJCCD Board of Trustees. Given the local 
decline in job availability, Conner feared that President Wainwright might lean toward 
additional nursing cuts. She and Beckett therefore arranged a series of conferences with 
Wainwright and other members of the board, in which they stressed the economic 
themes, and nursing's WSCH proposal. The trustees gave no assurances.
More than a third of the Pine Hill faculty attended the December 6 board meeting. 
Numerous teachers from the sciences spoke on behalf of nursing, however, Conner and 
Beckett were the primary spokespersons for the department Conner highlighted the 
survey findings and WSCH proposal; Beckett stressed a need to preserve the specialized 
expertise of the faculty. Further downsizing, he said, would reduce the ability of the 
faculty to provide up-to-date technical instruction in all areas of the curriculum.
The board took no action that evening. However, two weeks later, Ruff 
recommended that the district accept Pine Hill's “cutlist” The list did not include nursing 
(The Mercury News. December 29, 1983). From that point on, Ruff made no further 
references to reducing the nursing department
The aftermath. Late in January, the state legislature reached an accord on tuition. 
Ruff returned to the board with a revised budget plan, however, his new recommendation 
still included the controversial layoffs. At that point a social crisis erupted. Meetings of 
the board became the forum for faculty outrage as the faculty mood transformed from 
anxious skepticism into open hostility. In a series of meetings, a stream of irate teachers 
lashed out at the WSCH contract system which drew especially heavy criticism for the 
way in which it was implemented. .Several members of the faculty, including the director
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of the about-to-be-terminated diesel tech program, came forward to publicly proclaim they 
had been coerced into participating in Ruffs plan. Ruff denied the charges (The Mercury 
News. January 25, February 1, 1984).
The officers of the academic senates made repeated appeals to the officials to avoid 
layoffs at all costs, and maintain operations using the district's reserves-they wanted the 
proceeds from the Milpoco sale to go for faculty salaries. The debate over that issue, 
however, revealed a schism on the board. Trustees Wainwright and Bowers sided with 
the faculty and rejected Ruffs layoff proposal. “I don't like to see the education process 
impinged; I would hate to see it destroyed,” Bowers said (The Mercury News. February 
9, 1984, p. 5B).
In May, the academic senates, using funds collected by a voluntary faculty fund­
raising organization, hired an outside accountant to conduct an independent study of the 
district budget The analyst found the district to be in sound financial condition (The 
Metcurv News. May 23, 1984). The SJCCD board agreed to review the analysts 
findings, but in August, as enrollment took an upward swing, the trustees approved 
Ruffs personnel reductions in a 3:2 vote (The Mercury News. August 22, 1984). In 
taking that action, the board acknowledged a need for greater communication in budget 
planning. The following year, 1984-85, district reserves reached a low of nine percent.
During the spring semester, as crisis-social and economic-overtook the district, 
the nursing department quietly focused on implementing its WSCH proposal. The going 
was not all smooth. At mid-semester, the secretary of the department terminated her 
employment. With admissions underway, her departure had an immediate disorganizing 
effect on the program. Conner and Beckett appealed for a replacement, but Carr, Stoller, 
and Ruff, all declined, citing the district's hiring freeze policy as their reason.
By the fall semester, 1984, however, it was clear that the unit could not continue 
without secretarial assistance. Conner and Beckett took the controversial step of taking 
the personnel issue to the board of trustees. There Conner distributed a fact sheet spelling
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out the cost and benefits of their request “Given the district's economic problems,” she 
explained, “Dr. Ruff couldn't in good conscience approve my request I hope you'll find 
it worthy of another consideration.” After a heated discussion in which several trustees 
expressed their concern for the welfare of the department the board approved not the 
half-time position requested, but a permanent full-time position.
Though successful, the action violated the SJCCD's hierarchical protocol. It drew 
disapproval from several members of Pine Hill's middle management including Ravin 
who expressed dismay. “I guess if the chancellor had indicated to me that there wasn't 
money—I would not want to go beyond that point” Ravin said.
Beckett declined to discuss the strategy. “I prefer not to tell you how we got the 
secretary—it required a somewhat devious means,” he said to the researcher. Conner, 
however, talked freely about the action which she believed strengthened her position with 
the chancellor. Indeed, she reported that Ruff thereafter made public references to her as 
“one of those people who knows how to work the system.” When asked what she 
thought he meant, Connor said, “I think he meant that I know who to talk to, and—you 
know—when to put on a little pressure.”
Overall, the members of the nursing faculty viewed their effort as highly 
successful. Stoller agreed. Indeed, in an interview with the researcher, he restated one of 
the themes often repeated by the internal coalition. “Nursing students are an integral part 
of our college,” he said, “if we dropped that program, it would affect a host of others.” 
Stoller stressed the department’s use of the formal advisory structure. “The decision was 
mine, but the recommendation came through the college process, and that's important.” 
Carr, however, added another perspective. “Our objective was never to close the 
program, but to encourage nursing through whatever device was legal to increase its 
WSCH.”
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The case study at Fine Hill College illustrates how the mere threat of harsh 
strategies by those in authority can lead to intense, self-protective behavior on the part of a 
faculty. Professional idealism and shared governance were well-established aspects of 
the decision culture in the SJCCD. However, the values of the administration were in 
conflict with those of the faculty. Indeed, the faculty was willing to exhaust district 
reserves to spare teaching jobs and instructional programs. Its idealism put it at odds with 
district administrators who were trying to redirect district priorities and ground district 
policy on economic realism.
Unlike some other colleges, the decision culture at Pine Hill supported policy 
input from campus constituencies. Pine Hill executives, for example, involved campus 
groups in retrenchment planning-an action experts recommend (Deutsch, 1983; 
Gumport, 1993, May-June; Hannan and Freeman, 1988; Lewis and Logalbo, 1980; Me 
Tighe, 1979; Powers, 1982). But when the financial situation deteriorated, they resorted 
to coercion, albeit a subtle form, to elicit cooperation for the district's turnaround plan. In 
doing so, they undermined one of their most important resources, faculty good will. 
Biller (1980) advised against the use of tactical threats as a cutback strategy, pointing out 
that coercion fosters conflict between potential winners and losers, which is what 
happened at Pine Hill, where the social effect was extremely negative.
The nursing faculty was a prime target of the coercion strategy. Absent the 
stabilizing influence of a permanent director, the group was slow to respond to district 
events. For months, its members underestimated the growing threat to their unit, but 
responded to prompting by a concerned middle manager. The group was assisted by an 
internal alliance of middle managers and science faculty who clearly recognized the threat 
to nursing and wanted to prevent cutbacks in their own units. Here, the Pine Hill group 
had an advantage over other nursing faculties in this study. It benefited from an
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institutional structure which nurtured a sensitivity to the interdependence of college 
subunits not found at other colleges. As a result, members of the nursing faculty did not 
have to struggle for assistance; it was offered.
Several benefits flowed to nursing from its alliance. Nursing gained access, for 
example, to a critical advisory committee which proved central to its policy success, and 
also enjoyed the advocacy of campus leaders who wanted to see the program preserved. 
Despite the pressure brought to bear by district and college administrators, the nursing 
faculty made effective use of its resources with a complex strategy that included 
complying with the executive demand while co-opting challenges to its status in the 
college. The outcome was a successful resolution of the termination threat.
Throughout the crisis, the leadership of the center coordinator and new nursing 
director was important The center coordinator recognized the need for a strong program 
director, and picked one comfortable with the give and take of the play of power in the 
institution. The new director, for her part successfully exerted control in her day-to-day 
interchanges with her superiors. A risk-taker, she recognized the importance of 
supporting her opponents while challenging them, but was confident enough of her own 
political skill to apply pressure in the interest of her department. In the end, the trustees 
expressed support not only for the program, but for her leadership as well.
With the resolution of the state tuition issue, the economic necessity for district 
layoffs and program closures faded, and with it, faculty support for cutbacks. The 
officials of the SJCCD continued to press for greater efficiency, but in their exhausted the 
last vestiges of faculty good will. In the end, some departments not as successful as 
nursing in managing the challenges of the district's turnaround strategy lost jobs and 
programs.
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Nursing Faculty Behavior in the Los Angeles Community College District
(Nos, .2, .22,28, 38)
The case of the Los Angeles Community College District (LACCD) illustrates 
how a series of management errors and political miscalculations can compound the forces 
of decline to push a huge public entity to the brink of bankruptcy. In a desperate search 
for fiscal solutions, administrators turned their attention to nursing, where, ironically, 
years of stable enrollment rendered the district's eight programs attractive as a target for 
downsizing and termination.
Introduction
In early February of 1986, the board of trustees of the Los Angeles Community 
College District (LACCD) announced a plan to close two nursing programs and layoff 20 
full-time nursing instructors. Part of a general RIF and curriculum restructuring effort 
requested by Chancellor Leland Kolford, this plan was billed not as a cost-cutting 
measure, but as a means to rebuild district enrollment which had declined drastically over 
a period of years. Coming at a time when the district had been forced to borrow money, 
however, the move was widely regarded as a reaction to budget crisis.
To preserve nursing programs and jobs, nursing faculty members from each of 
the eight programs organized an ad hoc coalition dedicated to preventing the district from 
enacting its policy. They worked together with other organized groups in an all-out 
grass-roots effort to bring local and state pressure to bear on the district In the end, they 
managed to prevent instructor layoffs in nursing, but failed to stop the district from 
implementing the designated nursing program closures.
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Background
The Los Angeles Community College District (LACCD), situated in the Los 
Angeles Basin and San Fernando Valley, is a vast entity which spans some 882 square 
miles and encompasses not only the city of Los Angeles, but a number of separately 
incorporated cities and unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County as well. At the time 
of this study, it had a resident population of over 4.3 million people.
The LACCD is not only vast, but diverse, due largely to the area's explosive 
growth and post-World War II population trends. Thus, the communities making up the 
LACCD differ in size and population density, in culture and commerce, in racial and 
ethnic makeup, and the wealth of their inhabitants. In some cases, these differences are 
extreme. For example, in the early 1980s the median income of the heavily minority- 
based inner city population was $11,000, while that of the mostly-white suburban 
communities was over $30,000 (Avila and Stevens, 1984).
The diversity of the LACCD is likewise apparent in the district's nine colleges, 
each of which has a defined service area to meet the needs of local residents. L.A. 
Central, Midtown, Metro, and Industry Colleges, for example, serve the central city; L.A. 
Channel College serves the port and peninsula area; L.A. Coast College serves western 
Los Angeles, while L.A. Hills, Canyon, and River Colleges serve the San Fernando 
Valley. These units, which at the time of this study varied in size from less than 5,000 
students to over 20,000 students, all have unique identities derived from the changing 
needs of their surrounding communities.
The LACCD is complex in its bureaucratic and political structure. Major policy 
decisions, as in all districts, are made by the board of trustees according to the provisions 
of district contracts and the California Education Code. Similar to other multi-college 
districts, the LACCD has a centralized district administration. Located for many years in 
the heart of downtown Los Angeles, its offices provide important services colleges such
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as data processing, budgeting, and personnel management to district colleges, and house 
the chambers of the district's seven member board of trustees.
Although similar in many ways, the LACCD nevertheless differs from other 
districts in two outstanding respects—size and power. The LACCD is by far the largest 
community college district in California, its headcount equivalent to 10% of the total state 
enrollment, and it is the biggest consumer of resources (Avila and Stevens, 1984). 
Further, its boundaries encompass more than a fourth of California's state legislative 
districts (Hoeber, 1983). This gives the LACCD greater representation in the state 
legislature than other districts enjoy, and greater authority over the state decisions that 
determine community college policy. Indeed, it was not uncommon at the time of this 
study for LACCD officials to pursue legislative solutions to local problems.
The LACCD's size is reflected in its staffing. To accommodate its huge 
enrollment--the headcount peaked at 137,000 in 1981-82-the district maintains a very 
large teaching and ancillary staff. Indeed, at the time of this study, the faculty numbered 
more than 3,400 certificated teachers, half of whom had fidl-time positions (Tyre, 1986). 
The faculty is supervised by the chancellor and vice chancellors at the district level, and 
by the nine college presidents, numerous vice presidents and the legions of middle 
managers that comprise local college administration.
Although historically centralized, the administration of the LACCD became even 
more centrally concentrated in the aftermath of tax limitation. As funding declined, 
district administrators focused on the replication of programs in the district as a cause of 
inefficiency. Thus, in 1982, they expanded the functions of the district office to include 
planning. The new system, which featured a central planning unit, gradually supplanted 
local control. Administration at the college level thereafter took on the character of line 
management as its planning authority was usurped.
The LACCD’s nursing programs exemplified the program proliferation that 
occurred under local planning. Established and accredited as separate units over a period
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of thirty years, they numbered eight at the time of this study, and varied in their 
curriculum organization and philosophy. Under Kolford's restructuring plan, two 
programs were slated for closure.
The 1985-86 crisis. In 1985-86, the LACCD, having exhausted its cash reserves, 
found itself facing huge budget deficit projections and owing millions of dollars to the 
state. This unfortunate financial predicament, according to numerous interviewees, 
derived from local mismanagement and the conditions created by state tuition policy. In 
fact, there were additional factors, some held in common with other districts, others 
peculiar to the LACCD's own history. Poor local planning, for example, compounded by 
the unique state-local political dynamics surrounding LACCD finances, put a costly drain 
on district resources that was unmatched in other districts.
The 1985-86 crisis had roots in the decade preceding Proposition 13—a time when 
the LACCD pursued a policy of aggressive expansion. Between 1964, when the LACCD 
separated from the Los Angeles Unified District, and 1978, when tax limitation was 
approved, the LACCD added three new campuses, opened numerous satellite facilities 
and outreach programs, and started a vast array of instructional programs, many designed 
to appeal to student populations never before addressed by the district
Interviewees attributed this growth to the vision of Chancellor Lyle Kolford. 
Kolford, who took charge in 1969, acquired a reputation as an empire builder not by 
nurturing and refining old programs, but by promoting new enterprises to broaden the 
scope of district operations. Under Kolford, new campuses were built but at the expense 
of old facilities which went without standard amenities to help underwrite the new 
development. Endorsed by the board of trustees, Kolford's priorities gave rise to a 
pattern of expansion but always under conditions of austerity (Tyre, 1986).
That pattern carried over as the district prepared for Proposition 13. In 
anticipation, the LACCD drafted a series of budgets, a “business-as-usual” budget
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maintaining normal operating levels at all LACCD colleges, a “major disaster'’ budget 
continuing operations at only a few colleges, and a “minor disaster" budget funding all 
units at reduced service levels (LACCD, 1978).
The actual impact of Proposition 13, however, proved less severe than the worst 
case anticipated. District income dropped $96 million, but a $60 million bail-out from the 
state allowed the district to adopt its probable-case, reduced services plan (Koltai, 1978). 
Across-the-board economies pared operations 15%, which helped to stave off an 
immediate deficit (Koltai, 1978).
From the outset, LACCD officials recognized that basic changes would be 
necessary. Not long after Proposition 13 passed, Kolford publicly addressed the need to 
“regionalize” program planning (Koltai, 1978). After disaster was averted, however, 
district officials resumed expansion, and in short order they acquired land for a new 
campus at L.A. Hills, approved a new nursing program at L.A. Coast, and opened a 
worldwide outreach college to serve military personnel. (The latter quickly failed at a 
substantial loss to the district)
In short, the district returned to business-as-usual. That transition gave rise to a 
mood of optimism expressed in the district's salary schedule. At a time when other 
districts sought to impose salary freezes, the LACCD awarded substantial salary raises at 
the behest of its AFL-CIO-affiliated employee unions. Faculty collective bargaining, the 
advent of which preceded tax limitation by only five months, had a powerful influence on 
district policy (Glass, 1989). The first faculty contract, signed in February, 1978, 
contained many costly provisions, among them parental leave, unlimited half-pay 
sabbaticals, a workload-reducing FTE formula, and annual salary increments. It was the 
latter that set the scene for crisis. Between 1979-80 and 1981-82, the board of trustees 
increased faculty salaries 29%, and gave other employees equivalent raises to maintain 
parity (Tyre, 1986). Needless to say, those raises put an enormous strain on the 
LACCD's fiscal balance (Tyre, 1986).
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Having returned to business-as-usual, LACCD officials did little to change district 
management practices. Many of those practices served to amplify fiscal strain in the 
LACCD, and were catalogued by the government auditors called in to assess district 
operations after fiscal crisis ensued. Too numerous to detail here, examples of those 
practices help to explain the 1985-86 crisis.
Audit findings showed that, among other problems, the LACCD had a weak 
system of cost controls and a fragmented business services structure; it maintained an 
irrational system of personnel deployment and a variable administrative structure both of 
which caused wide disparities in costs, college-to-college; further, it relied on a 
centralized budget planning system that used data irrelevant to post-Proposition 13 fiscal 
realities. Additionally, auditors found that the district maintained no policy or procedure 
manuals specific to its own fiscal operations, an oversight which perpetuated substantial 
deviations from expenditure plans at the college level (Tyre, 1986).
The auditors further determined that the outlay for the district offices was 
unjustified. That outlay, for prime real estate in the downtown L.A. area, amounted to $1 
million in annual lease payments, and another $350,000 in annual subsidized employee 
parking fees (Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy, 
1986).
The most egregious practice, however, was the accounting system perpetuated by 
the district which treated all nine colleges as a fiscal aggregate. That system, according to 
the auditors, failed to track subunit revenues or expenditures, and thus created few 
incentives for subunits to improve efficiency. As a result, some colleges regularly 
consumed more revenue than they produced, which made the district as a whole 
vulnerable to cost-overruns (Tyre, 1986).
In sum, the LACCD handled decline in the same way it approached growth, by 
stretching resources while at the same time increasing its overall obligations. Further, by 
failing to face the implications of that pattern, district officials ignored actions that might
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have reduced the district's vulnerability to decline.
By 1981-82, the conditions for a pernicious spiral of decline were set. LACCD 
enrollment reached its highest point just as the state, under AB 1369, levied a stringent 
1% growth cap on district ADA That caused revenues to plummet 15%. Officials 
dipped into the district's cash reserves to cover the difference, but in the process, the 
reserve fund was depleted 16% in a single year. That left the district with an ARP of 3%, 
a margin putting it in a very tenuous fiscal position.
Foreseeing crisis, Kolford centralized planning and impaneled a task force to 
design further cost-cutting. Its task was to create a blueprint for regionalizing the 
LACCD’s instructional programs. Unfortunately, Kolford's action came too late. 
Previous cutbacks had already taken a serious toll on instruction and services (Avila and 
Stevens, 1984). The LACCD's enrollment dropped marginally in 1982-83 as students 
began leaving the district in search of better conditions.
Turmoil over tuition, which erupted in 1983, finally caused a fiscal emergency. 
The governor's revenue veto held up $12 million in district funds that were not reinstated 
in time to help the district meet its 1983-84 obligations. Lacking cash—the district’s ARP 
at that point was 0.02%—district officials were forced to cut course sections. As in other 
districts, course-cutting resulted in an immediate drop in enrollment-12% for AY 1983- 
84 (Koltai, 1985)—the fiscal effect of which was to reduce the revenue for 1984-85, 
when, again, the district was forced to cut course sections. Other factors-tuition fees, 
and a poorly advertised calendar change moving up the fall, 1984 start date-added to the 
impact of course reduction to drop the AY 1984-85 headcount by another 14%.
Despite the fiscal implications of those trends, district officials took no immediate 
steps to reorganize. In fact, the board of trustees—fully informed of the district’s fiscal 
situation-gave a 6% pay raise to all categories of personnel. To meet their new 
obligation, officials depleted their remaining cash reserves and more. FY 1984-85 
concluded with a general fund ending balance of -$2.8 million (Tyre, 1986). To avoid
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financial exigency, the LACCD was forced to secure emergency funding.
At that point the district turned to Los Angeles County which provided it with a $5 
million advance secured by tax anticipation notes. The amount was sufficient to meet 
LACCD liabilities and take care of district operating expenses through September, 1985 
when the loan became due (Los Angeles Times. June 27, 1985). As a condition of the 
loan, the district agreed to an independent audit of its management practices, later 
conducted by the firm of Peat, Marwick, and Mitchell.
While the county loan solved the short-term problem, the solution added to the 
overall fiscal instability of the district. Nevertheless, officials seemed intent on avoiding 
organizational changes. Chancellor Kolford advised against further downsizing. In a 
public statement, he recommended program improvements to rebuild district enrollment 
(Koltai, 1985).
As the deadline for repaying the county loan loomed, officials also rejected other 
available options such as divesting the district of unused real estate with an estimated 
value of $14 million. Instead, they turned to the state legislature for an infusion of funds. 
By then, however, press scrutiny had drawn public attention to the district's financial 
problems, which put the district in a weak bargaining position. A series of incidents 
followed that proved embarrassing to district officials:
- In response to the LACCD's appeal for funds, the State Senate Finance 
Committee obligingly amended AB 539 (Leonard, R, Redlands), a bill to provide loans to 
other districts then under its consideration, to include money for the LACCD. Special 
provisions, however, written in by Sen. Alan Robbins (D-Van Nuys), required the 
LACCD, as a condition of the loan, to sell its surplus property and hold an election to fill 
a vacancy on its board of trustees—an action the district for fiscal reasons wanted to avoid 
(Los Angeles Times. June 27, 1985).
- Before signing AB 539, the governor deleted the $5 million earmarked for the 
LACCD. Deukmejian cited the LACCD’s “failure to exercise prudent fiscal
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management,” but went on to indicate that he would approve a loan in the future if it were 
“accompanied by strong auditing provisions and a permanent incentive for improved 
fiscal management.” The governor recommended that the district amend its residency 
requirements to allow for a new “free-flow” policy under which LACCD residents would 
be eligible to attend schools in other districts. (Los Angeles Times. July 10, 1985, Part n, 
P- 1, 6).
- Consistent with its mission to promote efficiency in state government, the 
California Commission on State Government Organization and Economy—also known as 
the “Little Hoover” Commission-began a long-planned study of the fiscal accountability 
of California's community colleges after announcing that the LACCD would be singled 
out for special scrutiny (CCSGOE, 1986).
Behind those actions lay the competing and sometimes hidden political agendas of 
officials with a vested interest in the policies and practices of the LACCD. Robbins, for 
example, wanted to force the district to liquidate its real estate to raise money for facilities 
for L.A. Hills College, a school in his legislative district His actions drew the opposition 
of other state legislators in the L A  area who wanted the loan to go through (Los Angeles 
Times. June 27, 1985).
The governor, on the other hand, and members of the “Little Hoover” 
Commission wanted the LACCD to become more fiscally accountable in the interest of 
reducing the overall cost of education to state government For that reason, the governor 
aimed to force the LACCD to adopt the idea of “free flow” as a way of instilling 
competition and the motivation to enhance district efficiency (Los Angeles Times. July 
10, 1985).
Chagrined by these actions but unwilling to back down, district officials decided 
to fight back. The trustees, for example, vowed not to “knuckle under” to the governor’s 
demand, and began a search for ways other than a state bailout to repay the county debt 
(Los Angeles Times. July 11, 1985, Pt. II, p. 1). By fall, they had a plan calling for
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new economies and revenues to resolve the situation. The economies included canceling 
the district's remaining maintenance contracts, renegotiating employee fringe benefits, and 
laying off of dozens of clerical workers. New revenues were to come from the sale of a 
small parcel of property, parking fee increases, an infusion of cash from the state lottery, 
and a grant from the state for districts undergoing enrollment decline (Tyre, 1986). 
Officials calculated these measures would yield enough money to repay the county loan 
and wipe out an impending budget deficit.
Just weeks into the fall term, however, officials discovered their projections had 
been overly optimistic. Early revisions projected a current-year deficit of $2.5 million 
(Los Angeles Times. January 24, 1986; Tyre, 1986). In October, however, before 
LACCD officials had a chance to revise their course, the “Little Hoover’’ Commission 
began a series of public hearings at the LACCD to air charges of district mismanagement 
(CCSGOE, 1986). Shortly thereafter, the Los Angeles County Grand Jury announced 
that it too would investigate the LACCD's management practices.
Overwhelmed by those developments, district officials succumbed to a siege 
mentality that was clearly reflected in the comments of the district planning director, Nina 
Conrad. “In the last five years we've lost 33% of our enrollment, we had a $5 million 
deficit last year, we're being investigated by the Little Hoover Commission and an 
accounting firm for the county, and now we're going to be investigated by the County 
Grand Jury. So we have to cut back,” she commented to the researcher.
In November, LACCD officials finally began to lay the groundwork for a major 
reorganization. The chancellor convened a planning group comprised of the members of 
his planning department, the vice presidents of eight LACCD colleges, and Esther 
Wendell, director of the L.A. Canyon nursing program. Its task was to provide a final 
blueprint for district reorganization.
In December, with planning underway, district officials undertook a series of 
visits to LACCD campuses, in which Conrad began preparing the faculties for a radical
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reorganization of instruction. District officials promoted the plan, which called for large 
instructor layoffs in certain areas, as a strategy to shift the district's resources into new 
areas. “We have to more closely align the faculty with student demand,” Trustee Coleson 
told the press (Los Angeles Times. January 24, 1986, Part I, p. 3).
The plan. Specifically, the task force plan called for a districtwide RIF of 142 
full-time teachers, with faculty cutbacks in physical education (40), the social sciences 
(36), humanities (24), art (12), allied health (10), and nursing (20). To achieve the 
reduction, part-time teachers in those disciplines were also slated for dismissal, which in 
nursing amounted to an additional 36 PTE. Nursing programs at L.A. Central and L.A. 
Coast College were targeted for permanent closure, along with numerous allied health 
programs in the district.
Task force operation. In approaching its job, the task force relied on historical 
data amassed by Conrad over a period of several years, much of which dealt with subunit 
enrollment, productivity patterns, and labor costs. It examined the effects of various 
cutback and termination options projected for particular campuses and the district as a 
whole. To maximize economic productivity, the group decided to downsize the health 
occupations and other curricular areas in order to expand business and computer science, 
areas considered to have a higher growth potential.
According to Conrad, the heavy impact on the health occupations resulted from 
the desire of task force to find a big savings without substantially disrupting the district's 
curriculum. “What fell were nursing and allied health,” she remarked. The group 
considered nursing’s cost per ADA and relative resource consumption. Conrad's data 
placed the average cost at around $3000 per ADA—twice the district average~a figure that 
reflected the structure of clinical teaching with its low student-teacher ratios. Enrollment 
dynamics were also considered. As district enrollment dwindled, the enrollment in 
nursing had remained stable which increased nursing’s relative resource consumption to
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4.3% from 3.1% of the LACCD's total outlay for instruction. "With enrollment down in 
the district, but not in nursing, the burden got too big," Conrad explained.
According to Conrad, the job of choosing which programs to close fell to the 
district administrators after local college officials proved unable to make the decision. 
“Nobody wants to volunteer their own program,” noted Conrad. Key factors included 
comparative WSCH productivity, program quality as reflected by student performance 
and graduation rates, and proximity to other service areas. L.A. Coast, the newest and 
smallest program, and L.A. Central, the oldest and, according to Conrad, the least 
economically productive program, were slated for closure.
The plan was trumpeted to campus administrators as a means to redistribute 
instructional resources, eliminate overstaffing, and enhance revenue by redeploying 
resources into areas likely to attract students. “It sounded like a good way to solve a lot 
of the problems we had." commented Fred Barrow, Dean of Occupational Education at 
L.A. River College.
The faculty reaction. Although depicted as the product of a long planning 
process, many of the faculty members interviewed for this study looked at the reform plan 
as a stop-gap effort on the part of the district to accommodate political pressure. In 
general, members were cynical about the need for reform. A biology teacher at L.A. 
Channel, for example, referred to the plan as “the district's public relations campaign.” 
Numerous interviewees blamed the district's poor management practices. A health 
science administrator at L.A. Industry, for example, blamed district extravagance. “I'm a 
company person, but I see the expensive offices sitting downtown.” Others blamed 
LACCD expansion. A chemistry teacher at L.A. Midtown College said, “Kolford needs a 
big district.” Still others blamed planning mistakes such as the district's ill-fated calendar 
change.
In general, the faculty was angry and hostile as was clearly demonstrated at the
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February 5th meeting of the board of trustees where an overflow crowd of faculty 
assembled to denounce virtually every aspect of the proposal. Numerous faculty leaders 
lambasted the layoffs as an attempt to destroy the district. In the audience, for example, 
was Harvey Cox, AFT-Guild president, who charged the district with “panicking” over 
the budget situation. Also in the audience was Raoul Teilhet, AFT state director, and a 
prominent faculty organizer in California. Teilhet referred to the district’s plan as a 
“declaration of war on the faculty,” (Los Angeles Times. February 6, 1986, Pl II, p. 1). 
Despite the heated rhetoric, the trustees voted 6:1 to accept the chancellor's proposal.
Expansion of conflict. Embattled by the reaction, district officials went on to 
make a series of precipitous decisions that not only heightened faculty anxiety over the 
final scope of reform, but expanded the conflict to enfold the community. Two weeks 
after the layoff vote, the board voted to fire the presidents of L. A. Metro and L.A. Coast 
Colleges (Los Angeles Times. February 21, 1986), a decision which had explosive 
results. One of those fired, it turned out, was the highest ranking Asian-American 
educator in California. His removal angered L.A.'s Asian community and brought 
charges of racism from a group called “Leadership Education for Asian Pacifies,” which 
threatened to fight the decision (Los Angeles Times. February 21, 1986). Coincidentally, 
rumors of district plans to close L.A. Metro, a largely black college, spread through the 
district. These were followed by reports that black interest groups were also organizing 
for a fight.
Squeezed by the pressure, the board of trustees took immediate steps to defuse the 
situation, and at its next meeting announced the appointment of the Asian administrator as 
assistant to the chancellor, duties unspecified (Los Angeles Times. March 6, 1986). At 
the same meeting, Board President Marvin Rickman announced a “recision” of 60 layoff 
notices. The action, reported incorrectly by the press as a “softening” of the layoff 
policy, suggested a reduction of the final layoff total (Los Angeles lim es. March 6, 1986,
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Pt. n, p. 3). In fact, there had been no reduction, but an increase in the number of 
notices sent. As officials accommodated sixty faculty members who chose to exercise 
their bumping rights, they quietly issued another 75 layoff notices, producing a grand 
total of 157 notices-or a net increase of 15. When, sometime after the meeting, leaders 
of the AFT Guild caught on, they lambasted the “recision” as a ruse to manipulate public 
sentiment.
Impact on faculty morale. By the time of the layoff announcement, 400 full-time 
faculty positions vacated under the district's hiring freeze sat empty, work conditions after 
years of service and maintenance reductions were drastically deteriorated, and faculty 
morale was at an all time low. As one interviewee observed, “There were empty desks 
everywhere!” Vacant positions meant obligatory work increases for the teachers 
remaining. ‘To function around here,” another member noted ironically, “you have to 
have your own broom and dust pan!”
Reactions to these conditions were compounded by an insidious climate of 
suspicion in the district, deriving from an unusual situation in the district administration. 
In 1984, barely a year before the layoff announcement, the chancellor had appointed 
Valerie Mulanney, chief negotiator for the AFT Teachers' Guild, to the position of district 
Vice Chancellor of Personnel. As a primary author of the faculty contract and the guild's 
first president, Mulanney had come to symbolize union power, and was generally 
regarded as brilliant but ruthless. Her shift to district administration incited fears that she 
would use her insider knowledge to the detriment of faculty. When the district announced 
its layoff plan, many teachers decided to avoid drawing attention to themselves by leaving 
the battle to others.
Faculty organization. The layoff announcement took a serious toll on the faculty. 
Too demoralized to orchestrate a coordinated anti-coalition effort, teachers at several
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campuses responded by squabbling over how to react to the district's proposal. For 
weeks, debate in the academic senates centered around whether the faculty should stress 
academic excellence or job security in its opposition to restructuring-a debate energized 
by the practice of bumping.
The bumping process aggravated faculty tensions. Because those exercising 
bumping options usually lacked experience if not credentials for their new assignments, 
they were widely regarded as underqualified. While some units received few teacher 
transfers, others had many, and were often obliged to make space for the newcomers by 
exchanging seasoned for unseasoned teachers. Their losses focused attention on the issue 
of academic excellence. For other groups, however, where the layoff notices were 
numerous, job threats remained a larger problem than bumping. In those groups— 
physical education and social sciences faculties, for example-the focus was on the issue 
of job security. Thus, the debate became mired in squabbles over the relative importance 
of these two issues, with the result that faculties on several of the campuses were unable 
to orchestrate a unified opposition. Rick Martinez, academic senate president at L.A. 
Midtown College, explained: “Around here, because everything in this district is so 
dammed big, most people only pay attention to their own shop!”
The failure of the faculty to unite gave rise to two ad hoc splinter groups. One 
was a districtwide coalition comprised mainly of faculty in the humanities and social 
sciences which became known as the “Committee for Academic Excellence.” Its main 
objective was to prevent layoffs in those disciplines. The committee coordinated with the 
AFT Faculty Guild, and worked with members of the L.A. state legislative delegation to 
put pressure on the district. Another faculty group, called “Save Our Community 
Colleges,” which was opposed to the AFT Guild's influence, used various tactics in a 
fight to change the district's leadership.
Faculty theories. Theories about the layoff proposal were numerous, and indeed
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several have already been mentioned above. Large numbers of teachers, for example, 
concluded that the layoffs were the end result of financial pressure caused by district 
mismanagement, but some also saw the layoffs as a form of face saving for the board. A 
sizable number, for example, believed that the trustees, all of whom had been elected with 
AFT College Guild support, were embarrassed by the district's financial condition, and 
therefore backed restructuring to show themselves capable of going against union 
interests. Others, noting the chancellor's close des to the Democrats in the state 
legislature, and his important role as a leader of the CCC Urban District Association, saw 
a connection to state politics. They theorized that the chancellor, who opposed tuition, 
had engineered the layoffs to embarrass the governor. (Their theory spawned a faculty 
joke pointing out the irony of the situation. Although the governor may have wanted 
chancellor's head on a plate, the joke went, in the end it was the chancellor who served 
the governor with 157 heads!) Both theories underscored the political interests of 
LACCD officials in the layoff policy, and served to focus the various faculty ad hoc 
groups and coalitions on the importance of seeking state intervention to prevent 
restructuring.
Tbs Political Behavior of Nursing Faculty
Numerous factors—unit structure, organization, and leadership—that are best 
understood from an historical perspective shaped the responses of the LACCD nursing 
faculties to district developments.
At the time of the layoff announcement, there were 110 nursing teachers 
dispersed throughout the LACCD in eight independently accredited instructional units, 
features of which are summarized in Table 32. Each unit maintained its own curriculum, 
negotiated its own clinical contracts, and set its own schedule and policies. Joint 
meetings of the eight faculties, which operated independently of one another, were rare in
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the absence of a mandate from the district office to convene. As a result, faculty members 
enjoyed few opportunities for interacting with one another other than those provided by 
district governance activities in which few of them participated.
Thus, there was little faculty interaction and no central faculty organization at the 
time of the crisis. Only the joint meetings of the nursing program directors provided a 
nucleus for organization. In the LACCD, faculty members elected to the 100% released- 
time, non-management position of department chairperson served as program directors at 
seven institutions. The exception was L.A. Industry College where the associate dean of 
allied health acted as program director. Working together under the auspices of the 
district education office, the eight program directors met regularly to discuss policy, and 
provided what little coordination there was between programs.
Table 32
Characteristics of the LACCD Nursing Programs

















1958 generic 13$ 16 13,3^5 5l4 Urban
L.A.
Metro
1968 generic 211 20 3,298 227 Urban
L.A.
Industry
1970 ladder 140 9 8,653 491 Urban
L.A.
Midtown
1957 generic 154 14 11,859 416 Urban
L.A.
Coast
1980 generic 79 5 8,548 261 Urban
L.A.
Channel
1963 generic 195 17 7,275 308 Suburban
L.A.
Canyon
I960 generic 217 21 18,178 493 Suburban
L.A.
River
1969 generic 189 13 18,513 533 Suburban
Note. Year of state accreditation, nursing enrollment and program type State-Approved 
Schools of Nursing H.N.. 1986. 44th Edition, NLN, 1986. College enrollment. 
Location from The College Handbook. 1985-86. 23rd Edition, CEEB, 1985. Full-time
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faculty from Tyre, 1986.
Although the original task of the group was to make recommendations for 
standardizing nursing education in the district, its focus changed in 1982 at the behest of 
the chancellor, to program consolidation and ways to “regionalize” nursing. 
Unfortunately, the group, having no vertical hierarchy of authority, agreed on little. 
Faculty observers attributed its inaction to the loss of unit autonomy and director status 
that were certain to occur under a plan to consolidate, but Ruth Hartley, L.A. Industry 
director, claimed the group faltered because district planners never made their expectations 
clear. “We sent them ideas, but I guess we didn't give them what they wanted—we never 
got any feedback!” In the course of their interaction, the directors grew to distrust one 
another, and became divided in a number of factions, each of which had its own leader 
and power agenda. These divisions carried over to the 1986 termination crisis.
The program directors' response to the termination crisis. Kathy Ito, L.A. 
Channel chairperson, claimed the chairpersons were under strong pressure to improve 
program efficiency during the fall of 1985. They received little official information, 
however, on the cutbacks planned for nursing. As a result, most of the faculties remained 
focused on regular department routines, despite rumors of impending layoffs and 
program closures. In December, union leaders held an open meeting to discuss district 
developments, at which Assemblyman Mike Roos (D-Los Angeles) was on-hand to 
reassure the faculty. A few of the nursing chairpersons attended—Chairpersons Ito and 
Wendell—along with a small group of faculty members.
The following January, weeks in advance of the chancellor’s proposal, the 
nursing chairpersons were apprised of the district's plan. Most of the directors put off 
informing their faculties, however, pending a formal public announcement. Word of the 
district’s plan, leaked to members by Director Wendell, got out anyway.
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Wendell, faculty activist, believed that the chancellor wanted to use the nursing 
terminations as a political lever to advance the district’s objectives at the state level. “He's 
[Kolford] using us as a hammer against the legislators to get money released to the 
district—he's done it before. Nursing is a very visible program!” she told the researcher. 
Wendell favored a public challenge to the proposal, and an organized opposition. When it 
became clear that the chairpersons as a group were not going to act, Wendell advised 
members of the faculty to take action on their own behalf. She recommended they 
challenge the nursing decision by sending telegrams to the trustees to be delivered during 
the board meeting. A large number of teachers followed through, and the arrival of a 
flurry of telegrams interrupted the meeting.
Wendell's peers in the chairpersons' group were embarrassed by the incident 
According to Hartley, Wendell was well-known for flamboyant tactics. Although at one 
time influential with the chancellor, she fell into disfavor when she circulated her own 
plan for regionalizing nursing that action that not only caused an uproar in the district, but 
turned the other directors against Wendell. “Esther gives the impression she's speaking 
for the directors when she isn't,” Hartley observed.
Wendell did not attend the February 5th board meeting, but her peers nevertheless 
attributed the telegram incident to her. They believed she also instigated the appearance of 
an assistant to State Senator Alan Robbins (D - Van Nuys) who addressed the board with 
concerns about the impact of restructuring on the L.A. Canyon program—Wendell's 
program.
The directors preferred a conservative approach and worried that Wendell’s 
actions would alienate the administration. When they finally met to plan a response, they 
agreed to a wait-and-see approach. Carol Campbell, L.A. River director and 1986 “chair 
of chairs,” strongly backed a go-slow strategy. Campbell believed that people in the 
community would come forward. She therefore took her time in convening a meeting. 
“I'm not gonna jump right in. We'll wait until the dust settles a little, and see where we
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are.” she commented.
Implications of the termination policy for the nursing units. The restructuring- 
which slated two RN programs for closure—nevertheless touched all eight nursing 
programs. It called for a layoff of 20 full-time faculty members and all of nursing’s part- 
time instructors—a total reduction of 56 FTEs in all. The teachers laid off were 
determined, according to statute, by seniority on a districtwide basis. Notices went to 
seven members at L.A. Channel College; four each at L.A. Canyon and L.A. Industry; 
two at L.A. River College; and one each at L.A. River, L.A. Midtown, and L.A. Coast 
Colleges. Only L.A. Central, where all members of the faculty enjoyed seniority, had no 
layoffs. It, however, was one of the programs slated for closure. District officials 
announced no plans or schedule for the transition, leaving the eight faculties to speculate 
when their positions would be eliminated.
Nursing faculty reactions. The initial reactions to the proposal varied 
considerably, both from member to member, and within faculty groups. Teachers at 
several sites were taken by surprise. “We have a strong program. I guess we never 
thought they would cut us!” said a member of the L.A. Channel faculty. Others, 
however, claimed to have anticipated the move. “It was pretty clear when they started 
laying off classifieds [non faculty employees] last fall,” said another member of the L.A. 
Channel faculty. Some members, were very emotional. “How can they do this! Our 
program was one of the first in the country!” said an L.A. Central program member, 
angry about the potential fate of her program. Others, however, were dispassionate. “I 
don't think there's a real need for eight programs in this district!” said a member of the 
L.A. Canyon program.
Finger-pointing was common. Some members, for example, blamed the union. 
“The union got us down to 18 F i t !  What good did it do us?” said a member of the L.A.
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Central faculty.” Others blamed the district Many thought the administration was 
sacrificing nursing to escape its political problems. Although recognizing nursing's cost 
as a problem, few believed the district lacked money to pay for the programs. “They got 
a windfall from the lottery last fall!” scoffed an L.A. Midtown member. Although word 
of the rationale for the task force's closure recommendation filtered down, many members 
doubted its claim that objective criteria had been used. “They made their decision first, 
and then fed data into the computer to justify it,” said a member of the L.A. Central 
faculty. Indeed, as Lucille Muro, L.A. Central director, pointed out in revelation , L.A. 
Central surpassed other district programs in both WSCH and exam scores. Apparent 
contradictions such as these led to speculation that political factors such as the racial 
politics of service area constituencies had influenced the selection of programs for 
termination.
Organization of the faculty. Footdragging by the directors had a significant impact 
on members of the nursing faculties, most of whom were eager to take action. “This is 
very threatening-we're all very concerned!” a member of the L.A. River faculty told the 
researcher. After two weeks with no word from the group, confidence in the directors 
completely eroded.
Directors Wendell and Ito, were the first to respond to faculty concerns. Wendell 
was disgusted by the inaction of her peers. “They usually act after it's too late!” she said 
to the interviewer. Ito, however, was worried about the impact o f a RIF on her program. 
Her concern was that the terminations would dilute the expertise of her faculty which was 
distinguished by its number of advanced degrees—more than any other program. She 
consulted with Trustee Galvin, the lone dissenter in the termination vote, who advised her 
to organize an anti-termination campaign.
Thus, Ito and Wendell agreed on the need to organize. Ito, whose program stood 
to lose more than Wendell's, asked her staff to take the lead. Two teachers, Sally Tollis,
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a junior member who had received a layoff notice, and Nora Carson, a senior member 
active in the academic senate and AFT Guild negotiating team, responded.
Tollis and Carson took charge of organizing a faculty action group. Less than 
three weeks after the board vote, plans were underway for “The Coalition to Preserve 
Quality Health Care in Nursing.” On February 25th, 42 teachers representing six 
programs convened for a kick-off assembly. The first meeting was held at L.A. Industry 
College, the most centrally located of the eight institutions. A total of six raeetings- 
February 25, March 6, March 20, April 1, April 15, and April 29, 1986-were held prior 
to the May vote, and additional meetings followed during the summer and fall of 1986, 
and spring of 1987.
Strategy and tactics. The First meeting provided members with opportunities to 
get to know one another and discuss their mutual predicament The mood was one of 
cautious optimism as Tollis and Carson worked to get the planning off the ground. 
Wendell and Ito were there. Worried about their jobs, which they thought might be 
jeopardized if they were seen to challenge the district, they acted only as consultants. 
Melvin Baker, AFT Guild vice president, was also on hand. Baker had his own agenda. 
He believed an anti-termination campaign by the nursing faculties would serve to raise the 
level of public concern over restructuring, and thus benefit the union's campaign against 
it. He also viewed his support for nursing as a way of building union membership. 
“Nursing has over 100 teachers-that's a big part of our faculty body,” he commented to 
the researcher.
Baker's presence at the meetings was controversial. Many of the teachers at the 
meeting distrusted the union's goals and resented paying its closed-shop dues. “A lot of 
people don't feel the union represents the teachers,” said a member of the L.A. Central 
group. Tollis and Carson, on the other hand, while not exactly pro-union, believed that 
the coalition needed union support. Unfortunately, they failed to convey their rationale to
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coalition members. Unaware of the reasons for Baker's presence, members could be 
overheard questioning one another, “What’s he doing here?” Some also questioned Tollis 
and Carson's motives for inviting him, which took a toll on group cohesion later down 
the line.
Tollis and Carson ran the coalition in a business-like fashion, according to 
standard rules of order, which in the early meetings included minutes, a budget report, 
and progress assessments. The latter were given by faculty members acting as 
spokespersons for their respective faculties, and focused on work accomplished and 
upcoming events.
From the beginning, planning was a collective function. Everyone who came to 
the meetings participated in the coalition planning discussions. The decisions, however, 
were nonbinding, and the faculties remained free to decide which of the ideas presented to 
use in their own service areas-an arrangement that caused disparities program-to-program 
in the tactics actually put in action.
From the start, members of the coalition seemed to have an implicit understanding 
of the special-interest culture of the district They also seemed to understand the potential 
benefits of lobbying local politicians. No explanation was given, or indeed seemed 
necessary. As Tollis put i t  “We've got to get some politicians to support us. Otherwise, 
I don't know how far we'll go.” Lobbying became a major coalition strategy. By the 
March 6th meeting, members were ready to plan a campaign. Baker instructed the group 
on lobbying etiquette and provided a list of the legislators representing each service area 
of the district The coalition also decided on other tactical pressures that evening 
including a series of demonstrations and rallies, an outreach to local hospital executives 
and personnel, and a press conference to precede the board's final policy vote, but it was 
clear that its primary strategy was lobbying.
Reaction from the chairpersons' group. To spread news of the coalition’s
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upcoming meetings and agenda, Tollis used an inter-campus courier to forward notices to
the eight program offices. The courier service, however, proved unreliable, and a few of
the directors apparendy never received their notices. When they were informed of the
coalition by members of their faculties, they questioned what was going on, and put
pressure on Campbell to convene a meeting of the chairpersons. A meeting was finally
held which Wendell and Ito did not attend. That fostered suspicion among the other
directors that Wendell might be using the coalition as a way to regain influence in the
district Thus, the directors decided to monitor the coalition, as they pursued their wait-
and-see approach. “We can't go out and do radical things in the community. If the
%
people over in personnel get angry, they might go higher on the [seniority] list,” said 
Leslie Brookes, L.A. Midtown director, to the researcher, adding, “I've got young kids- 
I need my job!”
The directors’ decision put Muro the director from L.A. Central, and Susan 
Woods, the director from L.A. Coast, both of whom worried about losing their 
programs, in an awkward position. Muro and Woods wanted the directors group to come 
up with a unified action plan, but recognized after the meeting that the idea was 
unrealistic. Frustrated, they quietly turned to local legislators and community groups in 
their own service areas for help.
Events prior to the May policy vote. Not long after the district announcement, the 
Little Hoover Commission came out with a report on the LACCD (Los Angeles Times. 
February 10, 1986). Although failing to uncover “significant nonfeasance,” the 
commission nevertheless called the district's lavish spending pattern “imprudent” 
(CCSGOE, February, 1986, p. 40). The report amplified the pressure on the district to 
press forward with restructuring.
Within days of the report, the board of trustees began a series of hearings on 
restructuring. Faculty and student groups, predictably combative, held the first of a series
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of anti-termination rallies on February 19th, the day the board voted to fire the two college 
presidents.
The February 19th board meeting was eventful. Director Muro addressed the 
board on behalf of the L.A. Central program, and presented the trustees with a seven- 
page fact sheet challenging the district's WSCH data, in which she refuted in detail its 
arguments for closing the L.A. Central program. According to observers, the reaction of 
the trustees was one of interest but also confusion. The trustees were surprised to learn, 
for example, that L.A. Central was accredited by the NLN-revealing gaps in the 
information they had received. Observers concluded from the trustees' apparent interest 
that the board was open to reconsidering its position.
As the ad-hoc group’s anti-termination campaign began, some members of the 
chairpersons’s group worked quietly behind the scenes to advance another agenda. In the 
final days of February, Directors Hartley and Brookes quietly conferred with Conrad, the 
district planner, with whom both enjoyed close personal ties. Hartley and Brookes 
believed that a restructuring was inevitable. “No matter what anybody does, those 
programs are gone!” Brookes said to the researcher. They called on Conrad to contact the 
Board of Registered Nursing (BRN) to begin planning for the transition. According to 
Brookes, Conrad asked her to make the initial contact with the BRN, which she did. That 
action initiated a series of negotiations between the BRN and the district Neither 
director, however, informed the leaders of the nursing coalition about the action.
By March 5th, the conflict in the district had escalated. Hundreds of students- 
including nursing students-paraded outside of the district offices, chanting and carrying 
placards. Inside of the board room, emotions also ran high. An audience of faculty, 
students, and numerous disgruntled Asian activists were on hand to protest district 
actions. Many, holding tersely worded signs, muttered angry comments. The board's 
agenda that day focused on faculty presentations, including several by members of the 
L.A. Central nursing faculty and student body. Despite the tension in the room, the
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business concluded in an orderly fashion. Observers were again impressed by the 
receptivity of the trustees to faculty arguments. Kolford announced the formation of a 
new committee which he organized to oversee the nursing program closures.
At the ad hoc group’s meeting the following evening. Baker advised members of 
the nursing faculty to capitalize on the board's apparent openness. He recommended they 
try to co-opt the economic argument by documenting nursing's general education WSCH 
contributions. The proposal quickly died, however, when members reminded Baker that 
past attempts by Wendell and others to use such arguments had always failed. Instead, 
plans were laid for a series of student demonstrations highlighting, at Baker's suggestion, 
nursing's identity as a separate, identifiable occupational group. The intention was to 
capitalize on the sympathy Baker said the public had for nurses. Several nursing student 
association leaders were in attendance. They agreed to coordinate the actions of their 
groups with coalition plans.
With the lobbying campaign well underway, Wendell met on March 10th with 
Assemblyman Patrick Nolan (R-Glendale), whose legislative district included her service 
area. Nolan agreed to write a letter to the board expressing his concerns about the nursing 
cutbacks, but was noncommittal about making a personal appearance. This was the first 
in a series of unenthusiastic responses from politicians in the Los Angeles area to the 
coalition's appeals.
The nursing transition committee met for the first time on March 11th. Wendell, 
Hartley, and Brookes, all recruited by the chancellor, attended as committee 
representatives from nursing. Muro appeared before the committee to address the issue of 
the L. A. Central transition. The issue was whether the district should adopt a one or two- 
year phase-out plan. To buy time, Muro argued for a two-year phase-out plan. She 
claimed that the district’s eight programs were too dissimilar to expedite a transition with a 
massive inter-program student transfer. Hartley however, quickly undercut her argument 
by insisting that L.A. Industry could easily accommodate L.A. Central’s students. The
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administrators were reassured, and the committee voted to accept the one-year phase-out 
Muro left the meeting, irate.
For a number of reasons, the coalition's outreach to hospitals and other health 
agencies failed to gain momentum in all service areas. From the start, the directors were 
divided over whether to recruit hospital support, and some faculty members hesitated to 
proceed without their own director's approval. Nevertheless, a few faculties, L.A. 
Channel and L.A. Canyon, for example, did make a concerted effort, and in mid-March 
representatives from local health care agencies began to appear before the board. A nurse 
recruiter from a large hospital in the L.A. Channel service area, for example, addressed 
the board at its March 19th meeting with an offer of grant money to help save the 
programs targeted for closure. An authority on hospital personnel needs,, she informed 
the trustees that the nursing surplus in L.A. area had given way to a shortage, which 
challenged the argument raised by a few trustees that local employment trends justified the 
program closures.
At the same meeting, the trustees discussed the nursing transition, and voted to 
allow the current nursing freshman finish on site. That amounted to a tentative approval 
of a one-year phase-out plan-another step toward termination. Later, the board laid 
down new rules for public testimony at board hearings. The aim was to curtail the 
lengthy faculty speeches, but not necessarily to restrict the number of speakers, including 
nursing speakers. (As Conrad observed, the level of public interest was higher for 
nonnursing programs. “My desk is piled with over 300 letters, but so far only four letters 
about nursing!” she told the researcher.)
Baker addressed the rule changes at the March 20th coalition meeting. He 
acknowledged that the board's mood had changed. “The trustees are feeling the 
pressure,” he said. Director Hartley was also on hand at the March 20th meeting to 
discuss the phase-out plan. She announced that the district would rehire most, if not all, 
of those who received layoff notices for the period of the transition. In a thinly veiled bid
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to head of an open challenge to disrict policy, she encouraged the group to reconsider its 
tactics since it was now clear that jobs would be saved. Members of Muro’s faculty were 
also at the meeting. One informed the group that Muro was working with Assemblyman 
Roos on a political strategy to deter restructuring that would save the L.A. Central 
program. She went on to report that Muro had been reprimanded by the chancellor's 
office for the pressure members of her faculty had allegedly put on students to participate 
in media demonstrations.
On March 20th, a delegation of LACCD faculty members flew to Sacramento to 
lobby members of the Assembly Education Committee. Teresa Hughes (D-Los Angeles), 
the chairperson, agreed to hold a hearing on a bill before the committee to restrict the 
LACCD's restructuring effort Hughes’ action touched off a round of lobbying by 
LACCD lobbyist, Patricia Hewitt. A day later, Tollis and Ito appeared before the 
Commission on the Status of Women to request its help to save the nursing programs. 
Members of the commission agreed to write a letter to the LACCD board.
When the Board of Registered Nursing (BRN) met in Los Angeles, March 25th, 
Muro was on the agenda to request the BRN's intervention on behalf of the L.A. Central 
Program. A nine person panei, seven of which were Deukmejian appointees, the BRN 
declined, claiming it lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the district’s decision. In an 
interview for this study, however, member Tricia Hunter, R.N., cast the BRN's action in 
a partisan light. “Most of us are real uncomfortable getting involved in the political issues 
surrounding this district!” Hunter said. Hunter, a Republican, indicated that the BRN 
was divided along party lines. “I don't think the district needs eight programs!” she said 
(personal communication, March 31, 1986).
During the middle and lacer weeks of March, the nursing programs held their 
annual community advisory committee meetings. Although several directors had agreed 
to use these meetings as a forum to solicit support from local hospitals. Indeed, Campbell 
and her supervising dean downplayed nursing's situation at the L.A. River meeting. Her
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action alienated many of her faculty who had suspected for sometime that she had 
administrative ambitions. Hartley and Brookes also deemphasized the crisis in their 
advisors meetings, but managed to retain the loyalty of their staff members.
Late in March, Director Wendell was hospitalized with chest pains—another 
setback for the coalition. Although diagnosed as a stress reaction, Wendell's condition 
caused her to drop out of the coalition. She continued, however, to advise Tollis.
Meanwhile, Muro worked with Assemblyman Roos who desperately wanted to 
save the L.A. Central program. Roos believed that to serve as an important jobs-training 
program for the minority residents of his inner city district “There are a lot of immigrants 
here,” Roos commented, “that nursing program is their ticket to the mainstream!” 
(personal communication, November, 1986). Roos's idea was to erect legislative barriers 
to the flow of funds to the district, a strategy Muro enthusiastically embraced. “Our best 
chance is with the people in Sacramento—they hold the purse strings,” she explained to 
the researcher.
Days later, Chancellor Kolford visited the L.A. Coast campus to confirm the 
closure of its nursing program. His visit, which underscored the district's resolve to go 
ahead with restructuring, ignited another round of student resistance. The Coast students 
descended on the office of Assemblywoman Gwenn Moore (D-West Los Angeles) asking 
about the status of AB 3586, a piece of legislation Moore was sponsoring which would 
require the community college state board of governors to review local program 
termination proposals. On learning that the bill had stalled in committee, the students 
decided on another tactic-filing a lawsuit against the district.
By early April it was clear that the coalition's lobbying strategy was foundering. 
The mood at the April 1st meeting was somber as numerous members rose to report that 
politicians at all levels-city, county, and state-with a few notable exceptions had declined 
or side-stepped their appeals often citing the limits of their authority and hesitation to 
involve themselves in another public board's policies. Tollis reported that even her
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efforts to have John Vasconcellos (D-San Jose), Assembly Ways and Means Chairman, 
review nursing's WSCH data had failed. Sensing a morale problem, Ito urged members 
not to give up, and advised that they direct their energy into an appeal to the BRN to 
change its position.
With their options apparently narrowing, coalition members became concerned 
about the group’s board hearing, scheduled for April 9th. Baker spent much of the 
evening advising tactics for getting on the agenda. Constant side-talk, however, 
interfered with coalition business. The district had offered incentives to the teachers that 
week, and members could be heard discussing the pros and cons of the accepting the 
offers. Coalition attendance was down to 27 faculty members.
Coincidentally, L.A. radio stations announced a local fund-raiser organized by the 
“Committee for Academic Excellence” for Assemblyman Mike Roos. The committee, led 
by Lester Mort, L.A. Central history professor, planned a $25-a-plate affair, and invited 
the public's participation. The event was supported by the coalition. Numerous nursing 
faculty members and a large group of nursing students attended.
On April 9th, the day of the coalition's board hearing, the activities began as 
planned with a media demonstration in which a large group of uniformed nursing students 
picketed outside of the district offices. Somehow miscued, the media crews arrived too 
late to tape the event, thus failing to capture it for the local TV audience.
As the meeting opened, district officials acknowledged scores of letters from 
legislators and public officials expressing concern about the restructuring and nursing 
terminations. Only a few politicians, however, appeared in person to speak on behalf of 
nursing. One, the mayor of the city of Hawthorne, addressed the board to underscore the 
importance of the nursing program in his service area to his constituents. Other speakers 
included a number of hospital executives who confirmed that although many local 
hospitals suffered financial problems of their own, a local need for nurses still existed.
Numerous coalition members addressed the board. Their testimony highlighted
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the anticipated consequences of the termination policy, including the problems envisioned 
from student and faculty transfers, the loss of job education for women and minorities, 
and the accreditation status of the district's remaining nursing programs jeopardized by 
faculty exchanges. No one specifically addressed program economics or the loss of ADA 
to the district. Some presentations took on impassioned and even angry tones. During a 
particularly confrontational presentation, Board President Rickman rose abruptly and 
retired to the board antechamber. Frustrated by the day's events, coalition leaders 
nevertheless vowed to press on.
Within days of the hearing, President Rickman took to the airwaves to bolster the 
district's position. A practicing surgeon, he appeared on a number of radio and TV 
shows, and, stressing his dual role as health professional and district official, provided 
new arguments for the nursing terminations. Changes in the nursing profession, 
Rickman said, specifically a profession-wide debate over the entry credential—whether a 
two or four year degree-had reduced the need for community college nursing programs.
On April 15th, the coalition met to plan its grand finale—a press conference at the 
L.A. Press Club. It was clear that members were irate over Rickman's statements. As 
the meeting opened, a number of those present expressed their frustration with Rickman, 
whom they berated for “lacking respect for nurses.”
The group spent most of its time that afternoon discussing the press conference. 
To assist in the planning, Baker had invited outside consultants. Fox, AFT Guild 
president, and Mort, head of the Committee for Academic Excellence, attended. Also on 
hand was Jerry Fineberg, a political consultant hired by Mort's committee.
Tollis and Carson handed over the meeting to Fineberg. Fineberg presented 
himself with an insider’s bravado that appeared to offend coalition members. Few, for 
example, responded to his invitation to share their problems. Finally, Tollis mentioned 
that some of the politicians invited to the conference appeared to be wavering. Fineberg 
made some rather involved recommendations for action, but his suggestions seemed only
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to puzzle people in the audience. Sensing the mood, Mort broke into the discussion to 
laud the group's organization, which he said was better than that of other LACCD faculty 
units. Mort also stressed that nursing, with its reservoir of community sympathy, had a 
better chance than other groups of achieving a turnaround. The mood lifted, and the 
group resumed planning.
In the final weeks, the coalition both gained and lost ground in its bids for 
support. The students, who continued to rally, conducted a demonstration before the 
April 21st administrative law hearings held. Faculty members who attended the hearings 
complained that the lawyers assigned to the nursing teachers failed to bring out important 
points in nursing's defense. Days later, Trustee Galvin published an editorial 
prominently displayed in the Los Angeles Times Sunday edition outlining his reasons for 
opposing restructuring fLos Angeles Times. April 27, 1986). Among the points he 
highlighted were the negative consequences he foresaw from the nursing terminations.
On April 28th, Director Ito attended a meeting of the Greater Los Angeles Nursing 
Services Administrators’ Association. Ito wanted to have institutions other than those in 
the L.A. Channel and Canyon service areas involved in the coalition's effort. Members 
of the association were unenthusiastic and declined to intervene, however, noting that 
their numerous requests for information from Director Muro had gone unanswered. 
Privately to Ito, several members expressed reservations about the quality of the L.A. 
Central program.
On April 29th, at a meeting in San Diego, the BRN officially affirmed its support 
for the one-year phase out plan. That action cleared the way for termination. Bowing to 
pressure-much of it from the LACCD nursing coalition, the BRN agreed to make a 
thorough assessment of the impact of the terminations on the remaining programs.
On May 2nd, a handful of politicians, numerous hospital professionals, faculty, 
and scores of uniformed students assembled at the L.A. Press Club to address the local 
media. Assemblymen Gerald Felando (R-Torrance) and Mike Roos (D-Los Angeles)
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appeared in person. L.A. City Councilman, John Ferraro sent an assistant The 
politicians raised numerous questions about the impact of the nursing terminations on the 
city and county. Their remarks were carried on local TV that evening.
On May 7th, the board of trustees met to vote on the layoff and termination 
proposal-a meeting marred by numerous disruptions. One, a display by district students 
in which the students presented the trustees with a bushel of lemons inked with pejorative 
slogans, drew anger from Board President Rickman who asserted they had been 
manipulated by the faculty. After some discussion, the trustees went into an executive 
session which lasted several hours. Returning for the final vote, the trustees brought in a 
scaled-back version of their original plan which called for a final total of 48 layoffs. The 
new plan, however, while reinstating numerous allied health programs, included the 20 
layoffs in nursing and two nursing program closures. The vote was 6:1 in favor of 
restructuring, with Trustee Galvin again dissenting.
Events of the 1986 summer and fall. Members of the coalition did not disband, 
but regrouped to continue their campaign. Disappointed by the outcome, they attributed 
the board's decision not to district power, but to the divisions within nursing itself. 
Interviewees noted, for example, that the ad hoc effort never succeeded in completely 
uniting the eight faculties. Only the L.A. Channel group committed itself fully; members 
of the other groups were less fully committed—particularly at L.A. Metro and Industry 
where the nursing chairpersons opposed coalition strategy.
The leaders of the coalition nevertheless decided to press on. Baker, for example, 
remained optimistic, and advised the group to redouble its efforts. For many members, 
however, the outcome raised a question of efficacy. Was a reversal feasible? A number 
of them wondered. Noting that various coalition outreach strategies had failed, and that 
the nursing directors remained divided, many members factored the fatigue, 
inconvenience, and the other natural forces of attrition wearing on them, into their
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answers about whether it made sense to continue. For a number of members, the answer 
was no. Some found the demands of meetings and the other coalition activities 
impossible to sustain. “I live out in Calabasas,” said one member. Others found no 
reason for continuing—the district quickly rehired most of the teachers laid off. Thus, 
attendance at the meetings dropped off sharply, as those members drifted away. For 
some, however, continuing did make sense. The primary issue carrying them forward, 
however, no longer was jobs, but program preservation.
Ironically, as members reassessed their commitment, local interest in the nursing 
terminations surged. In a new round of media attention, the local presc, for example, ran 
a prominent article, and for the first time detailed the situation from the faculty and student 
point of view (Los Angeles Times. May 9, 1986). Largely as a result of the belated 
attention, the district found itself under pressure to reconsider.
Again, President Rickman, in a number of media interviews, reiterated the 
rationale for the nursing program terminations, and stressed among other arguments the 
local nursing surplus. This time, coalition leaders reacted by organizing their own public 
relations effort. A new coalition speakers' bureau dispatched a member to debate 
Rickman on a local TV talk show. The effort was not an apparent success. A skilled 
public speaker, Rickman dominated the discourse. On May 18th, George Green, 
president of KABC, editorialized on behalf of saving the nursing programs, however, 
and the coalition capitalized on its new support by sending a tape of Green's remarks to 
Joshua Smith, state chancellor.
With pressure on the district mounting, the union filed several lawsuits on behalf 
of the faculty, which Cox, AFT Guild president, discussed at the May 19th coalition 
meeting. The union suits charged the district with violating faculty due process, and 
enumerated a long-list of district affirmative action infractions. Cox promised to take the 
problem of the nursing terminations, which he said raised a labor issue, to the County 
Federation of Labor.
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Nine days later, on May 27th, the Los Angeles County Grand Jury issued a report 
on the findings of its investigation of the LACCD. The county report inventoried 
numerous instances of district mismanagement. These the auditors pointedly attributed to 
the district's decision culture. According to the report, the district had assumed that state 
legislators would be unwilling to allow a huge public entity such as the LACCD to 
descend into bankruptcy, and made little serious effort to alter its course (Tyre, 1986).
As the pressure on the district continued to grow, several local politicians 
indicated a renewed interest in the district’s restructuring plan. In late-May, Mort, at the 
behest of the union, flew to Sacramento to lobby members of the budget and education 
committees, but had difficulty getting interviews. At about the same time, Assemblyman 
Roos set his budget strategy in motion by inserting a section of budget control language 
into the California Budget Act for 1986-87--AB 3217. The provision asked for a 
moratorium on reform, and stipulated that the district's continued eligibility for 
stabilization funds should require the LACCD administration to submit a report to the state 
chancellor documenting the impact of restructuring on student access-see Appendix S.
Roos submitted his provision to the Joint Budget Conference Committee. The 
conference committee, which began deliberations on May 28th, consisted of four 
Democrats and two Republicans, three of whom were part of the L.A. state legislative 
delegation (Senator Seymour, R-Anaheim, Assemblymen Robbins, D-Van Nuys, and 
Assemblywoman Waters, D-Watts). According to Ross Clark, chief of staff to the 
committee. Assemblywoman Waters, known to share Roos's concern for minority 
education, introduced the provision into the final bill as a favor to Roos (personal 
communication, April 23, 1988).
On May 29th, within days of Mort's failed trip, Tollis and Wendell flew to 
Sacramento at the expense of the AFT Guild. Although they went to attend a BRN 
meeting, their primary mission was to lobby legislators. As the Guild's leaders had 
calculated, Tollis and Wendell succeeded where Mort failed, easily gaining access to
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members of the budget conference committee whom they lobbied for the Roos measure. 
AB 3217 passed out of the conference committee on June 9th with the Roos provision 
inserted (File Analysis, AB 3217,1986, Vasconcellos).
Legislation was the main topic at the June 10th meeting of the coalition. Tollis 
urged members to write to the governor on behalf of the Roos provision, and asked their 
support for AB 3586 (Assemblywoman Moore, D-West Los Angeles), scheduled to be 
heard within days.
Meanwhile, at the state level, LACCD lobbyist, Patricia Hewitt campaigned 
vigorously to have the Roos provision struck from AB 3217. Lobbying officials in the 
governor's finance office, Hewitt argued that the provision would interfere with local 
control and limit the LACCD's ability to comply with the governor's explicit instructions 
to reform (personal communication, April, 13,1988). The governor subsequently signed 
AB 3217, but after striking the Roos provision. Acknowledging that district management 
was a local responsibility, he noted that the LACCD faced severe fiscal problems 
requiring difficult decisions (California Statutes of 1986, Ch. 186, p. 497).
On July 8th, less than two weeks later, the Assembly Education Committee killed 
AB 3586. The action came after the committee received a letter from Chancellor Kolford 
arguing against further intrusion on local control. “This is a case of arranging priorities 
within existing resources. With respect to nursing, the district plan is to regionalize 
nursing and not to eliminate the discipline.” (File Analysis, AB 3586, 1986, Moore)
Although the coalition succeeded in bringing pressure to bear on the district, the 
reversals of the summer took a toll on its cohesion. At the July 23rd meeting, much of 
the discussion seemed directed toward reenergizing the coalition's effort Baker and the 
coalition leaders took on shrill tones as they attempted to shift the group's focus in a new 
direction~to district “violations” in reassigning faculty for the transition. They 
inventoried numerous infractions. Tollis also announced that the governor had vetoed 
$11 million in stabilization funds for the district claiming the veto as a sign of coalition
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success. People appeared doubtful. Baker closed by inviting members to participate in 
locating candidates for the union to support in the 1987 trustee elections. Although the 
discussion ended without a plan, Tollis and Carson personally took up Baker's challenge, 
and weeks later took seats on the AFT Guild's political action committee.
As fall approached, the LACCD pushed back its fall semester start date and district 
enrollment surged 11%. Without stabilization money, however, the district found itself 
projecting another short-term cash flow problem. Personnel Director Mullaney 
announced that the district had rehired 33 laid off faculty, an action possible because, as 
she noted, the LACCD had “...miscalculated its teaching needs under a new agreement 
reached with the faculty union in June” (Los Angeles Times. September 12, 1986, Pt. 
Ill, p. 4). Further, in what amounted to a complete reversal, the teachers who had been 
transferred out of nursing were “loaned” back to their units.
At its November 3rd meeting, which was attended by less than ten people, the 
coalition tried to draft a plan to prevent the program closures to present to the board of 
trustees. Carson suggested that the group propose a plan to consolidate the programs at 
L.A. Central and L.A. Industry Colleges. The members rejected the idea, however, 
based on the high probability that Muro and the other chairpersons would oppose such a 
plan.
Events in the spring of 1987. In the spring of 1987, nursing faculty members 
found themselves again in the eye of a crisis. The LACCD faced another multi-million 
dollar deficit, and district officials once again proposed faculty reductions as a means to 
balance its budget. On February 25th the LACCD board voted to lay off 59 instructors, 
including ten in nursing, for a saving of $1.7 million (Los Angeles Times. February 26, 
1987).
The action came just weeks before the 1987 district primary elections. The AFT 
Guild backed Josephine Chu, a Republican recommended by Tollis and Carson. Tollis
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and Carson used their influence with union leaders to get them to back a Republican 
candidate, and argued that such a move would help the union recast its political image. 
Their arguments succeeded, and Chu was drafted as the union's pick to replace incumbent 
Democrat Martha Garcie-Packard, the only black on the LACCD board. In addition to 
Chu, two other candidates, also backed by the union, joined the race to unseat the 
incumbents, including Board President Rickman, who had supported restructuring. 
Galvin was the only incumbent to retain union support
The nursing coalition, led by Tollis, waged a vigorous campaign on behalf the 
union's candidates. Members of the L.A. Channel faculty assisted by several coalition 
actives from the L.A. River and Canyon faculties, organized a phone bank, a 
neighborhood walk, and a community forum to raise community awareness on the 
impending fate of the nursing programs.
In the primary election, held on April 15th, Galvin was elected outright and 
Rickman was defeated outright. Chu and another non-incumbent faced a run-off election. 
The union claimed victory (Los Angeles Times. April 16, 1987).
Four days later, the LACCD board unanimously voted to rescind the faculty layoff 
notices. In a prepared statement, Chancellor Kolford rejected the idea that the board was 
influenced by the election results, indicating instead that the reversal was driven by state 
politics. “The yearlong efforts of our district board and administration to reach out to all 
sides in Sacramento are now bearing fruit,” he said (Los Angeles Times. April 23, 1987, 
Pt. II, p. 3). Both non-incumbent candidates went on to win their run-off elections (Los 
Angeles Times. June 4, 1987).
The aftermath. The nursing programs at L.A. Central and L.A. Coast Colleges 
closed in June, 1987. Newly elected Trustee Chu, assisted by Trustee Galvin, went 
quickly to work to find money to reopen the nursing programs. With Assemblyman 
Roos, they pursued a variety of avenues, and succeeded with their overtures to the
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Regional Hospital Council, which, concerned about the local nursing shortage, offered to 
underwrite faculty salaries for a program of reduced size at L.A. Central College.
At its October 7th meeting, however, the LACCD board in a 4:3 vote approved a 
buyout package for the chancellor's contract Subsequent efforts to reopen LA . Central 
nursing quickly faded as the district turned its attention to finding a new chancellor. As 
the trustees labored, officials in the LACCD district office repeatedly increased the cost- 
estimates for reinstating the nursing program. After months of stalling by the district, the 
Regional Hospital Council withdrew its offer.
By that time, the coalition had completely dissolved. Having lost ground first 
after the May policy vote, and again in the fall of 1986, the coalition revived only 
temporarily to influence the outcome of 1987 trustee elections. Although that effort more 
or less exhausted the group's political options, leader behavior was also a factor in its 
demise. “The people in charge started turning us off!” a member confided to the 
researcher, “It was an ego trip for them, calling those political types by their first names! 
People got tired of it.”
Discussion
The case of the LACCD shows the invidious effect of a decision culture that 
assumes outside entities will rescue its organizational interests.
For years, the LACCD enjoyed political support for its expansionary policies. 
That support eroded, however, when pressures in the California economy drew attention 
to the expenses of the community college system, prompting scrutiny by state officials as 
to how public money was being used. As a conspicuous entity in a large public system, 
the LACCD became a point of focus for politicians, and as a result, suffered a loss of 
legitimacy that, according to Whetten (1980), is often encountered by organizations 
challenged with economic changes.
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A victim of its own history, the LACCD was unable to respond effectively to its 
new economic and political conditions. It staved off reorganization for as long as 
possible, but in the process of avoiding change, committed itself to new fiscal obligations 
it could not possibly meet Finally, on the verge of bankruptcy, district officials 
requested a state bail-out, however subsequent events brought them face-to-face with 
fiscal and political reality, and forced them to accept the extent to which their political 
support had eroded. Only late in the game did they seek to restructure by cutting costly 
programs such as nursing to shift resources where the student demand was the greatest— 
an example under the Whetten paradigm of seeking a new ecological niche.
Faced with substantial layoffs and the termination of two programs, the faculties 
of the district's eight nursing departments joined together to build an ad hoc organization 
to prevent restructuring. With union help, nursing’s ad hoc group pushed an anti­
termination campaign of resistance and opposition that brought members into the shadow 
governance network surrounding LACCD policy. As defined by Tillary and 
Wattenbarger (1985), the term shadow network refers to the connections between local 
organizations and state government bodies which insiders and outsiders can use to 
influence local institutional policy.
Working in cooperation with union leaders, the nursing faculty succeeded in 
bringing substantial pressure to bear, but was frequently undercut by the actions of its 
own formal leaders, some of whom worked at cross-purposes with the ad hoc group to 
advance the district's termination proposal. Although jobs were preserved, the campaign 
failed to prevent the program closures, in part because members of the local hospital 
establishment failed to speak out strongly against the policy. Absent an enthusiastic 
resistance from hospital executives, the district was able to use the transitional nursing job 
market to its own advantage. In the end, the coalition failed, however, not because of 
politics or events at the local level, but because state politics—the politics of reform and 
local control so shrewdly co-opted by district officials—were on the side of the district.
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Nursing Faculty Behavior at Delta College. (No. 13)
The situation at Delta college, one of two control sites in this study, illustrates 
how deep across-the-board cutbacks can temporarily protect a campus from the political 
and social disruptions often caused by harsher measures, but fail over all to prevent 
faculty unrest. It also illustrates how, in the absence of harsh retrenchment, a nursing 
faculty may ignore the activities of the general faculty which in this case culminated in a 
job action and the censure of the chancellor over salary issues.
Introduction
Delta College experienced its most precipitous losses as a direct result of the 
governor's 1983-84 revenue veto. One of three colleges in a district highly dependent on 
state money. Delta sustained a 30% drop in revenue when district officials reduced its 
operating fund blockgrant pending the restoration of state revenues to the district.
Despite this setback, the college maintained its full-time teaching staff and almost 
all of its instructional programs, including a new career ladder program in nursing. 
College subunits were obliged to cut their operating budgets, but the cuts, at roughly 
10%, were proportional to the overall reduction in instructional outlay. Although barely 
affecting units adequately funded, the new reductions nevertheless devastated units such 
as the library where previous cutbacks had taken a serious toll.
Nursing, according to interviewees, remained remarkably unaffected by the 
funding crisis. Used to making do, its members had low expectations for instructional 
support, and accommodated easily to the new reductions by carrying over their previous 
adaptations. Few, in fact, voiced concern about the impact of cutbacks on the 
instructional quality of the nursing program.
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Bagjcgrgmid
Delta College, a large suburban institution, is located in a sprawling community in 
the vicinity of the state capitol and the farmlands of California's Central Valley region. 
Although much of the economy is agriculturally based, Delta maintains a broad-based 
curriculum typical of urban centers. Opened in 1955, the college moved to its present 153 
acre location in 1958, and, in 1965, merged with Union City College to form the Big 
Valley Community College District (BVCCD), The district, which eventually expanded 
with a third campus and several outreach programs, is governed by a seven member 
board of trustees.
For more than two decades, Delta College pursued a development program under 
which it added more than a dozen buildings-including large complexes for instruction, 
athletics, and student services. The program culminated in 1981 with the dedication of a 
new bookstore. As its physical plant grew, the college expanded its curriculum with a 
wide range of programs, many-including nursing-vocationally oriented.
Initiated in 1969 by a group of teachers transferred from Union City College, the 
Delta nursing department became the second nursing department in the district Launched 
on a shoestring, it operated for several years in the cramped, minimally-equipped quarters 
of an old farmhouse on the outer edge of campus. Only later did it move to a small suite 
in Delta's newly completed math/science complex--space it was obliged to share-and, 
from there into a temporary building vacated by the bookstore. These early moves were 
significant in that they helped to shape a perception shared by many department members 
that Delta nursing enjoyed little more than stepchild status.
The transition to decline. Prior to 1983, The history of Big Valley governance 
was one of unparalleled division and turmoil in which dissension on the board of trustees, 
driven by personality clashes as much as policy differences, complicated the work of the
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board on all kinds of decisions. The fighting, which began when the district formed in 
1965, continued for years, alienating a succession of chancellors, two of whom departed, 
unable to deal with the rancor and discord (The Bee. April 1, 1979). In 1976, however, 
the board hired Richard Grobstein as the district’s fourth CEO, and in a matter of months 
he defused the feuding to achieve a period of relative calm.
During the respite, which was brief, the district underwent important changes in 
management, governance, and finance. Grobstein, a self-described “district builder,” 
completed the final phase of district expansion by building up the district staff to handle 
the administrative work created by enrollment increases.
With the advent of faculty collective bargaining in 1977, three organizations— 
CTA, CFT and FACCC—waged a vigorous campaign to represent the faculty. The CFT, 
which enjoyed a reputation for being “pro-teacher,” narrowly won, but within months of 
negotiating its first contract found itself confronted by the first of what became a series of 
bitter decertification challenges (Glass, 1989).
In 1978, the BVCCD faced tax-limitation which, given its proximity to the state 
capitol, drew district officials into a local political effort to counter criticisms of public 
agencies made by the initiative's sponsors. In a particularly rash public relations move, 
the BVCCD reduced its property tax rate prior to the vote. Unfortunately, the ploy 
backfired, when, after Proposition 13 locked in BVCCD revenues at a low level relative 
to other districts (Rodda, 1986), the state set its the bail-out formula at a percentage of 
prior-year base funding. Forecasts projected revenue losses of $12 million, a figure that 
pushed the district, its reserves at a tenuous 9% level, into a state of organizational crisis 
(The Bee. June 1, 1978; Gooder, 1984).
The board's immediate response was to declare a state of fiscal emergency. 
Among other measures, Grobstein called for a massive layoff of classified workers, a 
faculty workload increase, and a salary and benefit freeze for all employees. Not 
surprisingly, these measures drew heavy fire from the BVCCD's employee unions. The
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teachers' union, for example, under pressure to act strongly, declined to accept the 
declaration, and later filed a lawsuit charging breech of contract (The Bee. June 27, 
September 28, 1978).
Stunned by the reaction, the board temporarily backed off, and asked Grobstein to 
reduce administrative personnel before other reductions were implemented (The Bee. June 
8, June 22, 1978). The chancellor came back with a plan for a radical reorganization of 
the district's administrative structure which called for abolishing numerous top executive 
positions and returning numerous middle managers to the classroom. The plan, 
ultimately approved by the board in a 5:2 vote, precipitated a return to conflict that took on 
racial overtones when Trustee Howard, the only African-American on the board, 
criticized it for failing to meet the affirmative action requirement for advertising district 
jobs to the public (The Bee. June 22, July 12, 1978). Howard followed with charges of 
racial discrimination against the chancellor, and persisted in leveling additional racial 
allegations to end the period of calm on the board (The Bee. October 7, 1985). The 
trustees went on to resolve the crisis with help from a $6 million state bail-out, but not 
before their old pattern reemerged to bring everything-district priorities, board rules, each 
other’s behavior—under scrutiny. Discord grew and eventually culminated in a well- 
publicized series of childish incidents amounting to a general breakdown of group civility 
(The Bee. September 7, September 28, October 5, November 1, 1978; January 5, 
February 27, April 4, 1979).
Ironically, tensions on the board worsened as the fiscal pressure dissipated. In 
the aftermath, the trustees worked to tighten their grip over district policy and regain 
power lost to the state through tax-limitation. In a series of decisions, they acted to limit 
the authority of the faculty and local administrators, and the opportunities for district 
residents to influence board deliberations (The Bee. November 1, 1978; February 8,
1979). Later, they turned their attention to one another as they scrutinized each other's 
activities for legal and ethical infractions (The Bee. June 14, 1979).
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As the situation on the board deteriorated, trustee civility and board stability 
became the prime issues in the 1979 trustee elections (The Bee. October 22, 23, 24,
1979). Although the candidates raised other issues—program development, instructional 
quality, student recruitment at Union City College-the challengers, who numbered 15 in 
all and remained along with the media strongly focused on the civility issue, paid only 
passing attention to district finances. One challenger—Lester Wallace, a former 
community college president—prevailed, as local residents returned three of the district's 
more combative incumbents, including Howard, to office (The Bee. November 8, 1979).
Although the new board vowed after the election to seek stability, the dissension 
continued and eventually engulfed the chancellor, leading to his departure. (The Bee. 
November 8, 1979; January 17, 1980). Here the administrative experience of the newly 
elected trustee played an important role. On learning that the trustees had never conducted 
a formal evaluation of the chancellor, Trustee Wallace called for one as a matter of 
procedure. That action offended Grobstein, who was known for his sensitivity to 
criticism. Forced by the board to wait outside as his performance was discussed in a 
closed-door session, Grobstein responded with a public display of anger, and threatened 
to resign.
The chancellor's public display fostered a realignment of the board. In the months 
that followed, Wallace joined a long-time Grobstein critic and two other members to 
successfully challenge the chancellor's tenure in a 4:3 vote (The Bee. November 26,
1980). Believing his rights violated, Grobstein departed mid-year, and an acting 
chancellor was named (The Bee. December 11, 1980).
Despite new reports of board incivility, the trustees moved quickly in a search for 
a new chancellor, and in May, 1981 named Dr. David Miller to replace Grobstein. 
Miller, a seasoned administrator with a strong reputation in community college 
administration, presented himself in a low-keyed manner that appealed to those who were 
looking for a change from Grobstein's intense style. More importantly, Miller stressed as
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a first order of business his intention to restore civility to the board and decentralize 
district authority while instituting governance sharing, positions that won him the support 
of the faculty (The Bee. August 27,1981). District finances did not factor prominently in 
the selection.
From the outset. Miller's efforts to impose order were impeded by Trustee 
Howard who filed a lawsuit and formal complaints with two government agencies related 
to alleged procedural violations in Miller's hiring. None of the actions succeeded (The 
Bee. August 28. 1981).
Things changed in the fall of 1981 when fiscal trouble again loomed. Faced with 
caps in growth funding, Miller acted decisively to assemble a task force of faculty and 
administrators which he mandated to consult local businesses and community agencies on 
funding priorities and sources (The Bee. October 29, 1981). The action helped to refocus 
the press on policy issues and take attention off of the board itself. Nevertheless, board 
stability was again an issue in the 1981 trustee elections. After a vigorous campaign, a 
black attorney prevailed to become the second black on the board, effectively diminishing 
Howard's power as the lone spokesman for racial issues (The Bee. November 4, 1981).
With that change, Miller was finally able to reestablish order. Much of his early 
success related to the strong emphasis he placed on policy analysis which he expedited by 
bringing in a researcher to generate data for framing district issues. As a faculty member 
observed, “Miller knew just how to set everything up with his data-he worked on the 
board members before they got to meetings.” Managing district problems proved more 
difficult. In the spring of 1982, as the district braced itself for growth caps and 
defunding. Miller took a consultative approach, conferring with several district 
constituencies. One of the measures recommended—fee increases—generated substantial 
controversy, and failed for over six months to gain the necessary board approval (The 
Bee. September 2, 1982). During the impasse, district officials reviewed course 
offerings in preparation for state defunding, the economic impact of which seemed likely
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to compound the district's growth funding losses--early forecasts pointed to a $3.2 
million combined deficit (The Bee. April 29, 1982).
The controversy over fee increases stemmed in part from trustee frustrations that 
had been building for some time which related to the board's role in budget decision­
making. Several trustees complained about the proliferation of budget scenarios and 
overly technical presentations made in budget deliberations (The Bee. April 29, 1982). 
Sensing that these conditions eroded their power, the trustees' dug in their heels on the 
fee increases, and declined to discuss Miller’s proposal. The action stalled a resolution on 
the deficit.
To move the situation along, Miller changed strategies, and turned to the faculty 
which had seen its expectations for empowerment dashed by the board's actions in the 
wake of Proposition 13. Faculty discontent put the union, which, faced with threats of 
decertification wanted to avoid a RIF, in a tenuous political position. Miller took 
advantage of that situation to negotiate a deal under which the district made a promise of 
no full-time faculty layoffs in return for the union's agreement to table a scheduled 6% 
salary increase (The Bee. July 13, 1982). Miller sold the arrangement directly to the 
faculty, claiming it would “save faculty jobs.” The faculty acquiesced, and in June the 
board approved the fee increases, and went on to adopt an austerity budget calling for a 
massive reduction of course sections (The Bee. October 21, 1982).
Given their preoccupation with district finances, district officials made little 
progress on Miller's promise of governance sharing during this period, and continued the 
established pattern of faculty-administration relations which meant officers of the 
academic senate were not included in district cabinet meetings, and were relegated to the 
status of visitors at board meetings. District budget meetings continued as informational 
forums—and controls were tight even on curriculum. “Miller would watch the ball go 
back and forth and then bust the result!” a faculty observer noted. One new program did 
gain approval-an LVN-to-RN career ladder program which was to be partially subsidized
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by local hospitals.
The situation at Delta College, where President Robert Benson involved the 
faculty in college decision-making was somewhat better. As one observer put it, “Benson 
tried to take what we [faculty] said into account.” The practical significance of those 
efforts was questioned by several interviewees, however. As Dr. Le Doh, dean of 
science and allied health, pointed out, “What can the faculty do when the district says, 
'Here's all the money we have!'“
Delta's system for setting spending priorities was to some extent collegial and 
incorporated a college budget advisory committee with faculty representatives, a division 
dean's council for middle-managers, and a series of “spokespersons’ groups” for 
department managers, all of which assisted in ordering spending requests. By most 
accounts, the system was fair, although the nursing director claimed that subtle pressures 
were applied to allied health administrators to use extramural resources which would free 
general fund monies for other units.
The 1983 crisis. In July, 1983, the BVCCD faced another crisis, this time caused 
by the governor's revenue veto anticipated to yield a $5 million deficit in a $59 million 
budget. Miller appealed to burden-sharing as the cornerstone of his strategy. In August, 
he announced that the district would make ends meet by cutting “a little bit every place,” 
and followed with steps to reduce college blockgrants (The Bee. August 5, 1983, p. B3). 
Somewhat later, he met with district constituencies, assuring them that the cuts would be 
made “sensibly by the entire district community” (The Bee. October 6, 1983, p. A26).
An official of the California Community College Chief Executive Officers’ 
Association, Miller anticipated a quick resolution to the funding impasse. In his capacity 
as a state leader, he spent substantial time at the state capitol personally lobbying 
legislators. During the latter part of the summer, Miller repeatedly assured the BVCCD 
board that a compromise was forthcoming, and based on his assurances, it finally passed
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an optimistic district budget, but one that included contingency proposals for large 
reductions, if reductions proved necessary (The Bee. September 8, 1983).
Hopes for a resolution faded in October, however, as the district projected a 
deficit of $6.3 million (The Bee. October 6, 1983). In a series of meetings, the trustees 
deliberated on numerous proposals-closing outreach centers and athletic programs and 
levying user fees for services—all of which brought loud outcries from the groups likely 
affected (The Bee. October 20, 1993) The discussions continued through the trustee 
elections.
The elections of 1983 focused on numerous issues—how to minimize the impact 
of tuition, district priorities in the face of state funding changes, and the meaning of the 
new harmony in board deliberations. A challenger charged the board with acting as a 
rubber stamp for the chancellor’s policies, rejecting the incumbent’s claims that the board 
had finally consolidated as a team. Trustee Howard, who had been a constant source of 
friction, finally lost his seat to a challenger who had the support of the teachers' union and 
numerous state lawmakers—the venerable community college educator and former state 
senator, A1 Rodda. Rodda promised to use his knowledge to help the BVCCD respond 
“critically and constructively” to its difficult fiscal situation (The Bee. October 25, 1983, 
p. B 3).
After the election, the search for budget reductions became an all-consuming 
focus. As hope continued to fade, district officials considered various options including a 
plan to radically reduce student counseling, however, the threat of staff layoffs brought an 
outcry from the district's faculties. Led by Nell Daniels, associate director of the Delta 
nursing faculty, the Delta academic senate ratified a formal resolution opposing the 
layoffs. Senate leaders offered to aid the district in a search for other alternatives.
In December, the board canceled the outreach programs, and approved a 
contingency plan for cutbacks of $4.4 million that included possible academic program 
terminations, none of which would affect nursing (The Bee. December 8, 1983). In
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January, with no compromise in sight. Miller asked the board to declare a state of 
emergency (The Bee. January 5, 1984). At the last minute, the board received notice of 
the state compromise, and the crisis was averted (The Bee. January 19, 1984).
The aftermath. The Delta academic senate worked throughout the fall to prevent 
professional staff layoffs, but as the situation worsened, members grew restive over other 
changes such as forced split workdays. In October, the BVCFT organized a faculty 
march on the state capitol—and by February, with the tuition compromise in place, the 
faculty was looking forward to an end to the salary freeze. Two semesters went by, 
however, before the situation improved.
In early 1985, the board voted to raise administrator salaries, an action that had an 
immediate negative impact on faculty morale, but which became an explosive issue later 
when, in faculty contract negotiations, district officials offered the faculty only an 
inflation adjustment The negotiations, predictably, stalled. Facing bankruptcy and 
plagued by declining membership, the teacher's federation used the opportunity to call its 
first job action. Tim Birklin, BVCFT president, asked later whether salaries were the 
main issue, said, “That's what we said. When you're trying to build and organization, 
you do what's necessary to save it.” The teachers' federation, joined the district's 
academic senates in organizing an informational picket and a boycott of all advisory 
committees-hundreds of faculty participated, none from Delta nursing. The climax, 
however, came when, in late 1985, the BVCFT asked the faculties to submit a vote of no- 
confidence on the chancellor. A vote was taken, and the result, which was never 
announced, seemed certain to go against Miller. At the last minute, officials offered a 
compromise, the insertion of a “trombone clause” calling for salary increases in 
proportion to the future growth of district revenue into the faculty contract. They also 
agreed to a contract-mandated shared-govemance committee at the district level.
Throughout the fiscal ups and downs, district reserves (ARP) rippled between
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five and ten percent of expenditures, and hovered around seven. With conservative 
management and deep across-the-board cutbacks, officials succeeded in avoiding financial 
exigency, but years of service reductions and deferred maintenance took a very apparent 
toll—campus libraries went understaffed and their collections became outdated, and cuts in 
course sections brought district enrollment growth to a halt. As Tom Lowell, Delta 
admissions officer put it, “The facilities and equipment went to hell, our library resources 
went totally down the tubes, and salaries eroded terribly, but we muddled through-this is 
a conservative district—we've always minded our nickels.”
The Political Behavior of the Nursing Faculty
During these years, Delta nursing incurred only those cutbacks common to all 
Delta programs. In 1983, the college conducted a comprehensive program review and 
cost analysis in which nursing ranked second to bottom in WSCH per FTE. Despite that 
poor showing. Delta officials made no proposal to terminate the department. Although 
rumors of plans for consolidating occupational programs circulated, counseling was the 
only unit actually proposed for downsizing. “In this district, programs that generate ADA 
are like the husband who brings home the paycheck. Counseling doesn't—it's like the 
housewife,” explained Lowell.
Thus, nursing retained a secure position in the Delta curriculum. As Ron Long, 
dean of instruction, put it, “I think everyone recognized that nursing was a program that 
was needed, and, just as important, that the hospitals were helping out.” Lowell 
amplified. “It was a program with prestige-the administration thought nursing did a lot 
to raise the credibility of the college in the community,” he said.
Unthreatened by selective cutbacks, members of the nursing faculty adapted 
primarily by accommodating to the fiscal pressures on their unit. Space was the primary 
issue in 1982 and had been since 1979 when the department began planning its career-
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ladder program. In the intervening years, the members passed by good opportunities to 
expand on site, primarily because they had become convinced that competing for space 
against more powerful units would be a waste of time and energy. Luckily, the faculty 
solved its problem with the unsolicited help of a trustee who had a personal interest in 
nursing, and who, in 1980, took it upon herself to request new quarters for the 
department In 1982, the nursing department moved into a newly remodeled temporary 
building, but when the facility proved less than optimal, its members reacted by blaming 
the administration. “Nursing has always been given second-hand--we get angry,” said 
Tom Babcock, a nursing fundamentals teacher.
The issue of department facilities, in fact, reflected deep differences within the 
group over how the department should solve its problems. Although most of the faculty 
was unenthusiastic about engaging other units in a competition for space, Associate 
Director Daniels had wanted the group to stand its ground. She alone dissented when the 
group voted instead to move to the temporary building. After that decision, she 
terminated her tenure as associate nursing director, and for reasons described below, took 
a position as a counselor in the Delta counseling department
Donna Potter, nursing program director, as the others, voted for the move. She 
blamed the administration, which she viewed as overly influenced by nursing's WSCH 
status, for the department's problems. “Math wanted our suite—those people get what 
they want. Nursing has no leverage--we feel like poor step-children,” she said to the 
researcher.
Many nursing staff members agreed. “Nursing is at the bottom of the list in terms 
of clout,” said Lucille Horton, another nursing fundamentals teacher. Babcock
concurred. “If you're not a money maker like P.E., you just sort of take what's left,” he 
said. People outside the department contradicted that view, however. As evidence, they 
pointed to a unique clause in the faculty contract exempting allied health programs from 
district WSCH targets, which, in their view, gave nursing a privileged status, if not
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power.
When crisis overtook the district in 1983-84, the nursing budget, like most 
instructional budgets, was trimmed ten percent Don Long, the dean of instruction, 
worked with the division deans to refine the amounts in some cases, and for fairness, 
varied the cuts marginally so that some units lost slightly more and some slightly less than 
ten percent. According to Long, nursing's cut was a straight ten percent-no less because 
nursing had access to the resources of the hospitals. Long denied that nursing's 
extramural alternatives weighed heavily in the decision, but admitted they were a factor. 
“We didn’t assume the hospitals were going to pick it up [the funding losses], but we 
hoped they would,” he said.
The overall impact of the ten percent reduction proved hard to pin down, in part 
because members’ opinions, derived from the vantage point of their position and role, 
differed markedly. From her managerial perspective, Potter saw the effects as 
inconsequential. “We don’t have that big a budget, so ten percent doesn't mean that much 
to us--it was business as usual,” she said.
Other people in the department painted a different picture. According to some of 
the teachers, supplies and equipment suffered considerably. Babcock, for example, 
described the situation in the laboratory as critical. “It was embarrassing some of the stuff 
we had to use for the students.” Conservation was a major coping tactic. Having 
adjusted both to double-digit inflation and Proposition 13, Horton, the lead teacher in 
nursing fundamentals recognized the value of stockpiling. “I'm retired military. I saw 
the situation coming, and I over-ordered on everything.”
Indeed, Horton's colleagues credited her efforts with preserving the quality of 
nursing's campus instructional program. “Lucille knew how to manage—she kept us 
going,” said a teacher in the second year. Despite Horton's stockpiling and the district's 
lab fee increases, recycling became a constant and necessary practice, and students were 
often obliged to share disposable items. “We really had to make do and reuse until things
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finally fell apart,” Horton complained. “The lab fee goes into the college fund, and 
doesn't come back to us,” Director Potter explained.
The faculty managed for a while to maintain its aging laboratory equipment and 
other paraphernalia with a small annual allotment from the district's VEA monies. In 
1984-85, however, a new Delta management team changed the funding policy, and 
abruptly withdrew nursing’s VEA funds. At that point, nursing decided to give up its 
NLN membership and redirect the money into its laboratory supply fund. Members also 
accelerated their practice of soliciting supply donations from numerous sources, but never 
resorte*1 to outright fundraising, as some Delta faculties did, or to asking the hospitals for 
additional funds. “We really couldn't ask the hospitals for more help—they were having 
problems of their own,” said Potter.
With no money for equipment, and the college's meager repair fund under central 
control, the faculty found itself obliged to work with broken laboratory mannequins. 
“We didn't have the money to fix them,” Potter explained. Further, they had to cut the 
hours of the campus laboratory assistant for which the faculty gamely compensated by 
taking students to the clinical facilities for simulation practice. ‘What saved us was the 
clinical area,” said Horton. “It's not like being down at autobody where the students have 
nowhere else to go!” explained Nell Daniels.
Despite such inconveniences, few of the department's teachers complained. 
Those teaching the more advanced courses, for example, did not have to depend on the 
campus laboratory, and found the situation decidedly less distressing than their colleagues 
in nursing fundamentals. As Mary Ruiz, a second-year teacher put it, “The 10% cutback 
didn’t have any meaning in my course.” Members adapted by reducing their expectations 
for instructional support, which was particularly evident in the way they reacted to the 
lack of funding for audio-visual teaching aids. “AVs are so expensive.” said Betty 
Edwards, “and our students don't really have time for them anyway.”
A major frustration for everyone, however, was the loss of faculty positions that
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occurred incrementally over the period. Nursing lost a total of three full-time positions, 
including the position vacated by Daniels. To avoid compensatory enrollment reductions, 
the department employed long-term substitutes. That practice, however, increased staff 
turnover and reduced teaching continuity. The full-timers, moreover, resented having to 
orient new substitutes each semester.
Throughout the years of decline, members regarded their inconveniences as a 
temporary problem, and the situation of the district as deriving from state politics. “The 
feedback we got was that the reason for the funding crisis was the governor's refusal to 
do much for the community colleges,” said Potter. No one believed, at least in the early 
years, that the department would face anything more than material austerity. “We were 
producing their nurses,” said Ruiz, “We felt good that our program was needed.” The 
challenge, as members saw it, was to make do for as long as possible, and wait the 
situation out.
Expecting the situation to pass, members ignored the efforts and activities of their 
faculty peers on the Delta campus and in the district at large. Few, for example, took part 
in the faculty's march on the capitol or participated in the district's letter lobby campaigns, 
or its boardroom debates over district priorities, which one nursing member described as 
“a lot of hullabaloo that went nowhere.” They relied on Daniels, moreover, to represent 
nursing on college governance bodies. “This faculty has a tendency to take care of the 
students and go home,” explained Babcock. Ruiz agreed, “Our priorities just seem to lie 
elsewhere.”
Daniels' left the unit in 1983, however, and at that point, the faculty lost its 
campus spokesperson. Her absence created a vacuum in department leadership. Although 
Potter continued to perform her executive duties, she did not attempt to take on the 
political functions usually assumed by Daniels. “Donna doesn’t come from a political 
base,” observed Dick Balducci, associate dean of behavior and social sciences, “She 
prefers to work through the hierarchy.”
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In the spring of 1985, nursing's situation changed in a subtle but significant way. 
Student applications began to drop as did graduate job placements. Further, there were 
rumors of a nursing consolidation that worried some members who became anxious about 
the implication for their jobs. “We worried for a while about whether we would 
eventually be closing,” said Ruiz. Later asked about what she and her colleagues did to 
resolve their worries, she replied, “We kind of played it by ear—it [consolidation] didn't 
happen.”
Faculty tension again increased when Delta administrators, under pressure from 
district officials, began to question nursing's WSCH exemption. In 1985, the district 
instituted a “formula hour” policy under which faculty members exempted from WSCH 
targets were obliged to log their campus and clinical laboratory hours much as a worker 
would punch a time clock. The purpose was to encourage compliance with laboratory 
FTE requirements, but the faculty looked at the system as a form of harassment.
Undercurrents of dissatisfaction began to surface at that point as members took to 
questioning among themselves Director Potter’s leadership.” There's a lot of 
undercurrent-a power struggle against Donna,” said Babcock, “I'm the type of person 
who will support the boss, but sometimes I wish she'd push harder.” Potter gave 
indications that she was aware of her staffs dissatisfaction. Never directly addressing 
their concerns, she countered the undercurrents by blaming the administration for the 
department's problems. “Nursing has no leverage,” she said repeatedly. She also tried to 
redirect the group's attention, and seized on an opportunity provided by an event in the 
nursing profession-the anniversary of the American Nurses' Association's entry-to- 
practice 1985 Resolution. Ignoring what was happening locally, she focused the 
faculty's attention on the entry issue and the future professional status of two-year 
graduate in nursing, underscoring the issue, according to several on her staff, as the 
premier contemporary problem of the nursing profession. “Donna pushed it,” said 
Babcock, “She says its about our future in associate degree nursing.”
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Early in 1985, Potter pressed her faculty into action by asking Vera Edwards, a 
second-year instructor, to ask the Delta academic senate for a resolution of support for the 
institution of AD nursing. That led to an awkward, and for the nursing unit, image- 
tarnishing situation. Unfamiliar with senate protocol, Edwards, made a stumbling request 
that left her general faculty peers confused about the nature of the issue and her purpose in 
coming to the senate for assistance. Daniels finally stepped in, but only after she came 
forward did the body agree to act. As Daniels observed, “It was like they [senate 
members] wanted to know, Where've you [Edwards, nursing] been before this?'“
The incident, which coincided in time with the BVCFT job action, underscored 
the nursing faculty's detachment from the college as an organization. It also embarrassed 
Daniels who for years had worked to build an image of connectedness for the unit. “If 
you don’t take part and let them [general faculty peers] know you’re there, they're not 
going to support you when you need them,” Daniels lamented.
Delta's economic problems eased somewhat with an influx of money from the 
state lottery. Daniels, by then in the counseling department, continued in her activist role 
which had begun in 1969, shortly after the inauguration of the program. Daniels at that 
time recognized a reluctance on the part of the general faculty to embrace new low-WSCH 
programs. “We were thrust upon them,” she recalled, “so I joined the senate to smooth 
the way for nursing.” Daniels used her activities to educate the general faculty about 
nursing. “For years I worked to correct a fallacy on this campus that nursing is Delta's 
most expensive program,” she said. Along the way, Daniels-who eventually rose to 
become president of the district senate-helped to secure the WSCH exemption for allied 
health, but paid a price for her activism, by failing to gain the program directorship, a 
position her tenure as associate director should have guaranteed. “I had been associate 
director for over 10 years, and I knew all the ins and outs of the job,” she observed. 
Daniels believed it was her activism that cost her the promotion. “The dean told me I 
would never get the job while he was on campus because I was too assertive for him,”
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she related to the researcher.
After being passed over, Daniels did not curtail her activities, but renewed her 
effort and went on to pursue higher levels of governance leadership. According to several 
observers, Daniels showed a level of commitment unusual not only for nursing, but for 
general faculty members as well. Daniels' personal loss unfortunately left her embittered. 
“Nursing faculties are notoriously passive. That's not the way I define my professional 
role, so I am the one that has come out from nursing and done all of these things, but the 
others have been passive--they always hide behind the fact that they’re different,” she 
observed. She left nursing frustrated by Potter's refusal to deal with the realities of 
campus politics. “There was no threat to the program as Donna saw it~you know 
'Nursing was needed and therefore the administration would not do away with iL'“ she 
said, referring to Potter's outlook as one of “arrogance.”
Potter, who was approaching retirement, continued to nurture her faculty's 
frustration over the power disparity members collectively perceived between nursing and 
the other college subunits. Potter was uncomfortable with Daniels activist tendencies, 
and, clearly rejected Daniels' model, referring her somewhat disparagingly as “a person 
who is involved in everything.” Others in the department also rejected Daniels' model. 
As Edwards noted, “Nell cares a lot more about the college operation than the rest of us 
do.” Horton underscored Edwards' sentiment. “Nell is very political-the rest of us in 
nursing don't give two hoots for politics.”
Discussion
The case study of Delta College illustrates how, even under conditions of 
institutional crisis, the absence of a perceived threat at the subunit level may serve to 
support a faculty's prior mode of adaptation. In the case of Delta nursing, that meant that 
faculty members passively accepted executive decisions about the place of their
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department in the institution.
A striking feature of district governance in this case was the pattern of incivility on 
the board of trustees, which for several years complicated the district's efforts to deal with 
decline and the shift of power to the state. Fortunately, the community tired of the 
situation, and voted for a change. Electoral turnover led eventually to executive turnover 
and the leadership needed to stabilize the board and district as they faced a series of 
challenges and fiscal crisis. The new chancellor, who preferred an across-the-board 
approach to retrenchment, handled the district's fiscal crises with appeals for burden- 
sharing, a tactic supported by the retrenchment literature. In 1982, he took advantage of 
the faculty union's weak position to negotiate a salary freeze that staved off a budget 
deficit, and he used the same appeal again in 1983 when the revenue veto threatened to 
push the district into financial exigency. The district weathered both situations, but its 
close calls took a toll on its willingness to compromise. The consensus for burden- 
sharing gave way when district officials ignored the faculty's sacrifice yet gave the 
administrators a salary raise. Cued by its besieged and self-interested union, the faculty 
engaged in a job action, an unprecedented event that although avoidable, in the end 
restored harmony by producing a sensible compromise.
Members of Delta nursing faculty did not take part in the job action, and in general 
did not involve themselves in the governance activities of the college or district. Their 
pattern can be understood as a reflection of their common viewpoint on nursing's place in 
the institution. Miller et al. (1981) differentiated group identification, the process of self­
location within a stratum of a society or an organization, from group consciousness which 
is the process of identifying with group ideology as a way of establishing social position. 
Members of the Delta nursing faculty, in an example of the former, shared a common a 
perception of nursing's position in the college, which they believed was one of low 
power. Based on that perception, they curtailed their participation in college decision­
making, but when they failed to gain the benefits of participation, however, explained
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their losses as a function of nursing's corporate powerlessness, which became a self- 
fulfilling pattern.
Another factor was low motivation. Members of the Delta nursing faculty did not 
see their situation has a crisis, and were not bothered by the job insecurity found at some 
of the other case sites. Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt (1988) studied job insecurity in 
groups, and noted that insecurity aroused perceptual defenses which blunt a group's 
experience of threat. They further found that those defenses are fostered by threat 
situations lacking clear, unambiguous indicators. Although job threat clearly existed at 
Delta, members of Delta nursing, including the director, did not experience that threat as a 
serious one, arguably because some indicators, the chancellor's no-layoff promise, and 
nursing's WSCH exemption, for example, contradicted others such as the rumors of 
program consolidation, in the faculty's threat-severity equation. Given the apparent 
ambiguity of their situation, members had little cause to change their pattern.
Nursing Faculty Behavior_at Desert Flat College, (No, 35)
The situation at Desert Flat College, the second control site, illustrates how an 
institution facing serious revenue losses can continue to expand its instructional programs 
by using part-time personnel, while balancing its budget with deep across-the-board 
economies in all areas. It also shows how the conditions created by an excessive part- 
time faculty buildup can politicize faculty groups such as nursing even in the absence of a 
selective termination threat to their units.
Introduction
As the only college in a small but growing district, Desert Flat College fared better 
than many institutions in this study. Although Proposition 13 rolled back its revenues
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causing sizable short-term losses, the district had accumulated a multi-million dollar 
building fund which made it possible to continue expanding instruction while managing 
decline with across-the-board budget reductions. College officials acted decisively, 
setting a stringent personnel policy which featured part-time staff increases and a high 
faculty FTE, and stemmed the growth of faculty salaries.
The nursing department, which experienced the full brunt of the part-time buildup 
and heavy workload formula, was the unit most affected by these policies. Not only was 
its FTE high, at 24 hours, but its ratio of students to full-time faculty-unmatched by the 
other nursing programs in this study—see Appendix J—was extremely high.
The impetus for the part-time buildup in nursing was a district policy to expand 
enrollment in programs attractive to students, one of which was nursing. Thus, between 
1979 and 1984, the college more than tripled the number of students in the nursing 
department—see Appendix L-but did so on a shoestring. Indeed, officials dramatically 
enlarged the program without enlarging the full-time nursing faculty. Although part-time 
teachers were hired to cover the increased in clinical workload, the full-time teaching 
staff, which numbered six for a student body that grew to more than 200 students, was 
obliged to absorb all other increases, including the added classroom teaching and student 
evaluation.
The result was a morale-busting accumulation of demands that exhausted the full- 
timers as they attempted to juggle their own clinical teaching responsibilities with their on- 
campus workload. As time passed, the full-timers began to chafe under the weight of the 
heavy expectations placed on them by the college. “We were losing all of our creativity,” 
recalled Sara Black, a second year teacher.
Eventually, they sought relief in the form of an FTE work-hour reduction, but 
their requests were turned down by the administration. Frustration finally prompted them 
to turn to Desert Flat's CTA-affiliated faculty council for help. The council took up their 
cause, but failed to make headway on workload or faculty salaries, both of which were
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issues of concern to the general faculty. Finally, it seized on the 1987 trustee elections as 
a vehicle for change. Its effort resulted in the unseating of two incumbents on the board 
of trustees, and the new majority finally gave the nursing faculty a measure of the 
workload relief it sought.
Background
Desert Rat College is a rural institution situated on the western edge of Mojave 
Desert in the high-desert country east of the San Bernardino Mountains of Southern 
California. Its 280 acre campus is physically one of the largest in the state system, and 
the district it serves, established in 1960, is likewise large, spanning more than 2200 
square miles. The town in which the college resides, which is known for its libertarian 
political culture, is a hub for regional commerce but also serves as a bedroom community 
for the urban industrial areas to the west (Homor, 1989).
Long a peaceful retreat for retirees, the district’s younger population surged in the 
1970s to create new demands on public services, including education. That prompted 
district officials to expand the college's facilities. Thus, in 1979, the college opened a 
new vocational complex, in 1981 a performing arts center, and, in 1983 a new structure 
to house allied health—which by then was an important feature of the Desert Rat 
curriculum.
Transition to decline. Prior to tax limitation, Desert Rat was a quiet, peaceful 
institution with a tranquil atmosphere that reflected the unhurried, relaxed ways of its rural 
setting. Unique among the sample colleges, Desert Rat stood out for its informality. For 
years, in fact, the college operated with a loosely organized social network that substituted 
for the advisory bodies found at other colleges, and seemed to nurture a relaxed 
environment in which the teachers enjoyed an unusual level of freedom. According to
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several interviewees, members of the faculty prized the individual discretion they 
exercised in academic matters. So strong was the value placed on autonomy that the 
academic senate failed to attract faculty interest, and depended year after year on a small 
group of activists to keep it going. In 1977, however, the activists turned their attention 
to collective bargaining, and combined the senate with Desert Flat's new CTA-affiliated 
faculty council.
As in other districts, fiscal conditions declined after Proposition 13. Officials 
managed the revenue losses--31% in 1978-79-by cutting course sections which resulted 
in a 26% drop in headcount (California Community Colleges, 1980). Within a year, 
however, the college resumed growing and restored its building program. “We had 
losses, but we still managed to bring in a new building every three years funded enurely 
by the district!” boasted Charles Larsen, Desert Flat's planning director.
Enrollment peaked in 1981-82. Although defunding and the revenue veto also 
took a toll on district resources, they did not overwhelm district operadons. “We took a 
little beadng with the hit list, but we just hunkered down to weather the storm,” observed 
Larson, whose nonchalance belied Desert Flat's 49% cumuladve losses.
Members of the faculty also weathered the transition with apparent ease. Many of 
them in fact seemed to regard the college building fund as a source of reserve monies. As 
Ed Lewin, a biology teacher, observed, “Even when Prop 13 came along and the general 
fund got dght--we all knew that with the building fund, we were in basically good 
financial shape.” That idea seemed to buffer the threat of declining revenue, and as a 
result, the events at the state level did not touch life at Desert Flat. According to Janet 
Wirt, the head librarian, “We focused on local issues—people here don't care much about 
what goes on in Sacramento.” Thus, the climate of crisis that existed at other campuses 
was did not develop at Desert Hat.
Subde changes in atmosphere did occur, however. As Jeff Walker from biology 
recalled, “District officials did a good job until '81 when they decided they were really
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going to save money. They'd go to meetings up north and pretty soon they were difficult 
to talk to.” Walker's reference was to members of the upper administration, and to 
changes in administrative policy. In 1981, Ben Goodfellow, Desert Flat CEO, and James 
Lynch, the budget manager, established new cost-controls, capping supply budgets, 
monitoring purchase requests, and filling positions with part-time personnel. Their 
personnel policy in the span of a few years increased the proportion of part-timers at 
Desert Hat from 44% to 56% of the teaching staff (Community Colleges, 1980, 
September; 1984, May).
At first, faculty morale did not suffer, but a series of coincidental changes 
followed that eventually took a serious toll. In 1983, Goodfellow retired, and Lynch 
quite his job, departing the college. Thereafter, the institution underwent a period 
turbulent executive tumover-indeed, three presidents and four vice presidents between 
1983 and 1986. “We had basic organization problems—it was chaotic for a while,” Lewin 
noted. The situation was brought on, not by the fiscal situation, but by personality 
clashes in the executive cabinet which had a disorganizing effect on the college. To 
correct the problem, the board of trustees first tried to micro-manage the institution's 
business, and when that failed, acted to reform the cabinet The turnover finally ended in 
the fall of 1986 when a new CEO succeeded in restoring the harmony.
Before order resumed, however, the new administrators instituted changes that 
transformed the way business was done at the college. First, they formalized decision­
making, reviving the college’s advisory committee system, and then they tightened the 
budgeting process by initiating a program of long-range fiscal planning. For the first 
time, the college required all instructional units to submit written budgets, an action that 
put new demands on middle managers and faculty. As Jean Riley, allied health dean, 
noted, “I never had to do a budget when Ben was here-I had to learn from scratch!”
The changes were largely unwelcome. Members of the faculty resented the new 
system, which many viewed as an encroachment on their traditional autonomy.
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“Everybody here was going to committee meetings, and doing all these things they had 
never done for years!” Riley observed.
It was during those years-1983- 1986—that faculty morale dropped, and faculty 
frustration first emerged. In 1984, the CTA faculty council undertook a salary review 
which showed Desert Flat salaries seriously eroded. That prompted the faculty council to 
press for increases. In a series of negotiations, however, officials of the district 
steadfastly declined to consider its demands. Finally, in the fall of 1987, after several 
semesters with no contract, the council asserted itself with an electoral strategy to unseat 
incumbent trustees. Its officers met with civic leaders and local business people to gain 
their support, and organized door-to-door neighborhood walks, and a faculty picket of the 
college which was unprecedented in Desert Flat's history. The effort was successful. 
The incumbents were defeated, and within weeks a new majority acceded to a large pay 
increase and one-hour reduction in faculty workload.
The Political Responses of Nursing Faculty
The expansion of nursing and allied health came at a time when the demand for 
program graduates was regional and strong. According to numerous interviewees, 
Norma Werner, former division dean, convinced Desert Flat officials to expand the 
curriculum to meet the demand. Thus, the college began a buildup in nursing, and two 
years before Proposition 13, added programs in respiratory therapy and emergency 
medical services. As Larson, district planning director, noted, “Norma was a real go- 
getter—she was very expansion-minded.” Nursing proved to be a big student attraction, 
which resulted in its remarkable growth. Indeed, at the time of this study, the program 
was prominently featured in a booster pamphlet published by the regional chamber of 
commerce, and remained Desert Flat's vocational centerpiece.
By the time of this study, nursing's growth had stopped. The rapid expansion
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begun in the late 1970s slowed dramatically in 1984 when conditions in the health service 
job market changed. At that time, Werner departed Desert Flat, leaving her legacy to 
others, and shortly after her departure, the growth of the allied health programs also 
stopped. “Norma built up our programs, but after she left, we mostly just maintained 
them,” said Jean Riley, who assumed Werner's position, and the problems of maintaining 
an overgrown division.
It was Riley who recognized that conditions no longer supported expansion. 
Nursing's waiting list was shrinking, and she saw that it had become a struggle to keep 
its class seats filled. With college finances uncertain, Riley initiated an LVN-to-RN career 
ladder program as a means to reduce the pressure on her department That innovation 
served the local hospitals, but also helped to minimize the affects of student attrition in her 
division.
As a study participant Riley was less than candid about the conditions in her 
department She minimized, for example, the impact of revenue decline on her division. 
“The administration gave me everything I wanted-they knew I wouldn't ask for the 
moon!” she said to the researcher. In fact she gave the impression that conditions were 
adequate, if not ideal, and failed to mention the years of roll over budgets and double-digit 
inflation that had left the department with supply and personnel shortages. “We didn't 
have any cuts in nursing,” she assured the researcher.
Impact of expansion on the faculty. A year after the initial inquiry to Riley, the 
researcher finally contacted members of the nursing faculty. At that time, an entirely 
different picture emerged—one of understaffing, serious supply shortages, and a faculty 
demoralized by extreme productivity pressure. Indeed, the first member interviewed 
questioned why the researcher had chosen the Desert Flat program as a control site. 
“We've had all kinds of cuts here. Some of us who teach full-time feel that our loads are 
very, very heavy-I just thought you should know that,” reported Sara Black.
From the faculty's point of view, the situation was grim. In addition to the on-
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campus work increases, members reported an upward creep in their clinical teaching ratio, 
which by then exceeded 1:14, the highest in this study's sample. Further, a lack of 
ancillary personnel forced them to do their own secretarial and laboratory management 
tasks such as typing, Xeroxing, supply inventories—activities, that took time away from 
teaching.
In addition, the administration was unrelenting in the pressure they applied for 
workload increases. “We were told again and again that we had to increase, increase, 
increase! Our department is only slightly under the college average, but the administrators 
still hold WSCH over our heads!” said Susan Ehlers, a first-year faculty member. 
“We've had to turn to our part-timers for the energy we need.” “They just kept inching us 
closer and closer to their definition of a full load~we knew that they were taking 
advantage of us,” Sally Green, another first-year member, observed.
Material austerity was another problem. Years of double-digit inflation seriously 
reduced the unit’s buying power, and its roll-over budget had to be spread thinner and 
thinner. At first nursing's capital purchases ceased, but eventually supplies were hard to 
come by. That forced the faculty to stockpile supplies, and use their inventories 
sparingly. “We reused, reused, and reused!” noted Black.
Nursing faculty actions. Difficult work conditions, and the growing perception 
that they were being exploited by the administration seriously demoralized several 
members of the group. A few individuals indeed grew quite bitter. “The administration 
never gave us credit for all the meetings the state forces us to attend. That violates 
policies in the faculty handbook!” Green observed.
Overwork became a constant theme in faculty meetings. As conditions worsened, 
members regularly implored Riley to press the administration for workload relief. “Over 
and over we asked her to explain our needs to the administration,” recalled Ehlers. These 
exhortations never produced results, however. Riley repeatedly returned to her division 
with excuses for the pressure or with explanations as to why the workload reductions
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members asked for were not possible.
In fact, Riley identified with the administration. “I’m management!” she 
volunteered to the researcher numerous times. Indeed, as a division dean, she was a 
member of the upper administration, and as such one of the highest ranking nursing 
administrators in the sample. Riley's position put her in an awkward situation. She 
knew the demands of her faculty would put her in conflict with her executive peers if she 
pushed them, so she refrained from making requests she knew they would not support. 
“We have an FTE of 24 hours with our clinical lab,” she said, “I think it should be 
lowered, but that's expensive to do! I have to side with the administration,” she 
explained to the researcher.
Riley used her personality to deal with the situation. A veteran of several years at 
Desert Flat, Riley enjoyed the professional respect of her peers, and the goodwill of 
people in and outside of her division. Even her faculty acknowledged her for the 
determination she showed in keeping the program going. Nearing retirement, Riley 
shrewdly used her personal influence to deflect the conflicting pressures put on her in her 
role as division dean. Instead of pushing for a workload reduction, she appealed to her 
teachers to cooperate with the administration's goals. If her teachers complained, she 
would respond with emotional displays. “Our director takes things in faculty meetings 
personally,” noted Black. “Sometimes she'll start crying, and we have to say, Jean, this 
isn't about you!” In administrative meetings, on the other hand, Riley deflected challenges 
from her peers by drawing attention to the long hours her staff put in, and by boasting 
about how hard her teachers worked.
Riley's strategy was to comply with the administration, but she was not alone in 
her preference for going along to get along. Indeed Diane Glen, the associate nursing 
program director, defended Riley on the workload issue. Unlike the other nursing 
members for whom fairness and workload equity were major concerns, the concern Glen 
articulated was for job security. “I have young children, so I guess weekends.
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Christmas, and summers are important to me. I guess I look at the alternative, which is to 
go back to work in the hospital for $ 10 an hour,” she reported to the researcher. Several 
of the interviewees, however, suspected that she had administrative ambitions and hoped 
to get Riley’s job.
The situation in nursing climaxed in 1987. After years of waiting for workload 
relief. Black and the other full-timers concluded that they needed to try a new strategy. 
As she noted, “In many ways, Jean's a good boss, but there's been no help in relieving 
the pressure on us!” Green, her colleague, was more succinct. “Jean's on the fence,” she 
said. Thus, they turned to the faculty council. “We finally realized that things needed to 
go to our CTA,” said Green.
The transition was awkward at first. The nursing faculty had in fact never been 
involved in the campus social network. “The people in nursing kept to themselves and 
didn't get involved in much!” reflected Lewin from biology. Indeed, most of its members 
had not bothered to join the CTA. That made it awkward to reach out and join the union 
in a time of need. Dick Lowell, faculty council president, however, understood what was 
happening, and took matters in hand. He invited individual teachers to become involved. 
“We worked on the nurses to come on over!” he said.
Some members, fearing that Riley would not understand, hesitated at first. Riley 
had often referred to the faculty council leaders as “rabble rousers,” and Black, Green, 
and Ehlers worried that by going to the union, they would heighten tensions in the 
department To some extent they were correct. The tension did increase, but was 
partially defused by avoiding the workload in faculty meetings. As Green noted, it had 
become a “ticklish” issue. Riley, however, to their surprise, articulated support for their 
decision. “It's the only way they’re ever going to get what they want,” she explained to 
the researcher.
The faculty council officers, for their part, welcomed the nurses. Lowell, 
considered the participation of the nursing faculty a boost for the union. “Before the
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nurses came over and joined us, Riley could get away with claiming that things were fine 
with her nurses! After her teachers broke and came with us—allied health is a good chunk 
of our faculty-the administration could finally see this problem was universal!” he 
observed. Lowell believed that Riley’s boasting made it easier for district officials to 
dismiss the union's demands for workload relief. As he observed, “I love Jean, but she 
talks up her nurses-you know, 'My nurses do this, my nurses do that!’- a s  if there 
wouldn't be any of these troubles if the rest of us would just work as hard as they did.”
In October, 1987, the union implemented its electoral strategy with a get-out-the- 
vote campaign. Members of the nursing faculty worked side-by-side with their general 
faculty peers to picket the college and go on door-to-door walks where they influenced 
district voters to support the union's candidates. “We went all over town and basically 
told people how to vote,” laughed Green. With the election of new board members, 
nursing got a one-hour FTE reduction, but also another important benefit. By the end of 
the campaign, the nursing teachers had became full participants in the social and political 
organization of the campus. As Lowell put it, “The election brought the nurses into our 
group—they're no longer looked at as a separate entity.”
No doubt Riley's tactics benefited her department, especially in the turbulent years 
of administrative turnover at Desert Rat. By talking about the her faculty’s long hours 
and hard work, she kept the spotlight on nursing as a cost-efficient operation, and that 
message got across to the cabinet executives. As Larsen, the vice president for planning, 
emphasized to the researcher, “Our nursing unit at Desert Rat is net expensive!”
Discussion
Removed from the political and economic turbulence at the state level, Desert Rat 
College did not descend into economic crisis, but in fact expanded in certain areas while 
managing decline with deep across-the-board economies and stringent personnel policies
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that had a particularly harsh impact on the nursing department.
Those policies eventually cost officials the good will of the faculty, which 
eventually fell back on the electoral process to achieve its goals. In that strategy, the 
Desert Flat faculty was not unique, as the preceding cases confirm. Ernst (1985) 
observed that faculties increasingly employed adversarial strategies as collective 
bargaining spread, and the economic conditions of community colleges deteriorated.
The most difficult aspect of decline for the nursing faculty was the part-time staff 
buildup. The full-timers objected to it because they believed it put the burden of growth 
on them. Such a perspective is not unusual. Jackson (1988), for example, noted that 
full-time teachers often feel over-burdened by the increased work created in a system that 
relies on part-time staff. Further, the frustration they experienced is also not uncommon. 
Hartleb and Vilter (1986) in fact pointed out that while the use of part-time personnel 
produces a short-term gain in efficiency, it does so at a cost to faculty good-will and long­
term productivity.
Frustrated by perceived overwork, the full-timers in the nursing department 
complained to their director who in turn cast her lot with the administration. According to 
Staw el al. (1981) a clash of perspectives not uncommon between faculties and their 
overseers. In this case, the full-timers were concerned about instructional excellence and 
their own welfare, while the director was concerned about program continuity and the 
fiscal solvency of the college. To achieve their goal, the full-timers joined the union in its 
campaign to change budget policy at Desert Flat. As Bahrawy (1992), adroitly pointed 
out, governance participation is never more important than in times of decline.
Summary of Findings from the Selected Sites
This chapter focused in depth on six community colleges, diverse in size, 
structure, and location, during a unique period of California history, 1982-1987, when
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the community colleges were struggling with the economic and political consequences of 
Proposition 13. The purpose of these studies was to illuminate the fiscal and social 
conditions that prompted administrators at some institutions to propose nursing programs 
for termination, and to describe the behavior of nursing faculties in response to local 
retrenchment policies.
The years of this study, 1982-1987, were years of unprecedented economic 
volatility in the community college system. Policy changes at the state level threatened the 
financial and social stability of colleges throughout the system. The six selected sites 
were no exception. Indeed, funding changes initiated by Proposition 13, and accelerated 
by later events, caused major problems at all six selected sites. As Table 33 illustrates, 
each institution underwent years of financial decline during which officials were under 
immense pressure to redirect their institutions.
Notably, all six districts had unique financial and organizational circumstances that 
affected their ability to withstand decline. District-to-district differences in local revenue, 
costs, expendable assets, and reserves shaped their post-tax limitation conditions, 
determined the size of their losses, and to a large extent, their capacity to withstand 
decline. For example. Pine Hill College resided in a multicollege district with a 54% ARP 
in 1978. It avoided major restructuring until 1983 when the district, then with reserves of 
22%, undertook a controversial, and some said coercive, WSCH contract program. In 
contrast. Delta College resided in a district with only 9% reserves in 1978, but managed 
decline throughout the period with across-the-board economies. Thus, it is difficult to 
generalize on the links between the fiscal conditions and administrative strategies, except 
to say that some of the districts acted more conservatively than others.
Although all six districts anticipated decline and initiated economies to offset their 
losses, the timing and pace of financial adaptation varied, as did the financial and social 
conditions under which they made their changes. Nonselective cutbacks were common, 
but as revenues continued to fall, some institutions showed a shift in values and opted for
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a selective strategy. Thus, officials at Arroyo, Palomino, Pine Hill, and Los Angeles all 
made plans to restructure whereas officials at Delta and Desert Rat avoided selective 
cutbacks, even in times of fiscal crises. Thus, institutional values and the priorities of
Table 33
Summary of Selected Sites
Arroyo Palomino
Selected Sites
Pine Hill Los Angeles Delta Desert
Flat
College Size Small Large Moderate Very Large Large Small
Nsg Program Size Small Large Moderate Varied Small Large
Location Suburban Urban Suburban Urban/Suburb Suburban Rural
District Type Single-Col Single-Col Multi-Col Multi-Col Multi-Col Single-
Col
Revenue 1978-84
Total Change (28%) (25%) (49%) (43%) (22%) (49%)
Prop 13 (24%) (14%) (19%) (17%) (13%) (31%)
Growth caps 1% (6%) (17%) (22%) (7%) (11%)
Defund/Veto (5%) (5%) (13%) (4%) (2%) (7%)
Spending 1978-84
Total Change (40%) (28%) (49%) (37%) (33%) (22%)
Propl3 (29%) (17%) (15%) (14%) (21%) (23%)
Growth caps (4%) (2%) (19%) 0% (8%) 6%
Defund/veto (7%) (9%) (15%) (23%) (4%) (5%)
Reserves
1978 ARP 21% 12% 54% 24% 9% 36%
Pre-crisis ARP 15% 11% 22% (1%) 7% 12%
Lowest ARP 12% 8% 9% (1%) 5% 12%
Crisis year(s) 1981-2 1982-3 1983-4 1985-6. 86-7 1983-4 1986-7
Retrenchment Proposed Enacted Suggested Enacted Nonselective Non
Strategy Prog.term. Prog.term. Prog.term. Prog.term. selective
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decision makers shaped the manner in which the selected sites reacted to economic events.
At three of the sites-Arroyo, Palomino, and Pine Hill-a dramatic change in 
values, away from educational idealism and toward economic efficiency, was evident 
Officials anticipated decline well before the institution's reserve levels had dissipated to 
emergency levels. Although their precise objectives were different in each case, all 
elected to change the priorities that guided their institution’s spending decisions. Thus, at 
Arroyo College, the board of trustees wanted to pull back from their comprehensive 
curriculum; at Palomino, the aim was to keep the faculty union in check as the institution 
adjusted to lower revenue; and at Pine Hill, officials wanted to stem the drain of rapid 
enrollment growth on district reserves.
In each of these cases, officials reacted by hiring new executives to redirect the 
institution's priorities. In search efforts that excluded faculty and other internal groups, 
they sought individuals with skills tailored to the task. In each case, they hired new 
managers who lacked broad experience but had the narrow management skills needed to 
advance the financial priorities of the organization. These individuals expedited change 
by tightening control at the top of the organization, usually with planning arrangements in 
which the faculty and other groups were relegated to token roles. These arrangements 
allowed the officials to dominate decision-making, but, ironically, weakened their ability 
to resolve fiscal crisis when they occurred. Thus, as crises arose, administrators in each 
case found it necessary to use harsh, coercive measures to achieve their financial 
objectives, in an overall approach Mason (1985) referred to as an abuse of excessive 
rationalism.
Although the pattern in the Los Angeles district was different in some ways, it 
was similar in others. Having adopted the rhetoric of reorganization, the officials in Los 
Angeles where more interested in preserving the status quo and thus perpetuated gross 
inefficiencies which rendered the district as a whole vulnerable to decline. Forced by 
intense political pressure to abandon their long-established pattern of district expansion.
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the officials finally opted to restructure, but with procedures as high-handed as those of 
the other districts, they, too, promulgated policies that invited resistance from their 
constituencies.
Eventually, all four districts faced huge deficits, and proposed to resolve them 
with targeted cutbacks to nursing and other areas. In each case, the selection of nursing 
was justified on the basis of the high cost of nursing programs, but appeared to have 
political as well economic objectives. Indeed, public persuasion appeared to be part of the 
agenda in each case. At Arroyo, for example, the nursing proposal was part of an effort 
to move public opinion in favor of canceling an athletic program; at Palomino, it was part 
of a plan to force the union to accept a salary or workload concession. At Pine Hill, the 
objective was to gain public acceptance for continued institutional cutbacks, and at Los 
Angeles, to enlist government support for increased district allocations.
In contrast, the officials at Delta and Desert Rat showed a firm commitment to 
nonselective measures. They too fostered a top-down policy approach, but did display 
the dramatic shift in values evident at the other sites. In both institutions, the officials 
made strenuous efforts to balance economic with educational priorities. For example, the 
board of trustees in Delta’s district, while struggling with its own internal problems, hired 
a new CEO with broad administrative experience to run the district. Although he 
maintained tight economic control, he tempered his approach with a demonstrated concern 
for the human resources of the institution. By engaging the faculty in a humane cutback 
policy based on shared sacrifice, he fostered conditions that preserved the financial and 
social integrity of the institution for several years.
Likewise, at Desert Rat, the executives managed with deep across-the-board 
cutbacks and selective growth to build revenue. Despite the unpopularity of the 
institution's part-time instructor policy, the faculty as a whole remained cooperative until a 
series of new administrators invoked procedural changes encroaching on the teachers' 
traditional autonomy. Thereafter, the faculty union pressed for demands that resulted in a
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negotiation impasse, and ultimately an electoral campaign to unseat incumbent trustees.
At Delta and Desert Flat, the executives demonstrated a sensitivity to value of 
nursing as a student attraction. Indeed, at Desert Rat, the nursing program became the 
centerpiece of a strategy to build resources by expanding popular programs. The 
administrators in both cases clearly viewed nursing as an organizational asset rather than 
an economic liability. Committed to nonselective cutbacks, they did not display a need to 
deal with perceived or real economic crisis by using high-cost programs as pawns in an 
effort to manipulate public opinion.
The question posed in this study was whether or not community college nursing 
faculties would act to influence the policies responsible for their circumstances. The case 
data showed that faculties five of the six nursing faculties studies did challenge those 
policies that threatened the survival of their programs, their jobs, or the standards they 
perceived essential to their job performance.
Thus, the nursing faculties at Arroyo, Palomino, Pine Hill, and in the Los 
Angeles district all organized anti-termination campaigns to prevent enactment of district 
termination recommendations, and succeeded in achieving a partial or complete reversal of 
the policy proposal.
In each case, they operated on theories about their circumstances. Although 
recognizing that program cost made nursing a conspicuous target, they also suspected 
other reasons for the district's proposal. Thus, members theorized that gender bias, 
political expedience, or a tendency on the part of administrators to devalue nursing as an 
academic pursuit, were the actual basis of nursing termination proposals. Litde evidence 
supported these claims, however, which are probably best understood as the judgmental 
outlook of groups whose survival is threatened.
More interesting, however, was the effort at Desert Rat, where the nursing faculty 
was not threatened by termination, but nevertheless challenged the across-the-board 
policies of its district Members of the Desert Rat nursing faculty believed that a district
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policy to expand the nursing department by employing part-time instructors unfairly 
exploited their full-time status, and threatened the quality of their program. They pushed 
for change by joining with members of the faculty union in an electoral effort to unseat 
incumbent trustees which eventually resulted in a workload reduction.
At Delta College, where the nursing faculty also felt exploited, but, in the absence 
of crisis, resisted governance participation, members, following the model of their 
program director, coped by accommodating decline.
Chapter VI, which follows, will summarize the findings of the research, present 
conclusions, and discuss the implications of this study for future research.
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THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
NURSING FACULTIES IN RESPONSE TO BUDGET CUTBACKS, 1982-1987:
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS 
Introduction
This chapter presents a summary of the methods and findings of the statewide and 
selected site studies, accompanied by the conclusions to be drawn, and discusses the 
implications of the findings for nursing education and future research.
This study is exploratory and descriptive in nature. Using a two-phase qualitative 
design, it looked broadly at the political behavior of nursing faculties in response to 
resource decline in California community colleges. In phase one it examined 38 programs 
statewide to identify the impact of resource decline on nursing programs and describe the 
responses of nursing faculties to their cutback circumstances. In phase two, it focused on 
six selected sites for a more detailed view of the circumstances and events surrounding 
resource decline, as well as the perspectives, attitudes, theories, and actions of nursing 
faculty members as they reacted to local administrative strategies and their impact on 
nursing programs.
Both phases incorporated numerous methodologies. Phase one employed 
surveys, interviews, and document review as principal research tools, while phase two
304
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employed these methods and newspaper accounts, and, in the case of one large, multi­
college district, limited participant observation.
The data from the statewide and selected site studies were analyzed in light of the 
conceptual framework outlined in Chapter I. To reiterate, the conceptual framework 
combined a model of cutback management and a model of crisis perception in 
organizations with authoritative ideas on the activation of political behavior. It stipulated 
that as organizations confront severe resource decline, strategies used by officials to deal 
with fiscal stress often invite dramatic changes in institutional governance. Those 
changes, characterized by competition, crisis, and social conflict, often serve to activate 
political behavior.
Summary of Findings from the Statewide Study 
Resource Decline
Thirty-three community college districts diverse in size, structure, and location, 
constituted the sample in this study. As the findings of the document review show, all of 
the districts reported a decline in their real dollar income during the period of this study. 
Indeed, seventeen districts suffered severe cumulative losses as defined by Sibolski's 
(1984) revenue criterion. However, the average losses for the period of defunding and 
the revenue veto, at 6.24%, were far less than the precipitous 17.45% decline incurred 
immediately after Proposition 13. Those losses, however, were devastating nonetheless, 
coming as they did at a time when many districts had already spent down their reserves. 
The fiscal indicators employed in this study showed 1982-84 to be the most fiscally 
stressful years. Although the financial situation began to improve after 1984, conditions 
in a some districts continued to worsen.
To address decline, all of the districts in this study cut spending, at least
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temporarily. Indeed, expenditure reductions were the primary means available to local 
officials seeking to balance their budgets after Proposition 13 shifted funding authority 
shifted to the state. As the data show, the size and pattern of retrenchment varied from 
district-to-districL Some districts acted in a highly conservative fashion, acting early to 
cut spending more than the amount required to balance revenue losses; others balanced 
their losses on a year-by-year basis, while some tried to preserve the status quo by relying 
heavily on reserve funds to cover budget deficits. Indeed, reserve consumption was a 
common finding. A majority of districts (N = 22) enjoyed reserve levels of 15-20% or 
more in 1978, but chose to reduce them substantially during the years of this study. 
Despite that trend, only ten districts reached a state of severe decline as defined by the 
reserve criterion set in this study—which, to reiterate was two or more consecutive years 
of reserve levels (ARPs) five percent (5%) or lower. Unlike the revenue indicators which 
define fiscal stress, reserves more precisely set the parameters of financial exigency, the 
state in which authorities agree restructuring is justified.
Administrative. Strategy
As the findings showed, most institutions avoided severe decline as defined by the 
reserve criterion. In most cases, spending reductions were critical to restoring their fiscal 
balance. The administrators in many districts made across-the-board economies in which 
they reduced plant maintenance and noninstructional student services, froze hiring, cut 
funds for faculty travel and sabbaticals, reduced capital outlay, and even reduced 
spending for instructional materials and supplies. In some cases, the administrators also 
undertook selective program termination and faculty layoffs.
Nursing programs, as an expensive aspect of the occupational curriculum, were 
not excluded from these strategies. Indeed, none of the programs in this study (N = 38) 
escaped the impact of resource decline, and, in fact, all of the programs experienced the
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effects of one or more nonselective economies. Seventy-eight percent (78%) received 
reduced funds for instructional materials, 88% for supplies, and 91% for capital outlay; 
29% reported support staff reductions, and 58% experienced faculty reduction by 
attrition. Some programs, moreover, were singled out for selective retrenchment. 
Indeed, twelve nursing programs (#1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 22, 27, 28, 34, 38, 39, and 40) were 
targeted for termination or downsizing. Only half (6) of these, however, resided in 
districts where the criterion of financial exigency was met. In fact, the reserve levels 
reported by their parent districts ranged from 15% to -3, with several reporting double­
digit ARPs. This suggests that impending financial exigency is only one explanation for 
administrative strategies that target nursing programs.
The Political Behavior of Nursing Faculties
The data showed that nursing faculties responded to local cutback policies with 
political behavior that varied in character and complexity according to the retrenchment 
circumstances in which they found themselves. Two distinct patterns, accommodation 
and contention, were apparent.
Accommodation, a pattern comprised of resource conservation and substitution, 
fund-raising, and curriculum adjustment tactics, was used by nursing faculties to stretch 
declining resources as they attempted to comply with or incrementally adjust to budget 
reductions. Accommodation predominated under circumstances in which administrators 
made cutbacks according to an across-the-board strategy that applied reductions more or 
less evenly to all instructional units.
Accommodation proved attractive to nursing faculties for a number of reasons, 
among them that most nursing faculty members perceived resource decline as unavoidable 
and temporary, and derived from conditions external to the institution. Because members 
regarded across-the-board strategies as fair, they were eager to support the retrenchment
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goals of their institutions. The availability of alternative resources or substitutes for items 
reduced by budget cutbacks was another factor. Alternative resources and substitutes 
reduced the needs-resources gap, and thus mitigated crisis perception. Nursing faculties 
enjoyed a relationship to the community other groups did not have. Unlike other 
faculties, nursing faculties could prevail on hospitals and other agencies for materials and 
supplies or use the hospital as an alternative laboratory when campus supplies became 
scarce. Such alternatives relieved the pressure on nursing groups and prevented crises 
that otherwise may have developed.
Finally, many nursing faculties were often isolated by the location, schedule, and 
the patterns of their teaching routines which involve long, off-campus clinical 
laboratories. They thus had a tendency to become detached the from the college-as- 
organization. Because of the inconveniences created by their work situation, most groups 
did not participate fully in college governance activities or the changes in campus politics, 
in particular the subunit funding competition that developed on many campuses during the 
period of this study. Their detachment, too, helped to mitigate crisis perception.
Finally, nursing faculties sought solutions to their budget problems that allowed 
them to preserve their functional routines and thus protect their primary value, clinical 
teaching. Thus, the tactics of accommodation, which required no new behavior, proved 
attractive.
Contention, a pattern of resisting and opposing district policy, predominated 
under conditions in which institutional officials targeted nursing programs for selective 
termination. It was also evident in few instances in which faculties sought relief from 
drastic conditions caused by across-the-board cutbacks.
Faculties shifted to a pattern of contention when they recognized that termination 
as imminent absent an effort to change district policy. Unlike across-the-board cutbacks 
generally perceived as fair, nursing faculties regarded termination proposals as a crisis of 
individual and group welfare as well as an injustice to themselves, their students, and the
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community.
The tactics of contention required new behavior of nursing faculties, and transition 
was not easy in many cases. Nursing faculties were often surprised, and sometimes 
shocked, by termination proposals. Unprepared for their new circumstances, groups 
encountered problems as they tried to shift into a contention mode. Most lacked political 
resources including such basic assets such as internal group cohesion, political 
organization and leadership. Further, members often disagreed over decisions to oppose 
district policy. Such decisions put faculties in an adversarial position with respect to their 
administrative superiors, and thus were fought with conflict.
Typically, nursing faculties went through stages of adaptation. The first stage, 
immobilization, was a period of variable duration in which members were unable to 
engage in effective planning activities. The second phase, interpretation, was an 
intermediate phase in which members attempted to regroup, and sought explanations for 
the district's proposal. In the final phase, organization, members resolved their shock, 
overcame barriers to action, and moved on to orchestrate a political plan.
When organized, most groups mounted anti-termination campaigns to counter 
district termination proposals. Pursuing various tactics for a policy reversal, they formed 
coalitions, activated their community base, supported legislative and regulatory initiatives, 
gave direct testimony to boards of trustees, instigated media demonstrations, and 
participated in district electoral politics. In almost all cases, they gained a complete or 
partial reversal of the termination policy, and, in addition, intangible benefits such as 
group morale improvement and perceived group status gains.
The data from the statewide study showed that faculties also participated in a 
limited number of activities intended to influence state funding policies. These usually 
consisted of letter lobbies organized by district officials or by the nursing faculties 
themselves. The nursing faculties in this study did not, however, pursue broadly 
organized professional or educational coalitions to strategically alter the state policies
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driving up the relative cost of nursing programs.
Summary of Findings from the Selected Site Studies
The selected site studies explored conditions at six sites chosen for their size, 
location, structure, and the nature of their retrenchment decisions regarding nursing 
programs. At Arroyo, Palomino, Pine Hill, and Los Angeles, officials adopted a policy 
of selective retrenchment in which they targeted nursing programs for reductions. At 
Delta and Desert Flat, officials relied on across-the-board strategies to deal with decline.
Site Summaries
Arrovo College (#39)
Arroyo College, a small, conservative, but financially overextended institution, 
struggled to maintain its fiscal equilibrium in the late 1970s and early 1980s as pressure 
from a newly-organized faculty collective bargaining unit mounted within the 
organization. As conditions deteriorated, the historical grip of Arroyo's executive 
hegemony weakened. In an unprecedented move, the board of trustees sought a new 
CEO to redirect the organization, and hired an outside executive search firm to conduct the 
search. However unintentionally, they excluded the faculty from the decision process, 
and by their action raised faculty suspicions about the likelihood of an imminent shift in 
district priorities. When information spread to the faculty that person hired as chief 
executive had no community college administrative experience, and in fact enjoyed a 
reputation as a program terminator, the conditions for a social crisis were set.
Within months, the new CEO proved himself unsuited in demeanor and style to 
deal with a disgruntled faculty. His open displays of temperament alienated the teaching
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staff as did the measures he instituted to prepare for decline such as hiring an outside firm 
to conduct an instructional program review—a move which again excluded the faculty 
from the decision process.
In 1981, the district faced its first serious projected budget deficit-a shortfall of 
10% of the institution's annual budget Officials attributed the deficit to the state's caps 
on enrollment growth funding. True to his reputation, however, Arroyo's new CEO 
proposed professional staff layoffs, and a series of student service and athletic program 
reductions. The plan, however, contained unexplained deviations from the program 
review findings. Indeed, some of its elements conflicted with the mandates of a state- 
funded service program. Nevertheless, with help from Arroyo's controversial budget 
manager, the new CEO succeeded in railroading the plan through the board of trustees 
virtually unopposed by any of the district's constituencies. Indeed, the faculty, having 
succumbed to rampant job insecurity, remained mobilized. When opposition from the 
community also failed to develop, the proposal was easily passed.
Some months after the decision, however, resistance began to mount. The local 
newspaper and the classified employees' union independently conducted audits of the 
district's finances. Their findings highlighted gross inconsistencies in Arroyo's budget 
planning, which the paper published just weeks before the 1981 district trustee elections. 
Under a front-page banner headline, the paper singled out Arroyo's executives and board 
of trustees for sharp criticism, and as a result of its scrutiny, two long-term incumbents 
were unseated. The election resulted in a new, more independent majority on Arroyo's 
board of trustees.
In 1982, another deficit loomed which Arroyo's CEO again proposed to solve by 
narrowing the mission of the college. This time the plan featured a measure long 
anticipated by the faculty-the termination of Arroyo's intercollegiate football program. 
The new board majority, skeptical of the economic necessity for any additional cutbacks, 
refused to consider the proposal but asked the CEO to draft a list of cutback options. He
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complied with a list of academic programs for cancellation that included nursing which he 
defended in the press in statements stressing the high cost and low enrollment of the 
nursing programs. The list was viewed by many observers as a political tactic to shift 
public opinion in favor of eliminating football.
Members of the nursing faculty were shocked by the CEO's proposal. Despite his 
previous attempts to reduce the nursing department, they had not anticipated the move. 
The nursing program director was also surprised. She perceived the CEO’s tactic as 
“pitting” nursing against football, and was angered by the comparison, and by the 
administration's apparent opportunism. A veteran of local civic organizations, however, 
the nursing program director was not intimidated, and indeed, ignored the risk opposing 
district policy might have posed to her own position. Working independently, she 
organized nursing's community base for an anti-termination coalition. Her tactics were to 
refute the administration's cost claims by gathering data on nursing's indirect ADA 
contributions, and to build an alliance of prominent hospital officials and civic leaders to 
support the department.
At the same time, members of the nursing department sought to find support 
within the general faculty. In view of the climate of intimidation that prevailed in the 
institution, their appeals were largely ignored. The members then turned to organizing 
nursing's alumni and networking with people in local health care agencies. Not all of the 
members participated in these efforts. Indeed, one faculty member supported the goals of 
the administration.
Although the appeals to the general faculty failed, the department did gain the 
enthusiastic backing of the regional health care establishment, the local business 
community, and the press. Community residents showed up in unprecedented numbers 
for the board hearing on nursing. Given a choice between academic or athletic program 
closures, the community withdrew its support from football, and the nursing faculty, 
armed with data-based arguments for rejecting the nursing proposal, prevailed.
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Palomino College (#1)
Palomino College, an old, established urban institution, anticipated the negative 
impact of Proposition 13 on district revenues, and acted to curtail the emerging strength of 
its faculty union before the measure was passed. As a key tactic, the Palomino board of 
trustees hired a new CEO, who lacking executive experience, nevertheless had a strong 
reputation for being tough on the union in contract negotiations.
The new CEO arrived in the summer of 1978, and shortly after his arrival, 
proceeded to overhaul Palomino's administrative structure with a series of changes in an 
effort to consolidate control at the top of the organization. The most notable change was 
the creation of four new executive vice presidencies filled outsiders in an action at odds 
with Palomino hiring tradition. The reorganization not only alienated the middle 
managers displaced by the change, but further raised the suspicions of union leaders and 
members of the faculty who believed that the changes were made in the interest of 
advancing a hidden agenda which was to bust the union.
At first, the new cabinet plotted a conservative course. In fact, for three years it 
managed to stave off fiscal crisis with an ambitious program of capital outlay, 
maintenance, and personnel cutbacks and operational spending freezes. However, the 
end-of-year surpluses often resulted from these economies which created the impression 
of an administration overreacting to fiscal circumstances.
Part of Palomino's economic strategy was to put downward pressure on faculty 
salaries. Thus, in contract negotiations, the CEO and his cabinet took a hardline stance on 
faculty demands. Over time, this resulted in an unusually acrimonious bargaining 
process, and eventually degenerated into adversarial warfare. The result was a state of 
chronic social conflict in the college. Concerned about the long-term effects on the 
institution, the board of trustees, in a futile effort to restore harmony, finally acquiesced to 
a series of faculty salary raises the district could ill-afford. That action, coming shortly
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before the state defunded much of Palomino's avocational curriculum, seriously 
embarrassed Palomino's finances. By the summer of 1982, the college faced a $5 million 
deficit, and appeared headed for serious fiscal trouble. Confronted with that likelihood, 
the board opted for a turnover in the chief executive position, but was forced temporarily 
to accept an interim-manager arrangement.
During the 1982 fall semester, it became clear to district officials that efforts to 
gain a salary concession from the faculty would be unsuccessful. Palomino's vice 
president for instruction, newly recruited from Arroyo College, arranged for an 
instructional program review, to be conducted as Arroyo's by an outside consultancy 
firm. He also assembled a committee comprised mainly of administrators to plan for a 
massive retrenchment The committee focused its attention on nursing which, unlike 
other units, had a large, all full-time faculty. A survey of local hospitals showed the 
demand for vocational nurses declining. Thus, under the vice president’s supervision, 
the committee came up with a plan to close the department's venerable LVN program, and 
reduce its teaching staff by fifty percent The plan, which also called for widely- 
distributed general faculty layoffs, was ultimately approved by a reluctant board of 
trustees at the urging of an interim CEO who shared the committee's cutback preferences.
Predictably, the layoff proposal outraged union officials and members of the 
general faculty who regarded it as a coercive measure aimed at forcing the union into a 
salary concession. Little coordinated faculty action preceded the board's decision, 
however, as self-interested department heads advocated for their separate agendas in a 
series of special board meetings held for that purpose. Press coverage focused public 
attention on the conflict, highlighting the nursing proposal in lengthy articles devoted to 
the administration's cost argument as disputed by the nursing faculty's claims of gender 
bias.
The proposal to cut nursing caught members of the nursing faculty, many of 
whom were overly confident of their department's standing in the college, by complete
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surprise. Although rumors of a nursing cutback had circulated for months, members had 
failed to anticipate the proposal. In fact the group was internally divided and preoccupied 
with unrelated problems, and thus had ignored the indicators of impending layoffs. 
Shocked at first by the announcement, they were initially unable to plan or organize 
themselves for action. Instead, they spent time speculating on the possible reasons for the 
board’s action. Members doubted the motives of district trustees, the executive cabinet, 
and even their own unit manager, whom some regarded as a weak leader. They thus 
rejected the reasons offered by the administration, instead embracing the theory of gender 
bias and political exploitation by the administration to explain their situation.
The shock eventually lifted, however, and members of department temporarily 
overcame their own lack of cohesion to begin planning a defense. Indeed, they rallied 
sufficiently to organize a media demonstration and a show of community support, both of 
which were scheduled to coincide with the board hearing on the nursing policy. Their 
efforts, the result of a tentative and loose internal organization in which ten of the 
department's thirty members actively participated, resulted in an unprecedented public 
turnout, which, ironically, conveyed an image of skilled political organization.
In the board hearing on nursing, members of the department stressed the 
reputation and quality of the nursing program, and, ignoring the administration's 
economic argument, shared their theory of administrative gender bias as the real reason 
for the nursing proposal. Although the suggestion that angered several trustees, the 
media demonstration and community turnout, which were unduplicated by other campus 
groups, impressed the trustees and to some extent canceled whatever negative effect the 
nursing. Weeks later, the board bowed to public opinion and a threat of electoral 
opposition from the faculty union, and voted to reduce the number of layoffs in the 
college and the nursing department, but declined to rescind the LVN program closure.
Although members of the nursing faculty were initially buoyed by the reduction of 
layoffs in nursing, they quickly refocused on their losses which were greater than those
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of other units. Some members blamed the program director. During the following 
summer, a highly successful fund-raising effort mounted by the director saved the LVN 
program and the jobs of several teachers. Although the local press gave credit to the 
director, some members of the department held fast to their view, and reverted to a 
demoralized state.
Months later, public confusion persisted over the status of the department This, 
along with a drop in the local demand for nurses, took a toll on the nursing program's 
enrollment At that point the administration, under a new CEO who balanced a concern 
for economy with preserving Palomino's human resources, decided to dismiss the rehired 
teachers. The action further offended those members of the department who were still 
unable to address the reasons for their department's decline. Again, they blamed the 
program director, but later, refocused on the instructional vice president after a 
coincidental and bizarre turn of events reopened speculation about institutionalized gender 
bias as the reason for nursing's losses. Ironically, the nursing faculty succumbed to 
chronic conflict just as conditions in the college began to improve.
Pine Hill College f#101
Pine Hill College, a mid-sized, structurally innovative institution in a central 
coastal multi-college district, conducted business-as-usual until 1980 when the board of 
trustees installed a new administration to redirect the district's economic policy, by then 
under siege from state-implemented growth funding caps. The new CEO, formerly 
district budget manager, put in place a three-year, phased-in program of cost-controls and 
an unusual plan for enhancing instructional productivity.
Under pressure from the district office to make cuts, Pine Hill's president, a man 
known for the value he placed on constituency participation, convened an internal 
program review committee with broad college representation. Its task was to review
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instructional programs for their efficiency and vitality~a test the RN nursing program 
withstood poorly. As a result of the committee’s findings, and on the recommendations 
of college and district executives, the board of trustees voted in the spring of 1983 to cut 
two full-time positions from Pine Hill's nursing department
In the fall of 1983, as the district struggled to resolve the economic crisis ignited 
by the governor’s revenue veto, Pine Hill's president again resisted the chancellor's 
invitation to drop nursing, and urgendy implemented a district-recommended efficiency 
program. All units, including nursing, were asked to commit voluntarily to new, higher 
WCSH targets. After some local administrators hinted that program termination awaited 
the noncompliant, many members of the Pine Hill faculty came to perceive the WSCH 
program as coercive. Throughout this period, the CEO put pressure on “low WSCH” 
programs such as nursing and engineering by singling them out in his press statements as 
possible targets for program termination.
Accustomed to unwavering administrative support, the nursing faculty was ill- 
prepared for this turn of events. Its long-time, administratively powerful director had 
taken leave because of a terminal illness, leaving the unit in the hands of an interim 
substitute with little interest in district politics. The lapse in vigilance had short-term 
consequences-the department lost two positions, and the administration threatened it with 
termination if it failed to comply with a new WSCH target
The lapse also alerted people outside of the department to the need for a strong 
nursing director. Acting on a personal commitment to the nursing department and its ill 
director, a Pine Hill middle manager, assigned to impanel a search committee, hand- 
picked several influential members of the Pine Hill science faculty who shared his 
concerns about finding a strong candidate. The committee reviewed several applications 
and recommended a member of the nursing faculty experienced in the arena of state 
politics. The recommendation was approved, and under pressure, the new director began 
to working with key people inside and outside of the department to mount an anti-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
318
termination campaign from within the organization.
Nursing's strategy was multifaceted. It addressed not only the department's new 
WSCH target, but also the advisory process through which the department’s restructuring 
plans would have to pass. The anti-termination effort required members of the nursing 
faculty to coordinate their actions with other faculty groups, and adapt, however 
temporarily, to the economic values and institutional politics driving district policy.
The change was not easy. Members of the department believed that the 
administration was failing to consider their reputation for excellence. However, their 
efforts argue against the WSCH proposal by focusing on program quality were frustrated, 
which prompted them to change strategy. Using data-based arguments, an internal 
coalition of middle managers and teachers from science and nursing managed to stave off 
strong competitive pressure from other units by emphasizing the economic unity of the 
college. The coalition worked through various college committees and advisory bodies, 
using ADA data to counter the arguments repeatedly made by the managers of other 
departments who promoted the idea that terminating nursing would solve the district's 
economic problems. It did so at a time when the board was divided on the direction to 
take, and the local job market for nurses was in a temporary slide. In the final analysis, 
nursing not only avoided the termination policies applied to other units but succeeded in 
gaining a full-time replacement for a vacant secretarial position, a notable gain given that 
district officials, besieged by months of financial and social turmoil, had yet to lift their 
hiring freeze.
Los Angeles Community College District (#2,22,28.38)
The transition to decline in the Los Angeles Community College District, a huge, 
powerful, urban multi-college district, was complicated by enormous pressure from 
special-interest groups to maintain a long-term commitment to district expansion, and
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equally strong pressure from the governor and various political bodies for the 
organization to hold itself fiscally accountable.
As the LACCD approached tax limitation, the rhetoric of its officials emphasized 
economy over programs, but belied the district’s real priority, which was to preserve its 
expansionary status quo. That paradox perpetuated a pattern of costly plant growth and 
program proliferation at a time when money for basic operations was dwindling. Early 
efforts to streamline district operations resulted in centralized planning but little structural 
change. Extravagances and inefficiencies went unaddressed, employees were given 
salary raises and benefit increases, while across-the-board economies eroded the capacity 
of instructional units to function.
For years, the district limped along by spending down its reserves. In the early 
1980s, however, changes in state growth-funding policy resulted in deficits necessitating 
a series of course section cutbacks. Those cutbacks in turn unleashed a vicious spiral of 
enrollment and income contraction, which given the district's failure to make prudent 
organizational changes, pushed it-the only selected study site to exhaust its reserves- 
over the brink, into a state of financial exigency and fiscal crisis.
Fiscally embarrassed, district officials asked the county administration, and then 
the state legislature for funds, but in the process drew the scrutiny of state executives and 
oversight bodies. After a statutory provision approving funds for the LACCD was denied 
by the governor, district officials decided to solve their own problems by going it alone. 
Unfortunately, they drafted a plan based on unrealistic fiscal assumptions, and, finally, 
faced with forecasts of huge, imminent deficits, were forced to make structural changes.
Officials of the district rapidly assembled a plan calling for wholesale faculty 
layoffs and academic program terminations. Nursing, a costly division, outstanding for 
its large size and stable enrollment, was noted by the district planner to consume an 
increasing proportion of the district's shrinking resources, and thus drew the attention of 
the LACCD's administrator-dominated planning committee as an attractive target for
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termination.
Billed as a “restructuring,” the district’s turnaround proposal focused on 
eliminating jobs in some departments while adding them in others. The argument invited 
faculty opposition. Indeed, the LACCD denied that financial exigency was the major 
reason for its action, which brought challenges from the faculty about the need for 
change. Long cynical about conditions in the district, the faculty resisted the action, and 
for three months, confrontation and conflict characterized district policy making as the 
district and its constituencies sparred in a battle that spilled over into the arena of state 
politics.
Under pressure from the teachers and community groups, district officials 
defended their proposal in a series of board meetings followed closely by the press and in 
the media where they strenuously promoted their decision to reduce health care and 
nursing. After months of angry testimony, lawsuit filings, and attempts by all sides to 
marshall the support of state legislators, the district finally approved a fraction of its 
original plan, and by the start of the 1986 fall semester, under threat of law suits, all but 
reversed its teacher layoff policy.
A year later, conditions were no better. Facing another large deficit, the board of 
trustees approved another proposal for massive layoffs. At that point, the faculty union 
shifted to an electoral strategy, campaigning against several of the board incumbents it at 
one time had helped to elect. As the votes were tallied, the trustees who favored 
restructuring lost their races to union-backed challengers.
The layoff plan was immediately dropped, although the chancellor declined to 
acknowledge the elections results as factor in the decision. Months later, a new board 
majority made sweeping changes in LACCD's executive administration, replacing not 
only the district's long-time, politically powerful CEO, but also the cabinet personnel 
director, a former president of the faculty union who had written the faculty contract, and 
whose appointment as personnel director therefore inspired great fear in the faculty ranks.
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Throughout 1986 and much of 1987, a dedicated group of nursing faculty 
volunteers representing the district's eight nursing programs responded to the district's 
proposal to drop two nursing programs and reduce the nursing faculty districtwide by 
twenty members. The group's initial task was to overcome the problems created by the 
absence of a district-level organization of nursing faculties and cohesion among the eight 
program directors, some of whom appeared more interested in protecting their own 
positions and protecting the independent standing of their programs than in working to 
oppose the termination policy.
To orchestrate a policy reversal, a districtwide ad hoc nursing faculty group 
formed. It coordinated allied itself with faculty union leaders who recognized a political 
opportunity in the nursing terminations. The nursing coalition's tactics included lobbying 
elected officials in municipal, county, and state government, and making appeals to the 
LACCD governing board, the state board regulating nursing education, a state 
commission on women’s issues, an organization of hospital nurse executives, and 
numerous hospital officials. Coordinating with other faculty and student groups, the ad 
hoc group also supported legislative efforts to erect fiscal and administrative barriers to 
district restructuring, and assisted the union's electoral campaign with strategic and 
supportive actions of its own. In all of these activities, the nursing group enjoyed 
advantages over other faculty groups involved in the effort. Because of the importance of 
health care and nursing service as a public policy issue, nursing gained attention from the 
media more easily than other faculties and more readily gained access to politicians able to 
influence the debate.
At all points, however, the ad hoc group was hindered by deep differences within 
the nursing faculty. These involved conflicts in management philosophy and style, in 
motivation and preferences for political strategy which alienated unit managers from one 
another, divided unit managers from their faculties, and at points came between the 
faculty members themselves. These conflicts impeded organization, led to pockets of
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inaction, as well as actions by some—notably program directors who were competing for 
position and power-that canceled out the actions of others. By the end of the effort, 
these conflicts had taken a serious toll on the organization which began with a 
participation of nearly half of the faculty and ended with only a few active members.
Nevertheless, the group succeeded in bringing substantial pressure to bear on 
district officials by its widespread appeals. Aided by the terms for the transition 
negotiated with the state regulatory board, it succeeded in reversing the nursing layoffs, 
but failed to prevent the nursing program closures. On that question the district prevailed, 
using a theme of local control to block legislation intended to regulate its reform efforts, 
and by co-opting the governor's reform agenda to advance its own goals. In the end, 
district officials won by stalling action on an offer of subsidies that would have reinstated 
one of the canceled nursing programs. The offer was solicited by the newly elected 
trustees with help from a local politician from the local Hospital Council. After months of 
waiting, the agency finally withdrew its offer, and the issue of the nursing program 
closures died.
Delta College (#131
Delta College, a large institution, in a fiscally conservative multicollege district 
located in the region of the state capitol, was chosen for study because its nursing 
programs were not targeted for harsh selective cutbacks.
At Delta College, the transition to decline was complicated not by program 
overcommitment or special interest pressures, but by a clash of personalities and policy 
perspectives at the level of the district governing board. Those clashes enveloped the 
board in a culture of conflict for much of its history prior to this study, and contributed to 
a fateful decision that left the district highly dependent on state funds after tax limitation. 
Numerous incidents resulting in a serious breakdown of civility on the board were amply
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covered by the local press. These eventually attracted enough voter attention to influence 
an electoral turnover on the board.
The new board majority, seeking to redirect the organization away from the 
district-building policies of the past, acted to change the executive administration of the 
institution. It hired a new CEO with long experience and a strong, statewide reputation in 
community college administration. Under the new CEO conditions stabilized, and the 
district gradually returned to a state of harmony and order. Calm persisted until the 
governor's revenue veto led the institution, which had long operated on a narrow reserve 
margin, to forecast financial exigency.
Despite the early chaos, the trustees and district administration budgeted 
conservatively and overcame numerous pressures to embrace a philosophy of 
retrenchment that stressed across-the-board economies and the preservation of 
instructional programs. When the state instituted defunding, causing a local crisis, the 
new chancellor made a concerted effort to preserve faculty jobs by taking advantage of the 
vulnerability of the faculty union. Appealing directly to the faculty, he offered a no-layoff 
policy in return for a salary concession. The faculty accepted, and the policy remained in 
place until the governor's revenue veto brought layoffs temporarily back into 
consideration.
After a series of close fiscal calls, the district unfortunately failed to reward the 
faculty's sacrifices. As the threat of fiscal crisis ebbed, the board of trustees approved 
salary increases for members of the administration, but declined to give raises to the 
faculty. At that point conflict erupted. The teachers' union, pressed by falling 
membership and its own financial problems, seized the opportunity to orchestrate a job 
action, and took a vote of no-confidence on the chancellor. In the end, those actions 
produced a compromise on salaries and structural changes giving the faculty a new formal 
voice in district decision making.
At no point did the district’s actions threaten Delta nursing. Rumors of program
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consolidation circulated during the months of crisis associated with the revenue veto, but 
no such action was taken. Several factors operated in nursing's favor. Interviewees 
pointed to the department's grant subsidies, and the career ladder program underwritten 
by local hospitals, its contractual arrangements with other community agencies, and its 
importance as a community asset They also stressed the administration’s overall support 
for instructional programs. Thus, as a small, externally subsidized program in a large 
district, the Delta nursing program, which by all accounts was run on a shoestring, was 
neither a highly conspicuous budget target nor a cost burden on the institution.
Under the supervision of a bureaucratically-oriented director, members of the 
Delta nursing faculty accommodated to institutional budget cuts with a program of 
conservation and cost-shifting. For example, they took students to the hospital for their 
skills orientation rather than use the department's sparsely outfitted campus laboratory. 
Although chronically dissatisfied with the amenities allotted their department, members of 
the department nevertheless distanced themselves from district governance activities. 
They preferred to weather austerity, not by fighting for larger allocations, but by reducing 
their expectations for instructional support When institutional fiscal crises arose, they 
discounted the likelihood of job losses in nursing on the basis of a unique clause in the 
faculty contract exempting nursing from district WSCH requirements, and carried over 
their usual mode of adaptation.
Not all nursing members were so confident, however. An associate program 
director served for years as nursing's only liaison to college and district governance 
bodies. She recognized the potential for political challenges from within the organization, 
but left the department in 1984, pardy out of frustration with her colleagues' passivity.
Desert Flat College f#35)
With a multi-million dollar building fund to stave off decline, Desert Rat
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weathered its funding losses with notable ease. Indeed, the college managed to expand its 
facilities, adding buildings at a time when other institutions were reeling from defunding 
and the revenue veto. Its strategy for dealing with fiscal uncertainty was to promote and 
expand programs that proved attractive to students, one of which was nursing. To make 
ends meet, however, the district perpetuated a high faculty workload formula, froze 
faculty salaries, and hired part-time instructors to cover the expanding workload, all of 
which took a toll on faculty morale.
In 1983, a series of executive turnovers began which caused chaotic conditions in 
the college and eventually resulted in new policies and a more formalized decision system 
that encroached on the traditional teacher autonomy at Desert Flat. Frustrated by 
procedural changes and the compensation issue, leaders of the faculty union made 
repeated demands for workload and salary compromises, which over a period of years the 
administration and board of trustees declined to oblige in a series of contract negotiations. 
Finally, in the fall of 1987, after three semesters without a contract, union leaders seized 
on the district trustee elections to effect change.
Nursing's rapid expansion-more than a tripling of enrollment in a few years time- 
-gave the department a position of importance at Desert Hat. Indeed, it was prominently 
featured in a community booster pamphlet published by the local chamber of commerce. 
But expansion caused considerable work increases for the full-time faculty, which did not 
grow as students were added. Fatigued from perceived overwork, members for years 
sought relief from the district's high FTE formula and incremental work increases that 
were taking a serious toll on their morale. After appeals were repeatedly ignored, they 
went to the faculty union for help.
The union president, in fact, had encouraged the nurses to join the union effort, 
and welcomed their involvement. Indeed, he saw the nursing faculty's participation as a 
way to back up the union's demands to workload relief and eliminate a barrier to union 
progress subtly imposed by the nursing program director who had a habit of bragging to
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her administrative peers about the long hours of her faculty, a habit the union president 
perceived to undermine his efforts to gain executive attention for the workload issue.
In the fall of 1987, four of the six full-time teachers in nursing worked with 
members of the general faculty in the union's effort to unseat two pro-administration 
board incumbents. Their effort succeeded. After years of waiting, the new board 
majority approved a new faculty contract that included salary increases and, finally, the 
workload reduction sought by the nursing faculty.
Cross-site Analysis
The preceding case summaries depict the responses of nursing faculties to 
retrenchment, and illustrate how some programs came to be targeted for harsh selective 
measures, while others avoided program termination. The lessons of those stories are 
important to summarize. How did nursing programs come to be targeted? What 
generalizations can be made?
Common to the districts selectively downsizing their nursing programs was that 
after Proposition 13 all of their boards of trustees made decisions about the future 
direction of their institutions. In three cases-Arroyo, Palomino, and Pine Hill-the 
trustees determined at an early point to change course in order to curtail conditions that 
might otherwise complicate their adaptation to the new economic environment, and hired 
new managers with skills and management philosophies tailored to the institution's 
objectives.
The pattern in the Los Angeles district, where officials sought to preserve and 
expand their institution's scope of operations, was somewhat different Adopting the 
rhetoric of reorganization, they rewarded special interests and perpetuated management 
practices that made the district vulnerable to decline. Forced by intense outside political 
pressure, the officials finally opted to restructure.
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In all four of these institutions, the officials held a vision of the institution not 
shared by their constituencies, and used procedures to develop retrenchment policy that 
invited resistance from groups within the organization. All four eventually faced huge 
deficits which their administrators proposed to resolve with cutbacks to nursing and other 
selected areas. In each case, the termination decisions appeared to have a political as well 
as an economic rationale. Public persuasion, for example, appeared to be part of the 
agenda.
The conditions at Delta and Desert Flat were similar in some respects~all, for 
example, experienced significant decline-but different in others. The troubled board of 
trustees of the Delta district, while struggling with its own internal problems, hired a CEO 
with broad experience to run the district. He balanced a concern for the economy of the 
institution with a value of its human resources. By budgeting conservatively, and 
engaging the faculty in a humane cutback policy based on shared sacrifice, he fostered 
conditions that preserved the financial and social welfare of the institution for several 
years. Only later, after the period of economic crisis finally passed, and the district failed 
with reward the faculty’s cooperation with salary raises, did the faculty organize to resist 
district policy.
At Desert Flat, an ample building fund eased uncertainty. Its top executives 
managed with deep across-the-board cutbacks and a policy of selective growth made 
possible by heavy use of part-time teachers. Despite the unpopularity of that policy, the 
faculty remained cooperative. Conflict did not erupt until new administrators invoked 
procedural changes that encroached on the autonomy of the teachers. Thereafter the 
faculty union pressed for salary increases and workload relief that eventually resulted in a 
campaign to unseat incumbent trustees.
At both Delta and Desert Flat, the executives demonstrated an ongoing 
commitment to preserving the instruction program, and to a value of nursing as a student 
attraction. Absent the economic desperation evident among the administrators at the other
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sites, neither district moved to selectively downsize their nursing departments.
The nursing faculties in all six cases responded with clear patterns of political 
behavior. At Arroyo, Palomino, Pine Hill, and Los Angeles they waged anti-termination 
campaigns to prevent the enactment of termination proposals. At Desert Rat, the nursing 
faculty joined a union effort to unseat incumbent trustees in the interest of gaining a 
workload reduction, and at Delta, where in the absence of crisis members resisted 
governance participation, the faculty accommodated to decline.
Summary of Findings on the Objectives
The primary objectives of this study were to determine:
1. How and to what extent nursing faculty members acted on behalf of their own 
interests to influence policies proposed in the campus and state legislative arenas as a 
response to community college fiscal decline, 1982-87.
2. What factors influenced the pattern of political behavior exhibited by nursing 
faculty members.
3. What impact nursing faculty response patterns had on policy decisions 
pertaining to nursing programs.
The secondary objectives were to determine:
4. How and to what extent the patterns of political behavior of nursing faculty 
compared to those of nonnursing faculty in the same community college subject to the 
same budget cuts.
5. How and to what extent the patterns of political behavior varied between 
community college nursing faculties.
The main focus of this study was the political behavior of community college 
nursing faculty in response to budget cuts and institutional retrenchment. The question 
asked was whether or not nursing instructors operating under reduced allotments would
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act to secure policies more in their own professional interest.
Levine et al. (1981) theorized that institutional retrenchment—how organizations 
cut back, whether across-the-board or selectively-depends on the relative strength of the 
groups exercising power over organization policy. They also identified a relationship 
between resource change and the outcome of the policy debate. Severe decline, according 
to their model, prompts administrators to attempt selective cutbacks, but also exposes the 
weaknesses of formal authority, rendering it vulnerable to challenges from interest group 
coalitions. A final review of the data in light of the research objectives is helpful to 
summarize the behavior of nursing faculties, how they acted, and how well they fared in 
their efforts to exercise power over organizational policy.
Objective I; Nursing faculties response to fiscal decline. Revenue decline and 
retrenchment were common to the institutions in this study’s sample. All of the 
institutions made across-the-board spending reductions which at some point challenged 
their nursing faculties to adapt to reduced budgets. Nonselective retrenchment policies cut 
or froze nursing allocations, resulting in losses which were amplified by the double-digit 
inflation of the period.
The most common nursing faculty response under these circumstances was to 
accommodate decline by complying with or incrementally adjusting to the reductions. 
The faculties engaged in a program of conservation, resource substitution, fundraising, 
and curriculum adjustment the objective of which was to make scarce resources go 
farther, and thus preserve the status quo, but also to minimize the threat of future, deeper 
cutbacks, and as one director put it, to “get administration off of our backs.”
Accommodation tactics fit easily into the functional routines of nursing 
departments. Indeed, they required no interruption of routine by time-consuming new 
activities such as those of on-campus governance participation, and created few new 
inconveniences for busy faculty members who often perceived themselves to be
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overworked. Thus, accommodation allowed nursing faculties to preserve their traditional 
focus and central value-clinical teaching—while dealing with the challenge of reduced 
allotments to the quality of their efforts. Absent a threat to program survival, few groups 
engaged in activities to change policy at the local level, and few participated in the political 
activities of the organizations seeking change at the state government level.
This pattern changed, however, when the survival of nursing programs was put in 
jeopardy by official or informal threats of termination. With few exceptions, the only 
groups to go beyond the tactics of accommodation were those forced to deal with 
involuntary faculty reduction and program termination proposals. Termination 
represented a threat to professional identity and job security of nursing faculty members, 
even among those whose jobs were not threatened by layoff. Thus, threatened with 
termination, nursing faculties typically adopted the tactics of contention, forming 
coalitions with various other groups inside and outside of the organization to wage anti­
termination campaigns. Although those campaigns varied in scope of action and 
participation, they, too, were directed toward preserving the status quo—that is, toward 
keeping nursing programs intact and unchanged.
Objective ! ;f a c to r s  influencing the political behavior of nursing faculties. 
Members' perspectives on the funding situation, the goals and needs of the institution, 
and their outlook on the fairness of the retrenchment policy, the ready availability of 
alternative resources and substitutes, and the desire of groups to their functional routines, 
were all important in influencing the political behavior exhibited by nursing faculties. 
How these factors shaped the patterns of nursing faculties can be understood by 
examining those patterns in light of crisis, conflict, leadership, and faculty values.
Layoff and termination proposals presented a profound threat to the professional 
identity of nursing faculties. Not only were jobs at stake, but also the satisfaction that 
members derived from their professional mission and other values such as continued
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association with each other, the department, and in some cases, the institution. 
Termination proposals, which raised the specter of the endangerment o f program 
survival, threatened those values, causing members to perceive a significant discrepancy 
between the existing and desired circumstances. Thus, termination caused a crisis as 
members came to perceive their individual and collective welfare in jeopardy from the 
direction of district policy.
Across-the-board retrenchment, on the other hand, and the material austerity and 
personnel attrition that from it overwhelmed very few faculties. Nursing faculties in 
general did not regard supply shortages or a loss of positions by attrition as an 
insurmountable blow to faculty or department welfare. Indeed, they had ready access to 
alternative resources and substitutes that allowed them to compensate for those losses and 
narrow the needs-resources gap. Thus, reduced allocations, even when severe, generally 
was not a cause for crisis.
Absent a crisis, most groups were reluctant to engage in behavior that would 
engage them in conflict with other groups. Indeed, the structure of faculty routines and 
unique mode of organization of nursing departments provided disincentives to do so, and 
substitutes and alternative resources made the avoidance of conflict possible. Rather than 
engage in governance participation most faculties adapted by using the tactics of 
accommodation and/or by reducing their expectations for instructional support
Only in a few cases when program survival and faculty jobs were not at stake 
were other responses evident. Those cases occurred in situations (#6,9, 21, 23, and 35, 
for example) where faculty leaders had a vision of how the nursing department could 
benefit from governance participation even during decline, and were able to persuade their 
colleagues of the importance of engaging in the activities of the institution. This happened 
in very few programs, however. Far more common were the cases in which program 
directors and their faculties pursued measures that allowed them to avoid the 
inconvenience of governance participation.
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Finally, the dedication to minimal change and preserving the status quo found at 
the district level also typified the efforts of nursing program directors in their state 
organizations. Again, the efforts of the directors' dealt more with educating their peers 
members’ in measures for coping with decline than with changing retrenchment policy at 
the local or state level.
Objectives 3: The impact of faculty responses on policy decisions. Most of the 
nursing faculties not selectively targeted for layoffs and termination accommodated to 
across-the-board budget reductions. Indeed, only a few faculties worked to change 
nonselective policies. According to Levine et al. (1981), administrators often meet 
declining resources with nonselective cutback strategies to avoid triggering the 
antagonism of groups inside and outside of the organization and weaken the involvement 
of interest groups in the policy process. It is not surprising, therefore, that nursing 
faculties would opt to accommodate to decline challenge since that is the political purpose 
of across-the-board strategies.
By accommodating, nursing faculties clearly avoided conflict, but at some cost to 
their instructional standards. On the other hand, the few groups that risked conflict to 
compete for benefits did not gain additional resources in every case or improve the 
conditions of their departments. Some (#6, 9, 23, 35) were successful, while others 
(#21, for example) were not
On the other hand, most of the nursing faculties targeted for selective cutbacks 
challenged district proposals that otherwise might have resulted in program reduction and 
an involuntary loss of faculty jobs. Indeed, all but a few mounted anti-termination 
campaigns, and succeeded in completely or partially reversing their circumstances, and 
sometimes in gaining other tangible and intangible benefits (improved faculty morale, 
program standing).
Nursing faculties brought pressure to bear by a variety of means. They appealed
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to public figures, local agencies, and government entities in a position to influence district 
decisions, and in some cases worked jointly with them to identify and implement strategy; 
they worked to gain organizational positions from which to influence policy; they 
coordinated with unions, students, alumni and others to orchestrate media 
demonstrations, with local health service professionals to coordinate community 
challenges, and with other faculty groups to thwart policy opponents inside the 
organization; they collected data for rational anti-termination arguments, testified on their 
own behalf before boards of trustees, mounted letter lobbies in support of legislative and 
regulatory intervention; and, when all else failed, they participated in and, in some cases, 
helped to coordinate local electoral efforts aimed at ousting incumbents and installing new 
trustees who favored their policy objectives.
The scope of actions varied from group to group, as did the number of members 
participating in the effort, which in most groups was less than full faculty participation. 
Overall, nursing faculties engaged in a wide range of anti-termination activities, and 
showed strength in their efforts to exercise power over district policy. Indeed, their 
actions confirmed the relationship between resource change and policy outcome described 
by Levine et al. (1981), who proposed that severe resource weakens the ability of formal 
authorities to resist challenges from the interest groups they serve-even, it would seem, 
from groups ordinarily inactive in organizational decision-making.
Objective 4: Comparison of political behavior of nursing and nonnursing faculties. 
Despite the severe financial conditions of many community college during the period of 
this study, the data revealed a tendency on the part of nursing faculties to focus on their 
teaching routines to the exclusion of other activities, including governance. Indeed, 
because of their unique relationship to the community, nursing faculties were able to 
accommodate to decline. The data also showed a related tendency on the part of nursing 
faculties to discount the likelihood of institutional policies selectively target nursing
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programs.
These tendencies, according to the survey and interview data, were not 
characteristic of nonnursing faculties. The data gathered about nonnursing groups 
showed they were more involved than nursing faculties in college and district governance 
activities and more regularly participated in the advisory bodies and informal networks 
where organizational policy was discussed, perhaps because they did not have the ready 
access to alternative resources and substitutes that nursing faculties had. Because 
nonnursing groups involved themselves in governance, it can be argued that they were in 
a better position than nursing faculties to compete in the arena of.organizational politics, 
and thereby improve their allocations from college or district sources.
Thus, it can also be argued that nonnursing groups were better prepared for 
dealing with termination crises when they arose. As the data showed, however, that 
nonnursing faculties often had difficulty putting their subunit self-interests aside, which 
hampered them in organizing internal anti-termination coalitions. At the same time, 
nonnursing faculties lacked the advantages of nursing faculties in putting together external 
coalitions, advantages such as strong economic connections to community agencies, a 
mission clearly connected to public policy concerns, or a well-defined vocational identity 
to which the public easily related. Lacking those advantages, nonnursing groups, it can 
be argued, had more difficulty than nonnursing groups putting together alliances that 
made strong anti-termination campaigns possible. Indeed, as the data showed, 
nonnursing faculties were usually no more effective and sometimes less effective than 
nursing faculties in responding to program termination proposals. Although their 
programs were usually less costly, and therefore less conspicuous than nursing as a 
solution to budget deficits, nonnursing faculties did not enjoy the unique structural 
relationship to the community typical of nursing and thus did not share the source of 
power exercised that shaped the behavior of nursing faculties.
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Objective 5: Variations of political behavior between nursing faculties. The date 
showed a remarkable similarity from program to program in the political behavior of 
nursing faculties. Most shared the goal of keeping their programs intact under the 
difficult conditions imposed by revenue decline. As indicated above, the faculties in this 
study pursued that goal with one of two distinct patterns of political behavior- 
accommodation and contention. Depending on their retrenchment circumstances, faculties 
either accommodated to across-the-board policies or employed the tactics of contention to 
prevent the enactment of a termination proposal targeted to nursing. Over 90% of the 
faculties in this study adapted with a pattern of accommodation to nonselective cutbacks, 
which all groups (N = 38) faced. See Tables 23 and 24. Although fewer groups (N = 
12) were targeted for selective retrenchment, all but one (N = 11) mounted anti- 
termination campaigns incorporating the tactics of resistance and opposition typical of a 
pattern of contention.
Working to prevent change from across-the-board reductions, accommodating 
faculties accepted the challenge of reduced allocations, and responded with a pattern of 
rational behavior compatible with their role as decision implementers. Encouraged by 
their program directors, they directed their attention to identifying practical solutions that 
promised to minimize their needs-resources gap.
Their actions centered on conserving resources, locating alternative resources, and 
making co-optive program adjustments. Such actions were compatible with the primary 
objective of their members which was to preserve the functional routines of the 
department, but allowed faculties to limit change while softening the impact of reduced 
resources, and yet avoid the inconveniences of participating in policy development 
Thus, they maintained their concentration on the clinical teaching routines from which 
their professional identity derived.
Faculties also accommodated to reduce the chance of a targeted threat in the future. 
As Director #10 put it, the aim was “to get administration off of our backs.” They
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accommodated to avoid conflict with institutional officials and their peers in other 
subunits. By accommodating, however, they did not always avoid conflict among 
themselves. Thus, the shortages created by nonselective cutbacks were felt most acutely 
by members whose courses had higher requirements for supplies, equipment, and 
personnel. Thus, the burden of accommodation, which fell disproportionately on some 
teachers, caused conflict within some faculties.
A few of the faculties in this study diverged from the pattern of accommodating to 
nonselective retrenchment. To alter the allocation decisions of local administrators, they 
resisted or opposed nonselective cutbacks, or co-opted administrators into increasing their 
allocations. In each case where this occurred, the faculties were encouraged by their 
nursing program directors who appreciated the political nature of allocation decisions and 
sought to influence their members to become active players in the internal politics of the 
organization.
Twelve nursing programs became the object of termination proposals. In each 
case, their faculties were desperate to prevent losses. Thus, in crisis they embraced a new 
model. In all but one instance, targeted faculties abandoned accommodation for the tactics 
of contention in order to exercise control over the policy decisions. Lacking political 
experience, information, organization, and leadership, they changed their behavior under 
difficult conditions, but overcame the barriers to mount anti-termination campaigns.
In place of the practical problem solving, faculties substituted direct challenges to 
district policy. Indeed, they formed coalitions and acted as interest groups in the open 
forum of district policy making. The alliances they organized usually involved 
community groups. Faculties thus prevailed upon their community base, groups external 
to the college with an interest in maintaining local nursing education programs, most 
commonly hospital executives. Such alliances were sensitive to changes in the local 
demand for program graduates, however. Thus, as hospitals began to suffer economic 
decline, nursing faculties had more difficulty enlisting the support of their executives.
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Further, the nature of the termination proposal and the political complexity of the 
institution were important determinants of the scope of political action employed in 
nursing anti-termination campaigns. Informal threats (policies suggested but not put to an 
official vote) gave nursing faculties latitude to use internal decision structures in their 
effort to redirect retrenchment policy, and to combine the tactics of accommodation and 
contention. Official proposals, on the other hand, pushed faculties directly into the public 
forum of policy decision making. Further, the relationship of the institution to higher 
levels of government, such as in the state-local shadow governance network that existed 
in the case of the Los Angeles district, made it necessary for nursing faculties to reach out 
beyond the immediate community to state government authorities and bodies in waging 
their campaigns.
Internal social factors, such as the motivation and tactical preferences of faculty 
members, also shaped anti-termination campaigns. In some groups, for example, there 
were members who rejected public challenges as a solution to department problems, and 
preferred to alter policy by influencing officials in the course of regular faculty routines 
and role relationships. Their preferences revealed a disparity of motivation between those 
members whose personal stake in the status quo was secure, and those whose personal 
stake was in jeopardy. Members in the former group, which included some program 
directors, feared the consequences of a failed power strategy, while members the latter 
feared the consequences of a failed consensus strategy. Not only were motivational 
differences a cause of social conflict, they served to undermine the capacity of faculties to 
organize in a time of crisis.
Faculties also differed in the arguments they offered to advance their anti­
termination efforts. Some faculties took a rational approach, directly challenging program 
cost, the rational argument most often used by college administrators to justify their 
proposals, as a basis for program termination. Other faculties countered with emotional 
appeals stressing the quality and reputation of their programs, while a few offered
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arguments based on faculty speculations about the underlying political basis of 
termination policies. The differences in the way faculties groups approached their own 
defense derived from internal dynamics of the group, and the perspectives and theories of 
those members who emerged to lead their efforts. In most cases, the internal organization 
of anti-termination campaigns was loose, and members were not unanimous in their 
perspectives on whether or not to challenge district policy.
Finally, the focus of this study was the political behavior of nursing faculties. It 
is therefore important to consider whether or not, or in what sense, accommodation and 
contention constituted forms of political behavior.
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary characterizes political action as action 
concerned with making policy as distinct from the executing policy. Jeffries and Rost 
(1996) characterize politics as an interactive process wherein individuals and groups 
attempt to affect the allocation of limited organizational resources to favor their own or the 
public's interest. By those definitions, the pattern of contention, which involved faculties 
in forming coalitions to prevent termination policies from being enacted, was clearly in the 
category of political behavior.
The case for accommodation is less clear. However, one might be argue that by 
complying and/or making incremental or pro forma, co-optive changes, that faculties took 
the initiative away from their administrators, and in that way, dissipated program cost as 
an issue, thus reducing the likelihood of additional future demands. Thus, 
accommodation behavior was clearly political to the extent that it had a political effect, 
which in the case of faculties in this study was to co-opt the administration's argument.
Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn from the findings on institutional 
retrenchment and nursing faculty behavior.
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Conclusions on Institutional Policy
Conclusion 1: Organizational history and values created circumstances that helped 
or hindered an institution's adaptation to decline. As the data showed, economic events at 
the state level—tax limitation, growth caps, defunding, and the revenue veto—led to 
widespread revenue decline at the institutional level. Revenue decline, however, 
coincided with another major event in the community college system—the advent of 
faculty collective bargaining, which became an important factor in local policies for 
dealing with decline. Further, an institution’s financial conditions prior to tax limitation 
helped to determine its vulnerability to fiscal crisis after tax limitation. Prior low tax rates, 
reflected in low reserve accumulation, left some districts dependent on state funds. Such 
conditions made it more difficult for some institutions to weather subsequent funding 
changes.
Institutional values-as reflected in the priority districts gave to service, 
community, public trust, or economic efficiency-also played a role in creating the 
financial conditions that institutions faced after tax limitation. Many institutions, for 
example, had trouble sustaining the cost of rapid growth or the comprehensive curricula 
they instituted prior to Proposition 13.
Conclusion 2: Some institutions realigned their values in anticipation of an 
economic crisis, while others did not Value realignments were evident in many districts, 
as officials reacted to financial pressure by redirecting their institutions the in the interest 
of achieving greater economic efficiency. Officials seeking to redirect their institutions 
sometimes sought new administrative personnel, and used executive turnover as a means 
of realigning district values. The administrators recruited to facilitate a redirection brought 
their preferences for managing decline with them. Often, although not always, the 
philosophies of the new executives stressed economy and narrowing the mission of the 
institution over other values.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
340
Conclusion 3; Few administrators in this study showed leadership in their 
approach to retrenchment policy development. Rost (1991, 1992) defined leadership as 
an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes (in 
people's attitudes, behavior, or assumptions) that reflect their mutual purposes. He 
further described the process as noncoercive in nature, and not to be equated with the 
hierarchical forms of decision making in which managers exercise their contractual 
authority and issue directives from the top of the communication ladder to decision 
implementers at the bottom of the organization.
In light of Rost's definition, few of the administrators in this study engaged in 
leadership as they developed their cutback recommendations. Indeed, as the selected site 
studies showed, most failed to engage the institution's internal constituencies in a 
meaningful exchange, and thus invited the conflict evident at all six sites, conflict which 
might have been lessened under a more collaborative approach to retrenchment policy 
development
Conclusion 4: The tolerance of institutional officials for economic uncertainty and 
risk varied considerably. As the data showed, economic crisis generally coincided with 
forecasts of large, looming budget deficits, not with the immediate financial position of 
institutions. Termination proposals were often proposed as a solution to perceived fiscal 
crisis. The financial point, however, at which administrators proposed to restructure and 
narrow the scope of district operations varied considerably.
Some executives, for example, appeared to value economic efficiency over other 
values, and proposed faculty layoffs and program terminations well before the 
institution's losses had reached the point of financial exigency. Others appeared to place a 
high value educational idealism and put off restructuring until an impending economic 
catastrophe forced it. The fiscal point at which administrators proposed restructuring 
reflected the value the institution put on economic efficiency.
Conclusion 5: In times of economic uncertainty, nursing program terminations
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had appeal to efficiency-conscious managers in search of solutions to looming deficits. 
Nursing programs, which were often sizable and expensive operations, made appealing 
administrative targets, as executives sought solutions to budget deficits. Indeed, their 
large faculties, small enrollments, and high budgets made them conspicuous, and 
provided efficiency-conscious administrators with compelling rational arguments for 
program termination. Nursing terminations comprised an easy way to reduce fiscal 
stress, and were easily justified as officials idealistic concerns for program quality and 
community gave way to pragmatic concerns about cost-burden—the proportion of district 
resources consumed by a nursing program.
Conclusion 6; Although cost-cutting was a common objective, administrators also 
had other objectives for proposing nursing program terminations. In every district where 
nursing programs were proposed for termination, the cost of nursing education was cited 
by planners as the main justification for termination. However, other objectives, often 
political, were also evident. Public persuasion was one. Administrators also used 
nursing termination proposals to advance their objectives for overall institutional cost- 
cutting, fund-raising, or eliminating programs other than nursing.
Conclusion 7: Program termination invited strong reaction from institutional 
constituencies. Confirming the propositions of Levine et al. (1981), program 
terminations proposals invited intense conflict and confrontation with an institution's 
internal and external constituencies. Termination proposals pitted faculty and student 
groups against administrators and boards o f trustees on the one hand, and community 
educational interests against district economic interests on the other. The economic and 
social consequences of that conflict were substantial.
Conclusion 8: The conflict aroused bv harsh retrenchment policies caused several 
institutions to realign their values. Harsh retrenchment policies resulted in electoral 
changes on to the boards of trustees at all six selected sites. Those changes caused a 
realignment of institutional values away from economic efficiency and toward educational
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idealism, and a greater concern for community and the restoration of social harmony.
Conclusions on Nursing Faculty Behavior
CanclHsiBD A  Absent a serious threat to. faculty jobs-Qr-progaffi-syryiYak nursing 
faculties accommodated to decline with managerial solutions to the problems imposed bv 
budget cutbacks. The results showed that most faculties accommodated to across-the- 
board cutbacks, but resisted and opposed selective termination, generally regarded as a 
crisis situation. One political benefit of accommodating was that it required little new 
behavior and faculties could remain focused on their teaching routines.
Accommodation, as Levine et al. (1981) suggested, was a natural political 
consequence of across-the-board retrenchment strategies, yet in part, as this study 
showed, reflected a deep motivation on the part of nursing faculties to protect their central 
value, clinical teaching. Thus, in very few instances did nursing faculties deal with 
decline by attempting to alter budget policy since such a strategy required a level of 
governance participation to which few faculties were willing to commit, absent a crisis.
Conclusion 10; Nursing faculties faced with a threat to Job security and the 
survival of their programs abandoned accommodation for contention. Faced with the 
high probability of program termination, nursing faculties altered their behavioral pattern, 
and organized anti-termination campaigns. Although most of the faculties in this study 
did not foresee targeted nursing program reductions, when termination crises occurred, 
they sought out resources, including political information and leadership, and formed 
alliances to stave off policy enactment
Conclusion 11: Nursing's community base was a key factor in the political 
hehavior of the faculties . Because of the availability of resources in the community to 
nursing programs, nursing faculties were able to accommodate to across-the-board 
retrenchment and avoid the conflict and inconvenience inherent in governance
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participation. Further, the close relationship that nursing faculties enjoyed with hospitals 
and other local health agencies provided them with resources not enjoyed by other faculty 
groups, including power resources important to the success of anti-termination 
campaigns.
Conclusion 12: Nursing faculty members differed in their preferences foranti- 
termination tactics, and those differences complicated faculty efforts to organize effective 
anti-termination campaigns. Individual self-interest in relation to job security and 
professional identity conflicted with the interests of the anti-termination effort in some 
cases, which caused variations in the scope of participation among members of the 
faculties in this study.
Conclusion 13: When nursing campaign outcomes fell short of a total policy 
reversal, the final decision was usually dominated bv factors outside of faculty control. 
Anti-termination efforts failed in situations where the economic and political trends were 
too strong to overcome. Decline in the local demand for program graduates, for example, 
kept some groups from obtaining a policy reversal, as did the politics of fiscal 
accountability which some administrators co-opted to the advantage of their retrenchment 
proposals.
Conclusion 14: The nursing faculties in this study engaged in political behavior. 
The nursing faculties in this study acted in their own interests with clear patterns of 
political behavior. All groups complied with, incrementally adjusted to, or co-opted 
across-the-board policies in order to fend off future cutbacks and seize the initiative from 
local administrators who argued that nursing programs were expensive. A few groups 
also resisted or opposed such policies to improve their allocations. Likewise, the faculties 
targeted for termination mounted and-termination campaigns in which they used power 
strategies to stave off the enactment of targeted policies as they applied to nursing.
Further, most faculties engaged in letter lobbying to alter policy at the state level, 
but few seized other political options at the state level, such as working to establish broad
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coalitions of educators and health service professionals to change the state policies driving 
up the cost of nursing education.
Conclusion 15: Nursing programs proved difficult to terminate. Community anti­
termination coalitions were easy to assemble during periods when the nursing job market 
was healthy and program graduates were in high demand. Thus, nursing anti-termination 
campaigns attracted media attention which helped to arouse vocal public opposition and 
made it difficult for college administrators to terminate nursing programs.
Implications for Future Research
This study focused on a unique period in the history of the California Community 
Colleges and associate degree nursing education in California. Not only were the 
community colleges under economic siege between 1982 to 1987, but associate degree 
nursing programs were challenged by a temporary downturn in many of the local nursing 
job markets in California, resulting in conditions that made nursing program downsizing 
and termination administratively justifiable.
Both situations subsequently improved, but with recent trends in the state 
economy, fluctuations in revenue again plague the community colleges (Adams, 1994; 
Huggett, 1994). As important, the economic impact of managed care in the California 
health care marketplace has profoundly affected the number and structure of jobs in 
California hospitals (Kreiner, 1995). Thus, the trends that put associate degree nursing 
programs at risk during the period of this study are again evident
Indeed, economics continue to dominant the politics of California's community 
colleges. Despite Proposition 98, a voter initiative which guaranteed 40 percent of state 
tax monies for public education, California has not kept up with the economic needs of its 
community college system (Piland, 1995). The reasons are by now familiar; a five-year 
recession (1990-1995) which substantially reduced tax revenues, and the limitation of
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funds for new community college students under state imposed growth caps. Thus, it 
would seem that the economic conditions that favored retrenchment in the years of this 
study, 1982-87, again exist
Moreover, the environment of health care has changed dramatically since this 
study was conducted. Managed care, a capitated, prospective payment system for 
containing health care costs, has rapidly evolved in recent years to become the new 
regional and national model of health care finance. By injecting market competition into 
health care finance, managed care has already had a huge effect on the resources of 
California's hospitals, and thus on provider jobs. Indeed, at one California hospital 
alone, more than 1500 of a total 4300 employees have been laid off since 1991 (New 
York Times. January 29, 1995).
Such conditions repeated throughout the state make it clear that the same forces 
that placed nursing programs at risk between 1982 to 87, are again relevant to today's 
environment, and will continue to shape the conditions of associate degree nursing 
programs in the state for the foreseeable future. That said, it is appropriate to again ask 
the questions asked in this study:
(1) How severely have the community colleges been affected by the recent 
economic trends? What actions have they taken to meet their resource needs?
(2) How are community college officials currently approaching their fiscal 
challenges, with a paternalistic, top-down paradigm as seen in the findings of this study, 
or with some other model of organizational decision making?
(3) How are nursing programs faring, and what factors are administrators 
considering as they allocate funds to nursing programs? What changes are nursing 
educators making to their programs in light of changes in the environment of education 
and health care?
(4) What is the current role of nursing faculties in the local and state policy 
process? Have they increased their participation in college and state budget governance?
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In a search for answers to these questions, it would be wise to consider the 
limitations of this study. First and foremost, the broad scope, although justified in 
exploratory research, made an in-depth analysis of many important aspects impossible to 
do. Future studies should therefore focus on narrow aspects of the questions posed 
above, which indeed might provide a direction for several studies rather than one.
Secondly, the methods used in this study were cumbersome. Although telephone 
interviews are superior to surveys when the objective is contextual data, the fact is they 
are not superior when the objective is factual information. Well-constructed surveys are 
appropriate for obtaining much of the factual information needed to answer the questions 
suggested above, and would limit the time and expense of collecting the information.
Thirdly, the design of this study was limited by its retrospective orientation. 
Indeed, some institutions were studied two or more years after their respective 
retrenchment crises, which made it difficult in some cases to locate those individuals who 
had important roles in local policy development A future design should study evolving 
situations. Further, a future design should focus on a broader range of retrenchment 
situations to identify cases with the potential to yield data on nuances in the patterns of 
nursing faculty political behavior.
The Implications for Nursing Education and the Community Colleges
The findings of this study have important implications for nursing education and 
the community colleges now and in the future.
Proposition 13 caused a political and economic sea change in the environment of 
the California community colleges. People at all levels of the system were forced to deal 
with new conditions which often included material austerity, budget deficits, student 
enrollment decline, and severe conflict between groups as the flow of resources 
dwindled. Faced with rapid and threatening change, it is no surprise that they would
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
347
assume a reactive posture and dedicate themselves to preserving the status quo. Indeed, 
as Harris (1995) noted, sameness is a comfort zone.
Clearly, the nursing faculties dealt reactively with their cutback circumstances. 
Thrust into unfamiliar conditions, they sought to minimize change rather than embrace it. 
Indeed, they paid little attention to one of the most important factors driving the politics of 
nursing education—the cost of nursing programs. Current trends, however, suggest that 
associate degree nursing faculties in California and the nation will soon face new demands 
that will force them to examine not only program cost, but also structure, content, 
methods, and settings, in short, the entire paradigm of nursing education.
Those demands will derive not only from changes in the economic environment of 
the community colleges, but from rapid changes in health care and medical technology 
will. With its emphasis on cost-efficiency, managed care, for example, is transforming 
not only the economics of health care, but health care itself. Providers who once worked 
independently on parallel professional tracks are now working collaboratively to provide 
cost-efficient care. At the same time, current technology and the emerging emphasis on 
prevention are making it possible to shift health care out of hospital settings and into the 
community and home. Hospital stays are becoming shorter and shorter, and more and 
more services are being transferred to ambulatory care centers or home settings.
These trends, which have already caused major changes in nursing, promise to 
carry over into the twenty-first century and the new millennium. Indeed, nurses in the 
managed care system are assuming central figures as case managers and as planners of 
critical pathways and other systems to ensure economic efficiency in health service. In 
ever greater numbers, moreover, nurses moving into the community or rendering nursing 
care in the home.
Given these changes, futuristic nursing educators are beginning to recognize the 
need for a new model of nursing education, a model that emphasizes the content and skills 
needed by nurses working in this new system. Lindeman (1996), for example, called for
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a new paradigm that emphasizes clinical simulations and care management skills; that 
provides exposure diverse groups and populations of patients in a variety of settings, as 
well as opportunities to work with communities; and, finally, a paradigm that stresses 
independent student learning. Her ideas require a new direction for the clinical education 
of nurses, particularly at the associate degree level, where nursing programs have long 
stressed hospital instruction, the care of individual patients, a focus on needs rather than 
resources, and close instructor supervision. Thus, community college nursing faculties 
will be challenged by such ideas to establish new ways of educating tomorrow's nurses.
In summary, associate degree nursing education is at a crossroads where change 
is unavoidable and where its resources are again uncertain. Nursing faculties have an 
opportunity to address these trends by establishing a new model of nursing education, 
one more appropriate to trends in the health care and education environments. 
Information technology will almost certainly become an essential feature of a more 
economical model of nursing education. The use of computer simulation promises to 
broaden range of experiences to which nursing students have access but without requiring 
intensive (and costly) instructor supervision. Faculties will therefore require resources to 
expand their hardware and software inventories, but will need to prepare for changes in 
their teaching role as the familiar tasks of classroom lecturing and clinical student 
supervision give way to program development and learning experience coordination. As 
the model for student education changes, faculdes will have to renegotiate not only the 
instructor's role, but also the economic formula under which their activities and programs 
are funded.
The demands confronting nursing faculties are presenting themselves at a time 
when California's community colleges are pondering their own future. To a large extent, 
the issues facing the community colleges are those of nursing education: how to enhance 
student learning opportunities and modernize operations in an environment where 
resources are shrinking. Piland (1995), for example, calls for a new educational
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paradigm in which the community colleges embrace the central role of information 
technology in the coming century.
Another issue is the role of the community colleges in economic development and 
addressing the needs of those facing career displacement (Dozier and Zwolak, 1996). 
Corporate reorganization and downsizing, documented by the New York Times as the 
most wrenching trend of the 1990s, is forecast to continue into the new millennium, 
creating a demand for worker retraining (New York Times. March 3-9, 1996). 
Presumably, hospital and health service reorganization will put pressure on the 
community colleges (and thus nursing programs) as workers displaced by downsizing 
seek new skills.
How these challenges will be resolved remains to be seen. Clearly, nursing 
faculties can no longer afford to react to change in health care and the educational 
environment, but must seize the initiative by proactively addressing the trends now 
apparent. To meet the demands, they will need to dispense with their old model and 
identify a new, more economical paradigm. This process will require new resources and 
it will take place in an organizational context. Thus, nursing faculties will have to 
redefine the way they relate to other groups in the college organization, as they redefine 
themselves and their operation. No longer can nursing faculties afford to exclude 
themselves from budget governance, as was evident in this study, and as Bahrawy (1992) 
found among nursing faculties in four-year institutions. Governance participation will be 
essential as nursing faculties seek to secure resources in an environment where resources 
are uncertain, will require nursing faculties to engage with college administrators, health 
service executives, government officials, other disciplines, and one another as they work 
to define a new, more economical paradigm for delivering preservice education to nurses.
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Appendix A
Cover Letter for Nursing Program Directors' Survey
December 3, 1984
Ms. , Assistant Dean 





The enclosed survey is the first phase of a doctoral dissertation on the political 
behavior of nurses. In this project the subjects of focus are nursing faculty members in 
California community colleges, and the issue to which political responses are related is the 
1982-84 budget retrenchment crisis in the California community college system.
In recent years nurses have come to appreciate what other health care groups have 
known for some time: that the route to achieving professional goals involves political 
strategy and engagement in the political arena. Yet a canvas of a small group of 
community college nursing education administrators reveals mixed impressions about the 
political assertion of nursing faculty during the recent budget crisis. Given their 
leadership role in conveying professional values to future nursing practitioners, the 
responses of this faculty group are extremely important to understand. Conducting a 
statewide study is a step toward achieving that understanding.
Thus, your completing this survey is very important. The survey form includes 
eleven brief, easy-to-answer questions. A stamped, self-addressed envelope is enclosed 
for returning the form. To be included in the data analysis, forms should be received by 
December 21, 1984. Let me thank you in advance for sharing your observations on this 
important matter.
Yours truly,
Karen J. Berger, R.N., Ed.D (C) 
Doctoral Candidate in Educational 
Leadership
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NURSING PROGRAM DIRECTORS SURVEY




1. What is your current enrollment?
What is the size of your facility?
2. Did your faculty make efforts to influence budget policy affecting your department 
during the 1982-84 budget retrenchment crisis in the California Community Colleges?
Yes No
3. How many of your faculty (total) participated in attempts to influence budget policy?
4. What form did these attempts take? Please check
Yes No Number of 
Faculty Participating
Participating on campus committees
Lobbying campus faculty leaders
Lobbying campus administrators
Lobbying school board members
Giving testimony to the school board
Enlisting students involvement
Enlisting teachers' union officials
Enlisting professional organization officials
Enlisting the media
Lobbying state legislators
Getters, phone calls, postcards, etc.)
Giving testimony to state legislative committees
Lobbying the Governor
Other
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5. Describe the patter of your faculty's efforts to influence the impact of budget 
retrenchment on your program (active vs. passive, etc.):
6. How do you explain this pattern?
7. Did other faculty groups on your campus (nonnursing faculty groups) make efforts 
to influence budget policy, and, if so, how did the pattern of the nursing faculty's 
efforts compare?
8. What impact did state budget cuts to post-secondary education have on your 
curriculum (enrollment, number of courses/program offered, number of faculty 
positions, facilities and equipment, etc.)?
9. Which other administrator on your campus would have insights on these questions?
Nam e__________________ Title________________________
10. Would you and your faculty be willing to participate in a further study of these 
issues?
11. Do you have a politics and policy making component in your nursing curriculum?
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Appendix B 
Cover Letter for Instructional Deans' Survey
April 8, 1985





The enclosed survey is the second phase of a doctoral dissertation on the political 
behavior of nurses. This study deals specifically with the political responses of nursing 
faculty members to the 1982-84 budget retrenchment crisis in the California community 
college system. It looks at attempts by nursing faculty members to influence budget 
decision affecting the nursing curriculum.
Data from the initial phase of the study indicate that, contrary to the common belief 
that “nurses are not very political,” many nursing program directors and faculty were very 
active indeed. The data also indicates that the factors determining their political behavior 
are complex.
At this point I am gathering further data to identify the actual impact of budget cuts 
on campus and nursing programs, and to determine the relative influence of the nursing 
faculty's efforts on budget cut decision. I am also interested in how their efforts 
compared with those of nonnursing faculty.
Your completing this survey is thus very important to the outcome of the study. 
Sixty seven percent of all California community college nursing program directors 
responded in the initial phase. You are being contacted to amplify the data they provided. 
The survey form includes seven short-answer questions and requests referral to politically 
active nonnursing faculty members who might provide comparative information on the 
issues o f this study.
Let me thank you in advance for sharing your observations and for returning this 
survey as soon as possible.
Yours truly,
Karen J. Berger, R.N., Ed.D (C) 
Doctoral Candidate 
University of San Diego






1. What impact did the budget retrenchment have on your campus? (Number of 
courses, programs offered; early retirements, replacement of those resigning, 
positions cut; equipment purchase and maintenance; student body size?)
2. What was the specific impact on your nursing department? 
How did this compare to other departments?
3. What were the organizational mechanisms on your campus for making decisions on 
implementing budget cuts? Who participated in making allocation decision?
4. Did the nursing department influence the allocation decisions? What impact did their 
efforts have on the budget decisions affecting nursing?
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5. How did the nursing faculty's efforts compare with those of other faculty groups in 
terms of assertiveness, organization, percentage of department members involved?
Who led the nurses efforts?
6. How active are your nursing department members (compared to other faculty 
groups) generally in campus politics?
7. Could you refer some nonnursing faculty on your campus who were involved in the 
politics of budget allocation decisions during the crisis and might have some insights on 
the issues of this study (teachers union officials, budget committee members, faculty 
senate leaders, etc.)?
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Appendix C 
Faculty Invitation Transmittal Letter
October 4,1985
Ms. , Department Chairperson 
Associate Degree Nursing Program 




Enclosed is a cover sheet about my dissertation research for your faculty to look 
over, and a sign-up sheet for those who are willing to be interviewed. I would really like 
to have 100% participation by those who were on campus between 1982 and 1984, if 
possible.
As you recall from the survey you were kind enough to return, the study looks at 
the political responses of nursing faculty during the California community college budget 
crisis, 1982-84. I am now entering the case study phase, looking for comparisons 
between faculty groups-10 faculties have been invited to participate.
I will be conducting brief telephone interviews with participating faculty. These 
will be scheduled at the convenience of each respondent I would like to complete the 
interviews by mid-semester. Interviews will be focused on the campus budget situation, 
the impact on the nursing department and most importantly, on nursing faculty 
responses.
I would greatly appreciate anything you can do to encourage cooperation. Thanks 
so much for your cooperation.
Yours truly.
Karen J. Berger, R.N., Ed.D (C) 
Doctoral Candidate 
University of San Diego
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Appendix D
Telephone Interview Schedule Sheet
School______________________________
Department___________________________ Extension______
Name Office Extension Home Phone Preferred Time
Dav/H our
* If preferred, interview calls can be directed to home phone number, however, this is for 
your convenience only.
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Appendix E 
Notice of Follow-up Call
April 8, 1985





The response to the survey you returned on the political behavior of California 
community college nursing faculty in the 1982-1984 budget retrenchment crisis in post­
secondary education was indeed gratifying. Two-thirds of the nursing program directors 
contacted replied. Preliminary analysis of the data indicates that there was considerable 
variability in faculty responses and that determining factors are complex.
To clarify and amplify survey data, I will be contacting the program directors who 
participated in the study. In brief telephone interviews during the month of April, I will 
be focusing on the same questions covered in the survey in an effort to fill in missing but 
necessary details.
Your initial response helped to provide potentially important data on the political 
behavior of nurses. I look forward to speaking with you to gain further insight on the 
important issues in this study.
Yours truly,
Karen J. Berger, R.N., Ed.D (C) 
Doctoral Candidate 
University of San Diego
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Appendix F 
Values for Constant Dollar Computation
















Source for CACPI: California Commission on State Finance
Note. Deflators are computed by dividing each year’s CACPI by the 1973-74 CACPI. Constant dollars 
are then calculated by dividing each year’s current dollar figure by that year’s deflator.
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Appendix G
Revenue Indexes Rank Ordered by Year 1973-1988
Dist 73-74 Dist 74-75 Dist 75-76 Dist 76-77 Dist 77-78 Dist 78-79 Dist 7980 Dist 8081
I LOQ 17 221 9 150 9 m 9 189 5 165 9 2£5 9 216
2 1.00 20 133 40 132 5 1.52 5 182 9 1.59 40 1.65 5 1.79
3 1.00 29 124 16 132 8 1.52 40 1.71 40 1.57 5 1.58 40 1.65
4 1.00 9 123 5 124 40 1.48 35 1.® 19 1.41 34 1.42 8 1.51
5 1.00 40 1.18 35 124 35 1.43 8 1.53 8 139 8 1.41 16 134
6 1.00 19 1.16 36 122 16 137 19 1.51 35 1.32 35 133 19 134
7 1.00 36 1.14 34 1.19 34 134 34 1.50 34 128 36 128 36 127
8 1.00 16 1.13 2 1.19 32 129 36 1.40 36 1.19 19 124 34 127
9 m 32 I S : 8 1.18 19 128 11 236 n 126 26 119 35 122
10 1.00 2 1.11 32 1.16 36 128 16 135 16 1.15 11 1.17 11 1.16
11 1.00 10 1.10 19 1.15 11 127 32 133 32 1.12 39 1.15 39 1.14
12 1.00 8 1.09 21 1.13 39 124 21 132 27 1.12 30 1.10 21 1.12
15 1.00 3 1.08 18 1.13 21 1.19 7 130 21 1.12 32 1.10 32 1.12
16 1.00 31 1.07 4 1.12 18 1.19 39 130 7 1.10 21 1.07 4 1.10
17 1.00 37 1.07 Z7 1.12 27 1.17 27 129 18 1.09 18 1.05 18 1.08
18 1.00 21 1.06 11 1.11 3 1.17 18 123 30 1.07 27 1.05 30 1.06
19 1.00 11 106 37 110 2 1.16 2 120 39 105 7 1(8 27 104
20 1.00 35 1.06 3 1.10 7 1.15 17 1.18 2 1.(8 37 1.01 24 1.04
21 1.00 15 1.06 10 1.09 37 1.15 37 1.17 20 1.01 2 1.00 17 1.04
23 1.00 18 1.06 30 1.08 17 1.15 4 1.16 17 0.99 24 1.00 20 1.01
24 1.00 M 1.05 3 1.08 30 1.14 20 1.15 4 0.97 17 1.00 7 1.01
27 1.00 4 1.04 15 1.08 15 1.13 24 1.15 3 0.96 4 0.99 37 1.01
29 1.00 24 1.04 7 1.07 4 1.13 30 1.13 24 0.96 20 0.98 3 0.99
30 1.00 7 1.04 31 1.07 33 1.13 10 1.12 37 0.95 31 0.97 29 0.99
31 1.00 39 1.(8 29 1.07 24 1.10 33 1.09 3 0.94 3 0.97 33 0.96
32 1X0 6 1.02 33 1.06 20 I® 3 109 33 0.94 3 m 31 096
33 1.00 33 1.02 24 1.06 3 1.09 3 1.07 15 0.93 33 0.91 2 0.96
34 1.00 30 1.01 39 1.06 31 1.06 29 1.06 10 0.93 6 058 3 0.93
35 1.00 27 1.01 20 1.05 10 1.05 31 1.05 31 0.88 29 057 6 0.93
36 1.00 23 0.98 17 1.02 1 1.04 15 1.03 6 0.88 15 050 10 053
37 1.00 12 0.97 6 1.00 29 1.02 1 0.97 29 0.87 12 0.80 1 052
39 1.00 1 0.94 1 1.00 6 1.01 6 0.97 1 0.83 1 0.79 15 0.78
40 LOO 5 087 12 090 12 091 12 (195 12 <179 » 078 12 076
Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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Revenue Indexes Rank Ordered by Year 1973-1988
Dist 81-82 Dist 82-83 Dist ©54 Dist 8455 Dist 8556 Dist 8687 Dist 8758
9 W 9 200 9 207 9 218 9' 249 9 257 9 280
5 1.66 5 1.61 5 1.55 5 1.59 5 1.72 5 1.68 5 1.76
40 1.53 40 1.42 8 135 40 138 8 1.51 8 1.53 11 1.59
8 1.48 8 1.40 40 130 8 136 40 1.49 40 1.48 40 1.55
36 127 16 120 11 1.19 11 134 11 1.42 11 1.46 8 1.55
16 1.26 35 1.17 16 1.16 36 121 36 134 36 1.41 36 1.52
19 122 U 1.14 35 1.14 35 1.15 35 125 35 137 35 1.42
35 121 36 1.14 36 1.11 16 1.13 39 122 34 L31 21 138
U 1.17 34 1.12 34 1.10 18 116 34 121 39 125 34 m
34 1.16 19 1.10 19 1.08 21 1.09 18 120 21 123 39 133
32 1.09 32 1.04 39 1.02 34 1.09 16 1.19 16 123 18 133
39 1.07 39 1.® 21 0.99 39 1.05 21 1.19 18 122 16 130
21 1.03 18 1.01 18 0.99 19 1.04 17 1.15 17 1.12 17 125
18 1.® 21 1.00 17 0.99 17 1.® 19 1.12 20 1.10 20 1.18
29 1.01 4 0.96 32 0.98 37 1.00 29 1.07 19 1.10 7 1.15
27 0.99 37 0.98 27 0.96 32 0.99 32 1.07 24 1.09 24 1.14
17 095 29 095 37 093 29 097 37 106 7 1.07 19 132
4 0.97 24 0.95 20 0.95 27 0.97 20 1.05 29 1.07 27 1.11
24 0.97 27 0.94 24 0.94 20 0.96 7 1.05 32 1.05 37 1.09
20 0.95 20 0.92 4 0.93 24 0.95 27 1.04 27 1.04 23 1.08
37 0.95 7 0.91 7 0.91 7 0.94 24 1.04 37 1.02 32 1.07
7 0.93 23 059 29 0.90 3 0.91 4 1.02 73 1.02 29 1.07
23 0.92 17 059 3 057 4 0.90 23 0.98 4 0.99 4 1.02
31 0.91 3 057 31 055 31 059 3 0.95 3 0.95 3 0.98
3 0.89 31 057 23 0.85 23 059 31 0.93 31 0.91 31 0.94
30 056 30' 050 33 0.78 33 052 33 m 33 090 33 091
33 0.85 2 050 2 0.77 6 0.75 l 051 1 0.81 1 055
2 0.81 33 0.77 30 0.76 30 0.74 6 0.78 30 0.78 12 053
6 0.80 1 0.74 6 0.73 2 0.74 2 0.76 12 0.77 30 0.79
1 0.77 6 0.74 1 0.72 1 0.74 30 0.76 6 0.75 2 0.74
10 0.76 15 0.71 15 0.68 12 0.68 12 0.75 2 0.73 15 0.70
15 0.72 10 0.70 12 0.64 15 0.66 15 0.68 15 0.67 6 0.68
12 0id9 12 067 10 063 10 0.® 10 m 10 066 10 067
Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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Appendix H
Expenditure Indexes Rank Ordered by Year 1973-1988
Dist 73-74 Dist 74-75 Dist 75-76 Dist 76-77 Dist 77-78 Dist 78-79 Dist 7980 Dist 8081
1 1.00 10 1.67 « 148 40 1.58 5 2.15 5 216 5 200 5 226
2 1.00 40 127 5 1.46 5 1.53 40 1.91 40 1.90 40 m 40 1.76
3 1.00 19 125 36 1.40 19 1.50 19 1.58 19 1.47 19 1.55 19 1.68
4 1.00 36 121 9 138 36 1.48 36 1.47 8 1.41 8 l.« 8 1.59
5 1.00 27 121 19 136 31 1.46 21 1.46 36 136 36 132 36 139
6 1.00 5 1.17 27 129 27 138 11 1.45 16 1.32 16 127 16 138
7 1.00 32 1.15 15 127 21 138 27 1.45 31 1.29 U 126 9 130
8 1.00 3 1.14 21 127 9 138 31 1.44 27 129 35 125 31 130
9 1.00 8 1.13 31 125 20 137 8 W 11 129 31 125 34 127
10 1.00 21 1.12 7 125 11 135 37 1.44 34 123 21 124 11 127
11 1.00 15 1.12 32 125 37 134 9 1.42 7 1.22 27 122 17 127
12 1.00 7 1.12 37 124 16 133 35 1.42 32 122 2 121 27 125
15 1.00 24 1.09 3 124 39 132 16 1.41 20 121 7 121 21 122
16 1.00 35 1.09 20 124 32 131 7 139 37 121 37 121 2 121
17 1.00 39 1.08 35 122 8 131 39 139 10 120 20 1.19 20 120
18 1.00 20 1.08 39 122 2 130 20 137 17 120 34 1.19 7 1.18
19 1.00 31 1.08 16 121 35 129 10 135 9 120 9 1.19 37 1.16
20 1.00 16 1.08 2 120 34 128 32 134 35 1.19 32 1.18 32 1.16
21 1.00 17 1.07 17 120 7 127 34 134 21 1.18 17 1.17 35 1.16
23 1.00 9 1.07 23 120 17 127 2 132 2 1.18 39 1.14 4 1.13
24 1.00 23 1.06 8 1.19 23 126 17 130 4 1.11 30 1.11 39 1.13
27 1.00 2 1.05 34 1.18 3 124 3 127 39 1.10 4 1.08 30 1.12
29 1.00 34 1.04 24 1.18 18 123 24 124 18 1.07 24 1.04 29 1.10
30 1.00 29 1.04 11 1.17 30 120 4 121 24 1.06 18 1.(0 18 1.09
31 1.00 11 1.(8 10 1.15 24 1.19 75 1.19 3 1.06 3 1.01 24 1.05
32 1.00 30 L01 30 1.15 4 1.17 18 119 75 L04 75 1.00 3 1.02
33 1.00 4 1.01 18 1.15 29 1.14 29 1.16 33 0.98 29 1.00 23 1.02
34 1.00 18 1.01 4 1.11 10 1.12 33 1.13 6 0.97 6 0.97 6 1.02
35 1.00 33 1.00 29 1.10 33 1.11 6 1.07 29 0.95 10 0.97 10 1.01
36 1.00 12 0.99 33 1.07 6 1.06 30 1.04 30 0.94 33 0.96 33 0.95
37 1.00 37 0.98 6 1.00 15 1.05 1 1.03 15 0.86 15 0.92 15 087
39 1.00 1 0.97 1 0.99 1 1.00 15 0.99 1 0.86 12 002 1 080
40 1.00 6 0.97 12 0.90 12 036 12 088 12 079 1 080 12 0.74
Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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Expenditure Indexes Rank Ordered by Year 1973-1988
Dist 81-82 Dist 82-® Dist 8384 Dist 8485 Dist 8586 Dist 8687 Dist 8788
5 217 5 1-99 5 2.00 5 2.12 5 222 5 112 5 213
40 1.78 4) 1.74 40 1.53 8 1.60 8 1.69 8 1.76 8 m
8 1.60 8 1.58 8 1.53 36 1.51 40 1.64 36 1.69 36 1.78
19 1.49 36 1.48 36 1.42 40 1.51 36 1.64 9 1.59 U 1.76
36 1.47 16 1.45 19 135 9 IS 11 1.53 11 1.59 9 1.69
16 135 19 139 11 134 11 1.40 9 1.52 40 1.58 40 1.67
17 133 31 131 31 133 16 133 19 1.44 35 1.51 35 1.54
34 128 29 125 16 132 19 131 35 138 21 1.40 21 1.54
31 127 31 124 9 127 U 129 16 136 34 139 34 L50
9 126 11 124 31 122 31 128 34 129 16 139 20 1.48
11 126 35 123 35 120 35 127 31 128 17 1.35 16 1.46
35 1.25 37 123 20 1.16 37 125 17 128 20 1.35 17 138
20 123 27 1.17 17 1.14 20 123 20 127 37 128 19 135
37 123 9 1.17 27 1.12 27 1.19 21 127 19 127 37 133
27 121 20 1.14 37 1.12 34 1.19 37 126 27 126 39 132
32 1.20 17 1.13 29 1.10 21 1.18 39 1.19 29 1.25 27 129
2 L18 23 1.11 32 107 29 1.16 27 1.18 39 125 18 128
23 1.16 32 1.10 21 1.06 32 1.13 32 1.18 31 125 23 127
24 1.08 2 1.10 24 1.05 18 1.09 29 1.18 32 122 7 127
4 1.07 4 1.08 23 1.04 39 1.08 18 1.16 24 120 31 126
39 1.06 24 1.07 18 1.01 7 1.07 23 1.16 18 1.19 24 125
7 1.06 18 1.06 7 1.00 23 1.06 7 1.15 23 1.18 29 123
30 1.05 7 1.05 39 0.99 24 1.05 24 1.13 7 1.16 32 121
21 1.05 21 1.04 4 0.99 4 1.02 4 1.07 4 1.12 4 1.14
29 1.05 39 1.01 33 0.98 2 1.01 3 1.01 33 1.05 33 1.07
18 L05 33 1.00 2 0.95 33 1.01 33 1.01 3 1.00 3 L06
10 1.01 10 0.99 3 0.94 3 0.96 2 0.91 2 0.90 2 0.93
33 0.98 3 0.97 10 086 6 081 10 084 1 0.87 1 089
3 0.98 30 0.86 6 0.81 10 0.78 1 083 10 0.86 30 088
6 0.85 6 0.82 1 0.75 1 0.78 6 081 30 0.85 10 086
1 0.84 1 081 30 0.73 30 0.76 30 0.79 6 0.77 12 0.77
15 0.© 15 080 15 0.70 15 0.70 15 0.72 12 0.74 15 0.74
12 0.68 12 0.67 12 0.61 12 0.66 12 0.72 15 0.69 6 068
Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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Appendix I 
ARPs Rank Ordered by Year, 1973-1988
Dist 73-74 Dist 74-75 Dist 75-76 Dist 76-77 Dist 77-78 Dist 78-79 Dist 79#) Dist 8081
10 LOO 36 0.64 36 0.60 10 070 10 054 30 052 » 051 10 045
9 0.73 15 0.57 10 0.59 36 0.50 35 036 32 034 23 031 36 0.44
15 0.67 9 0.53 37 0.42 37 0.40 17 031 34 033 36 029 33 037
36 0.64 37 0.51 15 039 15 030 32 031 15 029 37 026 23 034
11 0.51 4 0.48 4 036 8 029 37 030 17 028 17 026 34 030
39 0.47 39 0.46 2 035 39 028 36 030 35 027 2 025 37 029
31 0.43 31 0.44 39 033 2 027 12 025 2 027 33 025 35 026
4 0.41 2 038 31 029 4 027 2 024 33 026 34 022 40 021
23 0.37 10 036 17 027 34 026 34 022 37 026 $ 020 17 020
17 036 17 035 34 026 17 024 39 021 12 023 29 0.18 2 0.19
32 034 11 033 11 025 32 022 23 021 23 022 5 0.17 1 0.18
35 0.32 23 032 8 024 23 021 15 021 36 021 31 0.16 32 0.17
34 032 34 030 9 023 40 021 4 0.19 39 021 30 0.16 5 0.16
2 0.30 35 029 35 021 5 021 24 0.19 30 0.21 39 0.16 20 0.16
5 0.30 21 025 21 020 12 021 33 0.19 8 020 40 0.16 31 0.15
3 0.29 3 024 3 020 31 021 31 0.18 24 0.19 15 0.15 39 0.15
Z7 027 32 024 32 020 24 020 7 0.17 21 0J7 1 014 24 0.14
21 0.25 30 024 24 020 1 0.18 5 0.17 19 0.16 20 0.14 21 0.12
37 0.25 19 024 23 0.19 35 0.17 8 0.17 7 0.15 16 0.13 4 0.12
12 0.24 24 024 12 0.17 16 0.16 19 0.16 20 0.15 24 0.12 29 0.11
30 0.23 23 021 19 0.17 33 0.16 40 0.13 1 0.14 32 0.11 18 0.11
24 023 7 021 27 0.17 11 0.16 20 0.13 5 0.13 27 0.11 30 0.10
1 023 8 020 18 0.16 3 0.16 16 0.13 9 0.13 11 0.11 8 0.10
19 022 27 020 1 0.16 7 0.15 18 0.13 31 0.12 18 0.10 15 0.10
40 022 12 0.18 40 0.15 20 0.13 1 0.12 11 0.12 6 0.10 27 0.09
7 0.22 18 0.18 16 0.15 9 0.13 21 0.11 40 0.12 21 0.10 3 009
20 0.19 40 0.18 6 0.14 21 0.13 11 0.11 29 0.12 8 0.10 12 0.09
29 0.19 16 0.17 30 0.13 19 0.12 29 0.10 16 0.11 7 0.10 11 0.09
33 0.16 33 0.15 7 0.12 6 0.12 3 0.09 6 0.11 3 0.09 16 0.08
16 0.15 1 0.14 29 0.12 18 0.12 6 0.09 4 0.11 12 0.09 9 0.05
18 0.11 5 0.11 33 0.12 29 0.08 27 0.07 3 0.10 9 0.09 7 0.05
8 0.08 6 0.10 20 0.05 27 0.07 9 0.07 27 0.07 4 0.08 19 0.04
6 0.04 29 0.08 5 0.01 30 0.00 30 006 18 aos 19 0.01 6 0.00
Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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ARPs Rank Ordered by Year, 1973-1988
Dist 81-82 Dist 82-83 Dist 8384 Dist 8485 Dist 8586 Dist 8687 Dist 8788
33 030 10 022 35 020 36 0.15 36 020 36 021 V 026
10 028 33 0.19 37 0.19 39 0.14 17 020 17 0.17 36 025
29 027 35 0.17 10 0.16 35 0.14 1 0.16 35 0.16 35 021
34 023 23 0.17 20 0.15 37 0.13 4 0.15 1 0.16 1 0.18
35 021 37 0.15 17 0.15 1 0.11 37 0.14 11 0.15 16 0.15
36 0.19 34 0.14 39 0.14 34 0.11 39 0.14 4 0.13 11 0.14
23 0.19 32 0.13 34 0.14 3 0.10 34 0.14 34 0.12 39 0.13
37 0.18 20 0.13 5 0.13 20 0.10 35 0.12 23 0.12 18 0.12
4) 0.15 39 0.12 23 0.12 23 0.10 30 0tl2 16 012 25 0J2
5 0.15 5 0.12 8 0.12 17 0.10 21 0.11 39 0.12 5 0.12
31 0.13 21 0.12 36 0.11 10 0.09 11 0.11 18 0.12 15 0.12
8 0.12 8 0.11 1 0.11 30 0.08 29 0.11 7 0.10 4 0.11
39 0.12 31 0.10 33 0.11 4 0© 33 0.10 37 0.10 34 0.11
21 0.12 9 0.09 18 0.10 24 0© 20 0.10 10 0.09 10 0.10
1 0.11 17 0.09 12 0.10 8 0© 10 0.09 2 0.09 20 0.10
24 0.11 36 0.09 32 0.10 12 0.07 23 0.09 33 0.09 2 0.10
32 0.10 11 009 29 009 11 0.07 18 009 20 009 9 0J0
20 0.10 4 0.09 9 0.09 21 0.07 24 0© 21 0.09 4) 0.10
18 0.10 18 0.09 4 0.09 18 0.07 32 0© 15 0.09 7 0.09
12 0.09 1 0.08 19 0.08 40 0© 12 0© 40 0.09 33 0.09
4 0.09 24 0.08 21 0.08 33 0© 8 0© 24 0© 37 0.09
11 0.09 40 0.07 24 0.07 19 0© 9 0© 30 0© 21 0©
16 0.09 12 0.07 3 0.07 9 0© 16 0.07 19 0.07 24 0©
3 0.08 29 0.07 31 0.07 5 0© 40 0© 9 0.07 12 0©
27 0.08 3 0.07 27 0.06 29 0.04 3 0© 32 0.07 32 0.07
17 0.07 27 005 7 006 7 0© 7 005 5 a© 31 ao7
19 0.06 16 0.04 2 0.04 32 0.04 2 0© 3 0© 29 0.07
7 0.05 19 0.04 40 0.04 16 0.04 19 0.04 29 0© 19 0©
2 0.03 7 0.© 16 0.04 31 0© 5 0.04 12 0© 3 0©
6 0.02 2 0.02 11 0© 15 0© 31 0.04 8 0© 6 0©
9 0.02 6 0.00 15 0.01 27 0.02 27 0.04 31 0.04 27 0.04
15 0.01 15 0.00 6 0.00 6 0© 15 0© 27 0.02 30 0.04
30 -006 30 -0.11 30 -0.09 2 ■0.01 6 ■0© 6 -0© 8 a©
Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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Appendix J
The Relative Efficiency of Nursing Programs
Program FT Nursing Faculty Student Enrollment Ratio
1 28 213 0.13
2 21 261 0.07
3 15 140 0.11
4 16 238 0.07
5 18 210 0.09
6 7 118 0.06
7 12 140 0.09
8 13 144 0.09
9 7 108 0.06
10 9 142 0.06
11* 6 43 0.14
12 7 85 0.08
13 6 100 0.06
14 11 104 0.11
15 6 89 0.07
16 13 115 0.11
17 7 79 0.09
18 6 90 0.07
19 5 130 0.04
20 6 92 0.07
21 8 153 0.05
22 19 200 0.09
23 10 156 0.06
24 9 124 0.07
27 12 180 0.07
28 14 204 0.07
29 12 162 0.07
30 8 90 0.09
31 8 110 0.07
32 15 214 0.07
33 14 240 0.06
34 15 150 0.10
35 6 200 0.03
36 7 96 0.07
37 7 75 0.09
38 13 178 0.07
39 2 32 0.06
40 12 123 0.10
Note. Data from 1985 study survey. District 11 enrollment for 1984-85 was atypically low; enrollments 
for the previous and following years numbered 90+ students.
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Appendix K
The Relative Cost-burden of Nursing Programs, 1982-83
Program Nursing College Ratio
Enrollment Enrollment
1 248 21,800 1.1
2 363 22,600 1.6
3 148 16,000 0.9
4 310 30,500 1.0
5 214 24,800 0.9
6 168 9,800 1.7
7 148 13,300 l . l
8 68 25,200 0.3
9 124 20,100 0.6
10 172 9.500 1.8
11 102 7,500 1.3
12 61 6,800 0.9
13 98 14,600 0.7
14 117 9,900 1.2
15 103 7,400 1.4
16 95 15,300 0.6
17 75 12,900 0.6
18 104 10,000 1.0
19 64 10,600 0.6
20 92 6,000 1.5
21 132 26,600 0.5
22 159 12,700 1.3
23 163 14,200 1.1
24 157 21,500 0.7
27 286 13,500 2.1
28 146 20,000 0.7
29 184 27,200 0.7
30 135 7,000 1.8
31 105 6,500 1.6
32 124 14,800 0.8
33 221 31,100 0.7
34 118 7,500 1.6
35 180 5,100 3.5
36 114 23,900 0.5
37 77 9,000 0.9
38 179 23,000 0.8
39 31 4,200 0.7
40 181 17,500 1.0
Note. Nursing enrollment data from State Approved Schools of Nursing. R.N.. 1983. 41st Edition, NLN, 
1983; college enrollment data from 1982-83 Occupational Programs in California Community Colleges. 
Leo A. Mayer, 1982.
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The Relative Cost-burden of Nursing Programs, 1984-85
Program Nursing College Ratio
Enrollment Enrollment
1 213 22,000 0.9
2 250 16,200 1.5
3 123 14,900 0.8
4 338 23,400 1.4
5 216 22,400 1.0
6 111 7,200 1.5
7 133 15,100 0.9
8 68 22,300 0.3
9 113 19,000 0.6
10 132 7,600 1.4
11 44 7,800 0.6
12 58 6,200 0.9
13 96 19,700 0.5
14 109 10,400 1.1
15 92 18,200 0.5
16 113 15,000 0.8
17 81 10,300 0.8
18 96 19,200 0.5
19 150 11,400 1.3
20 90 5,600 1.6
21 182 26,500 0.7
22 157 7,700 2.0
23 144 11,100 1.3
24 112 22,400 0.5
27 158 11,400 1.4
28 241 11,709 2.1
29 140 20,700 0.7
30 90 3,500 2.6
31 117 5,300 2.2
32 204 12,900 1.6
33 230 27,000 0.9
34 120 6,700 1.8
35 210 4,800 4.3
36 93 18,400 0.5
37 93 9,000 1.0
38 178 17,400 1.0
39 32 3,500 0.9
40 110 15,400 0.7
Note. Nursing enrollment data from State Approved Schools of Nursing. R.N.. 1985. 44th Edition, 
NLN, 1985; college enrollment data from 1984-85 Occupational Programs in California Community 
Colleges. Leo A. Mayer, 1984.
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The Relative Cost-burden of Nursing Programs, 1987-88
Program Nursing College Ratio
Enrollment Enrollment
1 150 20,100 0.7
2 144 16,400 0.9
3 94 14,900 0.6
4 219 21,200 1.0
5 148 18,700 0.8
6 111 8,200 1.4
7 133 15,100 0.9
8 142 22,000 0.6
9 106 18,100 0.6
10 134 7,600 1.8
11 90 7,700 1.2
12 60 7,000 0.9
13 136 19,200 0.7
14 118 9,800 1.2
15 88 7,500 1.1
16 54 12,000 0.5
17 81 12,400 0.7
18 99 23,500 0.4
19 103 9,300 l.l
20 81 6,600 1.2
21 121 29,600 0.4
22 170 13,900 1.2
23 120 15,000 0.8
24 112 28,600 0.4
27 163 12,400 1.3
28 165 12,000 1.4
29 167 23,500 0.7
30 79 4,300 1.8
31 118 5,700 2.1
32 189 12,700 1.5
33 179 27,000 0.7
34 120 6,800 1.8
35 214 6,100 3.5
36 87 22,400 0.4
37 57 8,000 0.7
38 175 17,900 1.0
39 28 3,800 0.7
40 107 15,800 0.7
Note. Nursing enrollment data from State Approved Schools of Nursing. R.N.. 1988.46st Edition, NLN, 
1988; college enrollment data from 1987-88 Occupational Programs in California Community Colleges. 
Leo A. Mayer, 1987.
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Appendix L
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Note. Data Source: National League for Nursing (1974-1988). State-Approved Schools of Nursing. R.N. 
(32nd-46th ed.). New York: National League for Nursing Division of Research.
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Nursing Program Enrollments, 1973-74 through 1987-88
Vears ■73nr~ T T fT ~73-77"77-’7T  7T79' 75rgtnff.fi 8T-ff2'82:S3 - m r 54-55 5ff-ff6 56-87 57-88
Program
1 m 2(54 244 255 217 235 241 265 268 248 252 213 196 167 150
1.00 0.97 0.90 054 0.80 0.87 059 058 059 052 093 0.79 0.72 0.62 0.55
2 247 273 277 2^8 295 289 264 257 333 363 " m " ’ 256 2i7 186 i44
1.00 l.ii 1.12 1.09 1.19 1.17 1.07 1.04 155 1.47 1.09 1.01 0.88 0.73 0.58
a 1© 76!"" ■1©' 166 1© 163 164 156 141 159 1 in 157 ■T95"' 159 176
1.00 OSS 059 058 1.00 056 057 052 053 054 1.08 0.93 1:15 0.94 1.01
u 137 137 137 137 137 152 159 146 15ft 146 125 241' T5H T50 165
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.33 1.16 1.07 1.09 1.07 0.93 1.76 1.12 1.09 1.20
142 156” "137 " 171 173 169 169 177 188 179 ' !55“ 178 189 TTS-- 175
1.00 1.10 1.18 ISO 1.22 1.19 1.19 155 152 1.26 1.16 1.25 1.33 1.23 1.23
3 ITS' 126 134 i36 136 124 127 148 l48 T4S'" i32 123 i32 9o 94
1.00 1.04 1.17 1.18 1.13 1.08 1.10 1.29 129 1.29 1.15 1.07 1.15 0.78 0.82
I T ' " 65 73 © 67 76 77 69 95 166 95 55 "96- - 58 76 136
1.00 1.07 1.00 a99 1.12 113 1.01 1.40 156 1.44 1.25 1.41 1.29 1.12 2 00
4 i97 223 " 245 257 239 256 253 258 321 316 249 335 236 2i2 219
1.00 1.13 1.24 1.30 1.21 1.30 1.28 u i 1.63 157 1.26 1.72 1.17 1.08 1.11
5 167 129 165 95 163 115 192 266 226 I P T  ’ 20ft ■Jiff " i l l ■ t w l48
1.00 1.21 0.98 0189 152 1.07 1.79 1.87 256 2.00 1.87 2.02 1.97 1.81 1.38
i! 96 95 9S ■' 165 165 167' ‘ 116 118 126 169 123 111 111 ■ f i r - ■ n r  ■
1.00 0.99 1.00 1.09 1.09 1.11 1.15 123 151 1.76 1.28 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16
7 162 151 1 TW 167 167 166 163 164 143 148' 1 156 131 ■ 143 i33
1.00 0.99 059 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.01 152 1.40 1.45 1.47 130 1.30 1.40 1.30
3 30 36 35 57 59 45 4g 45 83 68 68 65 69 165 142
1.00 1.00 1.17 1.90 1.97 1.60 1.60 1.60 2.77 1X1 2.27 2.27 2.30 3.60 4.73
9 166 111 ii5 115 122 12ff 134 1.16 i29 124 »4 ti3 lif t iftg l66
1.00 1.06 1.08 1.08 1.15 1.13 156 1.09 1.22 1.17 1.08 1.07 1.04 1.02 1.00
10 147 T47 147 l64 i46 159 i58 167 181 172' l39 i31 135 i44 i34
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.12 0.99 1.08 1.07 1.14 1.23 1.17 0.95 0.90 0.92 0.98 0.91
l l 72 6s 72 79 77 32 9 i lift 98 162 109 44 96 96 96
1.00 0.94 1.00 1.10 1.07 1.14 1.26 153 156 1.42 151 0.61 1.33 135 1.25
n ------- 2o 2o 36" 43 42 44 47 58 66 51 59 58 66 " 6 6 "
1.00 1.00 2.00 2.15 2.10 2.20 2.35 2.90 3.00 3.05 2.95 2.90 3.00 3.00 3.00
14 1© I d lSl 165 149 136 121 126 113 117 160 t69 n c  ■ U 2 ’118
1.00 1.02 1.01 1.03 0.93 a s i 0.76 0.79 0.74 0.73 0.63 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.74
is io3 93 i67 i63 i63 92 168 ii9 169 ii5 161 92 55 84 85
1.00 0.95 1.04 1.00 1.00 0.89 1.05 1.16 1.06 1.12 0.98 0.89 0.83 0.82 0.85
16 30 29 3S 33 33 46 44 124 137 95 96 tl3 55 94' 54
1.00 0.97 L.00 1.10 1.10 1.33 1.47 4.13 457 3.17 3,17 3.77 t.83 3.13 1.80
17 77 77 77 77 79 74 76 76 76 75 72 81 81 76 81
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.94 1.05 1.0S 0.99 1.05
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Nursing Program Enrollments, 1973-74 through 1987-88
Years 73-74 74-73 75-7<5 70-77 77-7s 78-75 75-85 80-81'81-82 82-83 8T-8r84-8T85^S 80-8717-88
Program
18 82 84 86 74 82 102 97 78 96 104 103 94 98 56 99
1.00 1.02 1.05 0.90 1.00 124 1.18 095 1.10 1.27 126 1.17 120 ; 1.05 121
15 85“ 43 TT~ 43 46 46 44 88 4 r “ 44 "58“ 136 48 55 ' 1(13
1.00 1.18 1.15 1.18 120 1.20 1.20 1.60 1.65 1.16 1.05 2.73 1.24 1.00 1.87
i 6 51 i t 53 51 52 33 43 74 84 52 52 56 88 77 81
1.00 1.00 1.04 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.27 1.45 1.65 1.80 1.80 1.76 1.73 .151: 159
11 117 151 lo8 lib 111 lob 157 lb5 133 132 142 182 115 to5 121
1.00 0.86 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.85 0.91 0.90 1.14 1.13 1.21 156 0.98 0.93 1.03
13 118 142 155 175 174 143 2o3 254 254 163 161 l4*. l42 122 i2o
1.00 1-11 I.tT 153 1.38 151 159 1-59 199 1.27 1.26 U 3 1.11 095 0.94
14 115 TBI” 122 111 1 115 'T22" 131 128 158 157 112 112 112 111 112
1.00 0.92 1.11 1.01 1.00 i.ii 1.19 1.16 1.44 1.43 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
a 58 '9 9 ' 124 125 i3z 144 195“ 196 230 284 T53 ~ 158 l54 14b 143
1.00 1.01 1.29 1.22 1.35 1.69 200 200 235 292 158 1.61 157 1.63 1.66
15 155 t44 172 i75 l84 l74 i81 i72 i84 i84 177 i4o l67 147 l47
1.00 0.77 0.91 0.92 0.98 0.92 0.95 0.91 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.74 0.88 098 058
lb 151 l31 128 133 ii2 126 i2 t 115 i2o 135 115 46 83 79 76
1.00 1.34 1.25 150 1.20 1.18 1.19 1.13 1.18 1.32 1.13 0.88 0.81 0.77 0.77
I t 115 111 151 43 9b 43 43 15b ibb 155 l IV 117 121 ll4 118
1.00 1.01 0.92 0.86 0.82 0.86 0.85 0.91 0.91 0.95 1.06 1.06 1.10 1.04 1.07
h 144 145 147 172 151 141 144 148 171 124 155 204’ i91 ls6 i&
1.00 0.98 0.99 1.02 0.89 0.83 0.88 099 1.01 0.73 0.94 1.21 1.13 1.07 1.12
33 14t 145 142 T55 152 171 221 145 245 221 225 23b 2W T45 17 9 "
1.00 1.03 1.15 1.10 1.08 1.21 1.57 195 1.70 1.57 1.60 1.63 1.42 1.18 1.27
34 ' 45 64 44 s r " 78 85 88 114 125 118 126 126 56 126 12b
1.00 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.20 1.31 1.35 1.75 1.85 1.82 1.85 1.85 0.91 1.85 1.85
35 35 35 33 38 76 77 63 rob i33 186 i82 2i6 186 2ob 214
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.66 2.00 2.20 2.43 2.86 4.37 5.14 5.20 6.00 5.40 5.71 6.11
36 84 44 154 lob 156 44 157 164 ib8 114 ll2 63 4b 82 87
1.00 1.14 1.24 1.19 1.19 1.18 1.27 124 129 136 1.33 l . l l 1.07 0.98 1.04
37 '  ' 84 85 74 3i 74 7b 78 72 7J 72 72 43 7b 75 3 T
1.00 0.95 0.90 0.96 0.94 0.83 0.93 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 i .i i 0.83 0.89 0.68
39 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 33 34 31 32 32 36 26 28
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.74 0.80
40 1 158 44 I l f ri9 132 147 T46 ' 152 148 181 125” “ lib 114 rw 767
1.00 0.92 1.08 1.10 1.22 1.36 1.35 1.41 156 1.68 1.19 1.02 1.06 1.06 0.99
Note. 1st line = nursing enrollment (data from NLN, state approved schools of nursing, 1974-1988); 2nd 
line = index; original data source was incomplete. Bold figures represent numbers inserted to prevent the 
gross distortion of the indexes that would have occurred if zeros bad been used.
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Nursing Enrollment Indexes Rank Ordered bv Y ear. 1973-1983
Dist 73-74 Dist 74-75 1Dist 75-76 1Dist 76-77 Dist 77-78 1Dist 78-79 Dist 79-80 1Dist 80-81
1 1.0C 30 n * 12 ZOC 12 2.15 12 Z1C 12 22C 35 Z4:- 16 4.13
2 1.00 5 1.21 27 1.29 8 1.90 35 ZOO 35 Z20 12 225 12 Z90
22 1.00 19 1.18 30 1.25 35 1.66 8 1.97 27 1.69 27 2.00 35 Z86
28 1.00 36 1.14 4 1.24 23 1.33 5 122 8 1.60 5 1.79 27 ZOO
38 1.00 4 1.13 36 1.24 4 1.30 23 1.38 23 121 8 1.60 5 1.87
3 1.00 2 1.11 38 1.18 30 120 27 1.35 40 1.36 23 129 34 1.75
13 1.00 23 1.11 23 1.17 27 1.22 40 1.22 16 1.33 33 127 8 1.60
4 1.00 38 1.10 8 1.17 38 1.20 38 1.22 28 1.33 16 1.47 19 1.60
5 1.00 13 1.07 3 1.17 36 1.19 4 1.21 34 1.31 34 1.35 23 129
6 1.0C 9 l.Ot 33 1.15 3 l.tf 19 I.2C 4 I.3C 40 t.3; 11 1.53
7 1.00 3 1.04 19 1.15 19 1.18 34 1.20 18 1.24 4 1.28 20 1.45
8 1.00 33 1.03 2 1.12 10 1.12 30 1.20 33 1.21 20 1.27 40 1.41
9 1.00 18 1.02 24 1.11 40 1.10 2 1.19 19 1.20 36 127 13 1.40
10 1.00 14 1.02 9 1.08 16 1.10 36 1.19 38 1.19 9 1.26 33 1.35
11 1.00 34 1.02 40 1.08 33 1.10 9 1.15 36 1.18 11 1.26 4 1.31
12 1.00 27 1.01 18 1.05 11 1.10 3 1.13 30 1.18 19 1.20 3 1.29
14 1.00 31 1.01 20 1.04 6 1.09 13 1.12 2 1.17 24 1.19 38 1.25
15 1.00 28 1.00 15 1.04 2 1.09 16 1.10 11 1.14 38 1.19 36 1.24
16 1.00 8 1.00 34 1.02 9 1.08 6 1.09 13 1.13 30 1.19 6 1.23
17 1.0C 10 1.0C 14 l.Ot 7 1.05 33 l.OS 9 1.12 18 1.11 24 1.16
18 1.00 12 1.00 28 1.00 14 1.03 11 1.07 6 1.11 28 1.16 15 1.16
19 1.00 17 1.00 13 1.00 32 1.02 7 1.05 24 1.11 6 1.15 10 1.14
20 1.00 20 1.00 6 1.00 24 1.01 17 1.03 10 1.08 3 1.10 30 1.13
21 1.00 35 1.00 10 1.00 28 1.00 20 1.02 3 1.08 10 1.07 9 1.09
23 1.00 39 1.00 11 1.00 15 1.00 22 1.00 5 1.07 2 1.07 28 1.07
24 1.00 7 0.99 16 1.00 17 1.00 28 1.00 7 1.04 15 1.05 2 1.04
27 1.00 6 0.99 17 1.00 20 1.00 15 1.00 20 1.04 13 1.01 7 1.02
29 1.00 32 0.98 35 1.00 34 1.00 18 1.00 39 1.00 7 1.01 39 1.00
30 1.00 1 0.97 39 1.00 39 1.00 24 1.00 22 0.96 39 1.00 32 0.99
31 t.oc 16 0.9; 7 0.99 13 0.95 39 1.0C 17 0.96 17 03< 17 039
32 1.00 22 0.95 22 0.99 22 0.98 10 0.99 29 0.92 22 0.97 1 0.98
33 1.00 37 0.95 32 0.99 37 0.% 29 0.98 15 0.89 29 0.95 18 0.95
34 1.00 15 0.95 5 0.98 1 0.94 21 0.95 1 0.87 37 0.93 22 0.92
35 1.00 11 0.94 21 0.92 21 0.94 37 0.94 31 0.86 21 0.91 31 0.91
36 1.00 24 0.92 31 0.92 29 0.92 14 0.93 21 0.85 I 0.89 29 0.91
37 1.00 40 0.92 29 0.91 18 0.90 32 0.89 32 0.83 32 0.88 21 0.90
39 1.00 21 0.86 37 0.90 5 0.89 31 0.82 37 0.83 31 0.85 37 0.86
40 1.0C 29 0.7t 1 0.9C 31 0.8€ 1 0.8C 14 0.81 14 0.7< 14 0.79
Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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Nursing Enrollment Indexes Rank Ordered by Year, 1973-1988
Dist 81-82 Dist 82-83 IDist 83-84 1Dist 84-85 Dist 85-86 1Dist 86-87 Dist 87-88
16 4.57 35 5.1* 35 5.2C 35 6.0C 35 5.4C 35 5.71 35 6.11
35 4.37 16 3.17 16 3.17 16 3.77 12 3.00 8 3.60 8 4.73
12 3.00 12 3.05 12 2.95 12 2.90 8 2.30 16 3.13 12 3.00
8 2.77 27 2.92 8 127 19 2.73 5 1.97 12 3.00 13 2.00
27 2.35 8 237 5 1.87 8 2.27 16 1.83 34 1.85 19 1.87
5 2.06 5 2.00 34 1.85 5 2.02 20 1.73 5 1.81 34 1.85
34 1.85 34 1.82 20 1.80 34 1.85 27 1.57 27 1.63 16 1.80
33 1.70 20 1.80 33 1.60 20 1.76 33 1.42 20 151 27 1.66
19 1.65 6 1.76 27 158 28 1.76 11 1.33 7 1.40 20 159
20 1.65 40 1.61 II 151 4 1.72 38 152 11 105 5 1.38
4 1.63 4 157 7 1.47 33 1.63 7 1.30 38 1.23 7 1.30
23 1.59 33 157 36 1.33 27 1.61 13 1.29 33 1.18 33 1.27
13 1.56 2 1.47 6 1.28 21 156 19 1.24 6 1.16 11 1.25
40 1.56 7 1.45 4 1.26 13 1.41 18 1.20 13 1.12 38 1.23
24 1.44 13 1.44 23 1.26 7 1.30 4 1.17 28 1.09 18 1.21
7 1.40 24 1.43 18 1.26 38 1.25 6 1.16 4 1.08 28 1.20
11 1.36 11 1.42 13 1.25 32 1.21 22 1.15 32 1.07 6 1.16
2 1.35 36 1.36 21 1.21 18 1.17 3 1.15 40 1.06 32 1.12
38 132 30 132 40 1.19 6 1.16 32 1.13 18 1.05 4 1.11
6 1.31 3 1.21 38 1.16 23 1.12 28 1.12 31 1.04 31 1.07
3 1.29 23 1.27 3 1.15 36 1.11 23 1.11 9 1.02 17 1.05
36 1.29 18 1.27 30 1.13 37 1.11 31 1.10 24 1.02 36 1.04
10 1.23 38 1.26 2 1.09 3 1.07 36 1.07 19 1.00 21 1.03
9 1.22 10 1.17 22 1.08 9 1.07 40 1.06 17 0.99 24 1.02
30 1.18 9 1.17 9 1.08 31 1.06 17 1.05 10 0.98 22 1.01
21 1.14 19 1.16 31 1.06 17 1.05 9 1.04 36 0.98 9 1.00
18 1.10 21 1.13 19 1.05 40 1.02 24 1.02 23 0.95 40 0.99
28 1.09 15 1.12 24 1.02 24 1.02 21 0.98 22 0.94 23 0.94
15 1.06 28 1.07 15 0.98 2 1.01 10 0.92 21 0.93 10 0.91
32 1.01 17 0.9: 10 0.95 22 0.92 34 051 37 0.85 29 0.88
1 0.99 29 0.97 32 0.94 39 0.91 29 0.88 29 0.88 15 0.85
17 0.99 31 0.95 17 0.94 10 0.90 -> 0.88 15 0.82 3 0.82
29 0.98 22 0.94 28 0.93 15 0.89 39 0.86 3 0.78 39 0.80
39 0.97 1 0.92 29 0.93 30 0.88 37 0.83 30 0.77 30 0.77
31 0.91 39 0.89 1 0.93 1 0.79 15 0.83 39 0.74 14 0.74
37 0.86 37 0.86 39 0.91 29 0.74 30 0.81 2 0.73 37 0.68
22 0.83 32 0.73 37 0.86 14 0.68 1 0.72 14 0.70 2 058
14 0.74 14 0.7' 14 0.63 11 0.61 14 0.6S 1 0.62 I 055
Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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Appendix M
Nursing Faculty Perspectives on the Probability of Selective Retrenchment
“We thought they [administration] had hidden money, and that the faculty wouldn’t be 
touched.” (Faculty member, #1).
“The administrators on this campus consider nursing students one of their elitist 
products!” (Director #2).
“I’ve been here since 1960. Things wax and wane but we always survive!” (Director 
#3).
“We have the best graduation rate of any program on campus. Administration commends 
us for that!” (Director #4).
“Administration wouldn't dare to mess with us—our advisory committee has some very 
important people on it!” (Director #4).
“People on the program review committee felt nursing was a needed service to the city 
and that it served the city well-even if it was Low WSCH.” (Faculty member, 
#4).
“Administration would be cutting their own throat to close nursing!” (Director #5).
“We're the only R.N. program in this area.” (Director #6).
“Nursing is central to the mission of the college.” (Director #6).
“This program is administration's crown jewel.” (Director #7).
“This department fares well because of the reputation of our program.” (Director #7)
“Our director is embarrassed about our contact hours. She worries that to outsiders it 
looks like we're eating gravy, and she wants us to look like really hard workers.” 
(Faculty member, #7).
“Nursing is hard to cut because that means cuts to other departments!” (Director #9).
“We don't have a vitality problem in nursing like some programs on this campus have.” 
(Director #10).
“Nursing attracts students to this campus—administration would be foolish to cut us.” 
(Director #10).
“We felt certain they wouldn't close the program because we have contracts in the 
community.” (Director #10).
“We're really low WSCH-we really look bad on paper!” (Faculty member, #10).
“If you cut nursing, it hurts everybody!” (Director #12).
“We felt pretty safe. We produce their [the community's] nurses!” (Faculty member, 
#13).
“People in our faculty don't see what happened on a statewide level as as much of a threat 
as they should.” (Faculty member, #14).
“When the college is accredited, one of the things the officials point to is the quality of 
certain programs. Included on their short list is nursing—so we're in a nice 
position.” (Director #15).
“Nursing has a waiting list We're one of the only programs to fill our classes—that helps 
the sciences.” (Director #16).
“Administration knows how valuable nursing is-w e documented the ADA we bring in!” 
(Director #17).
“We're the only nursing program around here, and this community needs our graduates.” 
(Director #18).
“This is a rural area, and we're the only nursing program here.” (Director #19).
“This is a small town, so we have a close relationship to the community—community 
support is one of the ways we prove our worth.” (Director #20).
“We have always been subject to question by people in the administration because nursing 
is expensive-we are always under the gun.” (Faculty member, #20).
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“This is the only program in a two-district area, so it's needed.” (Director #21).
“We didn't think £ur program would be closed-this college built an expensive facility for 
nursing. We heard warnings from one of the chairpersons, but people don’t think 
it will ever happen.” (Faculty member, #22).
“Our students graduate, transfer, and go on to get jobs-all the things that the review 
committee looks at (Director #23).
“I don't think we were really too concemed-we consolidated our lecture sections to get 
our WSCH up, but that only lasted a year or so.” (Faculty member, #27).
“I don't think we worried about the program closing. There was such a need for nurses 
that we felt the Hospital Council and the hospitals in the area would never allow 
the district to cancel nursing.” (Faculty member, #27).
“They've [administrators] been talking about regionalization for years, but it didn't seem 
like we had to start on i t  The idea was to have a plan.” (Director #28).
“It seems like every time we come back from summer vacation there are rumors of March 
15 letters~I let it go like water off a duck's back.” (Faculty member, #28).
“The noises were there, but they'd cried wolf before.” (Faculty member, #28).
“We're kind of prestigious to administration—they count us as one of their professional 
programs.” (Director #29).
“Administration doesn't bother us. As long as our students do well on state boards— 
that's a feather in the their cap!” (Director #29).
“We’re OK as long as we keep getting students in the program—lately our applications 
have been dropping.” (Director #29).
“Our program provides more than job skills, it gives a lot of minority women a 
profession!” (Director #30).
“A lot of students are at this campus taking prerequisites because they intend to go into 
nursing.” (Director #30).
“We didn't feel terribly threatened—we always have plenty of students, and almost all of 
our courses are required for graduation.” (Director #32).
“We’re the biggest program in this college-we bring in a lot of students!” (Director #32).
“The community wants our nurses. I guess we weren’t really thinking anything would 
happen.” (Director #32).
“I believe the nursing faculty here did not feel they would be touched.” (Division Dean, 
#32).
“Nursing is a showcase program on this campus.” (Director #33).
“All you have to do is a little figuring to see how much nursing generates versus its 
expenses, and you can see that if the program weren't on campus it would hurt the 
support courses!” (Director #33).
“The administration knows and appreciates that our student attrition is extremely low.” 
(Director #35).
“Our students support physiology, history, and English so we don't pay attention when 
administrators talk about how expensive we are!” (Director #36).
“We get lots of recognition. It's almost like a baby sucking its thumb-the board knows 
the value of instruction and administration looks on nursing as something really 
great!” (Director #36).
“This program has strong community support.” (Director #37).
“The hospitals that asked for this program in the first place—they need us!” (Director 
#39).
“We've been a Cinderella program! We’re well-known in the community.” (Director 
#39).
“Our dean said publicly that we were expensive, but also that we were the most 
successful program on campus-success in terms of graduation, retention, and 
employment. So he expressed his support-there were no indicators ihjs [layoffs] 
was going to happen.” (Faculty member, #40).
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Appendix N
Nursing Faculty Governance Participation
“We've always had a rep to faculty senate, but we aren't really involved—our faculty is 
off campus much of the time.” (Director #1).
“A few of our faculty have been on committees, but only on minor committees, and they 
haven't ever been in leadership roles,” (Director #1).
“Getting involved on campus is a problem in nursing. We catt be on committees if we 
want to be.” (Faculty member, #1).
“We're not on committees—it’s no excuse really, but we don't have a lot of time being in 
clinical.” (Faculty member, #1).
“Some of our faculty isolate themselves and it's their fault they're not on committees.” 
(Faculty member, #1).
“We have twenty contact hours and two of our days are in the hospital, so its more 
difficult for us to get to meetings.” (Faculty member, #1).
“The committee meetings are all on Tuesday when we're in clinical!” (Director #2).
“People believe that the only reason for them to be active in [campus] committees is if 
they want to move into administration.” (Director #2).
“The nurses generally don't get very involved [in college activities]. Their problem is that 
they are not on campus enough.” (Biology faculty member, #2).
“Sometimes we don't have energy left after hours of clinical.” (Faculty member, #3).
“The nursing faculty is not involved on campus-this somewhat reflects the fact that 
they're off campus so much.” (Dean of instruction, #3).
“I don't think our faculty is aware of how it [campus involvement] can benefit the 
program—they're not sophisticated in that respect.” (Director #4).
“Some of our faculty work two jobs, and a few have young children to take care of—that 
decreases their participation on campus.” (Director #5).
“Our faculty has never been active in campus governance-we're too busy!” (Director #6).
“We can be on committees, but it's harder for us!” (Faculty Member, #6).
“The nursing faculty here are not active in college governance.” (Dean of Instruction, #6).
“The only time I can get them [nursing faculty] to go to advisory committee meetings is 
when we have an accreditation visit coming up!” (Director #7).
“We would have reps at faculty senate except the meetings conflict with our clinical 
schedules.” (Director #7).
“Most of us feel we put in so many hours what with classes and labs and going to the 
hospital, that we feel we've paid our dues.” (Faculty member, #7).
“Only one or two of us have ever been interested in what's going on on campus.” 
(Faculty member, #7)
“The nursing faculty here doesn't want to be bothered with college matters. They just 
want to be left alone to do their own thing.” (Division dean, #7).
“We have someone in faculty senate, but we're only on campus three days a week, and 
our attendance isn’t always good.” (Director #8).
“Our eight-hour labs make it almost impossible for us to get to advisory meetings.” 
(Director #9).
“Our faculty is very upset with administration because they refuse to lower our hours, so 
they say 'The hell with it’ when it comes to being involved in the college.” 
(Director #9).
“We let other people fight the battle.” (Faculty member, #9).
“Most of my faculty just won’t go to meetings. I'm always after them.” (Director #10).
“More than half our faculty is complacent when it comes to participating in campus 
committees.” (Associate Director, #10).
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“The nursing faculty here seems to prefer their own company.” (Division dean, #10).
“Our faculty are on committees, the college requires it, but so does the department.” 
(Director #12).
“We have one member who's in everything—she's on all the committees—that's her 
thing.” (Director #13).
“A lot of us live out in the country. We tend to take care of the students, and go home.” 
(Faculty member, #13).
“Our director asks for volunteers, but no one raises their hand.” (Faculty member, #13).
‘The nursing faculty here doesn’t work with the rest of the campus. They have the 
excuse that they have all this clinical they have to do.” (Former Associate Director, 
#13).
“Nursing has always had someone on faculty senate, but they haven't been on a lot of 
committees. They're off campus a fair amount, so we don't see them much.” 
(Counselor, #13).
“One nurse is involved in the college, but the rest don’t seem interested.” (Dean of 
Instruction, #13).
“Our faculty won't get involved on campus because of being so busy on the job.” 
(Director #14).
“Most of our faculty have their own interests—one is writing a book, another is doing a 
curriculum project One is a new teacher—she's overwhelmed with the job right 
now. Those kinds of things keep our group from being involved on campus.” 
(Director #15).
“It's a college policy that we are all involved in campus committees.” (Director #18).
“We always have reps on the decision making bodies-its an expectation of the college.” 
(Director #19).
“Our faculty are overwhelmed with direct teaching concerns—they trust me to do the 
politicking!” (Director #20).
“Our faculty hasn't been involved on campus until recently.” (Director #23).
“Nursing is the most overworked department and that probably never will change, I've 
resigned myself to that!” (Director #23).
“When the issue is important, we get there [senate, advisory bodies]. (Director #24).
‘There's not time to do everything. My faculty chooses to concentrate on teaching.” 
(Director #27).
“Our people have difficulty getting to campus committees-they meet at a bad time for us.” 
(Director #27).
“It's just with the long lab hours, I chose to spend my time with the teaching aspect rather 
than with the college.” (Faculty member, #27).
“I've never been assigned to a committee that I've been able to get to.” (Faculty member, 
#27).
“I belong to the curriculum funding committee, but I've never been able to go.” (Faculty 
member, #27).
“We get about 20% participation.” (faculty member, #27).
“The nursing faculty here is not active in campus politics.” (Vice President, #27).
‘The nurses aren't involved in campus meetings simply because of the load they carry.” 
(Photography faculty member. Faculty senate president, #28).
“We do have an advisory council, but our faculty don't go-they're in the hospital.” 
(Director #29).
“Working an 18 hour week plus a three hour class-you’re putting in a lot more time than 
anybody else on campus.” (Director #29).
‘W e don't have any reps in faculty senate because of time—we do have someone in the 
union.” (Director #30).
‘W e aren't in the faculty senate. In fact, we are really overworked—because again 
nursing is unique as far as having to teach clinical and theory, and we have to stay 
in the hospital long after the students are gone.” (Faculty member, #30).
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“Faculty members in other departments don't expect us to come [to meetings]-they say, 
'Oh, you're in the hospital all the time.'" (Faculty member, #30).
“We've always had a representative on faculty senate, but I don't think it has ever been 
taken quite seriously.” (Director #32).
“We really haven't felt the need to be involved, we feel very secure in our program.” 
(Director #32).
“Our faculty makes an effort to be involved-its not easy with our schedules,” (Director 
#34).
“A few of our faculty are involved on campus, but clinical assignments make it difficult.” 
(Director #35).
“We're tired. When you add up the teaching time and obligations to students for faculty 
hours and all our faculty meetings-it's a very high number.” (Faculty member, 
#35).
“A lot of times our meetings are on days when the nurses are in clinical, and it’s just not 
possible [for them to come].” (Librarian, #35).
“The nurses used to keep to themselves, but they found out that to get what they want, 
they have to go out and get involved.” (Biology faculty member, #35).
“We just go to clinical and classroom and work our 80 hour week to get the job done!” 
(Director #36).
“Like many nursing faculties, this group tends not to be particularly active 
organizationally!” (Director #37).
“Because of hospital teaching schedules, it's difficult for our faculty to get to campus 
committee meetings.” (Director #38).
“Only the nursing director is involved in our advisory committees. The rest of the faculty 
is in the hospital.” (Dean of Occupational Education, #38).
‘Traditionally in nursing--we have weird hours, longer hours, and we're off campus, and 
that leads to a feeling of complacency.” (Director #39)
“Our faculty has never been involved in campus governance—there isn't enough energy.” 
(Director #40).
“People [nursing faculty] felt they were so busy with clinical and department meetings 
that they weren't that interested in the college, and that's pretty much the way they 
feel now.” (Director #40).
“They've [nursing faculty] become involved since the cuts. I kept saying to them—it's 
real easy to cut from somebody you don't know and don't see what they're trying 
to do.” (Director #40).
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Appendix O
The Professional Interests, Identification, and Isolation 
of Nursing Faculty Members
Interests
“The nursing faculty has set high standards for teaching, but beyond that they don't see 
an active role for themselves.” (Director #4).
“This faculty's main concern is for clinical teaching.” (Director #7).
“It hasn't been worth it to me to get upset about anything-I just concentrate on trying to 
become a better teacher.” (Faculty member, #7).
“For a long time we have just retreated back and concentrated on doing a good job of 
producing professional nurses.” (Faculty member, #9).
“The faculty here is a lot more interested in nursing issues than the college budget.” 
(Director #13).
“Most of us don’t give two hoots for [college] politics.” (Faculty member, #13).
“Most of our faculty have their own interests--one is writing a book, another is doing a 
curriculum project One is a new teacher—she's overwhelmed with the job right 
not. Those kinds of things keep our group from being involved on campus.” 
(Director #15).
“This faculty's primary interest is the clinical preparation of students.” (Director #20).
“Our faculty are most intensely concerned with their classes and clinical teaching roles. 
(Director #21).
“A group of faculty from our campus requested a special meeting with the Chancellor to 
talk about funding, but no one from nursing went!” (Director #21).
“There's not time to do everything. My faculty chooses to concentrate on teaching.” 
(Director #27).
“This group [nursing] is almost totally focused on clinical teaching. Our members really 
aren't interested in college issues.”(Director #30).
“We just go clinical and do our classes. No one ever really looks into how other people 
get things done.” (Director #36).
Identification
“Our thrust over the last five years has been to become more like other departments, but 
we always end up looking at ourselves and seeing that we're different. (Director 
# 1).
“We work harder than other faculty—there's a lot of anger deep down!” (Faculty 
Member, #1).
“We tend to say to ourselves that our content is different, that our students are different, 
and that we have different needs [than other units]. (Director #2).
“Nursing faculty are neither fish nor fowl. We always have to deal with two 
bureaucracies, and we don’t really know where we fit!” (Director #2).
“We set ourselves apart. It's almost as though we want to be in the college and we don't 
want to be in the college.” (Director #2).
“Nursing faculty never really belong to the hospital staff and they don't belong to the 
college faculty-it’s a mindset.” (Director #2).
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“Being nurses, we are used to making do with very little—we know how to improvise.” 
(Director #3).
“Nurses have been improvising for a thousand years-that's why we don't get as upset [at 
budget cuts] as the people over in psych, for example.” (Director #5).
‘This faculty is not really politically oriented.” (Director #7).
“Our faculty identify with their clinical teaching duties.” (Director #13).
“The first loyalty of the nursing faculty here is to nursing. I mean, they even put on a 
separate graduation.” (Former Associate Director #13).
“In general, one of the things about nursing faculty in our district is that they have been 
non-joiners. They're not in the union or the senate.” (Associate Director #22).
“Most of our faculty associate themselves more with the teaching aspect of the job than 
with the global college operation!” (Director #27).
“The faculty in this department identify less with the campus as a whole and more with 
nursing concerns.” (Director #32).
“I think most of our faculty are not political in their own personal lives.” (Director #32).
“We’re tired. When you add up all the teaching time and obligations to students and 
department meetings-it's a lot!” (Faculty member #35).
“Like many nursing faculties, this group tends not to be particularly active 
organizationally!” (Director #37).
“Our faculty members consider themselves nurses first and educators second.” (Director 
#37).
isolation
“We’re really isolated, not only because we're off campus so much, but our building is 
set off from the rest of the college.” (Faculty Member, #1).
“Some of our faculty isolate themselves and it’s their fault they're not on committees.” 
(Faculty member, #1).
“We're accused of being very ivory tower!” (Faculty Member, #1).
“The nurses always seem to be in the hospital—their not on campus much which causes 
some people to feel they're kind of elitist!” (Vocational Education Dean, #1)
“The nursing faculty is not involved on campus—this somewhat reflects the fact that they 
are off campus so much!” (Dean of Instruction, #3).
“The nursing faculty isn't very much involved in the college as a whole,” (Director #4).
“We're really isolated from what's going on in the college. (Faculty Member, #7).
“Sometimes I feel like a bastard relative of the college faculty. People I've seen for 20 
years I still don’t feel like I know!” (Faculty Member, #7).
“We have very little interaction with other faculty. We don't even see them at lunch 
because that's when our department meetings are! (Faculty Member, #9).
“Some of the science faculty tried in the past to organize social functions, but nursing 
didn’t support i t ” (Faculty Member, #9).
“The nursing faculty here seems to prefer their own company!” (Division Dean, #10).
“The nursing faculty here has always isolated themselves—they’ve never gone out and 
intermingled and tried to put across what they're doing.” (Former Associate 
Director, #13)
“We tend to be isolated from the rest of the campus.” (Faculty member, #13).
“The nurses aren’t on campus much, so we don't see much of them. Their classes are 
housed over on a comer of the campus.” (Admissions director, #13).
“The nursing faculty on this campus isn't active in campus affairs. They claim their 
clinical assignments don't allow them enough time.” (Dean of Instruction, #14).
“The faculty are off campus a lot, and so I guess you can say they aren't very visible,” 
(Director #15).
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“We are off campus so much that we really feel cut off from the campus!” (Faculty 
Member, #15).
“Only one of our faculty is involved in the college-there just isn’t time.” (Director #17).
“Our faculty is isolated. Some of it is kind of self-induced—I mean they just sort of stay 
in this little area [department suite].” (Director #27).
“Our director brings us information, but we don't get to involved down on campus. 
We're in the hospital,” (Faculty Member, #27).
“I’m not sure, just as an instructor, where all that money [college budget] is going—some 
of my colleagues are more involved in the global college operation than I am.” 
(Faculty member, #27).
“We just stay in our own little area. Other faculty think we are isolated and elitist—I've 
heard that” (Director, #29).
“Faculty from other departments don’t expect us to come [to meetings]—they say, 'Oh 
you're in the hospital all the time!” (Faculty Member, #30).
“We are the biggest department on campus and we are the least involved in the 
organization. Many times decisions were made and we’re the last to know!” 
(Director #32).
“The majority of time we are off campus, and we are also isolated physically from the rest 
of the campus.” (Director #32).
“We don't really get to know our faculty peers— our campus is designed on a house 
system and there's no faculty dining area—there are people teaching here twenty 
years you don’t really know.” (Faculty Member, #32).
“Only one nursing faculty member out of eighteen seems to have any interest outside the 
department!” (Division Dean, #32).
“Our nursing faculty is very good, but they do keep to themselves!” (College planning 
director, #35).
“There is a feeling-kind of an undertow, you know-that the nurses are so cliquish!” 
(Automotive mechanics faculty member, #35).
“The nurses, you know, they're over there on the comer of the campus.” (Biology faculty 
member, #35).
“The nursing department chair is the only one from the department on committees-the 
rest are in the hospital.” (Vocational Education Dean, #38).
“We're in the hospital so much that we’re really ignorant as far as college politics is 
concerned.” (Faculty Member, #40).
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Appendix P
Nursing Faculty Attitudes and Perspectives on Budget Governance
“I keep a copy of our budget here in the office, but nobody comes in to look at it.” 
(Director #1).
“This nursing faculty is not really budget-oriented.” (Director #2).
“I was probably the only one aware of the budget because that's my bag—this group 
[nursing faculty] knows it's an interest of mine!” (Director #2).
“The budget here is strictly an administrative process. Our faculty feels powerless-they 
have no role in deciding how the funding is divvied up!” (Director #3).
“I don't see the [college] budget because I'm not the department head right now.” 
(Associate director, #4).
“There seems to be varying degrees of how much they care. Some pay attention, but 
others don't care about it [budget] as long as they don’t suffer.” (Director #5).
“My faculty doesn’t want to be involved [in the budget]. They say, you take care of
that.” (Director #7).
“People at the department level aren't really involved in budget planning!” (Director #7).
“It hasn't been worth it to me to get upset about anything-the budget is so out of my 
hands. I just concentrate on trying to become a better teacher.” (Faculty member, 
#7).
“Most people on this campus don't have any idea about how the budget is constructed!” 
(Faculty member, #7).
“We're [nursing faculty] ignorant about the budget process.” (Director #8).
“The budget is pretty much dictated by the administration.” (Director #9).
“Our faculty doesn't feel they have any influence over the [college] budget at all!
(Director #9).
“This faculty [nursing] isn't interested in the budget—not even the nursing budget! I bring 
it to meetings and they don't even look at it!” (Director #10).
“As long as there's enough money left to get what they want for their own classes, they 
don't seem to care!” (Director #13).
“There are faculty on the district budget committee, but they have no role in the 
decisions.” (Director #13).
“The faculty here doesn’t know what's going on with the budget—I seriously doubt if the 
deans really know or have any clout!” (Director #13).
“The faculty here is a lot more interested in nursing issues than the college budget.” 
(Director #13).
“The budget is kind of a ponderous process with no definitive protocol-its one of those 
gray areas you're never quite sure of!” (Director #14).
“The budget is something that seems very far removed from our daily 
routines.”(Director #21).
“The outcome [of budget committee deliberations] seems a foregone conclusion and our 
faculty doesn't want to be a rubber stamp.” (Director #21).
“The nursing faculty is just too busy with clinical labs to worry about the budget.” 
(Director #21).
“The faculty isn't involved in college budget construction.” (Director 22).
“The faculty here has absolutely no control over the [college] budget-those decisions fall 
strickly to the administrators.” (Director #23).
‘There’s a mystique about the budget that is prevalent with my faculty as with other 
faculties on this campus. I think they feel there is little or nothing they can do to 
influence the process!” (Director #24).
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“The college budget is public information, but this group doesn’t see it-they don't even 
look at the nursing budget. They want me to take care of them.” (Director #24).
“We saw the rest of the campus in the same situation, and it didn't seem like there was 
anything we could do about it anyway!” (Director#27).
‘W e have our wish-list, but as far as the allocation of money—it's just kind of an 
administrative thing-at least it has been here.” (Faculty member, #27).
“They [nursing faculty members] don't even look at cm  budget!” (Director #29).
“They [nursing faculty] don't seem to care about the budget-as long as they get their 
paycheck!” (Director #29).
“I don't think our faculty is very interested in budget governance—they don’t see it as a 
real priority.” (Director #31).
“Our faculty identifies budget concerns as belonging to the director and the division 
chair!” (Director #32).
“They [nursing faculty] verbalized their frustrations [about the budget] to me, and 
expected me to implement change.” (Director #32).
“I scheduled budget priority meetings, but nobody came.” (Director #33).
“Unpredictable funding drives everybody nuts. We [nursing faculty] don't like it, but its 
not something we feel we have any choice over.” (Director #33).
“I used to send out memos to everyone asking for their budget input and requests, but 
they would go largely unanswered!” (Director #36).
“It has never been clear what influence, if any, the budget committee has on this campus.” 
(Director #37).
“The faculty crucified me [for the cutbacks]. They thought I should have been able to do 
something.” (Director #40)
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Appendix Q
Surprise, Shock, Anger, Guilt, Fear, and Demoralization 
as Responses to Termination Proposals
“I never thought jv£ would be cut. I mean, I was trying to help other schools where they 
were having RIFs, but I didn’t think jvg would be hit.” (Director #1).
“I couldn't get our people to focus on the situation. I finally called in a consultant to help 
us organize ourselves.” (Director #1)
“It's like this whole thing was happening, and the newspapers had been talking about it, 
but again we didn't think it was going to touch us at all!” (Faculty member#1).
“We knew the college was having a deficit, but I don’t think anybody thought it would 
impact our faculty.” (Faculty member, #1).
“Out of the blue, we got word that half our department would be getting pink slips.” 
(Faculty member, #1).
“We were nationally and internationally known for our innovations. We couldn't believe 
they were going to cut us.” (Faculty member, #1).
“Some of us wonder whether the director was informed. She says she wasn't.” (Faculty 
member, #1).
“All the decision were made behind the scenes—there was never any discussion with us 
before this happened.” (Faculty member, #1).
“We were in shock-at first. We couldn't even talk about d in our faculty meetings.” 
(Faculty member, #1).
“Nothing like this ever happened to us before.” (Faculty member, #1).
“We were stunned by what happened.” (Faculty member, #1).
“We were so frightened as a group.” (Faculty member, #!).
“What can you do? They can just zap the program and you're lost.” (Faculty member, 
# 1).
“Everybody was depressed. The morale was terrible-nobody wanted to teach.” (Faculty 
member, #1).
“We were depressed. We had no power and we didn't get support from the rest of the 
campus.” (Faculty member, #1).
“When you're told so many times that they no longer need, it affects your self-esteem.” 
(Faculty member, #1).
“The decision was completely irrational and unfair.” (Faculty member, #1).
“The faculty didn't know where to put their anger, so they put some of it on our director.” 
(Faculty member, #1).
“We were angry. Why is this happening to us? Why is nursing taking a bigger cut than 
anybody else?” (Faculty member, #1).
“There were divisions in the group. It was like, “You're OK, I'm not OK.'“ (Faculty 
member, #1).
“I didn’t get a pink slip, but I couldn't sit by and do nothing when some of my friends 
might lose their jobs.” (Faculty member, #1).
“We had no idea this was coming.” (Faculty member, #2).
“I think people are really concerned about their jobs.” (Faculty member, #2).
“I felt threatened—there were people in the district who might lose their jobs who had 
more tenure than I did.” (Faculty member, #2).
“Our director warned us this would happen, but I think everybody was sort of 
complacent.” (Faculty member, #2).
“Our director tried to warn us, but I think most people think it won't happen.” (Faculty 
member, #2).
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“We tried going to the academic senate, but they didn't seem to care about what was 
happening to us.” (Faculty member, #2).
“What could we do? We were really down-depressed as a matter of fact.” (Director #6).
“I think people knew at some point we might be cut-but it was still a shock.” (Director 
#6).
“We were shocked. The administration had always been so supportive.” (Associate 
director, #10).
“All of us feared for our jobs. After the president came to talk to us that day, we thought 
they might actually terminate our program.” (Faculty member, #10).
“Our director told us, 'I don't know anything more than you do.'“ (Faculty member, 
#22).
“They'd been talking about a cutback for years, but nothing ever happened.” (Faculty 
member #22).
“We felt our program was very viable and not at risk. We have a beautiful facility, and 
with all the money involved, we didn't think they’d chose to cut us.” (Faculty 
member, #22).
“It never occurred to us that our program would be affected. We were the one nursing 
program in the district with our own building—I guess we thought we were safe.” 
(Faculty member, #22).
“We didn't think it would ever happen. We thought that in a service oriented program 
like ours, the community would back us.” (Faculty member, #22).
“We [nursing] got shafted, there’s no two ways about it—we were just dumped on. At 
the start, people were really angry and hostile—now, I guess we've kind of 
accepted it [the layoffs].” (Faculty member, #22).
“We knew they had plans to regionalize, but in the future. It was never something that 
had any imminency-I never anticipated them closing schools.” (Faculty member, 
#22).
“I didn't know until a couple of days before we got our letters. I’m not naive, but my 
god, I was shocked. I really was.” (Faculty member, #22).
“I never really thought we had much of a chance-I mean all this activity seemed to be 
futile to me.” (Faculty member, #22).
“I don't see any support anywhere.” (Faculty member, #22).
“I didn't think there would be layoffs in our department—maybe at one of the other 
programs.” (Faculty member, #22).
“People are scared for their jobs—it doesn't seem like there will be a reversal.” (Faculty 
member, #22).
“My job isn't at risk-I've got lots of seniority. Some of my colleagues got slips. I feel 
so bad for them-that's why I'm going to the meetings.” (Faculty member, #22).
“I guess I feel sort of insecure-saddened, and pretty angry!!” (Faculty member, #28).
“It's all political. You have groups speaking out and some action will be done to appease 
them, but if the decision is carried out, those active people can be penalized in 
other ways.” (Faculty member, #28).
“I think we thought there might be cuts in the future, but I don't think anybody expected 
them now.” (Faculty member, #28).
“Everybody is in the hospital dealing with the students and there are so many distractions 
that your're fighting to keep your head above water, let alone saying, 'What's 
going to happen now.'“ (Faculty member, #28).
“We weren't involved in the planning—just reacting after the fact.” (Faculty member, 
#28).
“Even if they rescind everything, so much damage has been done to morale that it will 
take years to recover.” (Faculty member, #28).
“I'm not worried about my job-I can work anywhere. I'm concerned about this 
program—it's they only school that serves the Hispanic community. I'm 
Hispanic-it means a lot to me.” (Faculty member, #28).
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“They [administration] kept pushing us and pushing us to increase, increase, increase. 
We have just bad it.” (Faculty member, #35).
“All our energy is gone. They have us doing all these classes and going to all these
meetings that we don't even get paid for—that's against the faculty handbook.” 
(Faculty member, #35).
“All the creativity is coming from the parttimers.” (Faculty member, #35).
“We found out about it [termination proposal] in the paper-they [administration] didn't 
tell us anything. (Director #38).
“I didn't get a slip yet, but I'm the next down on the list. I'll be the next to go if they cut 
some more.” (Faculty member, #38).
“Our morale was low to start with. This [layoffs] just totally zeros it out.” (Faculty 
member, #38).
“I don't think anybody saw this coming. I mean, we had started to envision
regionalization as part of our future, but not the closing down of a school.”
(Faculty member, #38).
“There wasn't any way to anticipate what happened [termination proposal]. I think our 
director probably knew but didn’t tell us. It's almost like we have met the enemy 
and they were us!” (Faculty member, #38).
“There were rumors of March 15 letters, but I never thought it would hit the nursing 
department We have a waiting list!” (Faculty member, #38).
“This is very threatening. We are all very concerned.” (Faculty member, #38).
“Everyone was very, very shocked!'” (Faculty member, #38).
“Everyone is concerned about their job which is their livelihood, you know.” (Faculty 
member, #38).
“Nothing happened at first Then we realized that we had to go out and fight for 
ourselves. There was a power struggle going on among the chairs. Some of 
them don't like the coalition-our director was afraid that we might make the board 
angry.” (Faculty member, #38).
“The administration is going to do what the administration is going to do.” (Faculty 
member, #38).
“I was angry. They equated jis with football!” (Director #39).
“I think no matter what we do, the administration is going to dictate what's going to be 
done.” (Faculty member, #38).
“My concern is for the students—what are they going to do?” (Faculty member, #38).
“We knew the college was having problems, but we never thought it would lead to 
anything serious for our department.” (Faculty member, #39).
“There were no signs that layoffs were coming. I was invited down to the dean's office 
and he said your're going to lose three faculty—I'll never forget it.” (Director 
#40).
“I think it was ten days before I could get our people rallied. It took a while for them to 
believe that this was going to happen.” (Director #40).
“We were thinking how could they do that. I mean we were in a community college and 
we were meeting a community need!” (Faculty member, #40).
“It's real scary. You get a registered letter saying they may lay you off, and your are 
entitled to a hearing and to an attorney to represent you. It's a very unsettling 
thing to go through.” (Faculty member, #40).
“We were in such shock. And it's all you can do just to handle the students.” (Faculty 
member, #40).
“We were immobilized at first. We couldn't do anything.” (Faculty member, #40).
“There was a lot of anger-it was awful.” (Faculty member, #40).
“We were too demoralized to do much-our response was to redistribute the work so we 
wouldn't have to change our curriculum. (Faculty member, #40).
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“We were frozen with immobility. Unless somebody comes at you with an ax, I don't 
think that when people are theoredcally threatened they do as much to protect 
themselves as when they are really threatened.” (Faculty member, #40).
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Appendix R
Causal Theories and Members' Search for Explanations
“There were two people on the board who had taken positions and said things that made 
us think they were against women. “ (Director #1).
“There was a big question in our minds about the need for layoffs. The president at the 
time was not trustworthy, and we were all suspicious!” (Faculty member, #1).
“We didn't know the details of the budget-we thought they had hidden money 
somewhere.” (Faculty member, #1).
“They look for the most expensive department and its always nursing, and if they feel 
they have to cut, then let's cut nursing.” (Faculty member, #1).
“We heard the college was having trouble financially, but we were suspicious that 
finances were not the real cause.” (Faculty member, #1).
“We felt the cuts had something to do with our being women.” (Faculty member, #1).
‘W e knew the administrators were anti-women. I mean, they had made a lot of 
statements.” (Faculty member, #1).
“I think they put the screws to the nursing department because they were hoping the 
hospitals would come up with some money.” (Faculty member, #1).
“Our vice president for instruction didn't like nursing—he had been at another college 
where he also cut nursing.” (Faculty member, #1).
“What happened from my perspective is that the layoffs focused on female faculty-it was 
a very sexist thing.” (Faculty member, #1).
“Some of us feel that it was because we were women that we were getting it.” (Faculty 
member, #1).
“We knew the cuts were coming from Sacramento, but we still looked at it as, who is this 
that is promoting this?” (Faculty member, #1).
“The budget may have been a factor, but there was 112 move to layoff people in 
administration.” (Faculty member, #1).
“I don't think it's a woman's issue, I mean I don't get uptight about female stuff. I'm not 
sure what's going o n -I think there are just a few people who really know what's 
going on.” (Faculty member, #2).
“When they start cutting, they cut the most expensive programs, and they classify nursing 
as expensive.” (Faculty member, #2).
“I'll tell you frankly, the administration here will do anything I tell them to do with regard 
to nursing, anything.” (Director #4).
“The administration leaves nursing alone. We have a very large program and a very 
active, powerful community advisory committee.” (Director #4).
“Nursing has no power. Sometimes we feel like poor little stepchildren.” (Director #13).
“Nursing here is at the bottom in terms of clout” (Faculty member, #13).
“There are those who feel the RN program takes too much money and would rather see 
our budget to to them.” (Director #15).
‘W e are always under the gun from administration that nursing is expensive.” (Faculty 
member, #20).
“Administration is always on our backs about being the most expensive program in the 
district.” (Faculty member, #21).
“The president of the college does not support nursing because of the expense involved.” 
(Faculty member, #22).
“They said they were looking at the high cost of the programs, but I think it was just a 
bunch of stuff to justify their plan!” (Faculty member, #22).
“The VP of district personnel doesn't like nursing-she closed down the health service at 
VocTech.” (Faculty member, #22).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
409
“The district needs to show Sacramento they're doing something.” (Faculty member, 
#22).
“I don't think its money—they even told us it wasn't. I think one of the reasons they pick 
on nursing is because it's a majority female role.” (Faculty member, #28).
“I believe in my heart that it's politics—there is some sort of union-busting being done by 
the district” (Faculty member #28).
“I heard that Deukmejian is after the chancellor because the district is poorly managed.” 
(Faculty member, #28).
“I don't think it has anything to do with money-my understanding is that the district got a 
windfall from the lottery.” (Faculty member, #28).
“I think it's political—the program they're closing is integrated, largely Asian—lots of 
Filipinos. There's another program with worse problems, but it's black.” 
(Faculty member, #28).
“It's a sexist attitude. They think we're not going to react, that we’ll be subservient.” 
(Faculty member, #28).
“I think our president knew I would fight back and hoped I would generate some financial 
support from the community.” (Director #34).
“We didn't want to believe it [that the program was targeted] because we were a female 
department, but we wondered.” (Director #34).
“I think someone is trying to make clout for themselves-the higher ups in 
administration.” (Faculty member, #38).
I don't know whether it is political—I do think the district is in financial straits. A lot of 
people are alluding to mismanagement-I don't know, I really
haven't studied i t ” (Faculty member, #38).
“It's [terminations] budgetary to a point, but it's political too.” (Faculty member, #38).
“It all depends on who has the power, and nursing certainly doesn’t.” (Faculty member, 
#38).
“The administration here is very opportunistic. I think they thought I'd roll over and play 
dead, but I picked up the gauntlet” (Director #39).
“Our president was a hatchet man. That's what the board hired him for.” (Director #39).
“Yes, the community colleges were hurting, but this college started cutting back early. It 
didn't seem like it was a budget problem.” (Faculty member, #39).
‘There was a tone—'If you're a good girl, OK, if not, no.” (Director #40).
“The president at the time didn't respect nurses. He had a coconut head on his desk—you 
know, with a face painted on it-it was wearing a nurses cap. We asked him to 
put it away, but he refused.” (Faculty member, #40).
“We really felt it wa a man-woman issue as well as everything else.” (Faculty member, 
#40).
“We felt our president didn't mind offending some of the women up on the hill as much 
as the men down on campus.” (Faculty member, #40).
“Our director didn’t have a good relationship with the dean. He got mad when we 
changed divisions. That's what started it.” (Faculty member, #40).
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Appendix S
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The Legislature finds and declares that there shall be a 
moratorium on the implementation of the Los Angeles 
Community College District reform plan. Further that, no 
funds shall be allocated to the Los Angeles Community 
College District for declining enrollment unless the 
district submits a report to the Chancellor's Office on its 
district reform plan and the following requirements are 
satisfied:
(1) That the study include, but not be limited to, an
impact assessment on student access, student
enrollment, faculty displacement, reassignment, 
terminations, and management.
(2) The study describe in detail the plan for lay-offs,
reassignment, discontinued programs in divisions, 
departments, and student services offices, and other
management actions.
(3) The study be submitted to the Chancellor's Office for 
their review to determine whether the proposed plan 
will cause a decline in student access.
(4) If the Chancellor's Office determines that there will 
be a decline in student access, the district will not 
be eligible for any declining enrollment funds pursuant 
to this item.
The Chancellor's Office shall certify to the Director of 
Finance whether declining enrollment funds should be 
allocated to the Los Angeles District. Immediately 
following certification, the Department of Finance shall 
notify the Jt. Legislative Budget Committee of the 
Chancellor's Office recommendation. If the Director 
determines that funds should be provided to the Los Angeles 
District, the Director shall do so subject to approval of 
the Jt. Legislative Budget Committee within 30 days of 
notification
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Appendix S (con’d)
Ch. 186 1 STATUTES OF 1986 497
**18. The amount appropriated in schedule (ex) shall be available for staff develop* 
ment in community colleges. The Chancellor's Office shall allocate these funds 
to districts on the basis of ADA and subject to the approval of the Department 
of Finance. In addition, funding for staff development shall be contingent upon 
review and approval by the Joint Legislative Budget Committee pursuant to 
Section 28.00.” . . .
! am eliminating the 92,143,000 legislative augmentation for the Disabled Student 
Program. TTiese funds were requested to serve additional disabled students in the 
community colleges. While I am supportive of this program, I believe it Is critical that 
the Chancellor's Office provide better information on the number of.students needing 
services and the cast of providing servici's. Until such infarmuliou is provided, wr 
cannot determine the need for additional funding and cannot, therefore, justify this 
augmentation._______________
I am deleting Provision ib, which woula prohibit me Lot Angcics Community 
OaHeg" District from implementing reforms and recotving aid for declining enroll* 
menta until the district submits a report demonstrating that Its reforms will not cause 
a decline In student access.
"19. The Legislature flnds and declares that there shall be a moratorium on the 
Implementation of the Los Angeles Community College District reform plan. 
Further, that no funds shall be allocated to the Los Angeles Community Col­
lege District for declining enrollment unless the district submits a report to the 
Chancellor's Office on its district reform plan, Including, but not limited to, an 
impact assessment on student access, student enrollment, faculty displace* 
ment, reassignment, terminations, and management and a description, in de­
tail, of the plan for layoffs, reassignment, discontinued programs in divisions, 
departments, and student services offices, and other management actions.
This study shall be submitted to the Chancellor’s Office for its review to 
determine whether the proposed plan will cause a decline in student access 
If the Chancellor’s Office determines that there will be a decline in student 
access, the district will not lie eligible for any declining enrollment fund 
pursuant to this item.
The Chancellor's Office shall certify to the Director of Finance and the Joint 
Legislative lludgct Committee whether declining enrollment funds should In* 
allocated to the Los Angeles Community College District.”
Management of community college districts is a local responsibility. The Los Ange 
les Community College District is facing a severe financial crisis and must make some 
difficult decisions. If the Legislature believes that there should be additional oversight 
of local community college governing boards, then it should address its concerns 
through supurate legislation, rather thun through the Budget Act.
As a result of my actions, the total Ccncrul Fund locul assistance budget for com­
munity colleges for 1986-87, including this Item and Item 6870-111-001, will be $84.3 
million higher than for the current yc.:tr, which is a 7.1 percent increase.
Item 6870-101-782—For local assistance, Board of Governors of California Communi­
ty Colleges. I revise Provision I of this item.
I am revising Provision 1, as follows:
"1. The amount appropriated in this item is available on a one-time basis for the 
purpose of providing community college districts with funds 13 replace instruc­
tional equipment. The Chancellor shall allocate these funcs to the districts 
provided that any allocation would be subject to a 25 percent local match. The 
Ghinccillor Ahull mIaUMi tnlAfM fef llie wttvAf o f  the wwilththg fotiuiroHwut 
fr* hfr f  her jwlgwienh * * * * * *  provide m>l«hh»g ftmih 
wMhtmt financial hardnhipi The Chancellor thaU ewwilt with the Popartntcntt ^  »w  M ^
Community college districts huvc historically ullocotod u portion of their apportion- 
mo, * funding for instructional equipment und it is appropriate that the d is tr ic ts  
maintain this effort. With maintenance of district efforts, the additional State funding
0 34 20 0
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